Law, state and working class organisation in Uganda, 1962-1987 by Barya, John-Jean B.
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/35613
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
LAW, STATE AND WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION IN UGANDA: 1962-1987
by
JOHN-JEAN BARYAHARWEGO BARYA
LL.B (Hons), Makerere, Dip. L.P. (L.D.C), Kampala,
LL.M, Warwick, Advocate of the High Court of Uganda.
A thesis submitted to the Law School, University of Warwick, in
















CHAPTER I: LAW, STATE AND WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION 7
IN UGANDA - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
1. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE THESIS
2. RESEARCH ON WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION
IN UGANDA
3. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE:
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND LAW
4. SOME ANALYTICAL THEMES
a) THE CHARACTER AND ROLE OF LAW
b) LAW AND THE FORMATION OF TRADE
UNION IDEOLOGY
c) THE NATURE OF THE AFRICAN WORKING
CLASS AND ITS ORGANISATION
i) THE WORKING CLASS IN GENERAL
ii) DEVELOPMENTALISM AND LABOUR
ARISTOCRACY THESIS
d) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRIPARTISM
AND TRADE UNION ECONOMISM
NOTES
Page No. 
CHAPTER II: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF WORKING CLASS
	
31
ORGANISATION - COLONIAL FOUNDATIONS
1937-1962
INTRODUCTION
1. SEMI-PROLETARIAN LABOUR AND THE
BEGINNINGS OF ORGANISATION 1900-1945
a) SEMI-PROLETARIAN IMMIGRANT LABOUR
AND LACK OF ORGANISATION
b) INITIAL ORGANISATIONS
2) THE INTRODUCTION OF TRADE UNION
LEGISLATION 1937-1952
a) TRADE UNION LAW - PHASE I: 1937-1943
b) THE 1945 GENERAL STRIKE AND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE
c) TRADE UNION LAW - PHASE II:
1949/50-1952
i) THE TRADE DISPUTES (ARBITRATION AND
SETTLEMENT) ORDINANCE 1949
ii)THE TRADE UNIONS ORDINANCE 1952
- FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND TRADE
UNION RIGHTS
- FORMS OF ORGANISATION, COMPULSORY
REGISTRATION AND UNION LEADERSHIP
- TRADE UNION CONSTITUTION, PROPERTY
AND FUNDS
3. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATIONS 1945-1962
a) THE POLICY OF JOINT CONSULTATION
b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONISM
c) A PARTIAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW




CHAPTER III: FROM INDEPENDENT TO STATE-CONTROLLED TRADE	 100
UNION ORGANISATION 1962-1971
INTRODUCTION
1. THE PLACE OF WORKERS IN UGANDA'S
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1962-1971
2. TRADE UNION FISSURE AND JOINT TRADE
UNION AND POLITICAL MILITANCY
(UFL AND UPC-YL): 1962-1964
a) THE SPLIT OF UTUC AND FORMATION OF UFL
b) MILITANT POLITICAL UNIONISM AND THE
ENACTMENT OF RESTRICTIVE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS LEGISLATION
3. THE POST-COLONIAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK: RESTRICTING
WORKERS' ORGANISATION
a) THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CHARTER 1964
b) THE TRADE DISPUTES (ARBITRATION AND SETTLEMENT) ACT 1964
c) THE PUBLIC SERVICE (NEGOTIATING MACHINERY) ACT 1963
d) THE TRADE UNIONS ACT 1965
4. THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN
PRACTICE: 1964-1971
a) THE NATURE OF TRADE UNIONISM
i) INSTITUTIONALLY VIABLE UNIONS CREATED
ii) IDEOLOGICAL AND LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES BETWEEN UTUC
AND FUTU AND THE ROLE OF STATE INTERVENTION
iii)TRADE UNION "UNITY": THE RISE AND FALL OF ULC
iv) LACK OF DEMOCRACY IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
b) TRADE DISPUTES, STRIKES AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE
c) TRADE UNIONISM, DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE LABOUR
ARISTOCRACY THESIS
5. TRIPARTISM AND THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS
6. THE MOVE TO THE LEFT STRATEGY AND THE POLITICAL-LEGAL




CHAPTER IV: THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATION 	 197
UNDER STATE REPRESSION 1971-1979
INTRODUCTION
1. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF TRADE UNION AUTONOMY AND THE
LIBERALISATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGISLATION:
1971-1973/4
a) TRADE UNION AUTONOMY AND THE LIBERALISATION
OF TRADE UNION LEGISLATION: 1971-1973
b) AMENDMENT OF THE TRADE DISPUTES ACT 1964:
THE ROLE OF THE 1971-1973 STRIKES
2. LOW-PROFILE UNIONISM UNDER AMIN 1973/74-1979
a) TRADE UNIONS AND THE ECONOMIC WAR
i) THE ECONOMIC WAR, INDUSTRIAL COLLAPSE AND
ANTI-UNION INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
ii)THE RE-ORGANISATION OF TRADE UNIONS AND THE
FORMATION OF NOTU
b) THE "LIBERAL" INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGAL FRAMEWORK
IN PRACTICE
i) UNION RIGHTS IN PRACTICE - GENERAL
ii) THE MILITARISATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
REPRESSION REPLACES LEGALITY
iii)WEAK TRADE UNIONS, THE DIMUNITION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND THE DETERIORATION OF CONDITIONS
OF LABOUR
iv) DISPUTES AND STRIKES: THE DIMUNITION OF LEGAL
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESSES
3. TRADE UNION EDUCATION, IDEOLOGY AND THE LAW




CHAPTER V: THE TRIUMPH OF AUTONOMOUS TRADE UNION ORGANISATION 	 263
OVER STATE INTERVENTION 1979-1987
INTRODUCTION
1. THE NATURE OF TRADE UNIONISM
a) ATTEMPTS TO FORM A LABOUR PARTY AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMISM
b) STATE VIOLATION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
i) THE DIVISIVE STRATEGY OF THE UPC-OBOTE II REGIME
ii) GOVERNMENT NEGATION OF UNION DEMOCRACY
iii)REPRESSION OF UNION LEADERS AND WORKERS




2. WORKERS' RESISTANCE TO EROSION OF LIVING STANDARDS:
REDUNDANCY OF LAW
a) THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF WORKERS AND THEIR RESISTANCE
b) THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
c) TRADE DISPUTES AND STRIKES
i) THE LIRA SPINNING MILL STRIKE 1984
ii) THE MULCO STRIKES 1984-1987
iii)THE 1984 URC STRIKE
3. FOREIGN MATERIAL AID AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE IN THE
.TRADE UNIONS
a) THE FOREIGN AFFILIATION QUESTION
b) THE ROLE OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL AID
c) TRADE UNION EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY
4. TRADE UNIONS AND LAW REFORM
5. TOWARDS THE FUTURE: TRADE UNIONS AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER
THE NRM GOVERNMENT 1986-1987
a) FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION










This work is dedicated to Uganda's workers who, in spite of all
adverse forces, have to-date maintained a relatively autonomous
trade union movement.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the course of preparing this thesis several people and
organisations gave me assistance which I now take occasion to -
acknowledge.
I begin with acknowledging my gratitude to the Association of
Commonwealth Universities (ACU), London which gave me a scholarship
for most of the PhD course. Then the Africa Educational Trust and
the Gilchrist Educational Trust, London came in at the right moment
to supplement the financial assistance of the ACU especially towards
the end of my work in 1989. The assistance of the University of
Warwick Law School is also hereby acknowledged. Without these
Institutions' finances this work would obviously not have been
accomplished.
Secondly I would like to extend my gratitude to all those
people, institutions and organisations that gave me access to the
necessary records for my work. Of particular importance were the
NOTU Secretariat, Kampala, the Secretary General NOTU, R.W. Kasozi
(1986-1988), the Director of Research and Economics, E.Y. Baingana
and the Director of Education, M. Onzi. Equally helpful were the
clerical staff of NOTU. Further the Secretary Generals and staff of
both UTGWU and URWU in Jinja and Kampala respectively provided me
with both written and oral information. Finally I would like to
record my thanks to Mr. F.X. Mubuuke now Deputy Chief Personnel
Manager of Uganda Railways Corporation who introduced me to the
relevant Ministry of Labour, employers' federation and trade union
officials before the commencement of my research in Uganda and Mr.
S. Gumoijukye Byomugisha who gathered materials and sent them to me
whenever I so requested.
Thirdly I would like to thank my supervisor Mr. Graham Moffat
who has patiently advised me from the beginning of my vague research
proposal through the gruesome drafts to this final and hopefully
intelligible product. His patience and fruitful incessant arguments
with me are hereby acknowledged.
Fourthly I extend my- thanks to all those colleagues in the Law
School at Warwick University and other people whom I cannot mention
individually for the academic and social support they provided me
with which was useful directly and indirectly in the accomplishment
of this work.
Finally my thanks go to Mrs. Hazel Taylor who has reduced my
often confusing handwriting to this clear legible form.
(iv)
ABBREVIATIONS
AALC	 African-American Labour Centre.
AATUF	 All-Africa Trade Union Federation.
ADC	 Annual Delegates Conference.
AFL-CIO
	 American Federation of Labour -
Congress of Industrial Organisations.
ARIL	 Annual Report of the Inspectorate of Labour.
ARML	 Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour.
ATGWU
	 Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union.
AUCCTU
	 All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (USSR).




	 Front For National Salvation.
FUE	 Federation of Uganda Employers.
FUECI
	 Federation of Uganda Employers, Commerce and
Industry.
FUTU
	 Federation of Uganda Trade Unions.
ICFTU
	 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
ILO	 International Labour Organisation/Office.
ILR	 International Labour Review.
ITG & LWF International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers
Federation.
JMAS
	 Journal of Modern African Studies.
KY	 Kabaka Yekka.
LC	 Labour Commissioner.
LCC	 Labour Consultative Council.
ML	 Ministry of Labour.
NOTU
	 National Organisation of Trade Unions.
NRA	 National Resistance Army.
NRM	 National Resistance Movement.
NUCCTE	 National Union of Clerical, Commercial and Technical Employees.
NUCMW(U)	 National Union of Co-operative Movement Workers (Uganda).
NUPAW	 National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers.
OATUU
	 Organisation of African Trade Union Unity.
PSI	 Public Services International.
QDC
	 Quinquennial Delegates Conference.
RAU(U)
	 Railway African Union (Uganda).
RC	 Resistance Council/Committee.
ROAPE
	 Review of African Political Economy.
RU	 Republic of Uganda.
SG	 Secretary General.
UAMDA	 Uganda African Motor Drivers Association.
UFL	 Uganda Federation of Labour.
UG	 Uganda Government.
ULC	 Uganda Labour Congress.
UNC	 Ugandan National Congress.
UP	 Uganda Protectorate.
UPC	 Uganda Peoples Congress.
UPC-YL	 Uganda Peoples Congress - Youth League.
UPEU
	 Uganda Public Employees Union.
UPM	 Uganda Patriotic Movement.
URC	 Uganda Railways Corporation.
URWU	 Uganda Railway Workers Union.
UTGWU	 Uganda Textile and Garment Workers Union.
UTUC	 Uganda Trade Union Congress.
WFTU
	 World Federation of Trade Unions.
(vi))
PRINCIPAL LEGISLATION CITED
1913 The Masters and Servants Ordinance, No.19.
1934 The Minimum Wages Ordinance, No.3.
1937 The Trade Unions Ordinance, No.18.
1941 The Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance, No.46.
1943 The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, No.9.
1945 The Deportation Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance, No.l.
1945 The Deportation Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance, No.14.
1946 The Employment Ordinance, No.13.
1946 The Workmens Compensation Ordinance, No.14.
1949 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
Ordinance, No.19.
1950 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
(Amendment) Ordinance, No.23.
1952 The Trade Unions Ordinance, No.10.
1963 The Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act, No.78.
1963 The Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages Councils
Act, Laws of Uganda 1964.
1964 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act,
No.20, Cap 200, Laws of Uganda 1964.
1964 The Workmen's Compensation Act, Cap 197, Laws of Uganda 1964.
1965 The Trade Unions Act, No.11.
1967 The Public Order and Security Act, No.20.
1968 The Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act (Amendment)
Act, No.24.
1969 The Public Service Act, No.18.
1970 The Trade Unions Act, No.40.
1970 The Companies (Government and Public Bodies Participation)
Act, No.3.
1971 The Suspension of Political Parties Decree, No.14.
1971 The Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.10.
1972 The Suspension of Political Parties Decree (Amendment)
Decree, No.6.
1973 The Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.29.
1974 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act
(Amendment) Decree, No.18.
1976 The Trade Unions Decree, No.20.
1982 The Empropriated Properties Act, No.9.
SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION CITED
S.I. 72/1963 Minimum Wages Order.
S.I. 162/1965 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
(Amendment of Schedule) Instrument.
S.I. 170/1965 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
(Amendment of Schedule) (No.2) Instrument.
S.I. 182/1965 The Trade Union Regulations.
S.I. 233/1965 Minimum Wages Order.
S.I. 101/1969 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
(Amendment of Schedule) Instrument.
S.I. 233/1969 The Penal (Unlawful Societies) (No.2) Order.
S.I. 143/1970 The Companies (Government and Public Bodies
Participation) (Amendment of Schedule) Order.
S.I. 45/1974 The Trade Unions Tribunal (Appointment) Order.
S.I. 71/1974	 The Trade Unions (Check-off) Regulations.
S.I. 34/1976 Minimum Wages Order.
CASES CITED
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union v. The Oil Industry Joint
Industrial Council. Trade Dispute Cause 3/1986.
ATGWU v. Messrs U.T.C. , Ltd. Industrial Court Cause (ICC) 19/1971.
Ejalu, E. v. P. Katabulingi, URWU & URC.Civil Suit No. 2076/1984.
Ejalu, E. v, URWU & URC. Civil Appeal No. 8/1985.
NUCCTE v. Family Planning Association of Uganda. ICC 5/1975.
Printers' Union v. M/S Catholic Press, Gulu, ICC3/1979.
Uganda Electricity and Allied Workers' Union v. Uganda Electricity
Board. Trade Dispute Cause 2/1984.
Uganda Printers, Journalists and Allied Employees' Union v. Isiko
Brothers Press Ltd. IC01/1974.





TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATIONS 1954 	 77
- NUMBER OF STRIKES AND MAN-DAYS LOST 1948-1962 	 79
III -	 TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATIONS AT 	 86
31st DECEMBER 1959




STRIKES IN UGANDA 1960-1970
	
111
VI	 DISTRIBUTION OF RECORDED MONEY INCOMES OF 	 168
AFRICAN ADULT MALES IN THE MODERN SECTOR
1961-1970 (7.)
VII -	 STRIKES IN UGANDA 1971-1978 	 213
VIII -	 NAMES AND MEMBERSHIP OF REGISTERED UNIONS 	 227
AFTER THE 1974 RE-ORGANISATION
IX	 TRADE DISPUTES REPORTED TO THE MINISTRY OF 	 244
LABOUR AND THEIR RESOLUTION 1970-1978
X	 TRADE DISPUTES BROUGHT BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 	 245
COURT 1970-1978
ABSTRACT
This thesis describes and interprets the historical development
of the legal regulation of the Ugandan trade union movement and -
assesses the relative importance of law in the determination of the
character of trade union organisation in the post-colonial period
1962-1987. Chapter I defines the scope of the thesis and identifies
the theoretical framework and analytical themes on which the thesis
is based. Chapter II deals with the colonial foundations of the
post-colonial legislation with which the thesis is mainly concerned.
Chapters III, IV and V cover the period 1962-1987 whereby we
analyse, first, the class and political character of the legal
changes that take place between 1963-1976. Secondly, we examine the
practical operation and impact of the law vis-a-vis the role of
state policy and behaviour, the ideological outlook adopted by the
trade unions, union constitutional structures and leadership
struggles in the formation of the character of contemporary trade
unionism in Uganda.
The thesis treats law as a historical category and takes as its
starting point the Marxist conceptualisations which view law
variously as an instrument of the dominant class, as ideology or
which attempt a materialist analysis. From these perspectives we
examine the processes of class struggle through which the specific
legislation came into being and more crucially the importance of the
balance of class forces in the practical utilisation of legal rights
or restrictions.
We conclude in Chapter VI that while the economic parameters in
which trade unions exist and operate are important determinants of
union character, within those parameters the character of the state
has proved to be most crucial. But at the level of the unions
themselves, the ideology they adopt, their constitutional structures
and leadership struggles, together, have created the contemporary
undemocratic, economistic-apolitical and technocratic aspects of
trade unionism in Uganda. However law has been important for the
unions to the extent that it has been mainly a source of
legitimation for their autonomous existence, most of the time, in
their chequered history.
The analysis of the historical and class origins and nature of
the law regulating trade union organisation and the assessment we
make of the role of law vis-a-vis the role played by other factors
in determining the character of trade union organisation in Uganda
is, in our view, an original contribution to the knowledge of
industrial relations law in Uganda. The construction and
interpretation of the historical phases through which both trade
union law and trade union organisation have passed is likewise an
original contribution to the knowledge of trade unionism in Uganda.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyses the historical origins of trade union and
trade disputes legislation and the role that this law has played in
the determination of the structures and character of trade union .
organisation in Uganda. These developments are closely related to
the various historical and political phases through which Uganda has
passed. We set out here an outline of those political developments
and introduce the arguments in each chapter.
Uganda was incorporated into the emergent world capitalist
system by British colonisation which formally began in 1894.
However it was not until the mid-1930s, following the introduction
of a money economy and the commodification of labour, that wage-
labour began to organise albeit tenously. Trade unionism only grew
into a more significant force after World War II. The nationalist
movement also developed in the 1950s and Uganda achieved
independence in 1962.
Since independence each regime in Uganda has had a specific
impact on trade union organisation through the enactment of
legislation or the way such legislation was applied and due to the
specific political character of a given regime. From 1962 the
Uganda People's Congress (UPC) led by A.M. Obote ruled Uganda till
the military coup of 1971 led by Idi Amin. It is in this period
(1962-1971) that most of the restrictive aspects of trade union and
trade disputes legislation was enacted thus moving away from the
basically voluntary system of colonial Uganda. Idi Amin's regime
lasted until 1979 and between 1979 and 1980 the Uganda National
Liberation Front (UNLF) ruleo Uganda leading to the 1980 General
Elections which brought A.M. Obote and his UPC back into power until
2he was overthrown by the Army again in 1985. There then followed a
short-lived military junta government under Lt.-General Tito Okello
Lutwa which was in turn overthrown in 1986 by a guerrilla movement,
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its armed wing the-
National Resistance Army (NRA) under the leadership of Y. Museveni.
The NRM then set up a broad-based "government of national unity"
including all the main political parties and the smaller guerrilla
organisations.
In Chapter 1 we set out the broad parameters of the subject
matter of this thesis and explain why we adopt the methodological
and theoretical perspective of dialectical and historical
materialism. The analytical themes and concepts utilised in the
thesis are also described and explained.
Chapter II establishes the colonial origins of trade union and
trade disputes law. We argue that while the original 1937 Trade
Union Ordinances was essentially a product of Colonial Office
directions, the subsequent 1952 Trade Union and , the 1949 Trade
Disputes Ordinanceswere a response to labour struggles in Uganda but
taking the experiences of other colonies, especially Kenya as the
impetus and guideline. This legislation was meant to nurture an
economistic type of trade unionism clearly separated from
nationalist politics. While the legislation provided the framework
for the attainment of this aim it was the ideological training of
Uganda's trade unions by the British TUC and the ICFTU which in
reality helped achieve this without the need for the state to invoke
many of the statutory provisions.
Chapter III deals with the Obote I post-colonial period (1962-
1971) and the struggle of the trade union movement to maintain its
autonomy. During this period the state sought to subordinate the
trade unions to its ideology of development by enacting legislation
restricting strikes and emphasising arbitration, excluding most of
the civil service from unionisation and subjecting trade union .
organisation and administration to state control. Here we argue
that although legislation was again used to provide the framework
for the defeat of early militant and political unionism (1962-1964),
political means and the disunity of the trade union movement -
mainly deriving from Cold War divisions - were probably more
significant in the realisation of this result.
With the introduction of Obote's Move to the Left Strategy in
1968 the UPC-Obote I regime sought to incorporate trade unions into
the emerging state or bureaucratic bourgeoisie which was developing
within the new parastatals, co-operatives, the civil service and the
nationalised companies 	 especially from 1970.
	 The Labour
Consultative Council (LCC) the main tripartite forum meant for
discussing labour policy and legislation was one of the ways the
trade union leadership were incorporated within state institutions
while, where inappropriate in its view, the state simply acted
without even any pretence at consultation. This was essentially the
case in the enactment of legislation between 1963-1965.	 A
justification for restrictions on labour rights and incorporationist
policies was found in the labour aristocracy concept. In this
thesis however, we argue that on the contrary workers were not a
labour aristocracy and that instead such conceptualisation of
workers only served the interests of the emergent bureaucratic
bourgeoisie.
Chapter IV deals with the Amin period 1971-1979.	 Our
contention here is that the early period (1971-1974) saw the
enactment of a more liberal trade union and trade disputes law than
under Obote I. This was due to workers' struggles, the liberal
viewsof the civilian Ministers of Labour and Amin's search for a
social base in civil society at the beginning of his regime. But
following the expulsion of Asians in the so-called Economic War
(1972-1973), the emergence of new but inexperienced African
employers and the collapse of the economy, a repressive industrial
relations system emerged in practice, enforced by the army, the
police and the intelligence services. 	 We also argue that in this
period, especially 1974-1979 partly because Western trade unions
were generally excluded from operating in Uganda, 	 the ILO
tripartite and consensual ideology of industrial relations through
education programmes came to be more systematically internalised by
the unions. The only positive result at the end of the regime was
that the liberal laws and a new potentially strong and viable trade
union structure remained in place and could be useful in better
political circumstances.
Chapter V covers the post-Amin period 1979-1987.
	
It	 deals
with the Obote II period (1980-1985) and, provisionally, the NRM
initial period 1986-1987. We begin by showing how the historical
economistic and apolitical unionism prevented the unions from
forming a Labour Party as mooted in 1980 and how lack of a political
programme led to the workers' being subjected to divisions among the
petty bourgeois-led political parties of the 1980s. The UPC Obote
II regime sought to divide and control the trade unions because it
lacked sufficient support among them. In this process it completely
disregarded the law - suppressed the constitutional organs of the
unions and deployed constant repression against union leaders and
workers.	 The main reason here was the existence of armed guerrilla
organisations arising out of the disputed 1980 Elections. The
regime knew that a wide section of the workers and the trade unions
sympathised with these anti-government organisations. But aside
from political intervention trade unions were further weakened by
leadership struggles inter se though these were also partly a result
of both political and foreign union intervention.
In this period (1979-1987) western trade unions especially
ICFTU and AALC attempted to regain a foothold in Uganda. Their
educational programmes were supplementary to those of the ILO. As a
result the views of apolitical and technocratic unionism are further
strengthened during this period. Apart from ideological influence
we argue in this part that foreign unions tend to foster patron-
client relations which are detrimental to local union democracy.
Finally we argue that due to the economic crisis of the 1980s
resulting from both the 1970s industrial and economic collapse of
Uganda's productive capacity and the adverse world economic trends,
trade disputes law and institutions have been rendered by and large
superfluous. However this was exacerbated by the Obote II regime's
suppression of the Industrial Court between 1980-1984, for political
reasons.
The coming to power of the NRM in 1986 however has changed the
political context in which the trade unions operate. Nonetheless
ideological limitations of both the NRM and the trade unions
themselves have meant that the atmosphere of freedom of association
created since 1986 has not been as fully utilised as it could have
been.
Chapter VI is the Conclusion. Here we conclude that the
character of the post-colonial state has been most crucial in the
determination of union rights while the struggles of workers
generally and unions in particular have managed to exact some
positive concessions from the state. However the adverse economic
condition of Uganda and the trade unions' narrow apolitical and
technocratic self-conception continue to be restrictive of the
unions' capacity to gain further substantive and procedural rights.
Research for this thesis was carried out mainly in Uganda and
London, U.K. Our main sources of primary information and data were
trade union records in Uganda, government publications and some
interviews with the trade union leadership. Some of the information
for the colonial period was obtained from the Public Records Office
(PRO), London.
	 However, one basic limitation in our research was
that most trade union records of the Amin period and even earlier
were unavailable because during the various political upheavals in
Uganda, in particular 	 the 1979 anti-Amin War, most offices,
including trade union offices, were looted. However, the general
reconstruction of the organisation of trade unions during the Amin
period was possible through a few of the union records that survived
and newspaper accounts. The post-Amin period however is, in our
view, sufficiently documented.
CHAPTER I: LAW, STATE AND WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION
- A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
This chapter identifies the theoretical perspective and the
analytical framework of the thesis. We begin in Section 1 by
identifying the subject matter of the thesis and outlining the
eventual conclusions arrived at. In Section 2 we relate our work to
the few works on the organisation of the Ugandan working class, thus
identifying our own contribution to knowledge in the area of working
class organistion in Uganda. In Section 3 we state and explain why
the methodological and theoretical perspective we adopt is
historical and dialectical materialism. Finally in Section 4 we
introduce
	
the broad issues with which this thesis is concerned in
the context of contributions made by other scholars and point to
their relevance to our study.
I. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE THESIS
The aim of the thesis is to give a materialist interpretation of
the origin of trade union and trade disputes law and to assess the
relative importance of law in the determination of the contemporary
character of trade union organisation in Uganda. To do this we
describe and interpret the historical phases through which the legal
regulation of trade union organisation has passed in the
postcolonial period 1962-1987. Specifically this thesis makes the
following propositions:
1. the most important determinant of the legal rights of union
organisation, including their creation, scope and practical
significance has been the character of the state. The character
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of the state has itself generally depended on its legitimacy. In
turn this centrality of the state, we argue, is a reflection of the
numerical and organisational weakness of the working class.
However, despite this weakness, in the case of Uganda, an autonomous
trade union movement has, for most of the time, continued to exist
in the post colonial period. This can be largely attributed to the
fragmentary nature of the ruling classes/groups but also, to a
lesser extent, the protection that law has given to the trade union
movement.
2. law, as analysed here, is a distinctly class and political category.
On the one hand both the colonial and post-colonial states attempted
to use trade union and trade disputes law to achieve policy
objectives of the dominant/ruling class in the various periods
covered. On the other hand, although some legal rights granted in
the colonial period were a result of struggles by workers in other
countries, in general the positive organisational rights have been
achieved by local working class struggles whether directly or by
taking advantage of weaknesses within the ruling class itself. In
the latter case we argue that law exhibits political rather than
instrumentalist characteristics. Further we argue that in Uganda,
as in most sub-Saharan African countries, legal ideology has not
been advanced or used by the state to justify labour policies and
legislation - instead alternative ideologies to law have been put
forward, namely, developmentalism, socialism and economic
independence.
3. the ideological character of the trade unions which has emanated
mainly from ICFTU and ILO-dominated trade union education is
essentially economistic and technocratic. It is this ideological
self-conception that has been, to a large extent, responsible for
the inability of the trade unions to transcend their immediate
economic concerns to an understanding of the broad legal, economic
and political status quo that inhibits the improvement of their
organisational, procedural and substantive rights.
4. at the level of the unions themselves apart from ideological
limitations, the constitutional structures and the incessant
leadership struggles - which are further fuelled by state and
foreign union intervention - have contributed a great deal to
the weaknesses and undemocratic character of trade unions.
5. the material conditions of an under-developed economy and the
economic collapse of the 1970s followed by the more general
economic crisis of the 1980s have been severely inhibiting
factors for the successful operation of an automous trade union
movement. Thus the post-colonial state used under-development
to argue that development required the negation of certain trade
union rights. The continuation of the current economic crisis
may therefore provoke state repression and further aggravate the
undemocratic character of internal union organisation itself.
2. RESEARCH ON WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION IN 'UGANDA
So far only very little work has been done on Ugandan labour
issues and even that done was in the 1960s and early 1970s and by
scholars not concerned with the legal aspects of working class
organisation.
There are only four writers that have attempted to analyse
aspects of working class organisation in Uganda. The first one was
R. Scott (1966). He provides a brief descriptive account of the
origin of trade unions in colonial Uganda up to about 1964. He also
briefly describes the factors limiting the development of trade
unionism as: tribal loyalties, the migrant nature of labour, poor
financial resources and leadership. However his insistence on the
tribal divisions within trade unions seemed exaggerated as
R.E. Gonsalves later showed (R.E. Gonsalves 1974: 425-440) while the
migrant character of wage-labour had generally ended by the end of
the 1960s. We show. how poor financial resources and leadership
struggles, not mere poor leadership have continued to plague.
Uganda's trade unions. R. Scott treats his subject within the
context of Cold War unionism and does not see the ideological
limitations of the trade unions as well as the political and legal
restrictions as problematic.
The second and most important work on working class
organisation however is R.E. Gonsalves (1974). He analyses several
aspects of trade union organisation between 1951-1971. However his
main concern was the nature of industrial relations and as such
discusses the minimum wage-setting process, collective bargaining
and the nature of trade disputes. Although he points out and
outlines the legal framework of industrial relations in the period
1951-1971, he does not actually specifically discuss the role that
law played in industrial relations vis-a-vis other factors. Further
he is not concerned with the law-making process: the material and
historical forces that determined the content of trade union
legislation and the form of unionism that arose in the 1950s and
continued after independence. He seems to take the law for granted
while in other aspects he implicitly takes law as simply an
instrument of the ruling class (Cap. II and VIII especially). In
our case however we discuss both the historical origin of the law
and its various characteristics: instrumental, political and
ideological.
The other two writers who deal with working class organisation
limit their analysis to specific sociological aspects. R.D. Grillo
made an in-depth study of the Railway African Union (Uganda)
(RAU(U)), especially as of 1964-5. He was mainly concerned with
explaining the workplace and residential characteristics of the
railwaymen and thus to show that these were long term migrants with.
links that pertained to "an 'ethnic' system of values which provides
one framework by which relationships between railwaymen may be
ordered" while on the other hand "the industry itself provides
another" (1974:4). Further he emphasises the importance of the
occupational grading system as a determinant of union behaviour and
extra-workplace relations (1973: 65-90; 148-178). According to him
racial discrimination was a significant impetus in African workers'
struggle for equality and trade unionism developed partly in this
context (1974: 33-73).	 Although it would have been more
illuminating for us to further consider these aspects of intra-
working class divisions in the 1970s and 1980s we did not concern
ourselves with them as our main concern was with relations between
union and state or union and employer. What is clear for the 1980s
is that political divisions were most important.
Finally B. Nicol (1979) is simply a formal description of
Uganda's industrial relations framework up to 1971. The more
important work is B. Nicol's (1972) study of industrial arbitration.
His main conclusions are, for our purposes, , on the role of the
Industrial Court at least between 1966-1969. He concludes that "in
its years of operation (it) had largely persuaded employers of its
impartiality, but almost half of the trade unions suspected the
Court of showing some anti-union bias 't1972: 537-538). Regarding
government objectives he concluded that the Court "has assisted in
achieving a reasonable degree of industrial harmony...(but) has
largely ignored the Governmental objective of keeping to the
suggested income norms of the Second Five Year Plan" while managing
for the most part "to keep wage rises below those settled by
negotiation and conciliation" (ibid: 547). On our part we argue.
that in the period 1971-1985 the collapse of the economy and the
hostility of employers to trade unions and state repression eroded
the limited legitimacy that the dispute settlement process and
institutions such as the Industrial Court may have had. So while
under Amin, especially in the period 1974-1979, the Industrial Court
gave awards according to the law and sought to uphold union rights,
both the employers and the state ignored such awards and showed
little concern for legality. Under Obote II the Industrial Court,
for political reasons, was suppressed.
In short the different writers above were concerned with
different and specific aspects of trade unionism and only up to
1971. Our contribution goes beyond the pioneering work of R. Scott
(1966) and the more wide ranging industrial relations analysis of
R.E. Gonsalves (1974). We seek instead to assess the historical
role that law has played in shaping the character of Uganda's
contemporary trade union movement. We are concerned with showing
both the historical, class and social forces that created the law
regulating trade union organisation, the scope of the rights created
and their utilisation in practice in the period 1962-1987. While
the underdeveloped nature of the economy provides the broad
framework in which such rights are created and exercised or denied,
we argue that the character of the state has been most central to
the creation and enjoyment of rights of organisation for the working
class while on a secondary level both the economistic and
technocratic self-conceptualisation of the unions and internal union
weaknesses at the constitutional and leadership levels have
seriously curtailed both the struggle for more or better rights and
the capacity to utilize existing rights.
3. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
AND LAW
This thesis is undertaken within the framework of a Marxist
interpretation of law and legal phenomena. 	 Our theoretical
perspective is historical and dialectical materialism as advanced by
K. Marx in his rejection of idealism and adoption of a materialist
world outlook in the analysis of social phenomena. With respect to
law K. Marx stipulated that
legal relations as well as forms of state are to be
grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-
called general development of the human mind but
rather have their roots in the material conditions
of life. (K. Marx 1969: 503).
Further, Marx advanced the view that in the social production of
their lives men enter into objective relations of production
corresponding to a definite stage of their material productive
forces:
the sum total of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the
real foundation on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness (ibid.).
However the economic structure to which law and political
institutions belong in any social formation are historical
processes. In this respect the general Marxist postulate is that
class struggle is the motive force of history. K. Marx and F.
Engels therefore argued that "the history of all hitherto existing
society is the history of class struggles" (K. Marx/F. Engels
1969(a): 108) and F. EngelsA concluded that
in modern history at least... it is... proved that
all political struggles are class struggles, and all
class struggles for emancipation, despite their
necessarily political form - for every class
struggle is a political struggle - turn on the
question of economic emancipation (F. Engels 1962:
394).
Thus an analysis of the character of working class organisation in
trade unions in Uganda is essentially an analysis of struggle with
the dominant classes in control of the state. It is in the context
of this struggle that the legal rights of wage-labour are
determined.
Dialectical materialism however goes beyond the mere principle
of class struggle. It also stipulates that social change is a
continual process, that social phenomena are in constant motion
while this motion itself, derives from the conflict or contradiction
internal and external to the given social formation. (See for
instance, M. Cornforth; Mao Tse-Tung: 311-346). Dialectical and
historical materialism treats a given question in its class and
historical ramifications. Thus in our case the use of a dialectical
and historical approach in studying the legal regulation of trade
union organisation allows us to analyse the different roles played
by forces internal and external to trade unions whether those forces
are local or foreign to Ugandan society. In this thesis foreign
forces are identified as the imperatives of the world capitalist
system affecting Uganda's economy and the foreign trade union
organisations of both East and West. Local forces which are
essentially external to the unions are the dominant/ruling classes
in control of the state who intervene in union organisation. Intra-
union forces, that is forces internal to the unions, albeit
interacting with the external forces (both local and foreign) are
mainly leadership struggles,
	 constitutional mechanisms and
differentiations among the workers themselves which may be economic,
social, ethnic or political.
4. SOME ANALYTICAL THEMES
The analysis of forces internal and external to trade unions
helps us to gauge the relative function and importance of law vis-a-
vis those other forces. In order to effectively make such analysis
and in order to clarify the specific contributions that this thesis
seeks to make, it is important to consider some themes raised by
other writers in their study of working class organisation in the
African context. The first and most central theme is the character
of law generally and the law regulating labour in particular. The
second theme is the actual significance of law in shaping the
ideological character of trade union organisation in the transition
from colonialism to independence. The third theme is a contrast in
the characterisation of labour and labour organisation in the post
colonial period between what we call the orthodox Marxist view that
adopts a "heroic mode" of analysing working class activity and
consciousness and the more sophisticated analyses of the African
working class that systematically take into account factors such as
nationality (tribe), race, gender, status and other forms of
differentiation and sources of contradiction within the working
class itself. The fourth theme central to an understanding of the
nature of trade union organisation is the concept of corporatism and
its specific relationship to the ideologies of economism, tripartism
and technocratic unionism.
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(a) THE CHARACTER AND ROLE OF LAW
In the Marxist theorisation of law we can identify three
dominant approaches. For some time the most influential position
was that law is an instrument of class domination and oppression.
This view was derived from some of the classical writings of K. Marx
and F. Engels in particular K. Marx's identification of law as
superstructural phenomenon (supra, p.13). This position was however
opposed by the second approach which emphasised the ideological
character of law.	 Although this approach does not deny the
instrumentality of law for the dominant class it seeks to show that
such instrumentality of law for repressive purposes is limited.
Instead the emphasis is on the ideological character of law. From
this point of view A. Gramsci (1971) argues that law is part of
several ideological elements that the ruling class advances to
achieve hegemony over the dominated classes. The specificity of the
ideological character of law however seems to have become more
influential from the work N. Poulantzas (1973) and L. Althusser
(1971, though the latter is concerned with ideology generally and
not specifically with the ideological function of law). 	 The
importance, in the West at least, of the conceptualisation of law as
ideology is most clearly found in ruling class support for and
insistence upon the concept of "the rule of law".
However in the late 1970s a third Marxist perspective critical
of the two approaches above sought to establish a holistic
materialist conceptualisation of law from the very nature of
capitalist economic relations.
	 This approach represented by J.
Holloway and S. Picciotto (1978; also S. Picciotto 1979) sought to
derive the form of law and state in the capitalist production
relations and took E. Pashukanis (1978) who tried to derive the form
of bourgeois law from the commodity relation as their starting
point. The central point of this approach is that once capitalist
social relations have become dominant and "free" wage-labour has
been created the liberal bourEeois state seeks to rely on the free
play of market forces. The state through law reproduces the social
relations of class inequality embedded in objective economic
relations.	 But one writer, A. Hunt, has suggested that this
approach is flawed because
the function of law is simply'prescribed in advance
by the structure of the capitalist relations of
production. In other words, it is a form of
essentialialism in that the effectivity or function
of law is inscribed, as it were, in advance of
economic relations (A. Hunt: 100).
In our view however to derive the function of law from the
material conditions is not necessarily determinist. The importance
of this approach is that it does not see law as external to the
relations of production (S. Picciotto 1979: 168) and avoids the
simple dichotomy of law as a class instrument or simply as ideology.
The approach emphasises the historical specifity of law and its
class character although this is masked by its formalism and
apparent autonomy.
The materialist conception of law as outlined here is not
entirely appropriate for our purposes for two reasons. First, it
operates at a very general level of abstraction and secondly it is
principally concerned with the conceptualisation of law in a society
dominated by capitalist relations of production in which labour has
been fully commodified. In this respect the insights it provides
cannot be specifically applicable to the African situation where
capitalist economic relations exist only partially. In our case our
intention is not to analyse the development of the one area of law
we deal with - trade union legislation - at this level of
abstraction. We do not seek to deal with the more general and
abstract questions regarding the role of law in the creation and
reproduction of capitalist economic relations in a peripheral
capitalist society. What we seek to do at a lower level of
abstraction is to trace the historical specificity of the enactment
of legal rights and restrictions for labour organisation in Uganda.
With respect to the other two approaches to law, that is law as
an instrument of the ruling class or as ideology this thesis
contends, first, that historically there has hardly been any role
for law as ideology in Uganda. Secondly, we argue that while the
instrumentality of law for the ruling class has existed in specific
ways, it has on the one hand been modified by ideologies other than
law and on the other hand been countered by struggles of the
dominated class in this case wage - labour.
The virtual absence of the ideological aspect of law in Africa
has been, to some extent, dealt with by some African legal
theoreticians, in particular I.G. Shivji and Y. Ghai. I.G. Shivji
for instance setting out to analyse the instrumentalist, political
and ideological characteristics of law in the regulaticnof labour in
Tanzania (1986: 2-3) actually only deals with the former two. This
is precisely because there existed little ideological role for law.
Indeed elsewhere he explicitly argues, again regarding Tanzania,
that the weakness and flabbiness of the ruling compradore
bourgeoisie
find expression in lack of independence and
impartiality of the judiciary while its
authoritarian character as a ruling class manifests
itself in lack of ideological notions of 'rights' as
a central element in legal ideology. Indeed law
assumes a typically instrumentalist character while
legal ideology has little role in the dominant
ideological formation... (which) is of course very
much unlike the 'juridical world outlook' of the
western bourgeoisie (I.G. Shivji 1985: 6-7).
This point has also been made more generally by other writers. Y.
Ghai for instance shows how in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania the rule
of law as ideology is very limited due to political and economic
instability; instead, he argues, alternative sources of legitimacy
are sought in other ideologies such as nationalism, traditionalism
and developmentalism (Y. Ghai 1987: 253-261; also Y. Ghai 1976; see
also R.E. Howard 1985).
As far as our study is concerned we argue that at a more
general level legal ideology did not provide legitimacy for the
post-colonial ruling classes/groups. In particular legitimacy for
the labour policies and industrial relations legislation was found
in the ideology of development generally as well as in the
construction of socialism (1968-1971) and economic independence
under Amin.	 However the general ideology of development (or
socialism for 1968-1971) appears not to have been sufficient to
legitimate state policy in industrial relations. A more lasting
ideological framework which for a while also buttressed the general
ideology of development was the tripartite conceptualisation of
industrial relations and the economistic and technocratic view of
trade union organisation and function. It is more lasting because,
as this thesis will show, the ideology of development was
discredited by the mid - 1970s while the technocratic and
economistic ideological perspectives continued to inform trade union
organisation.
Apart from this ideological element a further modification of
the instrumentalist view of law from our study is that the law
regulating labour organisation in Uganda has exhibited political
characteristics. While the control aspects of this legislation may
still be viewed as an instrumental aspect of the function of law for
the ruling class, the positive rights for labour have been achieved
essentially in struggle.	 According to I.G. Shivji political
characteristics of law refer to
that aspect of law which encapsulates or embodies
either the results of class struggle or is meant to
control the class struggle. Here too, it is
ultimately the interests of the ruling/dominating
class that are served. Yet they are mediated
through and do embody certain partial successes and
gains made by the ruled/dominated classes. Laws on
trade unions and trade disputes settlement machinery
may be said to be of this type (I.G. Shivji 1986:3).
In our view here Shivji seems to see law in an essentially
instrumentalist perspective and views rights achieved by the
dominated class as merely concessions. But our study shows that in
Uganda the law analysed is more complicated than this
categorisation. The law itself has proved to be an arena of
struggle because in the process of its creation the ruling class has
not always successfully ensured the protection of its interests as
will be shown by the colonial and Idi Amin (1971-1974) periods.
Moreover the existence of the legal rights for the dominated class
constrains the activity of the ruling class, however marginally in
our case, as the legal and autonomous existence of trade unions
demonstrated in the periods 1962-1968, 1971-1974 and 1980-1985. We
view these as political characteristics of law that modify the
instrumentalist perspective.
(b) LAW AND THE FORMATION OF TRADE UNION IDEOLOGY
While many writers analysing the organisation of the African
working class tended to assume that trade unions were arms of the
nationalist movement l and although this was true to a great extent,
E.J. Berg and J. Butler (1964) in a seminal article, rejected the
political importance of the trade union movement. They argued that
in general
what is most striking about the political role of
trade unions in the countries of Tropical Africa is
their failure to become politically involved during
the colonial period, their limited political impact
when they did become involved, and their restricted
role after independence (ibid: 340).
What was lacking in this debate for our purposes was the
discussion of the role that law played in determining the inclusion
or exclusion of the trade unions in the nationalist struggle and
political participation after independence. Although he does not
make an assessment of the impact of law in this regard, B.C. Roberts
(1964: Caps 3 & 7) indicates clearly the use of legislation as well
as ideology by the British Colonial state to separate trade union .
organisation from political parties and the nationalist movement.
For Tanzania I.G. Shivji, although noting the legal provisions meant
to separate politics and trade unionism (1986: 206-208), does not
assess the actual impact law made but more explicitly attributes the
separation to the economistic ideological orientation of the trade
unions emanating from the Labour Department, the ICFTU, British TUC,
the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the International Trade Secretariats
(ibid: 189-192), in addition to TANU's own preference for such
separation.
We argue in the case of Uganda that the trade union movement
was separated from the nationalist political parties by both
legislative and ideological means. The legislation, the 1952 Trade
Union Ordinance defined what a trade union could be and its objects
and functions. Trade union registration was compulsory and unions
not conforming to the statutory definition could not and were not
registered.	 However the actual internalisation of trade union
economism by the trade union movement in Uganda was realised not by
the strict application of the control aspects of the Ordinance but
by the ideological-educational training given by the ICFTU. We
argue therefore that the success of ideological training made the
application of certain aspects of the law superfluous. (Cap II). The
law only provided the framework within which the trade union
ideology of economism was nurtured.
	
The dominance of ICFTU
influence continued even after independence through its African
Labour College in Kampala. However the terms of the debate changed
after independence because the post-colonial government sought to
incorporate trade unions within state institutions while the
majority faction of the trade union movement sought to preserve its,
autonomy. In the long term however the economistic ideology, though
to some extent helping the unions to preserve their autonomy,
crippled their vision of both the economic structure and politics of
the country, narrowed their self-conceptualisation and limited their
capacity for positive self-transformation.
(c) THE NATURE OF THE AFRICAN WORKING CLASS AND ITS ORGANISATION
(i) THE WORKING CLASS IN GENERAL
Apart from ideological self-conception the African working class
has specific attributes which influence the character of its
organisation.	 Here we deal with two strands of Marxist
characterisation of the African working class: the orthodox one and
the more sophisticated materialist analyses.
The orthodox Marxist view of the African working class had as
its starting point the use of the periodisation of modes of
production and the emergence of a working class everywhere as
capitalism became a global mode of production. To this group the
growing African working class was naturally organising in trade
unions which would almost unproblematically extend into class based
political parties 2 . In 1972 J. Woddis a foremost orthodox Marxist
still argued, regarding Africa:
In country after country the workers acted as pace
makers of the national liberation struggle. They
staged major confrontations with imperialism,
organised strike struggles... General strikes became
manifestations of national struggle and stirred
millions into awareness of the total system of
colonial oppression and discrimination, of the
necessity to fight against it and of the possibility
of defeating it (1972: 170)
Regarding post-colonial Africa he argued that
the African countries will either become capitalist,
in which case they will be led by the bourgeoisie;
or they will advance to socialism, which requires a
state led by the working class (ibid: 171).
In the latter case what was required was "the creation of the
necessary political weapon, the party of the working class" (ibid:
174).
Writing in the same "heroic mode" of J. Woddis as P. Waterman
calls it (P. Waterman 1975: 69) I.G. Shivji characterised the 1970s
sporadic workers' struggles in Tanzania in categorical terms:
the workers have definitely declared that the stage
of history when they were used as cannon fodder in
the intra-petty bourgeois struggles to be fast
coming to an end. This time it will be their own
struggles - their own class war - and the struggle
of their fellow exploited class, the poor peasants
that they will fight, not to replace one exploiter
with another but to begin to replace the very system
of exploitation (I.G. Shivji 1976: 145).
With respect to the legal dispute settlement process he argued that
since "one of the most important functions of industrial relations
machinery in bourgeois society is to individualise the workers and
their grievances and attempt to destroy their class solidarity" the
post Mwongozo era (of strikes and takeovers) demonstrated that the
workers had begun to blow off "this lid of ideological false
consciousness" (ibid: 132-133).
It is our view that this mode of analysis glossed over
important characteristics of and contradictions within the working
class and within trade unions themselves. However during the 1970s
and thereafter more sophisticated analyses that closely looked at
the material basis and social conditions of wage-labour provided
more realistic views of the nature of labour organisation and its
possible future development. The simple labour-capital, dominant-
dominated class analysis which informed the heroic mode of analysis
was modified to integrally include other analytical categories such
as the impact of nationality (tribe), race, gender, regionalism,.
status and skill divisions within the working class itself. Thus a
collection of articles in R. Cohen and R. Sandbrook (1975) though
generally underpinned by Marxist class analysis de-emphasized the
heroic view and made an explicit critique of the role of labour in
the nationalist struggle, their place in post-colonial capitalism
and African socialism. Further the analysis of the working class
was no longer solely on the conventional forms of organisation -
trade unions and political parties . - but sought to include other
forms of organisation and what R. Cohen later called "hidden forms
of consciousness" (R. Cohen 1980; 1987).
Although this thesis does not intend to go into the various
forms of consciousness exhibited by the working class in Uganda, it
is our contention that the organisation of trade unions in the post-
colonial period was hampered by divisions within the working class
itself. Although most of these divisions were expressed in terms of
allegiance to different political parties the latterwere themselves
organised according to nationality (tribe) and religious divisions
exacerbated or introduced during the colonial.period.
(ii) DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY THESIS
One of the special characteristics of the African working class
is its small size vis-a-vis the rest of society, mainly the
peasantry and its location in the modern and monetary sector of the
economy.	 This peculiarity in the 1960s and 1970s created a
situation whereby the views of the African ruling classes seemed to
converge with those of certain left-wing academics. The views of
the African ruling classes were expressed in their construction of
the developmentalist ideology while the academics advanced the.
labour aristocracy thesis.
The ideology of development essentially placed the need for
economic growth in particular by relying on foreign aid and
investment as a priority above everything else. Analysing the rule
of law, legitimacy and governance in Kenya and Tanzania Y. Ghai for
instance concluded that both states shared an "ideology of
development which has been used as a powerful argument against
legality.	 The primacy of	 'nation-building', and 'economic
development' has been used to justify the centralisation of power,
the appropriation of surplus from rural and other communities, the
outlawing of political parties and the repression of the opposition!'
(Y. Ghai 1987: 261). It is in this context that African governments
argued that a very well-organised, autonomous trade union movement
enjoying the rights of organisation and protective legislation as
stipulated by ILO Conventions (especially Nos 87 and 98) would be
detrimental to economic development 3 . The ideology of development
therefore meant the control of trade unions to advance the aims of
capital accumulation 4 ; it entailed the post-colonial ruling classes
allying with foreign capital interests to maintain labour discipline
and the suppression of wage rises in order "to be internationally
competetive with a host of other impoverished countries" (B. Freund
1988: 107).
The labour aristocracy thesis logic pointed in the same
direction of the need to control the working class and trade unions
in rarticular. Originally applied to Africa by F. Fanon (1967) it
held that the regularly employed urban workers in Africa were
privileged	 in their incomes and would associate themselves
politically with the ruling class rather than the peasantry and the,
unemployed. J. Saul and G. Arrighi extended the thesis and argued
that the semi-proletarianised peasantry, unskilled urban workers
still tied to the land due to poverty were the exploited while the
proletariat proper - the skilled, semi-skilled manual and clerical
workers - received relatively high wages and identified themselves
with the local elite and international corporations in the post-
colonial states (J. Saul 168; G. Arrighi & J. Saul 1970). Although
the thesis was meant essentially to point to the non-revolutionary
potentials of the working class the ruling classes could selectively
identify themselves with aspects of the arguments to cast the
"privileged" workers as exploiters of the vast peasantry.
The thesis however came under attack in the mid-1970s, (see P.
Waterman: 1975, for an excellent introduction) and it has been
subsequently shown that only a very small section of the working
class could be said to be an "aristocracy"5 . In particular this
thesis tended to "assign a key role in the struggle for socialism to
progressive bureaucrats rather than the working class" (R. Munck
1988: 54). More recently B. Freund has concluded from a general
assessment of the African workers that
far from being a labour aristocracy, most organised
workers in Tropical Africa, particularly those who
are not in clerical jobs, suffer from basic economic
grievances and experience the impact and the
disappointment of the fading development prospects
of the continent. Even where their wages are better
than those of others, the communities they live in
still benefit materially from their relative good
fortune (B. Freund 1988: 108).
We argue in this thesis that labour legislation and state
policy and practice in relation to trade unions in Uganda fell in
the same category as that of other African ruling classes, which,
under the ideology of development sought to subordinate all
institutions and organisations to the goal of capital accumulation.
In Uganda the ideology of development provided the justification for
the restrictive 1963-1965 trade union and trade disputes legislation
while between 1968-1971 an even "higher ideology", the construction
of socialism was put forward to justify the further restriction of
rights of all autonomous organisations, including the trade unions.
(Cap III). The Amin regime sought to revive the ideology of
development in the form of "economic independence" but due to the
collapse of industrial production and national economic performance
by the mid-1970s the ideology of development had completely been
discredited in Uganda as the governments thereafter could only talk
of "rehabilitation". For this reason, we argue, repression replaced
both legality and the ideology of development.
(d) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRIPARTISM AND TRADE UNION ECONONISM
The contemporary character of trade unionism in Uganda has been
to a large extent shaped by the ideological perspectives of
tripartism, economism and the technocratic view of union
organisation and activity. These ideological perspectives were a
result of the historical domination of trade union education in
Uganda by ILO and Western trade unions especially the ICFTU. The
influence of these perspectives however must be analysed in the
light of the corporatist policies of the Obote I regime (1962-1971)




We shall argue that while corporatism generally and
specifically in industrial relations seems to have been more or less
successful in both Kenya and Tanzania in Uganda it failed. But
while corporatism failed the ILO perspective of tripartism together
with the ICFTU historical influence of economism have, together,
continued and are responsible for the pervasive economistic -
technocratic character of the Ugandan trade union movement.
In general tripartite institutions in Africa have been
concerted state employer attempts to co-opt unions to the state-
capital vision of "development".	 Here a consensual view of
industrial relations, aimed at maintaining industrial peace, was the
central element of tripartism. The African post-colonial states
favoured tripaftism because it was not wholly inconsistent with
their general corporatist policies. 	 Corporatism itself in the
African context has been generally defined as
a pattern of relationships between the state and
interest groups that involves such elements as state
structuring of representation that produces a
system of officially sanctioned, non-competitive
interest associations organised into legally
prescribed functional groupings, state subsidy of
these associations; and direct state control over
their leadership,	 demand-making and internal
governance6.
At the level of industrial relations, R. Howard views corporatism as
a conceptual "division of society into three basic groups, namely,
state, employers and employees" and argues that with respect to
Kenya "the periodic tripartite agreements among state, employers and
trade unions (there) can can be interpreted as a form of
corporatism" (R. Howard 1988: 241-242). On his part R. Sandbrook
identifies five elements of corporatist policies towards labour in
Africa: the requirement of registration of all trade unions under
restrictive conditions, the defacto or de jure abolition of the
right to strike, compulsory membership of all unions in one
officially recognised and state-supervised centre or federation, the
grant of financial subsidles 	 (or check-off arrangements - JB) for
recognised labour organisations and finally co-optation of labour
leaders into political positions (R. Sandbrook 1982: 203).
Central to the corporatist vision of the African states has
been the denial of class or other forms of differentiation and an
attempt to mystify the class character of state policy with
structures that conceal different class interests.	 Thus in
Tanzania, seen as the quintessential example of corporatism (R.
Howard, supra: 242; B. Freund 1988: 97-102) the ruling and only
party equated the single trade union created by state decree with a
central women's group, a central youth group, and, previously, the
co-operative movement and incorporated all into the party with
constitutional representation in parliament. The industrial peace,
deemed to have arisen partly out of this approach, albeit only for
about a decade, led one writer to conclude that in the Third World
policy
should not attempt to by pass or undercut the
existing institutions, especially trade unions, but
should seek to incorporate them into the system:
compromise not defeat is the essential requirement
for success (D. Jackson 1979: 251).
This approach to industrial relations in Tanzania has held for along
time and to some extent in Kenya (R. Sandbrook 1982: 97, 202-'7) but
has, according to other writers on Tanzania, suppressed working
class action and organisation, demobilised worker: leaders into the
party which made the only union an arm of the state and thus lead to
inceboaLL unofficial strikes and even factory takeovers in the early
1970s 7 . Nonetheless the corporatist structure as conceived under
the Nyererian form of African socialism held together into the
1980s.	 The corporatist approach, however, modified ILO-type
tripartism as the state and the union were more or less fused.
In the case of Uganda tripartism has had three distinct phases
and operated differently. In the first instance between 1962-1968
ILO-type conceptualisation of tripartism was attempted but in the
context of further legislative control over the unions and a
struggle for autonomy by the trade union movement. Legally both
trade union autonomy and the right to strike, though limited, still
remained. In the second instance between 1968-1971 a Tanzania-like
corporatist policy was tried in which the right to strike was
abolished, a single central trade union created by law and subjected
to more direct state control.	 Finally the Amin coup of 1971
reversed these policies and restored trade union autonomy between
1971-1974 but thereafter neither a corporatist nor a voluntarist
industrial relations policy was attempted - the regime relied on
repression as its main mainstay. Nor could a corporatist policy be
attempted in the post-Amin period because there was a multi-party
system which divided the loyalties of trade unions. In addition
there were few material benefits for the state to dispense to the
unions in return for co-operation, and above all the trade union
movement was hostile to the Obote II regime which carried on in a
crsisi of legitimacy. 	 However at the level of trade union
consciousness tripartism, due to ILO educational dominance, came to
be systematically internalised by the unions and continued to
influence them into the 1980s.
This tripartite view of industrial relations fed into the
economistic perspective of trade unionism as it emphasised a
consensual, non-confrontational and narrow type of trade unionism.
Economism itself however can be more specifically traced to ithe
historical influence of the ICFTU and its affiliates. It is a
conceptual view that the function of trade unions is simply the
struggle for better economic returns for their members without any
organisational programme, as a class, to transform society in a more
radical way. There are two main reasons for this. Most of the
economistic trade union movements, such as the Ugandan one, were
nurtured by ICFTU and other Western trade unions in the context of
the Cold War. However the argument for the need of trade union
independence from both party and government generally advocated by
ICFTU found favour with trade unions seeking such independence. But
precisely because of this constant struggle to remain independent
from state/party control or incorporation and the constant
educational efforts of Western trade unions especially ICFTU and the
ILO itself trade unions came to view themselves as professional
collective bargaining organisations and nothing more.
In the case of Uganda historically ICFTU influence operated
from the mid-1950s up to 1968 when its College in Uganda was closed
while from the mid-1970s ILO education was the only systematic
education trade unions were expsed to. The ICFTU and other unions
returned to Uganda only after Amin's overthrow in 1979. This thesis
contends that the intersection of ILO technocratic education and
ICFTU economism as the main sources of organised instruction
systematised the economistic and technocratic self-conception of the
unions that dominates trade union consciousness in contemporary
Uganda.
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CHAPTER II THE LEGAL REGULATION OF WORKING CLASS ORGANISATION'
COLONIAL FOUNDATIONS 1937-1962
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to establish and explain the colonial
origins of trade union and trades disputes legislation in Uganda.
This is because the principles established during that period
continued after independence though with considerable modifications.
It is this legislation that is central to the regulation of working
class organisation in Uganda.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 1 we
argue that because from the time of colonisation (1894) 'up to
about the end of World War II Uganda's labour force was largely
semi-proletarian and immigrant there was no material basis for its
collective organisation. Consequently the initial organisations
amongst Africans did not exclusively concern themselves with wage
labour matters.	 Up to World War II labour resistance to
exploitation and labour consciousness remained essentially
individual rather than collective. The mid-1930s however saw
beginnings of working class organisation and the first trade union
was formed in 1938, the Uganda African Motor Drivers' Association
(UAMDA).
Section 2 deals with the origin and content of trade union
(1937-1952) and trade disputes (1949-50) legislation. We argue that
the first trade union Ordinance, 1937 and its amendments up to 1943
were a product of Colonial Office directions. On the other hand,
both the trade disputes and trade union Ordinances of 1949-1950 and
1952 respectively were a response to workers' struggles in Uganda
but with the immediate impetus from Kenya workers' struggles and,
more generally, from British colonial experiences elsewhere. The
primary aim of these statutes was to pre-empt radical left-wing
political unionism and to nurture a "responsible" economistic trade .
union movement.
Section 3 explains the early development of trade unions and
employees associations (1945-1962). Colonial state policy initially
did not encourage union development but favoured joint consultation.
By the mid 1950s due to workers' resistance and growing
stabilisation of labour it changed policy to encourage union
growth. While trade union training by the British TUC and the ICFTU
helped the development of the unions, ideologically it created a
technocratic and pro-West union movement. 	 And due to this
ideological training and the weakness of the trade unions most of
the provisions for state control over unions were not used in
practice - they were superfluous.
Finally in Section 4 we argue that the conceptual separation of
trade unions and political organisation in the 1952 Trade Union
Ordinance succeeded in depoliticising workers as a class. This was
not simply because of the state's partial enforcement of the law but
for two other reasons. 	 First, the nascent petty bourgeoisie
organised separately, in staff associations, and had their
grievances gradually redressed while the workers organised in trade
unions or remained unorganised.
	
Secondly, due to the class
interests of the petty bourgeoisie who were leading the nationalist
political parties on the one hand and the ideological training the
unions received (of trade union economism) on the other, a defacto 
separation not only of trade unionism but also of workers as a class 
and politics was achieved.
The centrality of class struggle in the creation and
maintenance of working class rights and the importance of the
balance of class and social forces in the actual enjoyment or
restriction of these rights will be demonstrated more closely in the
post-colonial period. We argue throughout this thesis that the
character of the state and the ideological outlook trade unions took
of themselves right from the colonial, period ., though with some
differences and modifications after independence have determined
the extent to which law has been used, ignored or misused by the
dominant class in the period 1962-1987.
I. SEMI-PROLETARIAN LABOUR AND BEGINNINGS OF ORGANISATION 1900-1945
(a) SEMI-PROLETARIAN IMMIGRANT LABOUR AND LACK OF ORGANISATION.
In Uganda the period before 1945 saw
	 little attempt by wage
labour to collectively organise itself. The main reason for this
was that this labour was both semi-proletarian and immigrant.
Though the British Protectorate Government was established over
Uganda in 1894 (D.w. Nabudere 1980: 28) the basis for the country's
colonial exploitation began only with the 1900 Buganda Agreement (UP
1951) whereby land distribution between the colonial state and the
Buganda kingdom hierarchy and private landlords was made. Between
1900-1909 colonial policy was to create a "voluntary" supply of
labour for government, Christian missions, private settlers and
planters by the imposition of various taxes on the African
population (P.G. Powesland: 13-14). This policy had only limited
success in forcing Africans to work and labour shortage persisted.
From 1909-1922 therefore the colonial state introduced a paid
forced labour system called kasanvu whereby every tax-payer was
obliged to work "for the usual wages, for at least one month in each
year" unless engaged in permanent employment'. But this system was
unstable and unpopular and led to the emigration of peasants in
protest.	 Subsequently due to protests in Kenya against forced.
labour there and the Buganda Chiefs' protest at the social effects
of this system it was abolished in 1922 (M. Singh 1969: 9-15; ibid
32).
Prior to 1922 therefore wage labour mainly consisted of
peasants who worked only part of the year essentially to fulfil
kasanvu obligations. But the abolition of kasanvu exacerbated the
shortage of labour for the colonial state and economy.  A Labour
Department was therefore established in 1925 and a private
Recruiting Organisation approved by government (P.G. Powesland: 39-
40) to oversee and recruit immigrant workers respectively. Most
labour in Uganda therefore came to be immigrant but in two senses.
First as most economic and state activity was located in central
Uganda (Buganda) most wage labour came from the Northern and Western
Regions. Secondly, in fact the majority of labourers for a long
time came from outside Uganda (especially Ruanda and Burundi) (See
. for instance UP 1938: 18). This situation was to change only after
World War II. But apart from being immigrant this labour was
predominantly casual (ibid. par as. 69-80). It was this type of
semi-proletarian labour, immigrant and casual, that was not
susceptible to organisation.	 M. Mamdani has summarised this
situation succinctly:
Migrant, short-term, and highly mobile, this type of
labour was least susceptible to being organised to
defend its working class interests. Common
interests born out of temporarily shared working
conditions were themselves temporary, and could at
best	 beget	 temporary	 organisation...
	
The
agricultural workers employed by the Buganda kulaks
(rich peasants), on the other hand, were temporarily
employed and geographically scattered, two to three
on a farm, and were concentrated in neither time nor
space (M. Mamdand 1976: 150).
(b) INITIAL ORGANISATIONS
. The initial organisations and resistance against the colonial
status quo centred on the 1900 Agreement distribution of land but by
the 1930s organisation had widened to include opposition to racial
discrimination in trade and employment especially in the Civil
Service.	 It is also in the 1930s that beginnings of labour
organisation are discernible.
Ever since the signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement peasants
(bakopi) and Clan Heads (Bataka) opposed the land settlement. The
Bataka Movement, as it was later called, was however compromised
with the passing by the Buganda Lukiiko (parliament) in 1927 of the
Busuulu and Envujjo Law which gave security of tenure to peasants by
fixing rent (busuulu) and tribute (envujjo). And so long as the
peasant met these obligations and kept the land cultivated - due to
metropolitan demands for cash crops especially cotton - he could not
be evicted except by Court Order (See D. Apter: 141-150; R.C. Pratt:
236-238). This law compromised the Bataka Movement by curtailing
the landlords' access to the social surplus. 	 These landlords
therefore organised in Bulunge Bua Buganda but their narrow base led
to the organisation's demise being replaced by the Uganda African
Welfare Association (UAWA) in 1934 (M. Mamdani 1976: 173). UAWA
mainly wrote petitions and raised various complaints 2 . But although
the UAWA advanced the grievances of peasants, traders and workers it
was essentially a paper organisation. The Resident of Buganda was
able to note that it owed "its continued existence to the enthusiasm
of its "President-General" and were he to disappear little further
might be heard of it"3.
As the methods of UAWA did not achieve much in 1938 two other"
organisations were established: the Bana ba Kintu (Descendants of
Kintu) and the first trade union, the Uganda African Motor Drivers
Association (UAMDA) (M. Mamdani 1.976: 173; R. Scott: 9). Although
the Descendants of Kintu primarily articulated the grievances of
rich peasants and traders it also articulated general demands
including those of wage-earners.	 It	 brought	 within	 its
organisational fold "all the disaffected social groups in Buganda"
and its membership included the founder and leader of UAMDA, James
Kivu (M. Mamdani, ibid: 175-177).
At this time the only organisations of wage earners were the
Civil Servants' Association though distinct groupings of wage
earners in other sectors were developing. In 1938 the Inspectorate
of Labour reported that there was no trade union in the accepted
sense as yet in the Protectorate "apart from the association of
civil servants... the Uganda AfricanCivil Servants Association, the
Uganda Asiatic Civil Service Association and the European Civil
Service Association". 	 It noted however that "there are some
indigenous formations among Africans in the nature of guilds and
craftsmen and artisans; and beginnings are visible of a tendency to
groupings, such as of bus drivers, which have some affinity to trade
unions as well as to co-operative societies" (ARIL 1938: 7).
The Uganda African Civil Servants Association (UACSA),
originally called the British Government Native Employees
Association (BGNEA) when formed in 1922, championed the interests
of African clerks and professionals trained at Makerere College:
medical, veterinary, agricultural and engineering assistants (N.A.
Motani: 17-19; E. Goldthorpe: 10-13). The main driving force of
UACSA was dissatisfaction with racial discrimination in the civil
service terms and conditions of work 04. Mamdani, op. cit 164; N.A.
Motani: 17-69). But the colonial civil servants were a rising petty
bourgeoisie and had little contact with unskilled labourers. Many
of them were eventually appointed chiefs, °them eventually becoming
ministers in the Buganda Government (N.A. Motani, ibid. 22-23, 25,
70). In addition most used their comparatively higher wages to
become successful farmers or traders.
To a great extent too UAMDA, the first trade union which was
registered in 1939, (ARE, 1939:3) was a diffuse organisation. (On
compulsory registration see infra: p.43). Its membership was drawn
from the young taxi drivers in Kampala and also the taxi owners so
that "it demanded higher wages, and at the same time, high
government subsidies for the owners" (R. Scott 1966: . 9). Similarly
it directed petitions to the Fabian Colonial Bureau in England and
to the colonial state demanding freedom of operation for Africans in
transport business and freedom of farmers to sell products without
intermediaries 4 .	 At the same time, for instance in 1944, it
demanded a better scale of wages for all bus and lorry drivers; but
"the main activities of the Association" according to the Labour
Department "continued to be directed towards internal political
affairs, especially those concerned with the Kingdom of Buganda
(ARID 1944: 7). In short
The organisation of...workers' grievances was
neither in opposition to, nor distinct from, those'
of the petty bourgeoisie. In fact although (UAMDA)
was ostensibly a workers' association, the workers'
interests were at times subordinated to those of
the petty bourgeoisie -precisely because these
interests had not yet emerged as distinct. Their
point of unity was their opposition to the colonial
order (M. Mamdani 1976: 177).
In the late 1930s and 	 the early 1940s workers' collective.
action, especially in strikes, was limited, though present. The
UAMDA seems in fact to have had no role outside its own jurisdiction
in spite of being the only trade union. The first recorded strikes
took place in 1938. Eight strikes in all took place among the
Kampala township labourers, the Post Office, Railways, Land and
Surveys, the Drainage and Severage Works and at the Lugazi Sugar
Estate, as a result of which wage increases were granted (ARIL 1938:
7-8). In 1940 three strikes took place at a coffee plantation,
in the Public Works Department (PWD) and township authority in
Kampala over the coffee picking task and hours of work respectively
(ARIL 1940: 3); while in 1942, again at Lugazi Sugar Factory, a
violent strike against an Indian overseer and the cane cutting task
size occurred ending only after deployment of police and the
imprisonment of 43 workers (ARLD 1942: 1-2). In 1944, five strikes
took place in the same areas and at a tea estate. Higher wages to
cover increased food ration costs were demanded and long working
hours without a break "on top of a walk of several miles to the
scene of work for most of the labour employed" were objected to by
construction workers (ARLD 1944: 6).
Nonetheless in spite of the growth of collective consciousness
even in the absence of trade unions, workers' resistance to poor
conditions of work remained mainly individual at this time. This
was expressed mainly through absenteeism and desertion. At the
sugar plantation for instance, in the 1940s absenteeism averaged to
- 39-
35% daily, out of about 12,000 employees (A.I. Richards (Ed) 1952:
120). At the Uganda Sugar Factory, Lugazi in 1937 out of 2393
contract labourers from W. Nile 400 (17%) deserted while 14% of the
Banyarwanda labourers also deserted. In 1939 45% of the West Nilers -
and 13% of the Banyarwanda deserted while in 1941 45% and 16.5%
respectively deserted (UP 1941: 5).
Thus before 1945 wage-earners in Uganda, predominantly semi-
proletarian and immigrant, were largely unorganised with the
exception of the civil servants and the diffuse UAMDA. Though
collective action in strikes was taking place it was still limited
and spontaneous without sustained organisational backing such as a
trade union could give. It was only a change in the objective and
subjective conditions that would alter this state of affairs.
2. THE INTRODUCTION OF TRADE UNION LEGISLATION 1937-1952
a) TRADE UNION LAW - PHASE I: 1937-1943.
In 1937 the first trade union statute, the Trade Union
Ordinance (No. 18/1937) was enacted in Uganda. It was a simple
Ordinance whose enactment had more to do with developments in either
British Colonies and Colonial Office strategies than with the
organisation, at the time, of Ugandan workers. In Uganda, unlike
Kenya for instance, trade union legislation preceded trade union
organisation.
The initiative for enacting the Trade Union Ordinance came
from the Colonial Office and was contained in the September 1930
despatch to the Colonies by the Secretary of State, Lord Passfield.
The despatch was a response to labour disturbances and strikes in
some colonies like India and the Gambia (M. Nicolson: 178-179). The
aim of the measures proposed in the despatch was to forestall the
development of a militant politically-directed trade union movement
in the colonies. In the 1930 Conference of Colonial Governors and
senior officials Lord Passfield had warned them that as wage labour .
increased, they would begin to be "troubled" with trade unions and
would have to take steps to regulate their existence and operation
(ibid: 179). In particular the Colonial Office sought to exclude
communist influence as in India from trade unions (B.C. Roberts:
172-180; M. Nicolson: 178-180). So colonial trade unions had to be
controlled by the state. The despatch explained:
Without sympathetic supervision and guidance the
organisations of labourers without experience of
combination for any social or economic purposes may
fall under the domination of disaffected persons by
whom their activities may be diverted to improper
and mischievous ends.. .it is the duty of colonial
governments to take such steps as may be possible to
smooth the passage of such organisations as they
emerge into constitutional channels5.
As an example an office draft of the despatch had commented about
the Kikuyu Central Association of Kenya as an association which
would serve a useful purpose for the expression of opinions provided
that it was "not allowed to drift into hands of undesirable
extremists flel
But with the resignation of the Labour Party Government in 1931
the Conservative Party made it clear that it would not press for the
implementation of the despatch. Most colonial governments and
European employers also opposed the enactment of legislation
permitting the formation of unions - arguing that there were too few
wage earners and that even for the few that existed the tribal
systems of mutual assistance protected them. Consequently the
enactment of trade union law was shelved by most. (ibid: 181).
Subsequently Uganda enacted Trade Union Ordinance in 1937 but
only to conform with similar enactments in Kenya and Tanganyika.
The Kenyan Ordinance was itself introduced as a result of
developments elsewhere as much as workers' struggles in Kenya.
Following strikes and disturbances in the Caribbean Territories in
1935 and 1937 the Colonial Office sent despatches to colonies urging
them to improve labour conditions and set up or strengthen Labour
Departments or Inspectorates, the 1937 one being more urgent (B.C.
Roberts: 182-3). At the same time the Secretary of State for
Colonies sanctioned the introduction of trade union legislation in
Kenya as an immediate response to the 1937 strikes (M. Singh 1969:
61). The circumstances were that in April 1937 all Indian artisans
had gone on strike disrupting all construction work on new buildings
in Nairobi. This had been followed by several strikes by African
workers in various companies and in different towns between April
and May.
It was as a result of the April Indian strike that "it was
decided to introduce trade union legislation and a Bill to provide
for this for all races was passed by Legislative Council in August".
The Kenyan government also observed: "natives have as yet no
organised trade unions but there is no doubt they took a great
interest in the Indian strike and ere long they will endeavour to
form their own unions" 7 . Moving the Bill the Attorney-General
stated the objectives of the colonial state:
From the evidence brought to light by the strikes
it was apparent that there had been an attempt to
organise labour in Kenya under the guise of trade
unions on a class basis. One object of the Bill was
to prevent all irresponsible agitators from causing
trouble among labdur in the Colony8.
One European paper further explained, that in a country with a large
African population
so suitable for dangerous manipulation by
professional political agitators, and where already
there is evidence of the infiltration of doctrines
of social and political philosophy foreign to
conditions of African life and government, the state
(was) fully justified in seeking legal powers to
confine the activities of Trade Union organisation
to legitimate Trade Union purposes9.
On the 10th August 1937 the Trade Union Ordinance of Kenya was
therefore passed to try and channel workers grievances into
controllable and state-directed institutions - the registered trade
union.
On 2nd September 1937 the Trade Union Ordinance of Uganda was
also enacted. The attitude of the colonial state to trade union
legislation can be clearly deduced from its observations in 1939
when postponing the enactment of provision for peaceful picketing
and trade union immunity from tort actions:
there is only one trade union in Uganda (the UAMDA)
which was registered early in 1939, so that, to
begin with, this legislation is not likely to be of
apppreciable effect or value; and it is open to






by providing these statutory rights.
however been provided in Kenya and the
Territory, and in matters of this kind
is regarded as expedient (ARIL 1939:
It may be said therefore that workers' struggles elsewhere and
Kenya in particular provided the impetus for the 1937 trade union
law in Uganda; but the use to which such law could be put depended
upon the level of organisation and consciousness of the Uganda
workers themselves.
But what was the content and importance of the 1937 Ordinance?
The primary	 importance of the 1937 Ordinance is that for the
first time in the history of wage labour in Uganda the right to form
a trade union was granted. Following the U.K. 1871 Trade Union Act
union restraint of trade would not be deemed criminal conspiracy,
(S.3(1)) nor would it be unlawful "so as to render void or voidable
any agreement or trust" (S.3(2)). But these immunities would apply
only to a registered trade union (S.3(3)).
Indeed the cornerstone of the Ordinance was compulsory
registration.	 Failure to register a union within 30 days of
formation (S.5(1))or participating in its meetings or proceedings
was an offence (S.10). State regulation and control of the unions
was vested in the Register of Trade Unions, appointed by the
Governor (S.4). The requirements for registration were however
mainly formal. Only a minimum of seven members was required; and a
disclosure of sources of union funds (S.6(a)). Further requirements
were: the name and office of the union; objects of the union
subscription rates and fines and purposes for which the funds would
be applicable; manner of making and altering rules; appointment and
removal of officers; the treasurer's duties and keeping of proper
and periodically audited accounts; and right of union members or any
person with an interest to inspect books (S.6(b)). If these matters
were provided for in the Union's Rules and the Registrar was
satisfied that the purposes of the union were not unlawful, he was
required to register the union (S.8).
The Registrar was also empowered to cancel the registration of
any union: at the request of the union or if the registration was
obtained by fraud or mistake or if it violated any provisions of the
Ordinance or rules thereunder or if it had ceased to exist
(S.17(1)).
	
But as the prerequisites for registration were
themselves mainly formal cancellation was not necessary a powerful
instrument at this time.
Regarding union administration the emphasis was on proper .
accounting. Every union treasurer had to render quarterly accounts,
or more often if the rules so required, which had to be audited.
The union was required to provide annual returns: a statement of
accounts and a copy of alterations of rules and changes of officers,
to the Registrar (S.13).
In 1941 and 1943 amendments were made to the 1937 Ordinance.
These amendments were a result of British politics during the Second
World War. Due to the existence of a coalition government in
Britain and the Labour Party specifically, the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act 1940 had been passed.
On the insistence of a group of Labour M.Ps... the
Act included clauses stipulating that no territory
might receive aid under its provisions unless it had
in force legislation protecting the rights of trade
unions, and unless the works for which the aid was
to be used were carried out under a contract which
embodied a fair wages clause, and which forbade the
employment of children under the age of fourteen...
(B.C. Roberts: 188).
Then in 1941 a model Trade Union Ordinance, based on British
legislation and practice was sent to all colonies in a circular
despatch by the Secretary of State (ibid. 262).
	 It was this
deapatch and the provisions of the Colonial Development and Welfare
Act 1940 that led the colonial state to enact the 1941 and 1943
amendments.
The importance of the 1941 amendment Ordinance (No. 46 of 1941)
was that 1) it legalised peaceful picketing and 2) granted trade
unions immunity from tortious action committed by or on behalf of a
union "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute".	 This
amendment followed the U.K. 1906 Trade Disputes Act. But these
rights and immunities were challenged by the employers. J. Simpson,
a European employer and unofficial Legislative Council member
opposed the provision for immunity in tort actions because, he
argued,
the officers and members of the trade unions in this
territory are likely to be irresponsible people and
it is also quite likely that they would incite
members to damage property but if the trade union
funds were liable to be attached for the repair of
such damage then I think they would be less likely
to take any such action (UP 1941 (a): 8).
The provision was nonetheless passed because the colonial state was
interested in conforming to Colonial Office directions and receiving
development funds. After all apart from the ineffective UAMDA no
trade union existed. Thus the Attorney-General explained regarding
the 1943 Ordinance that the aim was "to amend the law regarding
trade unions, in order that the requirements of the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act 1940, in regard to trade union
legislation may be fully complied with" (UP: 1943: (Ag. A-G) 11-12).
The objective was to secure funds for
colonial development but the Secretary of State had
to be satisfied that the colony in question provided
reasonable facilities for the establishment and
organisation of trade unions. The new law was to
consolidate and amplify existing law in accordance
with a model Ordinance prepared by the Colonial
Office (ibid. 12).
The 1943 Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (No. 9/1943)
replaced the 1937 Ordinance and brought in some new provisions. The
main innovations were that, first, both civil and criminal
conspiracy would not be maintainable regarding a combination or
agreement "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute"
(S.22(1)). This followed S.3 of the U.K. Conspiracy and Protection
of Property Act 1875. Secondly, following S.3 of the 1906 U.K. Act
liability for interference with business, trade and employment was
also removed so long as the act in question was also "in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" (S.23). Finally
under S.12(3) a right to appeal to the High Court against a refusal
of registration was now given. Thus to a great extent the 1941 and
1943 positive provisions were a result of workers struggles in
Britain who had overturned unfavourable common law judicial anti-
union decisions (see Wedderburn 1971: Chaps 7 & 8) and also Labour
Party struggles in the Coalition government.
There is no recorded evidence that trade union law between 1937
and 1943 had any practical importance. It had been initiated, in
Uganda, by the colonial state and not by workers' demands or
struggles as in Kenya for instance. Although it is claimed by one
writer that the Kenyan based Labour Trade Union of East Africa
(L.T.U.E.A.) had recruited members in Uganda with branches in
Soroti, Tororo and Kampala following the 1937 strikes in Kenya
(M. Singh 1969:66), there appears to be no records of its activities
in Uganda apart from a memorandum written on the 1938 Report of the
Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in Uganda (UP: 1938;
ibid.	 73).	 Although L.T.U.E.A. was . actually registered in
Tanganyika as the first trade union there (ibid. 70; I. Shivj i 1986:
161) attempts to get registered in Uganda were not successful, it is
claimed, due to the war situation (M. Singh, ibid.). On the other
hand for UAMDA, apart from being allowed to exist legally, the law
seems neither to have encouraged or discouraged its operation.
Because labour was largely unorganised both the colonial state and
European and Asian capital did not have much apprehension except for
the occasional strikes and were generally unconcerned about the
otherwise liberal and positive provisions of the law. It was not
until the 1945 General strike, subsequent politically-motivated.
strikes and the 1949 peasant uprising - in addition to strikes
elsewhere, especially in Kenya - that the application and even
strengthening of the law against a militant and politicised nascent
working class movement arose.
(b) THE 1945 GENERAL STRIKE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
A significant event which changed the colonial state's attitude
towards workers and led, to a great extent, to labour reforms among
other wider reforms, was the 1945 General Strike. At a more
general level it was a worker-peasant alliance against the colonial
state and its comprador Buganda Kingdom regime.	 The strike
precipitated the colonial state to enact legislation protective of
labour and was part of a process leading to institutionalised
industrial relations.
The strike was led by UAMDA and the domestic workers in the
urban centres.	 The first stoppages occurred in Government
Departments early in January in Masaka, Entebbe and Kampala (ARLD
1945: 5). But the co-ordinated general strike commenced on 15th and
lasted until 24th January 1945. The strike spread from Kampala and
the Polish Refugee Camp at Koja to most of the towns in Uganda.
Almost all workers in both public and private undertakings took part
in the strike (UP1945: paras. 34-36; 59, 68-69). In the rural areas
in Buganda peasants settled scores against Indian traders and
ginners. While the domestic workers provided leadership in the
towns, rich peasants did so in the countryside and motor drivers,
organised in UAMDA, provided communication links from town to town
and town to rural areas.
The workers demanded an increase of the war bonus and the .
application of the Minimum Wages Ordinance 1934. More specifically
it is reported that the strike organisers had held out to the
workers that some E8 million had been sent by the Colonial Office
from the Colonial Development Fund for the express purpose of wage
increases throughout the Protectorate.
These increases were put at fantastic figures,
roughly doubling existing wages, and were said to be
due to come into force on 1st January 1945. When the
expected millenium failed to materialise on the due
date the people were led to believe that the
Protectorate Government were wrongfully retaining
the money (ibid. par. 17F).
The fact however is that it was the general demand for wage.
increases that united all the workers around the strike. On the
other hand peasants and the intelligentsia demanded political and
democratic reforms (R. Mukherjee 1956: 275; UP1945 ibid: par. 18D;
Low and Pratt: 273-274). The Commissioner who inquired into the
"disturbances" aa the strike was officially called, recognised the
democratic demands of peasants and the intelligentsia:
I suggest that consideration be given to the
question of altering the constitution of the Lukiiko
(Buganda Parliament) so as to give direct
representation to the non-chief educated class
(teachers, medical officers, clerks, etc.) and to
the bakopi (peasant class) (UP;1945 : ibid: par.
77).
The colonial state however sought to underplay the leading role
of the workers, both the domestic workers and motor drivers (in
UAMDA) and attributed the leadership of the strike to "outsiders".
The Labour Department reported:
It early became evident that the disturbances were
pre-arranged and organised by a group of Baganda,
some of them highly placed, to suit their ends and
as part of a conspiracy to obtain office for
themselves or their nominees, or they may have had
even more sinister and far reaching designs. They
succeeded by the promise of fantastic wages and
other means in enlisting the support of a large
number of labourers and the like.., with the
intention of paralysing all public services and so
disrupting the general life of the community that
chaos would supervene and thus afford the organisers
the opportunity to seize power in the Kingdom of
Buganda (ARLD 1945:6).
The immediate response of the state was repression: arrests of over
500 people were made (UP1945: par. 54) and the workers leaders J.
Ki vu President of UAMDA, I.K. Musazi and others were immediately
deported. The Deportation Ordinance was twice amended in 1945:
first, to prevent a deportee from leaving his place of deportation
and to give more supervisory powers over deportees to the Governor
(UP: 1945(a); Ordinance 1/1945) and second, to allow the arrest of
deportees without warrant and to regulate their outside
communications (UP1945(b); Ordinance 14/1945).
But having violently suppressed the strike - as eight Africans
had been killed and fourteen wounded by the army - (ARLD1945: 6) the
colonial state was forced to make political and labour reforms. For
the first time Africans were appointed to the Legislative Council in
1945 and elected representives were, also for the first time,
introduced into the Lukiiko (Buganda parliament) (D. Apter:
231-2). From now on political and democratic reforms were put on
the agenda.
In the labour field however the significance of the 1945
strikes was that they precipitated the colonial state's enactment of
protective provisions hitherto shelved in spite of Colonial Office
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directives or recommendations since the 1930s. The major legal
developments were the enactment of the Employment Ordinance (No.
13/1946) replacing the Masters and Servants Ordinance and the
Workmen's Compensation Ordinance (No. 14/1946).
Apart from trade union legislation between 1937-1943 the
Protectorate Government had shelved most colonial office directions
for the improvement of labour conditions. But the desire for
Colonial Development and Welfare Funds had led the Government to
set up, in 1942, the Labour Advisory Committee (composed of
Government and employers' representatives, with a big Government
majority). This Committee had in fact been previously a sub-
committee of the Development and Welfare Committee (ARLD 1941: 1).
The Committee was examining various ILO Conventions and
Recommendations accepted by Britain with a view to giving them
statutory footing. However even when the Labour Department had been
re-established in 1943 (ARLD 1943: 1) the main concern during the
war was the provision of conscripts for the army and the production
of raw materials for "the war effort" (ARLD 1942: 1; 1943; 2-3;
1946: 2-3; B.C. Roberts: 212-213).
Having suppressed the strike the Government sought to redress
workers' grievances but presenting the reforms in a paternalistic
way.	 On workmens compensation the Labour Advisory Committee
submitted
	
its	 final report in October 1945 (UP1946: 4).
Although employers' representatives sought to exclude most
enterprises and especially agriculture from the application of the
Bill the Government was firm and the Ordinance was passed. It had
taken the strike for this Ordinance to be passed because though a
Workmens Compensation Model Ordinance (East and West Africa)
prepared by the Colonial Office existed since 1937 (ARLD 1945: 8),
due to employers objections it had been shelved indefinitely in the
whole of East Africa (ARIL 1939: 2).
Regarding the Employment Bill the Labour Commissioner argued.
that
until workers of this country are able to organise
themselves into Associations capable of
understanding collective bargaining, the Government
through the medium of its departmental officers
concerned must continue to be responsible for the
welfare of the worker... (UP 1946(a): 17).
But more significantly he encouraged employers to employ Welfare
officers to keep in touch with workers' feelings before they became
grievances, strikes and disturbances, adding "I do not think that
labour is inclined these days to remain passive as it has done in
the past" (ibid: 20). The Employment Bill therefore sought to enact
provisions protective of labour; in particular it sought the full
application of the Convention No. 65 of 1939 "in the progressive
abolition of all penal sanctions for breaches of contracts of
employment by indigenous workers" (ibid: 13). It also aimed at
ensuring that employers provided a specific type of minimum housing,
diet and medical care and the prohibition of the truck system -
implementing Art. 35 of Recommendation No. 70 of the 1944 ILO
Conference. The Bill also sought to implement the 1936 Recruiting
of Indigenous Workers Convention No. 50 which sought to regulate the
movement of recruited workers from places of employment, and for
their care and feeding during the journey, among other things.
Provisions borrowed from Nyasaland were also made: to regulate
professional recruiters, as touting and intimidation of the
immigrants in Uganda had been rife (ibid. 15-16); see the Employment
Ordinance 1946, ss. 39-56; ARLD 1944: 5).
Apert from these accelerated reforms it was also now felt that
state control over labour should be increased. The Labour Advisor
to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Orde Browne had concluded
for instance that because "the Labour Department, is at present.
constitutedon a very modest scale,.., this undoubtedly formed a
contributory cause in the events leading up to the recent
disturbances" (Orde Brown: 93). In the long term therefore the
strike also provided the backdrop for future state supervision and
control of workers' organisations.
(c) TRADE UNION LAW - PHASE II: 1949/50 - 1952
The reformative solutions of 1945-6 aimed at resolving labour
grievances proved short-lived and insufficient because further
developments necessitated a clearer demarcation of workers rights
especially organisational ones. The Trade Disputes Ordinance 1949,
as amended in 1950, and the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1952, were
introduced as a result of developments in workers' and general anti-
colonial struggles in Uganda though the specific events that
precipitated their enactment, especially the 1950 and 1952 statutes,
were struggles of workers in Kenya. The Trade Disputes statute
sought to de-radicalise and institutionalise workers' protests while
the Trade Unions one was more involved. In principle it aimed at
generating basic trade union rights and freedom of association but
these were to be enjoyed under state control and tutelage. Further,
we argue that the provisions of this Ordinance can be divided into
those meant to ensure state control and those that were
paternalistic. State control was to be achieved through compulsory
registration and supervision and was aimed at pre-empting the
development of a politicised left-wing trade union movement. The
paternalistic-democratic elements were concerned with the union
constitution, property and funds and represented the long term
vision of the state which preferred institutionalised industrial -
relations, albeit economistic in character.
(i) THE TRADE DISPUTES (ARBITRATION AND SETTLEMENT) ORDINANCE 1949
Following the 1945 General Strike and before the 1949 peasant
uprising in Buganda several other strikes had taken place and were
to a great extent politically motivated. Although only four strikes
are reported for 1946 (ARLD 1946: 10-11), strikes progressively
increased with a particularly militant one at Kakira sugar works in
1947 (ARLD 1947: pars. 73-74). In 1948, eleven strikes took place
and a number of them were related to general political unrest but
centering around the question of annual wage increments while at one
sisal estate workers forced the removal of a repressive Manager
(ARLD 1948: pars. 63-65). Then in 1949 there were 69 strikes with
18,973 man-days lost and 11,377 workers involved (ARID 1949: 21,
Appendix X). Most of these took place early in the year and were
clearly political. The Labour Department observed,
the rush of strikes (over 30 in 12 days) which
erupted round Kampala early in January and spread
through Busoga as far East as Mbale might have
developed into something in the nature of the
general strike...there is little doubt that most of
the trouble was caused by political agitation. As
it was, prompt action by Mengo and Jinja Offices in
dealing with each stoppage separately before any of
them had had time to coalesce, resulted in a
resumption of work... (ARLD 1949: 15).
These strikes had then been followed by a peasant uprising in
Buganda in April 1949. The demand centred upon political and
economic reforms. The peasants demanded to elect their own chiefs,
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the increase of elected representatives in the Lukiiko, the
resignation of the then Buganda government, on the political side;
and on the economic side that growers should gin their own cotton
and sell their agricultural products directly wherever they like (UP.
1949: 22).
Although the question of dispute settlement legislation had
been discussed earlier the strikes of January 1949 and the peasant
uprising which led to break down of formal government in Buganda (M.
Mamdani 1976: 182) forced the government's hand. The original Bill
dealt with simple voluntary conciliation and arbitration (UP
1949(a)).	 By July 1949 however provision dealing with the
settlement of disputes in "essential services" were added due to
"widespread feeling" that "trades disputes which arise in (public)
undertakings and services should invariably be settled by suitable
machinery and should not be permitted to cause dislocation or
definite harm to the community" (UP 1949(b) (L.C.): 36). As one
writer observed, all in all "strikes may well have been uppermost in
the mind of the Governor and Executive when the Bill was published,
although this was never clearly stated" (B. Nicol 1972: 39). But
the Labour Commisioner had been quite specific, in opposing those
who regarded the Bill as premature. "We have had disputes", he
argued,
"and we shall have disputes, but unless people
understand that there are reasonable ways of
settling those disputes, and unless they are
given voluntary machinery to do so, I do not see
any hope of reducing those disputes and they may in
fact increase" (UP: supra, 40).
Although originally the Bill also included minimum wage provisions,
this part was excised from it, due to strong opposition from
employer interests, and the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and
Settlement) Ordinance (No. 19/1949) was passed in July (ibid. 41).
There were two particularly important aspects of the Ordinance.
The first was that for the first time a statutory dispute settlement
process was instituted. For general disputes however the use of the
dispute settlement process was voluntary because both parties would
have to consent to the appointment (ad hoc) of an arbitration
tribunal by the Governor (S.3, Ord. 19/1949). The Second, was
that, in the so-called essential services, compulsory arbitration
was instituted. No employer would declare a lockout or any worker a
strike unless the specified arbitration procedure had been followed
(S.14). The essential services were water and electricity (public
utilities) and public health, hospital and sanitary services
(Schedule, Ord. 19/1949).
The in 1950 the 1949 Ordinance was amended. Two innovations
were made. First the scheduled essential services were increased by
including those similar services rendered by the private sector and
provision made for the Governor to reduce or increase the scheduled
essential services (UP 1950: 64; S.3 Ord. 23/1950). 	 Secondly
following the U.K. 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act,
conselling and procuring strikes by any person whether a trade
union official or not before complying with the statutory dispute
settlement procedure was made an offence (S.6 Ord. 23/1950).
The concept of essential services had been abstracted by the
Colonial Office from the 1926 General Strike in Britain and
experiences in other colonies. In Uganda the tightening up of the
law in 1950 was precipitated by a General Strike in Kenya that year.
The 1950 amendment had been introduced bearing in mind "recent
occurrences elsewhere"; specifically on the question of financial
support for strikes (prohibited by S.6, Ord. 23/1950) the Attorney-
General argued,
the need for this may not be apparent in the
Protectorate but it was in some instances which
occurred not so long ago elsewhere and where it was
of immediate or would have been of immediate use,
and in my opinion it would be wise to take advantage
of that experience with a view to prevention here 
(UP 1950: supra. Emphasis JB).
Finally, the colonial state argued that only when dispute settlement
failed was a strike justifiable. Above all there was no excuse for
"a strike which deprives the public of essential services; the
public has a right to be protected from purely political agitators,
and this measure should receive the fullest support of all men of
goodwill" (ibid).
It may be said in conclusion that bearing in mind the 1945
general strike and several strikes thereafter, the 1949 peasant
uprising and the recent general strike in Kenya, in May 1950, the
colonial state was taking steps to prevent the coalescence of
economic and political organisation by workers and other social
classes, by enacting the 1949-1950 trade disputes legislation. This
legislation marked a shift of strategy by the colonial state from
little concern about labour unrest and the use of criminal
sanctions such as deportations of leaders to an institutional model
of resolving industrial conflict. The Trade Union Ordinance 1952 was
to consolidate this approach.
(ii) THE TRADE UNIONS ORDINANCE 1952
Uganda's 1952 Trade Unions Ordinance (No. 10/1952) which forms
the foundation of the post-colonial law in most respects was part of
the general attempt by British colonial governments in East Africa
to stem radical and left-wing political unionism, especially as was
emerging in Kenya and as had emerged in the Asian colonies, before
it was too late. At the same time the development of an apolitical
economistic trade union movement would be encouraged by vesting of
control and supervisory powers in the Registrar of Trade Unions.
Opening the debate on the Bill the Labour Commissioner
explained,
In this territory there has so far been extremely
very little interest in genuine trade unions, and by
genuine, I mean a spontaneous movement among the
workers themselves to combine together to improve
their own working conditions; but experience in the
neighbouring East African territories has clearly
shown that the provisions of the existing Ordinance
fall short of what was intended when they were
enacted (UP: 1952, L.A. Mathias, L.C.: 45).
He further observed that following meetings and discussions of the
East African Labour Departments, new Trade Union Bills had been
agreed upon. He continued:
This is being brought in now not because
there is at present any great demand in this country
for the formation of trade unions, but so that when
that demand does arise we shall have an adequate
measure providing for their guidance until they can
assume the responsibilites of trade union status
(ibid).
The need to enact the new Ordinance followed workers' struggles
in both Tanganyika and Kenya but especially the latter. In 1950
following a dockworkers strike in Tanganyika over 80 arrests had
been made, many skilled workers lost their jobs and the Dockers'
Union - the most militant union - was deregistered (I.G. Shivji
1986: 174-177). In Kenya too following the General Strike in the
same year leaders of the only trade union federation, the E.A.T.U.C.
(East African Trade Unions Congress, formed in 1949), had been
banned and several trade union leaders arrested. These events led
to an upsurge in trade union organisation and militancy. At the
same time the Mau Mau (Land and Freedom Army) and Jomo Kenyatta's
Kenya African Union (KAU) had been formed and were demanding back
African land and independence (See M. Singh 1969: 288-296; A.
Amsden: 30-44). In Kenya leaders of the trade unions (13 unions in
1952, R. Scott: 18) were also members of and many became leaders in.
both Mau Mau and KAU (M. Singh 1980:5; Berg. E.J. and Butler, J.
1964: 347-34&,372).
What is important for Uganda is that it was these developments,
coupled with the 'political' strikes in Uganda itself between 1945-
1950, that led to the enactment of the 1952 Trade Union Ordinance.
At amore general level, the tightening up and enactment of new
provisions for controlling trade unions in East Africa was a result
of a long history and experience of British colonialism with the
emergence, development and character of working class organisation
especially in the West Indies West Africa and Asia l°. The latest
trade union laws in British experience therefore were made for East
Africa and Uganda in particular.
When the Trade Union Bill was introduced in Kenya in January
1952 it was opposed both by Kenyan unions and the British TUC.
	 The
objections centred around the issues of compulsory registration,
probationary trade unions, restrictions on who could become a union
official, requirements for English knowledge and reasons for
suspension and cancellation of unions (M. Singh 1969:306-310). In
Britain, the Colonial Advisory Committee (CAC) of the British TUC,
which had been in touch with Kenya trade unions after its formation
in 1937, met the Secretary of State for Colonies on 7 March 1952 and
presented their objections to the wide powers given to government
officials and all the provisions the Kenyan unions objected to. As
a result the Minister
undertook to inform the Government of Kenya of the
criticisms which had been levelled and in the
meantime the introduction of a similar measure
contemplated for Uganda would be suspended (Archives
of the TUC:1952).
However only three amendments were made. The powers of
approving, disapproving and supervising staff and employees'
organisations and associations were transferred from the Labour
Commissioner to the Registrar of Trade Unions (considered more
neutral); literacy in English for officials was dropped as Swahihi
would be sufficient; and failure of a union to comply with its own
rules would not in itself provide grounds for suspension or
cancellation of registration (M. Singh 1969:310). As the Uganda
Trade Union Ordinance closely followed the Kenyan one these
amendments, although minor, benefitted Ugandan workers - a result of
workers' struggles elsewhere.
The provisions of the 1952 Ordinance may be divided into three
categories as indicated earlier (p 52). First were those provisions
which guaranteed the formation of trade unions with specific
positive rights. Secondly there were those provisions meant to
ensure state control and thereby the pre-emption of a left-wing
politicised trade union movement. 	 Thirdly there were those
paternalistic aspects meant to nurture some form of democratic
administration of union affairs.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS
The most important positive aspects of the Ordinance were:
first, the retention of a right for trade unions to exist (S.2).
Secondly, following ILO Convention No. 98 (Right to Organise and
Collective Bargaining Convention 1949) freedom for workers to belong
to a trade union without any penalty from the state or prohibition
or discrimination from an employer was guaranteed (S.55). Thirdly,
the rights, immunities and privileges (including liabilities) -
available only to registered unions - were laid down in Part V of
the Ordinance. Immunity from civil suit for union officers and -
members was carried over from S.23 of the 1943 Ordinance in respect
of acts done "in comtemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute"
even where this involved inducement to breach a contract of
employment, interference with trade or business, the employment of
another person or the right of another person to dispose of his
capital or labour (S.22). The important immunity for trade unions,
officers and members from liability in tort for an act alleged to
have been committed by or on behalf of a trade union (S.24(1)) but
only in respect of acts committed "in contemplation or in
furtherance of a trade dispute" (S.24(2)) was also retained.
Although the L.C. had presented them simply as "the commonly
accepted rights and liabilities of trade unions... .largely the same
as in the existing Ordinance" and similar to "most trade union
legislation throughout the world including colonial territories
within the Empire" (UP 1952:47) the immunities were the most
contested.
The European employers' representative J. Simpson argued that
if we are seriously endeavouring.. .to make the
people of this country responsible people, then it
is absurdly wrong to free them from the
responsibility of their own acts, or any acts that
they may commit. I must strongly oppose the
inclusion of such a clause. ..such a clause.., should
not be introduced in this country by pressure from
the Secretary of State, but the Protectorate
Government should be permitted to bring into account
local conditions (ibid 48).
C. Patel respresentative of Asian propertied interests opposed it
suggesting it should be granted only to experienced unions (ibid 50)
while another one A. N. Maini thought it would protect individuals
from any tortious acts (ibid). Nonetheless the desire of the state
to encourage union growth in a paternalist way was insisted on with
the L.C. explaining the historical origin of the immunities in the •
U.K. (1906 Act). So similarly in Uganda
where we want to establish a stable, orderly trade
union movement as the workers become educated in
industrial relations and learn to negotiate with
their employers.., the first essential of any stable
union or any stable body is the possession of
funds... There is the necessity of having unions
grow up gradually to responsible status. We have
been faced with a number of mushroom growths which
might try and collect funds with no other intention
than of creating industrial disputes where there
should be stability (ibid:51-52).
The long term vision of the state here was opposed to the short
term interests of capital which only saw the immediate financial
losses the immunities could mean in case of disputes. But while
these rights and immunities won originally by the British working
class came to benefit the colonial territories the non-
enforceability of certain intra-union and inter-union agreements was
also brought in (5.25),
	 probably, as Wedderburn suggests
(Wedderburn:314), as a compromise vis-a-vis the immunities won.
FORMS OF ORGANISATION, COMPULSORY REGISTRATION AND UNION
LEADERSHIP
The central provisions of the Ordinance which were meant to
achieve state control over union development concerned the form of
organisation permitted to exist, the principle of compulsory
registration and the determination of union leadership.
In the 1952 Ordinance three innovations were made in the
concept of trade unionism which were unique to East Africa. This
was the introduction of the employees' associations, the employees'
organisations and the probationary trade union. The employees' 
association would consist of at least six members employed in the
same trade or industry, private or public or with any one employer,
(S.2). The employees' organisation on the other hand would comprise
at least six members engaged in "the same type of employment" but
working for different employers where each of those employers did
not employ more than twenty employees (S.2).
	 As the Labour
Commissioner explained the two types of organisation were "new to
trade union law anywhere in the world" (UP:1952:45). 	 Both
organisations had to notify their establishment to the Registrar
(S.3(1)) and neither organisation could collect or possess money
other than an "annual contribution to an office expense fund or
welfare fund" and the Governor could restrict the purposes of the
welfare fund (S.3(4)). An employees' association that collected no
subscription or primary contribution was not required to notify its
establishment to the Registrar (S.3(2)).
Because it was hoped that an association in one workplace or
one organising in the same trade would be an isolated entity so long
as no finances were collected the colonial state was even prepared
to waive the notification requirement. But the objextcf.controlling
the purposes for which funds could be collected was to ensure that
no political aims could be furthered or sponsored by these
organisations.	 Trade union economism (see Cap I: 27-8)was the
ideological construct within which these workers were officially
allowed to operate though the provisions were presented as simple
state paternalism. Moreover these two types of organisation were
allowed merely to exist legally - they did not possess the rights
and immunities of the trade unions. According to the L.C.
the intention is, particularly among staff
associations, to encourage the formation of simple
committees whereby employees and employers can
discuss matters of	 common interest.	 These
committees have a two-way function. They can
provide a useful safety valve whereby matters which
may genuinely be disturbing employees can be brought
to the notice of their employers; and also whereby
their employers can, when they consider desirable,
explain changes in policy which affect the working
conditions of their employees. It will be noted
that associations are limited as to the funds which
they may collect. The intention is to provide them
with the opportunity of learning how to handle money
but also keeping the money they may collect within
limits which are not attractive to undesirable
leaders (ibid 46).
So while on the one hand the intention was to keep out "undesirable
elements" which usually meant "political agitators" as recent events
in East Africa were interpreted, on the other hand organisations
were seen as a managerial device to keep industrial peace.
FinallyNAhere the Registrar was satisfied that an association or
organisation was "conducting its affairs in such a manner that it
should be regarded as a trade union" (S.3(6)) he was empowered to
require it to apply for registration as a trade union because more
control and supervision could then be statutorily exercised.
The probationary trade union, another innovation, came into
existence when the Registrar, subject to his powers of supervision
or refusal to register deferred a union's registration( S.-11). Such
a union possessed all the rights, immunities and privileges (and was
subject to the same liabilities) as a registered trade union except
the right to amalgamate with another union (S.22(2)). Although
these provisions were opposed again by employer interests (see C. R.
Patel, for instance, ibid:53) the L.C. emphasised that the
Registrar's powers to refuse registration (S.16) were enough
precaution. Instead the aim was
to provide a young union which is struggling along
to make the grade, with every chance of doing so,
while at the same time providing safeguards against
mushroom growths being created by self-appointed
leaders for their own self-seeking ends (ibid:46,
see also ARLD 1952:18).
The probationary period lasted between three and twelve months but
the union would still be subject to the Registrar's powers to refuse
registration (S.12).
The final provision that was to determine the form of union
organisation that developed concerned amalgamation. 5.32 provided
that amalgamation of unions could take place if fifty percent of the
eligible membership voted and only if "those in favour of the
proposal exceed by twenty percent or more... the votes against the
proposal". And in the case where the trade unions proposing to
amalgamate represented more than one trade or calling no
amalgamation could take place without the sanction of the Governor-
in-Council. The idea behind restrictions on amalgamations was that
they were likely to be politicised. Official opinion had been
influenced "by the fear that large unions and federations are more
likely to be concerned with political activities than are small
organisations based upon the unit of employment, or the industry"
(B. C. Roberts:301; see also M. Mamdani 1976:191).	 Small,
apolitical, industry-based unions only were to be encouraged or
tolerated.
COMPULSORY REGISTRATION
By far however the most important device of state control of
unions, right from 1937, was compulsory registration. S.9 of the
1952 Ordinance retained this requirement and further strengthened
it. The Registrar had wide powers to refuse or cancel registration.
Registration could be refused for any of the following reasons: the
union did not comply with the provisions of the Ordinance; any of
the principal objects or the constitution of the union was unlawful;
the union was used for unlawful purposes; a union already registered
was sufficiently representative of the whole or substantial
proportion of the interests in respect of which registrationwas
sought; the principal objects of the union were not in accordance
with the definition of "trade union" in S.2; the funds of the union
were being applied in an unlawful manner, upon unlawful objects or
on objects not authorised by the Ordinance; in case of a general
union, its constitution did not contain suitable provisions for the
protection and promotion of their respective sectional industrial
interests; and if the accounts of the union were not kept in
accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance (S.16(1)).
The existence and operation of any union was therefore to
depend upon what the state defined as legitimate trade union
functions. The objects of the union were limited to a regulation of
employee-employee relations and employee-employer relations (S.2).
The objects upon which union funds could be expended were also
specified and covered administration expenses, legal proceedings
expenses, the conduct of trade disputes, compensation of members for
loss arising out of trade disputes, allowances to members on account
of death, old age, sickness, accidents or unemployment (i.e. social
security functions) or any object authorised by the Governor (S.43).
But aware that a docile and "responsible" union prior to
registration could thereafter change character, leadership and
policies,the state provided for the suspension or cancellation of
registration. Some of the grounds for suspension or cancellation
were only formal, that is, if the union requested it after its
dissolution or if the union in the Registrar's opinion, had "ceased
to exist" (S.17(1)). In the case of the latter reason the provision
could be used to deregister a militant and recalcitrant union as had
happened with UANDA and the Uganda Transport and General Workers
Union in 1949 (ARLD 1949: 15, infra: 76). The more important
reasons for cancellation or suspension were similar to those for
refusal of registration (S.17(2)).
An unregistered union could not enjoy any of the rights,
immunities or privileges of a registered union (S.19(2) and failure
of a union or officer to apply for registration was an offence
(S.19(3)). Equally cancellation or suspension of registration meant
loss of rights, privileges and immunities for the members, officers,
and the union itself (SS.20(1)(a) & 21).
These provisions appear to have been by and large effective
especially in ensuring that only those unions conforming to the
conception of trade unionism favoured by the colonial state were
registered (infra: 67-88).
TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP
Next in importance to compulsory registration as a device of
state control of trade unions, perhaps, were the restrictions on
union leadership. Union leadership and administration would indeed
be the test for the success or failure in nurturing "responsible
unions". The L.C's explanation for the new provisions in Part VI of
the Ordinance, on the unions' constitution and administration which
was "taken from legislation which has proved necessary in other
colonial territories" was that it was "intended to ensure that every
union is set up on asound basis" (UP: 1952, supra, 47).
Under 5.29 it was provided that all union officers, except the
Secretary had to have been employed (and to be still employed) for
at least three years in the relevant industry or occupation. This
provision was designed, the L.C. claimed,
to protect young unions from exploitation by
outsiders. At the same time provision has to be
made for a limited amount of external assistance
because without it it might be impossible for an
experienced body ever to get on its feet (ibid.).
Further the L.C. also admitted that
another reason for permitting it is the power it
would place in the employers' hands. An employer
who perhaps was not on the best of relations with a
trade union, if the secretary of that union was
employed with that establishment, might go a very
long way to wreck that union hy dismissing the
secretary, who would thereupon have to cease being
an officer of the union (ibid. 53).
In general the employers were opposed to the whole Bill. But
since the state was determined to pass it they resigned themselves
to opposing sections of it. Here C.K. Patel, a representative of
Asian business stated that employers argued that "the happy
relationship that now exists between employers and employees will be
shattered by the introduction of this Bill". But personally he took
the more far-sighted view, as the state, and contended,
we know that in future when there are troubles some
people will say that there was no restriction
imposed on the healthy growth of trade unionism.
But they will claim then that there should be no
restrictions imposed on them. This is why...we
should have this Bill passed today and...not
tomorrow (ibid. 49).
However the greatest scare raised was that the growth of trade
unions would encourage communism in Uganda. The Uganda Chamber of
Commerce (formed in the 1920s) had expressed this view to the Labour
Commissioner, C. Patel said.	 Again he explained:
I, for one, do not understand how this Bill can
possibly encourage communism in this country.
Communism only thrives where there is poverty and
unequal distribution of wealth, but this Bill seeks
to give better conditions to labour and to give them
a right which they possess all over the world, viz.,
the right to strike. This could not possibly
encourage communism. The remedy lies in our hands,
Give better conditions and good wages to labour.
There is not the slightest chance of communism
creeping into this country... (ibid.).
The same communist scare was being raised by employers against the
employment of a secretary (under S.29) who did not belong to the
firm. C.K. Patel continued, "there is an opinion that such an
officer would not be in the interests of the community itself
because he might hold communistic views" (ibid. 50). But aware that
the British TUC was already sending trade unionists to the colonies
to guide the growth of trade unions there on "sound lines", and as
in 1949 L.H. Nicklin a former trade union official in Britain had
been appointed a Labour Officer in Uganda for the same purpose (ARLD
1949:15), he argued,
if an officer who is brought into this country is an
experienced one, there is not going to be any
danger, so far as this section is concerned. I
think.., that in this country trade unions of the
future will only bring from outside an experienced
secretary who is not a communist (UP: 1952, supra:
50).
THE TRADE UNION CONSTITUTION, PROPERTY AND FUNDS
The paternalistic - democratic elements of the 1952 Ordinance
were in the area of the trade unions' rules, its property and funds.
Matters which had to be included in the union constitution were
carried over from the 1943 Ordinance but several new ones were now
also included. Now all decisions had to be taken by secret ballot,
rights of members to vote provided for, subscription fees
stipulated, contributory provident or pension fund, if any,
separated from other funds (S. 36(1), Schedule). For the first time
also comprehensive provisions for the regulation of trade union
funds and property were made. 	 The	 L.C.	 argued	 that	 these.
provisions had been drawn largely from legislation which had
"operated successfully in other colonial territories and provide
for a much closer inspection of a union's accounts than is possible
under the existing law" (UP: 1952, supra: 47).
S. 29 provided, inter alia, that no person could be secretary
or treasurer "who in the Registrar's opinion is incapable.., of
carrying out his respective duties" because he was illiterate; nor
could a person hold any office if convicted of any offence"
involving fraud or dishonesty in connection with the funds of any
trade union". These two measures were positive and were meant to
help develop genuine responsibility amongst union leaders. The L.C.
explained :-
These unions have got to learn by experience; if
they engage people who are known to be dishonest
there is a limiting clause. That is put partly
because we have information that in other
territories they are in the habit of being employed
by a union, acting dishonestly and subsequently
imposing themselves on other unions (ibid. 53).
Further for the first time trustees would have to be appointed
for each union and no trade union officer could be a trustee (S.
40).	 This was meant to separate union officers from those
responsible for the property and finances (the trustees), at least
theoretically.
The rest of the provisions related to annual returns and the
keeping of books of account.
	 Every union, probationary or
registered had to keep books of account to exhibit and explain the
transactions and financial position of the union, income and
expenditure (S.45). Every year the treasurer had to render to the
union "a just and true account" of the income and expenditure, all
bonds, securities and other property of the union entrusted to him.
(S. 46(1)).	 These accounts had to be audited (5.46(3)). 	 The
audited accounts had to be accompanied by the auditor's report
(S. 47(1). Changes to the union rules or of officers together with
the audited accounts had to be sent to the Registrar (S. 47(2)); and
every member was entitled to the copy of the audited accounts
(S. 47(1)).
Further the books of account and a list of union members were
open to inspection by an officer or member of a union or by the
Registrar (or his representative) (S. 48). Finally, any trade union
member or the Registrar could complain to Court about any person's
misappropriation or misuse of union funds or property and demand
redress (S. 57).
In conclusion a few points may be reiterated. First although the
forms of organisation-whether the associations or trade unions.were
allowed to exist legally with positive rights for trade unions, an
underlying objective was to pre-empt radical politicised
organisations of workers.	 The main device for achieving this
objective was the requirement for registration whereby the state
would determine the lawful objects and functions of any union and
the purposes for which funds could be expended. 	 Secondly the
importance of legal regulation in developing a minimum level of
democracy within unions was with regard to contents of the union
constitution and the management of finances and property. This
aspect was to remain generally unimplemented (infra: 8889). Thirdly
whilst in Britain and some other colonies like Ghana, Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia), Trinidad and Barbados, provisions were made for
the establishment of political funds in unions in the East African
territories, including Uganda, and as in Asia, political objects .
were completely forbidden (B.C. Roberts: 290). 	 Control over
objectives of unions and use of their funds in addition to stringent
requirements for any union amalgamations were also aimed at
depoliticising unions and restricting them to narrow industrial
levels and economistic purposes. All in all therefore the control
and bureaucratic - administrative aspects of the colonial state
vis-a-vis the democractic-judicial ones were enhanced by the 1952
Trade Union Ordinance.
3. THE EARLY DEVELOPHENT OF TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATIONS: 1945-1962
Although the Trade Union Ordinance was passed in 1952 the
colonial state did not initially encourage trade union growth and
employers were hostile to trade unionism in the 1950s. Instead
state policy was to encourage joint consultative machinery.
Nevertheless the 1950s saw the rapid growth of trade unions and an
increase in workers' militancy, especially in the deployment of the
strike weapon. State policy after 1949 generally succeeded in
limiting these strikes only to economic objectives and to shed the
political characteristics or strong association with political
struggles of the 1945-1949 period. The depoliticisation of unions
and workers' struggles generally was to be achieved by:	 1) the
redressing of grievances of the rising petty bourgeoisie; 2) the
petty bourgeoisie's own organisational separation, from the workers,
in staff associations; 3) the ideological training the trade unions
received from the British TUC and the ICFTU with state assistance or
encouragement.
The growth of trade unions greatly increased from about 1955-
for a number of reasons: first, the objective conditions were
changing as new industries were being set up which needed skilled,
stable labour; secondly, there was a general awareness among workers
of the need for collective organisation especially as the struggle
for independence intensified; thirdly state policy began to change
when it was realised that workers were opposed to joint consultation
and the state together with the foreign unions especially the ICFTU
began to encourage education for union leaders to ensure the growth
of "responsible" unionism. Finally we argue that in large measure
most of the restrictive provisions of the 1952 Ordinance were not
used because the ideological training the unions received had
depoliticised them.
	 This result also depended upon the weakness of
the nascent trade union movement and the acceptance by the petty
bourgeoisie to organise separately in staff associations in places
of work and politically, in political parties led by them but
organically not linked to any workers' organisations.
a) THE POLICY OF JOINT CONSULTATION
Between 1950-1955 in spite of the enactment of the 1952 Trade
Union Odinance the strategy of the Colonial state was to promote
joint consultation machinery and, together with employers, was not
in favour of trade unions. This, as we shall see, was also the
strategy in the political field where co-option was meant to creaW.a
pro-status quo middle class. From 1950 the Labour Department argued
that
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in the absence of responsible trade unions or any
trade unions at all, some form of industrial
relations machinery, which will enable management
and employers to meet regularly to discuss common
problems must be introduced if our industrial
process is to proceed smoothly (ARID 1950: par. 59).
In this respect the suggestion was that •
the most suitable form this machinery can take is
undoubtedly the staff association or works 
committee. These bodies consisting of
representatives of management and employees in a
single undertaking meeting round a table, or under a
tree according to local circumstances, have already
been successfully introduced in two neighbouring
territories (ibid.).
The justification was both managerial and paternalist, because:
they provide not only a safety valve for the airing
of grievances but also a valuable channel of
communication whereby management can explain changes
in conditions of employment. Machinery of this sort
also serves to educate the African in the ways of
negotiation through representatives, the electoral
principle and the proper conduct of meetings"
(ibid.).
So from 1950 onwards the colonial state took the initiative to
encourage Government Departments and large private employers to
establish works committees. By the end of the year 11 of then had
been established (ARID 1950: par. 60). By 1953 they had increased
to 50 representing 33,000 employees (ARID 1953: 25). And in 1955
they were made compulsory for each government department employing
more than 50 workers in one centre (R. Scott: 41). By 1957 out of a
total of 97 Works Committees, 76 were in government departments, 7
in public utilities and 14 in private industry covering a total of
90,000 employees in all (ARLD 1957: 14-15) while by 1959 they had
increased to 130 (ARID 1959: 21).
In spite of their proliferation however they were never
accepted willingly by workers. Their Chairmanship was always in the
hands of management (ARLD 1951: par. 69). Employees complained that
they were useless as they merely discussed wages and later some
other conditions of work. For instance in one committee of the
Mengo and Mubende Public Works Department which met 12 times in 1957
out of 105 items dealt with 21 were agreed in committee, 20 not
approved, 6 deferred and a whole 58 concerned only information to
to employers (ARLD 1957; 15). Further, in most cases workers'
"representatives" on the committees were appointed by management and
were the educated group, the nascent petty bourgeoisie who never
represented the ordinary workers' interests (W. Elkan 1955: Cap 6;
1960: 66-74).
By 1958 the Colonial state admitted that
"while works committees continued to function
satisfactorily as long as things are quiet they tend
to be bypassed and have no authority over workers at
times of stress when events lead suddenly to a
strike" (ARLD 1958: 21).
It was being admitted that the committees had essentially been and
were seen by workers as management tools. Moreover a number of
strikes had been engaged in by workers against the advice of works
committees (R. Scott: 14) while management often just appointed the
educated to represent workers (W. Elkan 1960:12). And anticipating
their demise as unionism took hold, and especially as independence
approached, the state came to accept their short term value. By
1959 the Labour Department accepted that
as workers become organised into trade unions they
will no longer be content to accept wages and
conditions of service imposed arbitrarily by employers
even where these are above average. With emancipation
in the industrial field, just as in the political
field, there comes a strong reaction against
paternalism,
 in any form. Employees should appreciate
that, once a union is recognised, it will demand the
right to negotiate wages and terms of service and if
sound industrial relations are to be developed it is
most important that proper negotiating machinery
should be established (ARLD 1959: 18-19).
Although the state had for a long time refused to encourage
trade union growth by the mid-1950s a number of factors led to a
change of policy. It is to the development of trade unions, then
that we now turn.
(b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONISM
We have already seen that the only trade union before the 1945
General Strike was the UAMDA which was even not wholly a workers'
organisation. But together with the domestic workers, UAMDA led the
1945 strike.	 The reaction of the state was not to encourage
"responsible" unions then but to seek to alleviate workers'
grievances by wage increases, and better conditions of work by the
enactment of more protective employment, factory and compensation
laws. The 1949 peasant rebellion which had followed a spate of
strikes a few months before was greeted with state force and some
political reforms which allowed peasant representation in the
Buganda Lukiiko (Low and Pratt: 282). Following this rebellion the
UAMDA Secretary was imprisoned for his role in it. And because
after the 1945 strike UAMDA leaders had been deported, for most of
the time between 1945-1949, UAMDA had been leaderless. Following
the peasant rebellion and the imprisonment of the Secretary the fact
that the union had not sent its annual returns since 1945 was used
to deregister it on the pretect that it had ceased to exist (ARLD
1949: 15). In 1949 a new union, the Uganda Transport and General
Workers' Trade Union, had been formed, after the deregistration of
UAMDA. But following the April peasant rebellion in which the
leaders of the new union were involved the leadership was deported
and by the end of the year the union collapsed and was also
deregistered (ARLD 1959: 15; R. Scott 1966: 10).
Otherwise the only workers' rudimentary organisations after
1945 were the civil service staff associations (European, Asian and
African) and union branches of the East-Africa-wide services: the
Railways and the Postal and Telegraph services. The latter were ,
organised largely because of being part of the inter-territorial
enterprises thus being influenced by the earlier organisation of the
workers in Kenya.
The postal workers had been organised for some years as a
welfare association but registered themselves as the Uganda African
Posts and Telegraph Welfare Union in 1951 (ARID 1951: par 67). On
the other hand the Railway African Staff Union had been formed in
Kenya during World War II with its headquarters in Nairobi and
founded a branch in Kampala, Uganda in 1946 (R. Scott 1966: 11; R.D.
Grillo 1974: 44). By 1948, it is also reported the European Staff
Association (ARLD 1947: 23) and the Kenya and Uganda Asian
Association, in the Railways, had been established (ARID 1949: 15,
20) in Uganda.
The first union to register under the 1952 Ordinance was the
Kampala Local Government Staff Association. Although it claimed to
be multi-racial it was mainly composed of European and higher paid
Asians with only one African member (R. Scott: 12) though originally
other Africans had joined (ARLD 1952: 18).
The second union to register was the Busoga African Motor
Drivers Union, in 1953. It had protested vigorously against the
restrictive 1952 Ordinance and contained the core of I.K. Musazi's
organised motor drivers before 1949 (ARLD 1953: 24; R. Scott: ibid.).
By the end of 1954 there were four registered unions and four
employees' associations notified to the Registrar as Table I shows.
TABLE 1: TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONS 1954
TRADE UNIONS	 REGISTRATION NO
AND DATE
The Kenya and Uganda Railway Asian
Union	 No. 3/1948
The Uganda Posts and Telegraphs




The Kampala Local Govt. Staff Assoc. No. 1/1952 	 78
Busoga African Drivers Union 	 No. 1/1953
	 370
EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION S
The Uganda African Civil Servants
Association
The Uganda Asian Civil Servants
Association
The Uganda European Civil Servants
Association






Source ARLD 1954: 77, Table 10 
By the end of 1954 therefore the only existing unions apart
from the Drivers Union, in addition to the staff associations in the
civil service, represented mainly white-collar Postal and Local
Government workers as far as Africans were concerned. By this time
the state was still insisting on the development of works committees
and staff associations instead of trade unions. The employers had
all refused to recognise all these unions as the law did not require
them to do so under any circumstances. Between 1953-1954 the only
accepted activity for the unions was simply to be consulted in ad.
hoc joint committees set up to consider the implementaton of the
Lidbury Report on the East African Civil Services (CO: 1954). So
the Municipal Council, the Posts and Telegraphs Administration and
the Railway Adminstration consulted the relevant unions; but the
staff associations were equally consulted. 	 In other words in
practice there was no distinction between a registered but
unrecognised union and a staff association.
Nonetheless the period 1955-1962 saw the consolidation of trade
unionism in Uganda as a result of changed circumstances. There were
three main reasons for this. First the objective conditions of
labour were changing because new industries were being set up and
required skilled or semi-skilled and stable labour. The setting up
of import-substitution industries in Uganda was a post World War II
phenomenon and was part of British policy at the time to earn and
conserve as much dollar currency due to British reliance on U.S.
products and loans for post-war reconstruction (D.W. Nabudere 1980:
102-108). Imports from dollar areas were discouraged and exports to
them were now encouraged. The first "Development" Plan in 1947,
beginning with the construction of Jinja Hydro-Electric Dam in 1952,
set out the projects to be developed. In 1952 Uganda Development
Corporation was set up, as a state holding corporation, to spearhead
industrial development and between 1952 and 1962 its subsidiary and
associate companies covered: textiles, fertilizers, mining, steel
and iron, cement, food and hotel and real estate enterprises (ibid:
104-107; J.J. Barya 1986: 24-5 Table I).
The second reason for union development was the growing
awareness of workers that collective action was necessary for the
improvement of their conditions of labour. There was a steady
growth of workers' militancy and willingness to strike. Many of
these strikes were led by trade unions and where benefits were won,
union support and membership increased. Between 1948 and 1962 the
year of independence, apart from the strikes of 1949 which
threatened to develop into a General strike, strikes increased and
then maintained a steady occurrence rate. But as Table II shows it
was mainly after 1958 that a further increase in strikes emerged
with more man-days lost as a result. Although the 1959 increase in
man-days lost was mainly a result of the 16-days Railway strike led
by the Railway African Union, strikes were taking place in other
workplaces, many of them unionised. The approach to independence
also spurred on the workers to demand better remuneration as much as
the politicians were demanding self-rule and political emancipation.
TABLE II	 NUMBER OF STRIKES AND MAN-DAYS LOST 1948-1962

















The militancy of the workers accelerated the states' change of
policy in favour of genuine unions as against simple joint
consultative bodies. This change of state policy was the third reasm
for the development of trade unions especially between 1955-1962.
In 1955 five more unions were registered and on one occasion a wage
agreement was negotiated for the first time. In the wake of the
1955 flare up of strikes in spite of the numerous works' committees,
the Labour Department began to change course and argue:
while works' committees continued to perform a
useful function, the fact has not been lost sight of
that they will never replace properly constituted
trade unions and probably as more advanced joint
consultative machinery is established they will
gradually disappear (ARLD 1955:17).
This change of course was even more necessary as in strike
situations works' committees were being bypassed by the workers who
had little confidence in them (Supra: 74 see also R. Scott:14). In
addition due to the state of the emergency in Kenya, many Kenyan
workers had run to Uganda for employment and many of them brought
their union experience to Ugandan workers.
By 1959 there were 22 registered unions with a book membership
of approximately 11,000 while the ten employees assocations notified
to the Registrar had over 10,000 members (ARLD 1959:89, Table 10).
However it must be said that most of these organisations were quite
small; only four unions had over 500 membership while most staff
associations had a membership of below 250 (see Table III p. 86).
The Postal and Railway Services had however established more
representative Joint Staff Councils whidh were now meeting often
(ARLD 1957:14; ARLD 1958:21). Then in 1958 the first two unions
were recognised and signed formal Recognition and Procedural
Agreements, one of them being the Uganda Tobacco Worker's Union.
By the end of the year four other unions were seeking
similar agreements.	 The	 Uganda	 Textile	 Workers	 Union,
established in 1958 in Nyanza Textile Industries Limited (NYTIL)
obtained formal recognition in 1959 and also signed a formal
agreement. But the Railway African Union in spite of protests and a
strike was not yet recognised (ARLD 1959:16).
But while workers generally were increasingly militant in their
economic demands the trade unions as institutions were being moulded
to be both moderate and apolitical. Originally the training of
members of works' committees and staff councils was undertaken by
the Labour Department with the help of the Community Development
Department by giving lectures and practical instruction in
industrial relations, labour legislation, the conduct of meetings
and the keeping of minutes (ARLD 1954:14). But the more far-
reaching ideological training of Uganda's trade unionists came from
the ICFTU in particular, with state support.
As far back as 1937 the British TUC had set up the Colonial
Advisory Committee in order to help improve labour conditions and
organisation (Archives of the TUC:1937). Their suggestion then was
that Labour Commissioners and Inspectors be appointed because they
saw the colonial state as a paternalist institution. Then in 1941 a
decision was made to send British trade unionists to help the
development of "responsible unions" and in Uganda such an officer
was appointed as a Labour officer in the Labour Department in 1949
(ARLD 1949:15). But the influence of the British TUC was minimal
and restricted to sponsoring individual trade unionists to courses
in Britain and elsewhere.
The most influencial training came from the ICFTU and to some
extent the AFL-CID. The first ICFTU Mission to East Africa which
included a TUC representative G. H. Bagnall came in 1951 (Archives
of the TUC:I951). The aim of the visit according to Bagnall, leader
of the delegation was "to establish contacts with the existing trade
union organisations to study the problems which confronted them; to
make a general survey of the economic and social conditions of the
people; to ascertain the views of governments and various political •
parties and to make proposals for the development of the free trade
union movement" (E. A. Standard, 6.11. 1951, M. Singh 1969:303).
The team met representatives from trade unions in Uganda to make
such contacts (ARLD 1951:par.66). Although the AFL-CIO also had an
advisor in East Africa, based in Kenya, trying to win over key
leaders "with a political future" eventually, as far as East Africa
was concerned, a "compromise was finally reached by which both
Britain and America agreed to channel the bulk of their future aid
through ICFTU and its associated organisations" (R. Scott:52). By
1957 both ICFTU and AFL- CIO were sending union leaders for training
in Europe and America (ARLD 1957:13) while at the regional level
East and Central African trade unionists attended a Conference in
1958 "for the main purpose of appointing a Central and East African
area committee to further the. aims of the ICFTU in the area" (ARID
1958:19). This followed an earlier meeting in Uganda between the
regional ICFTU representative and the East African labour
federations, including the Ugandan TUC, formed in 1956, where
similar meetings at regular intervals were agreedll.
The most significant achievement of the ICFTU before
independence in Uganda was the establishment in Kampala of the ICFTU
African Labour College in 1958. Uganda was chosen because it was
"indisputably African", well served by rail and air communication
.
and "close to the multi-racial University of East Africa n12
	But
the fundamental reason "not cited for diplomatic reasons was that
the (trade union) movement in Uganda was one of the weakest in
English-speaking Africa and would thus derive most benefit from the
presence of the College in terms of prestige and access to advisers"
(R. Scott:op.cit.73). This was true as far as the trade unions .
were ideologically uncommitted and organisationally weak. The ICFTU
would provide both training in technical aspects and ideological
direction.
The College lecturers came from large European and American
unions. And
the influence of the ICFTU, and the College in
particular, was readily apparent to the most
superficial observer. All unions of any
significance boasted at least one member of the
executive who had been on a College Course and this
experience was often shared with the African ex-
unionists on the other side of the bargaining table"
(ibid:54).
The curriculum for different courses aimed at "basic technical
education" for lower range union officials such as branch
secretaries and not merely national leaders (ibid:53). Emphasis was
on the technical aspects of trade unionism. This was the beginning
of the technocratic and careerist conception of trade unionism. In
particular unionists • were taught to eschew any trade union
relationship with politics. T. Mboya of Kenya, who advised the
formation of Uganda's TUC had warned against political and trade
union organic links (Uganda Argus 12.7.1955 in R. E.Gonsalves:217).
The colonial state's opposition to political unionism which was
reinforced by ICFTU trade union economism can be gauged from the
Labour Departments observations in the mid-1950's:
The trade unions, though they may be weak as yet,
are strong on one point: they have refused
steadfastly to allow their organisations to be used
for political ends by outsiders and the union
leaders have missed no opportunity to make this
clear to their own members and to the public.
Perhaps the motion adopted at the Annual General
Meeting of one of the registered unions can be
quoted, as it expresses very neatly the present
desire to be heard but also to be co-operative and
responsible. The motion read: "That one of our
bosses should be called to attend our Annual
General Meeting and have a tea party with him"!
(ARLD 1955:18).
Thus the aims of the colonial state and the ICFTU were basically the
same: that the union movement be apolitical and only economistic in
its function, that it be moderate and not militant and that it
eschews any left-wing political views or association with
"communism".
Whilst the technical training by ICFTU helped the general
development of trade unions it contributed to its "moderate"
character. The second influence in this direction was that the
grievances of the rising petty bourgeoisie were gradually being
redressed and had little reason to call upon workers to jointly
oppose both employers and the colonial state (see infra:90-91.).
Thirdly and closely connected with this was the organisation of the
civil servants, separately, in staff associations. In 1940 a Local
Civil Service had been introduced to embrace both African and Asian
officers but the better trained were later designated "officers"
while the lowest ranks, below the clerical grade were to be simply
"employees" 14 . But these changes did not apply to European officers
and Asian teachers (RU 1974:24). In 1947 the Civil Service was
unified though racial pay structures remained. After the 1954 Royal
Commission of Enquiry into the East African Civil Services,
Africanisation of the higher grades of the civil service began to be
encouraged (C0:1948; C0:1954).
The demands of the petty bourgeoisie for "Africanisation" of
the civil service were not resisted
	
by the colonial state.
Between 1956 and 1961 Africans in the higher grades of the civil
service rose from 18 to 28 percent (M. Mamdani 1976:204). This is -
because such demands also served the interests of the colonial
state. It was part and parcel of the policy of creating a "middle
class" to take over after independence. The East African Royal
Commission Report had recommended the creation of such a class in
British interests:
We endorse the majority view of the Carpenter
Committee that "the ultimate solution to the problem
of supervision in this country lies.., in the
emergence of a foreman class amongst the Africans
themselves" (C0:1955: supra152).
Thus, according to the Governor of Uganda at the time, A. Cohen, to
co-operate with nationalists, among whom the civil servants were a
big component, was the best strategy for imperialism against
suspected communist influence in the nationalist movement.
Nationalists
provide some of the dynamic force in societies which
in Africa are often static or inert; and.., in
their social, educational, and economic ideas and as
unifying forces, the aims of these nationalists are
often the same as our own, the main difference being
in the pace of advance they wish to see (A. Cohen
1959:61).
Therefore the best course for colonial governments was to realise
this early and "by skillful anticipation... try to guide the energies
of nationalists into constructive channels and to secure their co-
operation in a programme of steady but not headlong political
advance" (ibid).
For this reason the civil servants were encouraged to form and
belong only to associations and not unions. The Uganda African
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TABLE III: TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATIONSAS AT
31st DECEMBER 1959
a) REGISTERED UNIONS:
Name of Union 
	
Book Membership 
(i) Membership under 200 
1. Uganda Railway Asian Union	 114
2. Kampala Local Government Staff Association
	 150
3. Uganda General Clerical Union
	 110
4. Uganda Shoemakers Union	 50
5. National Union of Journalists	 7
6. East African Railway and Harbours European Staff
Association (Uganda)	 26
7. East African Posts and Telecommunication
European Association (Uganda) 	 50
8. Uganda Printing Trade Union	 Not known
9. Lango Motor Transport Workers' Union 	 38
10. Uganda Co-operative Workers' Union	 180
(ii) Membership between 200-500 
1. Uganda African Posts and Telegraphs Welfare Union 	 285
2. Uganda Medical Assistants' Association 	 201
3. Makerere University College Employees' Union
	
380
4. Bugisu District Administration Workers' Union	 320
5. Uganda Tobacco Workers' Union	 460
6. Uganda Textile Workers' Union 	 500
7. Lango Vernacular Teachers' Union 	 220
8. Bukedi Local Government Workers' Union	 220
(iii) Membership over 500 
1. Lango District Administration Employees Union 	 1100
2. Railway African Union (Uganda)	 4000




4. Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union
	
1200
b) EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATIONS NOTIFIED TO THE REGISTRAR:
Name of Association 	 Membership 
1. Uganda African Civil Servants Association 	 3800
2. Uganda Asian Civil Servants Association
	
800
3. Uganda European Civil Servants Association 	 1100
4. Asian Teachers' Union of Uganda	 227
5. Uganda Dispensers' Association 	 58
6. Medical Laboratory Assistants' Association 	 27
7. African Health Inspectors' Association	 92
8. Uganda African Teachers' Association 	 4000
9. Uganda Nursing Orderlies' Association 	 44
10. Uganda Veterinary Assistants' Association 	 100
11. Uganda Meteorological African Staff Association 	 40
Source: ARLD 1959: 89, Table X
Civil . Servants Association represented the so-called "officers". By
1959 it represented about 3,800 civil servants while the only other
big African association, the Uganda African Teachers Association
represented about 4,000 teachers. The other associations were small
groupings of similarly placed civil servants with 100 or less
members each. Even the trade unions of the rising petty bourgeoisie
were very small and generally weak and "moderate". Table III shows
the existing trade unions and associations and their membership in
1959.
The organisational separation of the petty bourgeoisie, in
staff associations,who saw themselves as "officers" distinct from
the workers proper, in trade unions, and many of them unorganised15,
meant that both the unions and the associations due to different
colonial state tactics came to be moderate.
(c) A PARTIAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW
It should be pointed out that the Trade Union Ordinance was
applied by the state but only partly. As far as setting the
boundaries of legitimate trade union functions was concerned this
was achieved by legislation but the actual on-going supervision
envisaged by the law was not carried out for the most part mainly
because ideological training of the unions achieved the same result.
But it may equally be said that the legal prohibition of a
politicised trade unionism provided the basis for the ideological
success of ICFTU educational efforts.
As far as the objects of unions, the purposes for which funds
could be used and the refusal to register general unions were
concerned these were enforced. For instance, the Transport and
General Workers' Union whose "intention was to form a comprehensive
union for all workers in Uganda" in the transport industry was
accepted for registration (after giving up its objective of becoming
a general union) only for a small group of drivers thus becoming
the Busoga African Motor Drivers Union in 1953 (R. Scott:10, 12;
ARLD 1953:24). The ICFTU Mission to Uganda in 1958 also noted that
the Registrar resisted general unions and tended to "push any
embryonic grouping into registering as an association when it might
have progressed more quickly as a union" (R. Scott:38). The unions
formed therefore were confirmed to the narrow industrial form.
However the provisions intended to encourage democracy and
accountability were the ones hardly enforced. While for instance
the probationary union device was not used much probably because
many staff associations were encouraged (supra:S5-7) the provisions
giving the Registrar powers to inspect books of account, the
administration of union property and finances and the use of secret
ballots for voting were rarely used". Although the Colonial Office
had made it clear that the 1952 Ordinance prerequisites for union
legality and registration, prohibition of political funds and
restriction of union objectives, restrictions on leadership
eligibility, among others, were in contravention of ILO Convention
No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention 1948) the colonial state was not bound by this
as the Convention was not ratified in Uganda (CO:n.d.).Further,
although the colonial state argued that most of the restrictive
provisions had never been used but were intended to guard against
"the formation of unions for purely political purposes" WL:19594960
the point was that at this stage there was no need for such
enforcement of the law. Trade unions due to training from ICFTU and
other western unions were already apolitical and separated from
political parties in Uganda. This confirms B. C. Roberts' general,
assessment of British colonial policy:
Attention (was) also... paid to ways of influencing
the development of trade unions other than by 
legislation.	 (This was) the policy of giving
official guidance and assistance to unions through
labour department channels.., training facilities
for trade unionists... providing lectures, short .
courses... As political nationalism has risen in the
various territories in Africa it has been the policy
of the colonial office to try to keep trade unions
and their leaders as far as possible independent of
the political parties (B. C. Roberts:194-195).
So towards independence in 1962 although trade unions had been
depoliticised they had not grown into democratic institutions
either. Lack of enforcement of the democratic aspects of the law
and the enforcement of the anti-political provisions of the same law
had achieved this result.
4. TRADE UNIONISM AND NATIONALIST POLITICS
Prior to the 1950s political organisation was mainly concerned
with the interests of African landowners, farmers and traders whose
advancement had been hampered by colonial policies. The elements
which had belonged to the old Bataka Association/Movement (supra:
35 ) formed the Bataka Party following the 1945 strike. More
democratic reforms were now being demanded. An obscure African
Labour Party existed in the 1940s but appears to have been a
grouping of a few educated individuals engaged in petitioning the
colonial authorities. The "Party" actually organised no labour and
was one of the several petty bourgeois. pressure groups that soon
sank into oblivion (See R, Mukherjee 1956: 37-38).
However the formation of modern political parties was permitted
only with the post-World War II change of colonial policy.
Following the 1945 General strike and the 1949 peasant uprising, the
formation of political parties was allowed but the colonial state
first made sure that a middle class was in formation and that
political	 parties	 and	 trade	 unions	 would be separated
organisationally.
The new intermediary middle class of Africans was being
encouraged by allowing co-operatives to proliferate (M. Mamdani
1976: 197). Traders were also being assisted - licences in the
transport and commercial sectors were being granted and courses in
bookkeeping and small business management given (ibid. 201-202).
The Uganda Credit and Savings Bank was set up in 1950 and gave loans
to farmers and traders and other forms of business especially
construction and in 1954 the African Loans Funds was established for
farmers outside Buganda who did not have land titles for security
(ibid. 202). Moreover Africanisation in the civil service began to
be accepted and many Africans were being promoted to posts hitherto
restricted toAsians and Europeans. 	 As D.W. Nabudere put it this
process was part of the change in tactics by imperialism, British
imperialism in particular, to contain anti-imperialist struggles and
redirect them into controllable, "constitutional" channels.
In this readjustment the interests of the more
articulate and advanced elements of the petty
bourgeoisie were isolated and addressed, thus
creating a division in the alliance forces. The
rich peasants, the trader and capitalist farmer were
addressed step by step and the position of the
workers and poor peasant, was increasingly put in
the background. (D.W. Nabudere 1980: 148).
Our main concern here is to show how the concerns of the petty
bourgeoisie and the economism of the trade unions as inculcated by
the ICFTU kept trade unions and politics apart. This was so
because, although unions could not legally e:spouse and fund
political objects (S.16(1) 1952 Ord.), this should never have
prevented workers, as a class, from pursuing a distinct political
programme separate from the trade unions.
The main political parties before independence were the UNC
(Uganda National Congress), DP (Democractic Party), KY (Kabaka
Yekka), UPC (Uganda People's Congress) and the Progressive Party.
The Uganda National Congress was the first political party to be
formed in 1952. It was led by the Baganda petty bourgeoisie. Its
leadership consisted of shopkeepers, clerks, lawyers, journalists
and editors, school masters and a student (M. Mamdani 1976 : 208).
Its support in the country came from the cash-crop growing peasantry
demanding better prices and from the traders, teachers and civil
servants - the upcoming petty bourgeoisie (ibid. 208-9). In 1955 the
Progressive Party was formed representing Buganda Protestants
•
Chiefs,	 landlords of large estates, businessmen and rich
professionals. (D. Apter: 338). Then in 1956 the DP as formed.
Because the . UNC was linked to nationalist movements elsewhere which
advocated socialism and both the UNC and Progressive Party were
dominated by Protestant leadership the DP was formed clearly as a
Catholic Party. Essentially it was opposed to the Protestants
historically favoured in land allocation in Buganda and in political
office in most of Uganda; it was also opposed to the so-called
"Communist" influence in the UNC (ibid. 340; M. Mamdani, op. cit.
216-220).
The Progressive Party quickly sank into oblivion because it
had no social base while the UNC, because it relied an different
policies in different areas and due to bitter leadership struggles,
twice split and ceased to exist in 1960. The first split in 1958
led to the formation of Uganda People Union (UPU) which included
legislative Council members from different districts. In the final
split of 1960 the faction led by A.M. Abote joined with UPU to form
the Uganda People Congress (U.P.C.) (ibid. 346). Meanwhile the
Baganda Protestant chiefs and landlords formed the KY (Kabaka
Yekka - Only the King) to protect landlordism and "traditional
values".
What was the relationship between these political parties and
the young trade union movement? The most crucial point here is that
no organisational relationship could take place because under the
1952 Ordinance trade unions could not Espouse or fund political
objects.	 Although trade unionists could theoretically form a
political party distinct from the unions or at least adopt a
programme or demands before supporting any other Party especially as
workers were numerically a minority the conceptual separation of
unionism and politics was maintained and unionists only sought to
join parties as individuals. On the other hand, with the gradual
redressing of petty bourgeois grievances and the legalisation of
political party formation the bourgeoisie were no longer interested
in labour organisation. They only sought the support of the workers
and union leaders as individuals.
It was C. Makayu General Secretary of Uganda Trade Union
Congress (UTUC) formed in 1956 who first joined the Progressive
Party. Later he switched and joined the DP as an executive officer
(R. Scott: 149). But Makayu was soon ousted from the UTUC. Most
trade unionists however "asserted from the beginning that the unions
should avoid entanglement with politicians" (ibid. 150). The most
powerful union then, the RAU(U), could only declare in 1960 that
"complete industrial freedom could only be achieved when the country
attained political freedom" and therefore urged its members,.
individually "to support the African politicians who were working
for political freedom" (Uganda Argus 31-12-1960). But there was no
organisational or programmatic relationship between the UTUC or any
union with any of the political parties. The objective position of
the UTUC was articulated by its General Secretary in 1960:
The UTUC intends to keep aloof from politics and
does not identify itself with any particular
party... Were the UTUC to affiliate to a particular
party, it would cease to be a free labour movement.
UTUC members can join parties, but those who do so
join in their individual capacities and not as UTUC
officials (Uganda Argus 25 June 1960).
Thus as independence approached some individual union leaders
sought to become Members of Parliament for the DP or the UPC. The
UPC was essentially representative on non-Baganda petty bourgeoisie
that were not Catholic. However it was able to get the support of
several Legislative Council members from the former UPU and also of
the emerging state apparatus of the Africanised civil service (A.
Mamdani 1976: 212). It also made an alliance with the Buganda KY to
defeat the DP. The UPC however came to be supported by many workers
because of its policies for a welfare state (Constitution of the
UPC, Art. 3(iv)). The UPC unlike the DP and KY also made it clear
that
The Party shall always maintain a working alliance
with trade unions, co-operatives or farmers' and
youth organisations. The Party shall grant
affiliation with itself to any such organisation
whose policy is not inconsistent with that of the
Party (ibid. Art. 5).
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But the DP did not even have such provisions. Nonetheless trade
unionists joined it as individuals. In fact two UTUC leaders stood
in the 'same Kampala constituency, Francis Pulle, President of the
Clerical Union and Treasurer of UTUC for DP, while H.M. Luande UTUC,
President and RAU(U) President, for the UPC. Luande was elected (R.
Scott: 142, 196). His election however represented no organisat-
ional success of the workers, rather it revealed the use to which
an essentially petty bourgeois party like the UPC could put
workers' leaders in its own interests. Only one M.P., H.1.1 Luande
was a worker or trade unionist. The overwhelming majority of the 72
M.Ps were teachers, professionals and the administrative salariat,
especially the civil service: 75.7% of the 37 elected UPC members,
83.3% of the 24 elected DP members and 85.7% of the 21 Lukiiko-
nominated KY members (J. Jorgensen 1977: 329). With independence in
1962 the colonial state aim of leaving the country in the hands of a
petty bourgeoisie had succeeded. The trade unions by accepting the
ideology of economism had been excluded from political power and had
made no significant impact even on the programmes of the existing
parties.
CONCLUSION
Prior to 1945 due to the predominance of an immigrant semi-
proletarian workforce in an economy relying mainly on unskilled
cheap labour there were hardly any conditions conducive to working
class organisation. Though collective action and organisation was
beginning it was still very limited and the first trade union UAMDA
was itself, in class terms, a diffuse organisation. The original
trade union legislation (1937-1943) which was positive and
essentially liberal was enacted due to Colonial Office pressure and
a desire to conform with developments in Kenya and Tanganyika. It
was not seriously opposed by capital nor was it applied because at
the time labour was largely unorganised.
However it was the 1945 General Strike and subsequent
'political' strikes that led to the enactment of legislation
protective of labour which legislation had been shelved since the
1930s.	 The 1949-50 Trade Disputes and the 1952 Trade Union
Ordinances unlike the 1937-1943 legislation were a result of the
cumulative workers struggles in Uganda as well as in East Africa,
especially Kenya, and in other British Colonies. They were intended
to deradicalise and institutionalise workers' protests. The Trade
Union Ordinance had two major aims: to prevent a politicised left
wing trade union movement and instead to nurture an economistic one
which, nonetheless, was accountable to the membership to some
extent.
But in spite of the enactment of this law both the state and
capital were initially opposed to the development of trade unionism
and instead encouraged joint consultative machinery. But by the
mid-1950s due to workers resistance to this machinery, the increase
of strikes bypassing that machinery (which was seen as a mangement
tool) and changes in the nature of industry the colonial state
changed policy to encourage trade unionism as envisaged by the 1952
Ordinance.
Those aspects of the law designed to nurture democracy within
the trade unions were hardly enforced by the Registrar as the state
was least concerned with this aspect of the law. However, the
conceptual aspects of the law regarding legitimate union form and
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function were enforced due to registration requirements. But the
day-to-day control and supervisory aspects were hardly	 enforced
because the ideological training of the unions by both Western
unions and the state ensured the creation of an essentially moderate
apolitical unionism, thus rendering certain aspects of the law
superfluous. Besides, the organisational separation of the petty
bourgeoisie in staff associations and the gradual satisfaction of
their demands by the colonial state ensured that the proletarian
unskilled and semi-skilled workers were distanced from the struggles
of the emerging petty bourgeoisie. Finally, because political
parties were now allowed to be formed as part of the colonial
strategy to leave state power in the hands of the "middle class"
after independence and the trade union leadership accepted the
ideology of economism, this meant that workers who, as a class,
could have organised themselves and at least made and directed
demands to the petty bourgeois-led political parties did not do so.
Acting within the framework of the law the ICFTU educational efforts
helped automise the working class and make it a mere appendage of
petty bourgeois political organisations.
At a more general level the colonial period shows that law is a
class category. Because the liberal and less restrictive 1937-1943
trade union legislation came onto the statute books with no direct
agitation from Ugandan workers, it caused little controversy. But
because the later legislation on trade disputes regulation
(1949/1950) and trade union organisation (1952) were a conscious
response of the state to workers' struggle in Uganda (albeit taking
other colonial experiences into account) it was more comprehensive
and had considerable practical impact. However the success of the
law in depoliticising the trade unions and workers as a class
generally was concretised by the ideological outlook that western
trade unions infused into the embryonic Ugandan labour movement. At
the same time, because the Ugandan nascent petty bourgeoisie
accepted organisational separation from the working class by forming
staff associations (at workplaces) and the political parties, this
sealed the political emasculation of the working class.
Nevertheless the struggles of workers had at the very minimum
succeeded in precipitating the colonial state to enact legislation
which gave some positive rights of organisation to workers as a
class.
Finally the colonial period legislation is significant for the
post-colonial period for various reasons. First the positive
organisational rights established through struggle during the
colonial period were maintained after independence but the new
African ruling class was to reverse or circumscribe several of these
rights. Secondly although those legal provisions meant to enhance
democracy within trade unions were improved on after independence,
the post-colonial state like its colonial predecessor was little
concerned about the democratic aspects of trade unionism. Instead
the state concentrated on the control aspects of the law and
deradicalising the labour movement. Thirdly, during the 1950s the
ideologically apolitical and economistic conception of trade unionsm
was generally successful due to the unity of the colonial state and
foreign union educational efforts facing a weak embryonic labour
movement. This ideological outlook continued after independence but
was to be modified into the reformist ILO conception of trade
unionsm based on a consensual incorporationist view of industrial
relations called tripartism.
We shall argue in this thesis that the above points show that
although law has been an important device of the state in creating
the framework through which its objectives should be realised, law
in itself has not been sufficient to realise those objectives.
Instead political action by the state and the apolitical-
technocratic later shifting to a consensual-tripartite ideology of
trade unionism were crucial in shaping the effectivity of law in
this regard.
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CHAPTER ITN FROM INDEPENDENT TO STATE—CONTROLLED
TRADE UNION ORGANISATION: 1962-1971
INTRODUCTION
Building on the last chapter the aim in this one is to provide
a historical and class interpretation of the changes in the law and
an assessment of the relative importance of law in shaping the
character of trade union organisation between 1962-1971. This
chapter argues that the first post-colonial government of the UPC
led by A.M. Obote sought to redesign the industrial relations legal
framework as set up under colonialism by restricting its liberal
voluntary character and enhancing the state control aspects of the
law.	 In this the ideology of development (See Cap 1:23-25) became
the pervasive motif in the state's conception of the legitimate
function of working class organisation in trade unions. There were
two motivating reasons for this: first, the government intended to
curb the militant political trade unionism that prevailed between
1962-1964. This was the immediate raison d'etre for the post-
colonial industrial relations legislation enacted between 1963-1965.
The second and more long term aim of the government was to curb
industrial disputes, enhance industrial peace and thereby attract
foreign investment for economic development.
The strategy was originally to restrict trade union rights by
increasing state intervention in union organisation and
administration and further restricting the right to strike, between
1962-1968. Later, between 1968-1971, the strategy changed to one of
attempting to incorporate trade unions within state institutions in
the "socialist" development strategy called the Move to the Left,
thus in essence ending the existing trade union automony. However
the whole strategy was halted by the Amin. coup of 1971 who
reversed most of these policies.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 places
the workers as a class in the context of Uganda's political economy
as it evolved up to 1971. Section 2 is an account of the split in
the trade union movement and how one faction, the militant and
political one was particularly responsible for the immediate
decision by the government to enact the new trade union and trade
disputes legislation and state its vision of development.
Section 3 sets out the post-colonial industrial relations legal
framework and the opposirig views of the state and a section of the
labour movement supporting it on the one hand and the section that
opposed (pervasive) legal restrictions on union organisation and
action in defence of workers' interests.
Section 4 looks at the law as it operated in practice vis-a-vis
other factors affecting the character of trade unionism. We contend
here first, that while state objectives to create relatively big
unions through the registration process were generally successful
the viability and stability of the unions was mainly at the formal
institutional level.	 In • particular state control was more
difficult to achieve. State Control through the sponsorship of a
pro-government faction failed and it was for this reason that direct
control
	 through incorporation was attempted between 1968-1971.
Secondly like under colonialism the democratic aspects of the law were
not actually enforced by the state. Thirdly, and probably most
important, the new trade disputes legislation while reducing
disputes did not create the industrial peace aimed at. On the
contrary workers chose to disregard the legal and constitutional
channels of resolving disputes in favour of unofficial and illegal
industrial action. Related to this is our contention that while
certain policies (minimum wages and Africanisation) improved all
wage-earners living conditions generally, only a very small section
of the working class, a so-called labour aristocracy substantially,
gained from the Obote I (1962-1971) labour policies while a new
African dominant class based in state institutions, the bureaucratic
(or state) bourgeoisie, was being created at the expense of both
workers and peasants. So while the restrictive laws were aimed at
the working class generally the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was
increasing its share of the national surplus and this was to be even
more so with the so-called "socialist" policies of the Move to the
Left.
We argue in Section 5 that the trade unions' reliance on
tripartite institutions and the Labour Consultative Council (LCC) in
particular as the most important method of demanding legal changes
to improve workers' organisational rights was not helpful because it
excluded rank and file input in the law-making process.
Finally Section 6 specifically deals with the Move to the Left
Strategy as part of the general policy change in which the 1970
Trade Unions Act was enacted which effectively destroyed trade union
automony and created a single trade union for the whole of Uganda.
In addition political and administrative plans were being made to
incorporate trade unions in state economic institutions while
excluding them from political power. Law was used here as part of a
political process of monopolising . power by a bureaucratic
bourgeoisie while the leadership of the unions was, it seems, to be
,	 '
used to control and discipline workers by ensuring that the union
leadership had a stake in the new economic institutions, especially
parastatal companies.
1. THE PLACE OF WORKERS IN UGANDA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 1962-1971
Uganda developed, from colonial times, essentially as a peasant
economy. In 1959 for instance out of a population of 6.5 million
only 315,000 (or 4.8%) were urban dwellers; by 1969 out of 9.5
million people only 747,000 (or 7.8%) constituted the urban
population; . while in 1980, out of 12.6 million people only 1.1
million (or . 8.7%) lived in urban areas (A. Walugembe-husoke: 6a)
areas, while the rural population
estimated that in the mid-1980s the
15 million people, is only about
concentrated in the urban
is essentially peasant. It is
urban population, out of about
10% (ibid: 5-6; See also RU
Ugandan wage-earners are overwhelmingly
1989/1990:26). Between 1960-1970, although there was some increase
in employment the percentage of employers to the working age
population actually dropped. In 1960 that percentage was 6.83 while
in 1968 it was down to 4.98% only, rising to 6.12% in 1970 (J.J.
Jorgensen 1977: 398). Numerically therefore, the trade unions, due
to such a small base, are in a weak position though their location
in the urban and monetary sector enhances their otherwise precarious
position vis-a-vis other classes and the state.
This weakness notwithstanding the 1960s decade saw a great
advance in unionisation because, in our view, unions offerred a
means for material advance especially outside the government sector.
As Table IV shows from a mere 3.5% of the recorded wage-earners in
the monetary sector in 1955 as union members, the union book
membership rose to about 60% of all recorded employees in 1970.
TABLE IV UNION MEMBERSHIP AS PERCENTAGE OF RECORDED EMPLOYEES
1955-1970
(a)	 (b)	 (c)
Year	 No. of employees	 Union	 No. of	 % of b/a
recorded	 membership unions
1955	 224,782	 783	 7	 3.57
1960	 254,200	 26,300	 35	 10
1965	 228,186	 90,000	 28	 39
1970	 298,868	 178,456	 25	 60
Sources: R. Scott: 18; ARML 1966: 19; 1970: 4; RU1974: 73-74;
RU 1969: 105.
But two things must be pointed out: the . figure of total employees is
understated as it does not include domestic servants and migrant
workers employed by rich .African peasants nor employees in
enterprises employing less than 5 people (RU: 1982: 11-12).
Secondly the book-membership could often be overstated by unions
wishing to appear big, strong and viable before government. For
instance of the 1970 figure only about half constituted the paid up
membership (ARML 1970: 4).	 So, although union membership
undoubtedly greatly increased in the 1960s it was probably only
around 307. of all unionisable employees by 1970. The small size of
wage-earners and even the smaller size of union membership provided
the backdrop for government claim that trade union autonomy, rights
and especially the right to strike all as stipulated by ILO
Conventions and as interpreted would not be in the interests of the
rural dwellers, peasants and the unemployed l. The claim of
government is assessed in section 4(c) and found groundless.
2. TRADE UNION FISSURE AND JOINT TRADE UNION AND POLITICAL
MILITANCY (UFL AND UPC-YL): 1962-1964
a) THE SPLIT OF UTUC AND FORMATION OF UFL.'
In 1961 the Uganda Trade Union Congress (UTUC), the only union
national centre from 1956, split. The split was mainly a result of
the domination of UTUC by Kampala based unions which neglected the
Jinja-based ones. But later ideological and leadership differences
reinforced and maintained the split. It was partly due to the
ftilitancy of the new centre the Uganda Federation of Labour (UFL) it
zoncert with a section .of UPC, the UPC-YL (Youth League) in
organising strikes and demonstrations that led to the enactment of
the 1963-1965 industrial relations legislation.
Before 1959 the UTUC leadership was almost exclusively from•
Kampala based unions. Although the' leadership was reconstituted in
1959 to include some Jinja-based unionists the latter were never
satisfied and continued to complain of UTUC dictatorship which was
mainly its acting without consultation and 'failure to assist weak
unions establish themselves (ARLD 1959: 16-17; R. Scott: 37). What
sparked off the split was misuse •of office by J. Reich Vice-
- .,
•
•President and A. Banyanga, General Secretary of IMMIC. Both were
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from Jinja-based unions. In 1960 invitations from the All-African
Trade Union Federation(AATUF), then in formation, for a preparatory
conference were taken up by the two officials without authority from
any UTUC organ (RU 1969: 7). The UTUC General Council then,
suspended them and a General Meeting later confirmed the suspension
in January 1961 (R. Scott: 139).
Having made themselves known to AATUF and probably especting
support from that quarter J. Reich and his supporters, all from the
Jinja unions, launched an alternative union centre, the Uganda
Federation of Labour (UFL) in March 1961. Although the Labour
Commissioner would have preferred only one centre, the 1952 Trade
Union Ordinance made no provisions regulating national centres, and
so he indicated he could do nothing about the development (Uganda
Argus 1.2.1961).
Originally the UFL did not see or present itself as being
ideologically opposed to UTUC. In fact it even applied to the ICFTU
for recognition to which UTUC was already affiliated. It also
declared that it was "in no way opposed to ICFTU policies and...
would not seek associaticn with the Ghana-sponsored All African
Trades Union Federation" (Uganda Argus 6.3.1961). Its contention
was that it was formed because of "the dictatorial and undemocratic
policies of UTUC in Kampala" (R. Scott: 139).
But both UTUC and ICFTU were opposed to J. Reich's association
with the initiatives of Ghana and Guinea to form an independent Pan
African union federation. ICFTU therefore intensified its support
for UTUC against UFL: a full-time Regional Organiser was stationed
in Jinja and some of the Jinja unions returned to UTUC (ibid. 141).
UFL throughout 1961 continued to have only a precarious existence.
However it has been suggested by one writer that UFL and UTUC
represented two opposing ideological conceptions of trade unionism.
He argues,
The UFL was formed in 1961 when the militant
manufacturing unions broke from. the TUC. Although
the split.., appeared to be a struggle for
leadership position, it in fact reflected a conflict
between two different conceptions of trade union
activity. The Jinja unions argued for a close
alliance with the nationalist movement and against
the "economism" of the TUC. Thus on its formation
the UFL allied with the UPC, While the TUC
affiliated, with the "free world" ICFTU, the UFL
allied with the Nkrumah-inspired AATUF. While the
TUC leader Humphreys Luande entered parliament as an
"independent" both leaders of the UFL, Reich and
Kibuka formally joined UPC (M. hamdani 1976: 239).
Both the facts and the analysis here are questionable. The UFL
was not founded on the basis of principled differences with the UTUC
in connection with the latter's moderation and pro-ICFTU ideology of
trade union economism. UFL was formed due to UTUC's neglect of
Jinja unions and began to associate itself with UPC after the latter
had won the April elections preceding Uganda's independence in
October, 1962. In fact at the end of 1961, because J. Reich himself
had resigned and become a Personnel Officer at Madhivani Sugar
Factory, Lugazi (in addition to being Deputy Mayor of Jinja) and
because some unions had returned to UTUC, UFL was moribund. (R.
Scott: 141). The UPC itself prior to the 1962 elections did not
have any commitment to either UTUC or UFL (See also infra:154).
Indeed H.M. Luande, UTUC President and RAU Secretary General and UPC
Vice-President for Buganda, whose views on the need to separate
unions and political parties organisationally were well knowland
opposed by a section of the UPC stood for the Independence elections
as and was elected a UPC M.P. in Kampala (See Cap. 11:94; A. Mujaju
1974: 4). Yet otherUTUC leaders supported D.P. and F. Pulle, UTUC
Treasurer had stood as a DP candidate (R. Scott: 142). Luande's
resignation from the UPC came only later in 1964 in opposition to
legislation and policies restrictive of union organisation and
autonomy (R. Gonsalves : 333).
Further although both J. Reich and E.R. Kibuka, General
Secretary of Uganda Public Employees Union (UPEU), formed only in
December 1961, were members of UPC the UPEU itself was affiliated to
neither UFL nor UTUC. And two months before independence UPEU
joined UTUC; and Kibuka, between 1962-1963, was acting General
Secretary of UTUC (R.Scott:145-6). 	 In short, no ideological
separation concretely existed between UFL and UTUC, initially.
Nonetheless following UPC electoral success and a few months
before independence UFL began to shape its ideological character and
allied itself with the UPC-Youth League (UPC-YL). Led by the UPC
Secretary General J. Kakonge, in concert with UFL, UPC-YL encouraged
political and militant unionism. It was this alliance of political
and trade union organisation that fuelled the high expectations of
workers from political independence leading to numerous strikes and
other industrial action. In turn this precipitated the UPC regime,
which took power in 1962, to outline its industrial relations
policy.	 First it enacted the restrictive legislation on trade
unionism and trade disputes. Secondly, the government sought to
assuage workers grievances by increasing minimum wages and above all
tried to encourage tripartism whereby workers, employers and the
state would work co-operatively rather than antagonistically.
Thirdly, it was also in this context that the ideology of
development and "the interests of the nation" as a whole began to be
articulated by government in opposing more organisational rights and
better living standards for workers.
(b) MILITANT POLITICAL UNIONISM AND THE ENACTMENT OF RESTRICTIVE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGISLATION.
Between 1962 and 1964 DEL and UPC-YL waged a joint struggle
aimed at obtaining better wages and terms of employment for workers-
In addition they also engaged in political activity together in
order to assert or express Uganda's independence.	 UFL also
developed close relations with Eastern Bloc trade unions and by 1963
had begun an ideological campaign against both UTUC and ICFTU. The
two main elements of its campaign were: first, to support the ideas
of Panafrican non-alignment also held by a section of the ruling UPC •
Party and second, to support state intervention in union affairs as
expressed by UPC. The UFL President arguing against U.S.A. union
influence in some Ugandan Unions was also able to state that to
prevent this he did "not consider it a bad thing to introduce new
legislation to restrict the rowers of unions as in the case of
Tanganyika" (Uganda Argus 5.2.1963). The Secretary-General of UPC,
J. Kakonge argued against UTUC independence from both party and
government. He contented,
The ICFTU leaders have called on so-called
independent African democratic states to support
their "struggle"againstthelegitimateGovernment of
our nation to maintain the so-called undiluted
democracy. If this is not the TUC setting itself up
in arms against our Government, what else can it be?
(Uganda Argus 17.4.1963).
The UPC continued to threaten that the trade union movement
would be taken over as an organ of the state and the Administrative
Secretary of UPC came out in support of UFL and UPC-YL proposals in
this regard (R. Scott: 154). Although the UPC as a whole favoured
party and government control of unions, there was a section in it
which went beyond this and supported a militant and politicised
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union movement. This was represented by J. Kakonge, the UPC-YL and
UFL.
The first African Government preceding independence had been
led by DP in 1961 and had awarded wage increases to government-
unestablished employees, even beyond those recommended by a
Committee of Enquiry
	 (instead of 5hs 2.60 per day for rural
areas and Shs 3.40 for urban areas: a flat rate of Shs 4.00, minimum,
was awarded, UG: 1961). The UPC, then in opposition, had promised a
wage structure guaranteeing "a decent minimum standard for all
workers and their families" (Uganda Argus 6.4.1962) among other
things.
But the workers were not satisfied with DP wage increases nor
UPC promises. In any case the wage increase only covered government
unestablished employees.	 A strike wave hitherto imprecedented
ensued. As independence approached workers began to demand better
conditions starting with the first African "self-goverment" regime
of DP in 1961. In that year 76 strikes took place. But in 1962 due
to UFL and UPC-YL involvement now the number of strikes rose to 161,
more workers were involved, though fewer man-days were lost compared
to 1961 due to the short duration of the strikes. The strike wave
continued throughout 1963, with 150 strikes, more workers involved
than in 1962 and 94,281 man-days lost. Up to 1965, when the new
industrial relations legislation was beginning to be implemented, in
addition to wage increases in 1964, strikes remained high. Table V
shows these developments.
TABLE V STRIKES IN UGANDA 1960-1970
Year No. of Strikes No. of Workers
Involved
Man-days Lost
1960 55 27,380 105,440
1961 76 18,995 105,631
1962 161 25,563 96,986
1963 150 33,381 94,281
1964 108 13,088 39,590
1965 96 17,689 55,847
1966 56 5,115 12,954
1967 48 5,395 10,478
1968 58 7,498 12,384
1969 95 3,202 66,327
1970 45 10,304 19,459
Sources: B. Nicol 1979: 292; ARML 1970: 5; ILO 1977: 843
The predominant demand in the strikes was for wage increases.
But other demands were also made. These related to management
attitudes to workers, victimisation of union members and employers
refusal to recognise or negotiate with union representatives -
demands mainly related to rights of organisation. (R.E. Gonsalves:
295). In general even outside strike situations demands for
Africanisation, higher minimum wages and the dismantling of the
racial wage structures continued. Even H.M. Luande of UTUC rejected
the slow, moderate pace of Africanisation advocated by the UPC-Obqte
government (from April 1962) contending that "it is useless to give
guarantees to expatriates who have despised us for over seventy
years (Uganda Argus 30.5.1962).
The strikes between 1962-1964 in particular were called by
unofficial leaders and the UFL and UPC-YL in opposition to most
official union leaderships' call that the legal disputes procedures
be followed. The Teso cotton ginnery workers' strike of January'
1963 is a case in point. The workers' slogan was "uhuru na
mshahara" (freedon and wages); they demanded wage increases and
objected to racial abuse by the Asian employers. In spite of
appeals by A. Obote the Prime Minister and F. Onama the Labour
Minister the workers refused to return to work before their demands
were met. The employers granted the wage increase and within a week
workers resumed work. The workers Victory enraged the employers.
The press, sympathetic to them, argued,
In effect, the Teso strike held the Minister to
ransom as well as the employers, and it resulted in.
an interim settlement that gave the employees a
considerable increase in pay rates pending the
announcement of the Minister's findings on the
minimum wage proposals... The Teso workers have
achieved something ahead of the rest of the country
as a result of an illegal and unrecognised strike.
(Uganda Argus 28.1.1963).
Because of its militancy the UFL, in concert with the UPC-YL,
came to command respect among a considerable section of the working
class, even beyond UFL affiliates. In some cases, grievances were
discovered only when workers lacking knowledge of their union or
having no union complained to local party offices. .upc-v, and UFL
took up their cause (R. Scott: 155). For instance in Kampala the
League followed up some disputes with motor traders and called out
•
the workers on strike.
	
One of the employers co-operated.
Immediately UTUC and the Uganda Federation of Employers (FUE)
complained to the Labour Ministry demanding that free collective
bargaining be enforced. The Minister reacted by imprisoning the
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strike leaders who were officials of UFL and members of the League
(M. Mamdani 1976: 240; R. Scott: 155).
In addition, the UFL and UPC-YL provided hope to the growing
numbers of the unemployed who hoped the organisation could put .
pressure on government to expand employment opportunities.
Politically the UPC-YL and UFL demanded respect for the new
African government by the British and Asian capitalists. For
instance they sought to enforce the display of the President and
Prime Minister's portraits in business premises and the removal of
the Queen's (A. Mujaju 1973: 298). They organised strikes and
demonstrations against Asians who had hitherto clearly allied
themselves with the colonial regime (ibid; R. Scott: 154). In one
instance the UPC-YL called for a deportation of leaders of British
business men who, at a party, had ridiculed Kenya's independence
celebrations and post-independence African life, caricaturing both
as a return to traditional backwardness. The deportation was
ordered (A. Mujaju 1973: 299). In 1964 and 1965 the League led
demonstrations against western embassies on several issues affecting
Uganda's interests (ibid.)
The militancy of UFL and UPC-YL caused consternation within UPC
itself and government. At the time a section of the UPC government
sought to attribute the strikes of 1962-1963 to foreign workers and
leaders especially Kenyans. One kinister, A. Nekyon charged that
"Kenya trade unionists who controlled most of the Ugandan trade
unions were practising a kind of sabotage through strikes" and even
threatened to deport "those leaders bent on sabotaging the national
effort" (Uganda Argus 6.10.1962).
	 Although most Kenyan trade
unionists were militant due to more working and organisational
experience they were not a dominent element in workers militancy in
Uganda. I fact out of 40 unions in 1962 (RU 1969: 105) only in RAU
and the Breweries Workers Union did Kenyans comprise 50% and 43% of
the union membership respectively (R.E. Gonsalves: 304). And of the
22 unions affiliated to UTUC in 1962 only 4 had Kenyan General
Secretaries (R. Scott: 163) while in the unions most active in the
strikes, ATGWU and NUCCTE, the leadership was predominantly Ugandan
(R.E. Gonsalves; 305).
UFL and UPC-YL activity exacerbated divisions within UPC. In
fact when UFL strike leaders had been imprisoned the radical
section in UPC opposed this and they were released though later re-
imprisoned on charges of assault and intimidation of non-Africans
(R. Scott: 155). But the conflict over UFL and UPC-YL activities
was part of a wider ideological struggle between the left-wing J.
Kakonge faction of UPC on the one hand and the right wing and
centre factions of the Party, in particular over the definition of
the function of workers' organisations and their relationship with
politics. In the event, the right wing and centre factions of UPC
acted in concert to destroy the left wing organisations: UFL, UPC-YL
and the leader, K. Kakonge.
Attempts to oust J. Kakonge from the UPC Secretary Generalship
started in 1962 (A. Mujaju 1974: 19-20). 	 In the 1964 Annual
Conference he was accused of being a "communist", delegates opposed
to him were arbitrarily increased and the elections process
manipulated so that in the end he was replaced by the right-wing
lawyer G.K. ibingira (ibid: 20-22; D.W. Nabudere 1980: 255-6).
Meanwhile in December 1963 A.M. Obote had pressurised the UPC-YL to
announce the dissolution of UFL which was then replaced by FUTU
(Federation of Uganda Trade Unions) in 1964 (RU 1969: 31). FUTU was
to be closely allied to the right-wing of UPC, and would be used
henceforth to oppose the independent UTUC. However because the UPC-
YL was itself still too powerful to be taken over directly, the UPC
right wing spearheaded by G. Ibingira the new Secretary General
began to create a parallel structure of decentralised regional youth
organisations (A. Mujaju 1974: 22). Further because UPC-YL partly
arose from the militancy of the unemployed another parallel
organisation NUYO (National Union of Youth Organisations) was
created to provide training and "facilitate the depoliticisation of
youth as well as to exercise strict control of their activities" (A.
Mujaju 1973: 303). MY° leaders and cadres were appointed and paid
by government as civil servants. UPC-YL continued but in 1965 some
of its leaders were expelled from UPC and it was forced underground
(ibid.).
The suppression of UFL and UPC-YL and the defeat of J. Kakonge
in 1964-1965 marked the end of an attempt to integrate militant
unionism and political organisation independent of government or
party control. But militant political unionism was not just
suppressed. Its historical importance is that it provided the
impetus for government to evolve its industrial relations policy and
legislation. Two strategies were adopted: first, workers grievances
were assuaged by wage increases and minimum wage stipulations on the
one hand and on the other the state sought to incorporate workers in
tripartite structures mainly the Labour Consultative Council and the
Industrial Relations Charter framework.
	 Secondly, and more
important, the restrictive trade disputes and trade unions
legislation was now enacted. Underlying both strategies was the
nascent ideology that the state had to look after the interests of
all classes and social groups by preventing organisation or action
detrimental to economic development, especially development largely
dependent on foreign investment.
As a result partly of the 1962 strikes and due to electoral
promises the government appointed a Minimum Wages Advisory Board to
review the wage situation. The flat minimum wage rate fixed by the
DP government was seen as unfair due to differences between central
and local government and was said to have "not unnaturally been a
cause of industrial unrest" due to its effect on the private sector
too (UG 1962: 4). The UPC Government also began to argue that wages
must not rise to the extent of widening the gap between peasant
incomes and workers' incomes (ibid.). Area wage differentials were
maintained with the hope that they would be abandoned in future.
The minimum wage now ranged between Shs 84.50 and 120.00 per month
depending upon the town (Minimum Wages Order 1963, S.I. 72/1963).
The restrictive labour legislation being mooted was a concerted
East African venture. The East African goverments at this time were
making consultations inter se in this area. While agreeing to
pursue a high wage policy with aminimum family wage, (R. Sandbrook
1975: 43) in the interests of development, unions would be
controlled and strikes curbed:
The East African governments are in a hurry to
develop and their countries cannot be jeopardised by
irresponsible actions or attitudes on the part of
trade unions and employees... While trade union
freedom and the right to strike are recognised, they
can also become dangerous tools if not responsibly
used or if abused (Uganda Argus 22.8.1982).
They then argued that "with provisions for effective arbitration
machinery, strikes or lockouts become unnecessary" and if such
machinery were not respected or adhered to "Government must act in
defence of the national interest and will not hesitate to legislate
the enforcement of agreements" (ibid.). But on behalf of UTUC
Luande argued against "selfish politicians" and those African states.
which had "embarked on arrangements, as a matter of policy, to
convert trade unions into an arm of government administration"; he
insisted that the trade union movement must fight "black capitalists
and imperialists to see that industrial freedom is achieved" (Uganda
Argus 20.8.1962).
A.M. Obote continued to condemn illegal strikes, attributing
them to weak leadership and union disorganisation (Uganda Argus
4.3.1963). Further he charged that foreign trade unionists posing
as advisors were behind the strikes. In particular, his view of the
ICFTU College was that "the College is supposed to teach leaders of
the movement.., if there are too many strikes the Government is
entitled to say that the College is not doing its job properly or is
actually engineering strikes" (Uganda Argus 12.4.1963). Later,
FUTU, under government tutelage, was to concur saying: "the
country's national economy was greatly endangered by a calculated
wave of strikes engineered by the ICFTU through the TUC" (FUTU:
1965). Yet as we have seen it was the UFL and UPC-YL that were at
the forefront of the strike wave although UTUC affiliated unions and
members were also involved." And as some of the leaders of FUTU were
originally leaders of UFL it was hyprocritical of FUTU to accuse
UTUC of engineering the 1962-1964 strike wave.
The constant threats by government and UTUC's knowledge that
government intended to control the union movement as Tanganyika had
done led UTUC to set out "to work for the establishment of a
voluntary tripartite structure to replace the system of bilateral
collective bargaining inherited from the colonial era" (R. Scott:
165). The UTUC seems to have been persuaded by some western unions
that to forestall repressive legislation "they should settle
voluntarily for some form of co-operation" (ibid.). In other words
UTUC was being pressurised in the direction favoured by government
anf FUTU.
The main institutions of the tripartite industrial relations
system preferred by government were the Labour Consultative Council
(LCC) and the Industrial Relations Charter. The LCC was inaugurated
in 1962 replacing the colonial Labour Advisory Board (UG: 1965:
1779). Its terms of reference were: "a) to advice the Minister of
Labour on all matters affecting labour policy and legislation; and
b) to keep under review the state of industrial relations and such
problems relating to employment as may arise" (LCC n.d). With
respect to the Industrial Relations Charter although the idea
originated from the Federation of Uganda Employers (FUE) at an LCC
meetng in 1962 (and was derived from the Kenyan Charter of October
1962) government encouraged it. Later it was reported that the 1963
TUC Congress showed that "trade union leaders are beginning to come
out in favour of adopting an Industrial Charter, possibly along
lines already adopted in Kenya, as an alternative to restrictive
labour legislation" (The Reporter 1.3.1963 in R. Scott: 165).
Negotiations soon followed among FUE, UTUC and government. The
Industrial Relations Charter was signed on 1st June 1964 between FUE
and UTUC with government as a witness and not a party. This was so
because government objected to committing itself to voluntary
industrial relations principles due to constitutional provisions
which gave the Public Service Commission unrestricted control over
matters regarded as negotiable by the Charter (ibid. 165-166).
3. THE POST-COLONIAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK: RESTRICTING WORKERS'
ORGANISATION
The post-colonial industrial relations legislation in Uganda had
certain common features with that of Kenya and Tanganyika especially
the latter. While the voluntarist Industrial Relations Charter was
an example from Kenya the legislation tended to be the restrictive
Tanganyika type. In fact whereas the Charter recognised voluntary
bilateral collective bargaining and the organisational rights of
workers and employers under state overview, the legislation tended
to undermine these rights. The aim of the new trade disputes and
trade union legislation was to ensure industrial peace and
encourages development. At the same time the government claimed it
intended to assist the development of sizeable, strong and stable
unions which were democratic and responsible to the union
membership. We shall now look at the provisions of the Charter and
the statutes vis-a-vis these declared aims.
(a) THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CHARTER 1964
The Industrial Relations Charter set out three main principles:
the recognition of union and employer rights of organisation; the
acceptance of legal, constitutional and peaceful dispute settlement
procedures; and the acceptance of tripartite bodies. The Charter
was a voluntary agreement and was not legally enforceable but simply
an agreed reference point. In the Charter both FUE and UTUC stated
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their	 belief	 that	 consultation,	 co-operation	 and mutual
understanding were essential for the achievement of efficiency and
productivity which would in turn be a foundation for good terms and
conditions of employment. To this end they agreed:
1. That management and unions respect each others right to freedom
of association. Management would recognise unions, accord
reasonsable facilities for normal union functioning and
undertook "generally to respect the provisions of ILO Convention
No. 98" (UG:Industrial Relations Charter 1964, Arts.1(viii) and
2 (i-i)). The unions on their part conceded that "management
has the exclusive right and power to manage its undertaking and
to engage, promote, transfer, demote or lay off employees and to
discipline, suspend or discharge employees for just cause..."
(Art. 3).
2. That both sides in accordance with democratic principles would
settle all future differences, disputes and grievances by mutual
negotiation according to the principles laid down in the Trade
Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance (Art. 1(iii)),
abide by the spirit of agreements mutually entered into (Art.
1(v)), settle industrial disputes at appropriate levels and
according to the laid down procedure (Art. 1(ii)) failing which
disputes would be referred to the government-established
machinery (Art. 5(b)).
In this respect Government as a witness to the Charter
agreed to maintain or introduce legislation providing machinery
for conciliation, arbitration and inquiry for different kinds of
industrial disputes and to associate, in the operation of the
dispute settlement, where practicable, respresentatives of both
workers and employers but on terms determined by Government; and
to ensure that tripartite bodies that already existed such as
the LCC met regularly (Art. 4).
	 Specifically however the
Charter would not apply to the public service or matters related
thereto (Art. 13).
3. Finally that both parties would "participate constructively in
tripartite bodies which may be formed by Government in order to
achieve liaison between them for the purposes of examining
labour policy and legislation, fostering industrial co-
operation, and raising industrial efficiency and productivity,
so as to build up the economic prosperity of Uganda" (Art. 6).
(b) THE TRADES DISPUTES (ARBITRATION AND SETTLEMENT) ACT 1964
In 1962 the independent government of Tanganyika had passed
three statutes meant to curb strikes and to bring the trade union
movement under state control (I. Shivji 1986:227-23. These were the
amendment of the Trade Unions Ordinance, the repeal and replacement
of the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance and the
enactment of the Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act
establishing a negotiating machinery for civil servants. These
statutes provided the guideline for similar legislation now
contemplated in Uganda. This was so because broadly the East
African governments were	 generally agreed by now that
developniefitrequired restrictions on labour rights (see R. Sandbrook
1975; 43-44; A. Ansden:100-102, 122-134; R. Scott: 159-163;
	 R.E.
Gonsalves:327-336; W. H. Friedland:130; I. G. Shivji 1983:16-17; W.
L. Kapinga). Following the passing of this legislation H. M. Luande
had called a UTUC General Council meeting to discuss the Uganda
Government plans to copy the Tanganyikan legislation of which he
claimed to have confidential knowledge (R. Scott:142-3). He was
soon to be proved correct.
Presenting the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Bill .
1964, G. B. K. Magezi, the Minister of Housing and Labour, affirmed
government's encouragement of voluntary industrial relations in
general.	 State intervention would only arise where agreement
between the parties could not be reached. He explained:
It is Uganda's policy that industry should be given
the fullest . encouragement and opportunity to
regulate its own affairs by its own machinery for
industrial relations. In many industries collective
agreements between employers and workers contain the
procedure to be followed for the settlement of
disputes... But in the interests of workers and
employers, the community as a whole and the country,
the Government has an ultimate responsibility to try
and prevent industrial conflict. It is, however an
accepted principle that the Government should only
intervene where, because workers and employers are
not organised, there is no effective bargaining
machinery in an industry or when negotiations
through an industry's own machinery have broken down
and no settlement of a dispute has been reached
(UG:1964(a):2400-2401).
The main innovations of the new Act were: to prolong the
dispute settlement procedure, to place the overall supervison in the
Minister of Labour, greatly restrict strike action even more so in
the essential services and to more systematically institutionalise
industrial conflict resolution.
Unlike under the 1949 Ordinance disputes were to be reported
not to the Labour Commissioner but the Minister (S.1(I),Cap. 200).
The Minister's options were very many. He could reject the dispute
if he considered it outside the Act's provisions or refer it back to
the parties for further negotiations (S.1(3)(a-c)); he could accept
the dispute and "endeavour to conciliate the parties" (S.1(3)(d)) or
refer it "with the consent of the parties thereto" either to an
arbitration tribunal appointed by him or the Industrial Court
(S.(3)(e)).	 But existing dispute settlement machinery between
workers and employers had to be exhausted before such reference
could be made, unless both parties consented to it (S.1(4)).
Alternatively the Minister could appoint a Board of Inquiry to look
into the dispute (S.6(1)). If the parties failed to implement its
recommendations the Minister could then refer the dispute to an
arbitration tribunal or the Industrial Court (S.6(5)). Any award
made by the tribunal or Industrial Court had to be submitted to the
Minister (S.7) who was the only one enpowered to publish it (S.8).
Apart from the elongation of the dispute settlement procedure
workers' right to strike was more severely circumscribed. First it
was now an offence for anyone to declare, counsel, procure or abet a
lock out or strike before the voluntary and statutory dispute
settlement machinery had been adhered to and exhausted (S.15). The
offence was punishable with up to one year imprisonment or a fine of
Shs.1000 or both (S.15(3)). The provision no longer applied only to
essential services. As for the essential services it was an offence
for any worker to break or terminate his contract of service whether
alone or collectively where the effect was to stop or substantially
diminish the availability of the service (S.16(1)(a)). 	 Here
punishment would be up to 14 days imprisonment or a 500 Shs. fine or
both (S.16(1)(b)). Even outside essential services where a worker
alone or with others broke or terminated his contract where the
result was "to endanger human life or public health, or to cause
serious bodily injury to any person, or to expose valuable property
to the risk of destruction, loss or serious injury" was guilty of an
offence (S.16(1b)).
	 Counselling the breaking or termination of
contracts in these circumstances was also an offence punishable with
up to three months imprisonment or a fine of Shs. 3000 or both
(S.16(2)).
Theoretically a strike was still possible in the essential
services. A strike notice had to be given and 14 days had to elapse
and the strike had to take place before the expiration of 21 days
after the delivery of the notice to the employer. Such seven-day
strike would be possible only if the notice was "accompanied by a 
Certificate under the hand of the Minister stating that a dispute in
an essential service has been reported, that twenty eight days have
elapsed since the date of the report, and that the dispute has not
during that time been referred by him for settlement by the
Industrial Court or an arbitration tribunal" (S.17). Thus only if
the Minister did not refer a dispute and the employer did not try to
settle in the periods provided for, could the seven-day strike take
place.
Finally, it should be pointed out that for the first time a
standing Industrial Court was established to avoid the ad hoc 
appointments of arbitration tribunals for dispute settlement as had
hitherto been the case. It consisted of a President appointed by
the Minister, an independent member and one respresentative for
employers and workers respectively (S.4(1 and 2)). But the President
would appoint the other members from panels representing workers,
employers and independent members, which panels would be appointed
by the Minister (S.4(2)(c-e) and (3)).
There were two important motivating factors for this Bill. The
first was the need to encourage industrial peace so as to attract
foreign aid and investment. The second need was to prevent the
politicisation of workers through such militant and politically-
directed industrial action emanating from the experience of UPC-YL
and the UFL between 1962-1964. On the first objective the Minister
explained:
Strikes and industrial unrest will earn a bad
reputation for this country and... the consequences
will be to deter investors from bringing industries
here and will discourage these countries who might
be willing to lend us money for development schemes
from giving us assistance (UG:1964(a), Supra:2043-
2044).
For the second objective the Minister was even more candid:
During the last few years there have been many
strikes called by individuals or local groups acting
irresponsibly. Most of the strikes which have
occurred have been unconstitutional, that is to say,
they have been called before the grievance procedure
contained in an agreement between the workers,
through their unions, and their employers have been
followed. Most of them have been unofficial, that
is to say, they have not been called by the union
following a decision taken by the executive
committee in accordance with the union's rules.
Sometimes strikes have not been caused by anything
arising out of the relationship between workers and
their employer but have been instigated by people
who were not even workers themselves, for political
reasons, or for other reasons, in order to serve
their own ends (ibid.2403).
Again while workers in the public service in essential services were
completely prohibited from striking, as we shall see below,
restrictions on strikes in essential services in the private sector
would apply to the withdrawal of labour "whether in persuance of a
trade dispute of otherwise" (S.17). This would be so also because
there is always a risk that a strike of workers in
an essential service might be called in support of
some political or other objective totally
unconnected with a trade dispute. Under the new
provisions restriction on withdrawal of labour will
apply to these cases also (ibid.2045). •
Opposition to the Bill was widespread. Both UTUC and the
opposition DP focused on the overwhelming powers of the Minister and
the implications of the Bill for voluntary industrial relations.
Even the press usually unsympathetic to workers added its
objections.
The opposition argued that the Industrial Relations Charter
signed only a month before and witnessed by the same Minister
introducing the new law had not been given a chance to foster
voluntary industrial relations processes. Strikes, they argued,
would continue so long as there is a misunderstanding between
workers and the employers (Mr. Magara, ibid. 2406). Disputes Mr.
Magara for instance contended should be reported to an apolitical
civil servant, the Labour Commissioner, as before, especially as
many recent strikes had been political and in fact organised by a
section of the UPC. He foresaw political bias from a Minister in
favour of workers who supported the Government (ibid. 2046-2047).
The appointment of the Industrial Court President, of the panel
members, or an arbitrator, the power to vary awards (S.8) all by the
Minister were seen as dictatorial and against industrial peace and
good industrial relations. Even at the committee stage objections
by H. M. Luande to the Minister's dictatorial and discretionary
powers, and proposals that they be subjected to some limitations
such as requiring the Minister to give reasons for his decisions,
were all brushed aside and the Minister's powers and absolute
discretions maintained (UG 1964(b):2504-2506).
Outside parliament trade union leaders organised no protest but
limited themselves to denunciations of the Act in the press. The .
Acting G. S. of UTUC, L. Wasuda threatened that unless the Act was
repealed workers and their families would not vote for UPC at the
next election. He maintained that
only mutual understanding can bring about stability
in the country, not restrictive laws. We have
understood and learnt that restrictive laws can only
drive people to act in a wild manner... Since strike
is our birthright we shall go on strike come what
may (Uganda Argus 16-7-1964).
Many trade unionists condemned the statute and felt that the UPC
Government had all along acted dishonestly by sponsoring tripartite
discussions on the Industrial Relations Charter while simultaneously
preparing restrictive controls over workers freedom to organise and
to withdraw labour (R. E. Gonsalves:329). Even the paper usually
unsympathetic to workers, whilst arguing in favour of the need to
protect the undefined "public interest", endorsed the view that "the
legal provisions.., proposed are stringent, providing penalties for
the withdrawal of labour in other than specified conditions. They
would appear, in fact, to seriously limit the freedom of many
employees if they are to be interpreted literally" (Uganda Argus 29-
6 - 1964).	 In spite of all this ' opposition, due to its
parliamentary majority, the UPC Government passed the Bill as
presented.
(c) THE PUBLIC SERVICE (NEGOTIATING MACHINERY) ACT 1963
The statutes which directly affected the organisational rights
of workers were the Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act of
1963 and the 1965 Trade Unions Act. We deal with the former first.
This Act fundamentally altered the nature of trade unionism in the
government sector in four ways. First it destroyed the collective
bargaining rights of UPEU (Uganda Public Employees Union).
Secondly, it subjected the public service to a dictatorial dispute
settlementprocess. Thirdly it completely removed the right to strike
in essential services operated by government and finally it reduced
the right to join a trade union to a privilege of only the
unestablished government employees with only a few others excepted.
It may be recalled that long prior to independence public
employees were organised in three racial staff associations and the
Kampala Government Staff Association (Cap. II: 36-37, 76-77, 85-87).
By 1959 however local government employees' unions were being
registered for instance in Bugisu, Bukedi and Lango, followed by
Busoga in 1961 (R. Scott: 22). In addition there were a number of
African staff associations covering medical assistants, laboratory
assistants, dispensers, health inspectors, nursing orderlies,
veterinary assistants and meteorological officers (ARID 1959; 89).
UPEU itself was formed only in 1961 with the help of the Public
Service International (PSI) as part of its initiatives to "assist"
African public employees' organisations (R. Scott: 118-120). In
fact prior to 1962 the Whitley Councils system which was being used
had proved ineffective. Hence the enthusiasm for union formation in
the run up to independence.
When UPEU was formed it amalgamated most of the local
government unions and included many officers of the established
section of the civil service and even senior civil servants; indeed
senior officers of the Central Government were then dominant in
UPEU, the first President being a University graduate who soon
became a Permanent Secretary (ibid: 130-131).
The intention of the UPC Government was to separate the
established from the unestablished section. Government tended to
view the established officials more as employers or the embodiment
of the state itself.	 It indicated informally that it would
recognise the UPEU as representative of only the E-I Scale
established group and the unestablished. And UPEU agreed not to try
to recruit nembers above the E-Scale.	 Further, Government
emphasised that
any attempt on the part of the union to recruit from
staff graded in other scales would be regarded as a
breach of the agreement and result in the withdrawal
of recognition of the union as a negotiation
machinery for all Central Government employees
(Uganda Argus 14.8.1962).
Besides, the Government made a 20% salary reduction for all
recently appointed super-scale civil servants following a
recommendation of a Commission on Africanisation (CO: 1960)
ostensibly to increase wages for the unestablished employees. Thus
a division was achieved as senior officers began to attack UPEU
leaders who accepted the change as traitors (R. Scott: 167-8). As
R. Scott put it "it was becoming obvious that the UPEU could not
serve two masters and the established group were being deprived of
effective union representation" (ibid: 168). Essentially Government
feared that unionised officers, the established group would have
divided loyalties.
It was in the context of these developments 	 that the
Government presented the Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Bill
1963 to parliament. There were three reasons advanced for the Bill.
The first and foremost was that the dispute settlement process,
•
especially disciplinary action, appointments and dismissals of
public officers, then subject to the general Trade Disputes
(Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance 1949 were ultra vires the
1962 Independence Constitution and contravened the supremacy of
parliament. The Minister argued:
In all matters of the state, Parliament is the
guardian of the public interest and public funds and
it could happen that the public interest could clash
with interests of Government servants, where
conditions of service and discipline are concerned,
and many of the issues which arise in the public
service require reference to this sovereign
Parliament to make provision of funds (UG: 1963:
705).
He further contended that unlike private employers who could
voluntarily accept decisions of an arbitrator in disputes
Government could not agree to any limitation of its
sovereignty in this matter by allowing an arbitrator
to commit public funds this honourable Assembly
could do no more than rubber stamp after the funds
have been committed. This necessity to avoid
limiting the Sovereignty of Parliament is a
principle behind the whole of this legislation
(ibid: 706).
Secondly, the Minister argued, civil servants should not have
divided loyalties between Government and the union. He observed:
If they (government opponents) think that these
people should go and read Cabinet draft memoranda to
their organisation out there in the trade unions, I
say this is not good for U.P.C. If they think they
should be members of trade unions so that they can
get all the secret letters, I must say we would have
to scrap the Secrets Act because it would not be
necessary. Their loyalty must be to the Government
(ibid: 722).
Emphasising the need for Civil Servants' loyalty he insisted:
It is their duty to carry out without grumbling •the
policies of the Government of the day. Anybody who
disagrees with that will be out... If this is not to
be the policy, you will have so much sabotage in
this country, not necessarily within Uganda,
emanating from within us, but you will have all
these chaps sending all their secret documents to
all the bogus people who come here... Their loyalty
must be to this country (ibid. 723).
Finally the Minister opposed ILO standards on freedom of
association in the interests of rapid economic development. He
concluded:
In underdeveloped countries let us make no mistake;
these ideas may sound glorious, about what is
happening in the States or... in Moscow or West
Germany 	
 We can only advance this country by
realising that our conditions require us to work
very hard. And if we are going to pay public
officers from public funds the Government must have
sufficient powers to ensure that nobody is receiving
public finance for nothing (ibid. 219).
The Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act 1963 established
a Joint Staff Council (JSC) members of which would be appointed from
nominees of the Permanent Secretary and the relevant trade unions
(S. 3). The objects of the JSC were "to secure the greatest measure
of co-operaton between the Government, in its capacity as employer,
and junior public officers, to provide machinery for dealing with
grievances of junior public officers and to enable consultation to
take place in matters affecting the well-being and efficiency of the
public service" (S. 4). The functions of the JSC were: to negotiate
terms and conditions of service of junion public officers and those
below them, to advise government on any matter and "generally to
assist in the furtherance of good relations between the Government
and junior public officers" (S. 5). But specifically, the JSC was
excluded from considerings advising or making recommendations
relating to "any matter concerning the appointment or non-
appointment, disciplinary control or removal from office of any
individual public officer" (S. 5, proviso).
The Act applied only to "junior public officers". This meant:
a) A group employee paid at a "daily, weekly or fortnightly or
monthly rate... who is not holding an established office"; b) a
public officer holding or acting in an established office on an
annual salary between Shs 1200-3012 (S. scale); or c) a public
officer holding or acting in an established office with the annual
salary between Shs. 2280-11,964 ("E" Scale) (S. 2).
The Minister was empowered to designate any trade union to be
the relevant trade union for the purposes of the Act (S. 2(1)) and
to amend the meaning of "junior public officer" (S. 2(2)). For the
avoidance of doubt senior public officers, that is, those above the
junior public officers, were prohibited from becoming members of
"any trade union or anybody or association affiliated to a trade
union" (S. 25(1)).
An agreement reached by the JSC on terms and conditions of
service of government employees covered by the Act was binding on
the parties and could not be re-opened within 12 months except with
the Minister's approval (S. 7)1-2)). Disputes would be reported to
the Minister (S. 8). And the Minister was given a wide range of
discretionary powers to deal with JSC disputes (Ss. 9, 12(1)).
Awards and reports of a Board of Inquiry appointed by him (S. 19)
had to be laid before the National Assembly (S. 15); the award was
binding on both parties within 12 months and could not be varied
except with the Minister's Consent (S. 16). According to the
Minister the Government side in the negotiations would be empowered
"to negotiate to finality only such matters as would not normally
require the approval of Cabinet and/or this Parliament"; laying
awards before the National Assembly would also guarantee that "the
sovereignty of Parliament is protected" (UG 1963 supra: 706).
Finally the Act prohibited any junior public officer from
taking part in a strike "which causes or is likely or calculated to
cause a cessation of work in any of the essential services specified
in the First Schedule to this Act" (S. 18(1)). The essential
services were: water, electricity, health, sanitary and hospital
services and transport services necessary or auxilliary to these
services and fire services (First Schedule; cf.Schedule to the Trade
Disputes (A & S) Act 1964). Even for the non—essential services
striking was virtually impossible. S. 17 provided that no junior
public officer could take part in a strike unless these conditions
were fulfilled: a) a report of the dispute has been made to the
Minister, b) 21 days or such longer period as the Minister may allow
have elapsed from the date of the report, and c) during such period
the dispute has not been settled or referred back to the Council or
to a Board or if referred to a Board, 21 days or such longer period
as the Minister may allow, have elapsed and no award has been made
by the Minister. Contravention of this provision would be deemed
misconduct justifying summary dismissal (S.17(3)).
Both H.M. Luande, still a member of UPC then, and the DP
parliamentary opposition strongly castigated the Bill. They relied
on the UN Human Rights Charter, ILO Conventions and Uganda's Bill of
Rights arguing that the Bill contravened them. H.M. Luande opposed
the overwhelming powers given to the Minister and the prohibition
of most of the public officers from joining trade unions. As to the
length of the dispute settlement process he warned: "... it is only
a mEtter of trying to prolong the dispute so that workers become
frustrated, industrial relations are destroyed and some people
become angry and go on strike" (UG:1963 ibid. 710). Stating that
workers were "responsible" and did not want to demonstrate, he
concluded:
We have tried to convince the Government that this
Bill was being copied word for word from Ghana and
Tanganyika outside this House. This is how things
begin. If you try to interfere with freedom of
association, you start slowly, then you go on
extending your hand... I say so because I would not
have thought that the Government which was supported
by workers, could come out with such a Bill which
amounts to causing divisions among the workers in
this country (ibid.707-708).
Mr. Ochola wondered why voluntary industrial relations were
encouraged in the private sector while lowly paid government workers
like sweepers and grasscutters were being disadvantaged, with no
equal union protection as every decision on their terms and
conditions of service virtually depended upon the Minister (ibid.
713-714). Mr. Obonyo concluded with the political motivation for
the Bill:
In those communist countries what they usually do is
to start with civil servants, close their mouths and
never allow them to join any organisation to oppose
the government, which is another way of victimising
them. When they have finished with the civil
servants, they pass on to other organisations. Here
is a Government starting with the lower class of
Government employees. As soon as they have finished
with these people they will pass on to other
organisations and I think that the earlier we take
action to stop this the better. It will not be in
the interests of this Government to single out these
loyal workers in order to shut their mouths, restrict
them from organising and claiming their rights (ibid.
716).
Before the Bill was passed both UTUC and FUE met the Ministers
of Labour and Public Service in the LCC to dissuade the Government
from passing it (R. Scott:171). UTUC argued that it would have been
better for the Government to concentrate on finalising the
Industrial Relations Charter through which both Government and the union
would feel bound by honour to respect 'industrial ethics' in
disputes (Par. 3, UTUC Memo, in ibid 172). But the Labour Minister, .
A. Ojera, stated that the Government was aware of the LCC but only
as a consultative body and "the decision when to consult the
Committee rests with the government and when it is necessary to do
so" (UG 1963:supra. 717). Secondly due to the "co-operative" stand
of UPEU it had been given specific respresentation in the LCC. The
Minister confirmed that UPEU was "responsible" and that he
"appreciated the way they have been working with the Government",
concluding: "I have had talks with the leaders of Uganda Public
Employees Union (UPEU) to which we are committed and with whom only
we can deal and not him (Luande)" (ibid.218-219). In fact it was at
this time that UPEU was, though still affiliated to UTUC, in the
process of leading the formation of FUTU following the UPC-directed
dissolution of the militant UFL. UPEU was therefore gradually
taking a clientelist role vis-a-vis the UPC regime. It accepted the
legal changes and welcomed them claiming that workers rights still
substantially existed (R. Scott:172-3).
The government's reasons for the restrictions cannot stand up
to scrutiny. The complete prohibition of senior civil servants from
joining tradeunionson grounds of loyalty was unsustainable because
other countries like Kenya and Nigeria allowed unionisation without
any damage to the state (E. C. Iwuji:209,212; M. A. L. Omole:149-
160). On the question of official secrets only very senior officers
usually have access to secret or important state information. Only
those junior officers with special access to such information need
have been restricted. The Bill was passed in December 1963.
(d) THE TRADE UNIONS ACT 1965
The Trade Unions Act 1965 (No. 11/1965) completed the post-
colonial legal framework of industrial relations. Of the three Acts
it was the most extensively debated. It repealed the 1952 Ordinance
and brought in new provisions. The declared aims of the Bill were
essentially three. First and foremost the Minister of Labour and
the Registrar were given wide powers of control over unions to
ensure that they were run in the interests of economic development.
This was a consolidation of the developmentalist philosopy of the
Trade Disputes Act and the Public Service (NY') Act. Secondly
government claimed it intended to help the development of stable,
viable and financially sound unions less dependent on foreign aid.
Finally government claimed it intended to ensure democracy and
accountability of union leadership. 	 To encourage "responsible
unionism" militant non-Ugandans would be excluded from leadership,
while to encourage strong unions employers would be required to some
extent to recognise unions and a "check-off" system would be provided for.
Laying perfunctory claim to the government's acceptance of the
concept of freedom of association the Minister justified the Bill
thus:
... the conception that members of the trade union
movement can be relied upon to supervise its
management and to take effective steps to protect
themselves against unscrupulous leaders is an
anachronism. Therefore in the interests of workers,
the community, and the country as a whole, the
Government has an inescapable responsibility to
ensure that the administration of these
organisations whose activities determine the
economic progress of this country is properly
undertaken, especially by the people who have the




He then argued that because some unionists had misapproriated
union funds this necessitated powers for the Minister "to inquire
into the affairs of the union and to take appropriate steps to
ensure that the management is carried out in the best interests of •
the members of the union" (ibid.1768).
Referring to non-Ugandan leaders who were only Kenyans in any
case, he asserted:
Others particularly those who are non-Ugandans have
ignored the principles of collective bargaining,
abused the freedom of association, and ignored the
statutory machinery for the settlement of trade
disputes thereby resorting to strike action as a
means of maintaining themselves employed under the
guise of protecting the interests of workers whilst
in effect jeopardising the economy of the
country...; a provision is... made in the Bill to
exclude such irresponsible elements from the
leadership of our trade unions (ibid).
Further regarding unions' financial dependence on foreign
sources a provision was made in the Bill to enable the Minister "to
make regulations concerning the system known as "check-off" anduin
regard to the amount of union subscriptions". He added, "I have no
doubt that when members who lead these various trade unions manage
to get sufficient funds they would cease functioning as automatic
typewriters of Brussels, New York or Peking or Moscow (ibid).
Finally the trade union movement was supposed to be
strengthened as the Minister was empowered "to direct that a
registered union be recognised after satisfying himself that refusal
to such recognition is not in the best interests of our workers"
(ibid.1769).
The claims of the UPC government aside, objectively, the
provisions of the new Act may be put into three categories. First
of all compulsory registration was strengthened and ministerial
powers to make inquiries and investigations created. Here the
intention was strict control of the objectives and functioning of
unions within boundaries determined by the state. The second type
of provisions aimed at deradicalising and depoliticising workers .
especially union leaders. Finally the most numerous provisions were
meant to nurture either strong, sizeable and viable unions or to
ensure democratic processes and accountability of union officials.
In other words at least conceptually, government saw no
contradiction between the broader aim of state control and a minimum
level of intra-union democracy.
The Act maintained compulsory registration (S.3) and the whole
Act revolved around this principle. All unions registered under the
1952 Ordinance had to apply for re-registration (S.3(3)). The
requirement for registration was now also extended to union branches
(S.10(1)). This was meant, the Minister said, to stop "abuse by
unscrupulous persons who purport to act on behalf of branches and
collect funds from members without accounting for them" (UG:Supra.
1773). Further, the Minister was empowered to order any person,
body of persons, representatives of any group of workers (whether a
trade union or not) or any organisation to which registered trade
unions were affiliated or any person or oganisation or workers
movement concerned with and devoted to trade unionism or labour
relations to notify his existence or its establishment to the
Registrar (S.11). This seems to have been an attempt to deal with
organisations such as the former UFL and UPC-YL in order to be able
to bring them under statutory control.
Apart from registration and notification the Minister could
order an inspection or investigation into any union. Inspections
were supposed to check on union management considered dictatorial or
oppressive to some members or to provide the Minister with a "full
and fair statement" of any issue (S.53(2)).	 Alternatively the
Minister could appoint an investigator following a report under S.53
or on the application of the Registrar or at least six union members
• (S.54(1)). After an inspection or investigation criminal or civil
proceedings could follow or the Minister could direct the Registrar
to cancel the union's registration (S.58). The Minister could also
investigate the membership of any union and in this respect could
require anybody to give him any information as to "the present and
past activities or interests of the members of the trade union and
the names and addresses of any other person interested, or any
persons who act or have acted on their behalf in relation to the
membership, affairs or activities of the trade union" (S.59(2)). If
this failed the Minister could order the cancellation of the union's
registration (S.59(5)). These sweeping powers were justified on the
basis that the Registrar under the 1952 Ordinance had powers only to
refuse registration or order cancellation which powers were not
"sufficient to bring to book the abuse of power by those in control
of the affairs of a trade union" (UG:Supra. 1776).
The second type of provisions aimed at deradicalising and
depoliticising trade unions concentrated on union leadership
eligibility criteria. All national union officers had to be
employed in the relevant industry though this time for a period of
one year (S.17(1)) instead of three. Only at branch level could a
treasurer or secretary be an outsider to the industry. The most
controversial provision however was the exclusion of foreigners from
union leadership. S.4(4) stipulated:
No trade union or an employees' association shall be
registered under this Act unless the officers
thereof and the members of its executive committee
or any other committee thereof are persons who are
citizens of Uganda.
This was one of the reasons why all hitherto registered unions had to
reapply for registration under the new Act (S.3(3)).	 The few
militant Kenyan union leaders were being made scapegoats for the
wave of strikes between 1961-1964 (see . pp.1107111).The Minister
clarified:
M.P.'s should not look at trade unions merely as
catering organisations for the interests of workers
in industry. These organisations can ruin a
country's economy... make no mistake. The people
who lead these organisations must have the country's
stake at heart... any trade union group in
developing Africa, which is going to gang-out to
oppose the Government is doomed to end up very
badly, because the Governments Africa which are
progressing are determined to ensure that all force
is available to be used for the development of the
country (UG 1965:Supra 1772).
Thus foreign - which was Kenyan-union leadership was being presented
as anti-Uganda and anti-development.
The rest of the new provisions were meant to enhance union
strength and viability on the one hand and democracy on the other.
For union viability provisions on check-off and recognition were
made. S.13 provided that a union with members in an enterprise was
bound to be recognised and if the employer declined to grant
recognition without reasons satisfactory to the Minister the
Minister could order that the union be recognised. However the
question as to who was unionisable,that is who could join a union, in
the private sector was left to collective bargaining because, it was
claimed, "it would be difficult to determine by law"2.
As for the check-off system the Minister was empowered to make
regulations	 (subsidiary legislation) to regulate the basic
h.
agreements and arrangements in respect of this system and the
collection of trade union subscriptions (S.63(2)(g )). Although the
Minister accepted that union leaders were responsible enough to
exercise proper control over vast union funds and that financial
stability would ensure the independence of unions from external
sources (ibid . 1777) no such regulations were made until 1974 (S.I
71/1974).
It may be noted also that the size of unions was expanded.
While under the 1952 Ordinance a minimum membership of seven (S.2)
was required, now this had to be at least 30 for both unions
(S.65(1)) and employees associations. For the latter this was in
addition to notifying their formation to the Registrar (S.65(1),
S.48(1)). The concepts of probationary trade unions and distinction
between employees' associations and organisations of the 1952
Ordinance were abandoned. The government seemed committed to the
development of strong viable trade unions. Taken together all these
provisions showed the state's determination to subjugate the unions
to its policies butat the same time attempting to lay down a legal basis
for intra-union democracy as we show below. In practice the state's
interests were to concentrate only on the former object.
The provisions meant to encourage democracy and accountability
in the unions revolved around union funds management and
administration and holding of meetings.
Originally while only a person who had committed a fraud in
connection with union funds could not hold office (S.29, 1952
Ordinance) now no person could hold union office if he had been
convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty (S.17(6)).
The Registrar was also empowered to remove a treasurer whom he
deemed incapable of carrying out his duties. ( S.17 (4) and (5)).
The Controller and Auditor-General were empowered to audit the
annual balance sheet of every union (S. 38(3)). Further for the
first time union officers were made collectively responsible for the,
submission of the annual returns and collectively liable for failure
todosc(S. 39(1) and (3)). The Minister explained that
a number of those who are now required by the law to
submit these returns, when the funds of unions are
squandered, some of them resign in three or four
days time and disappeared (into) oblivion. It will
be very difficult this time for the whole executive
to disappear or the officers of the unions (UG:
Supra, 1775).
Finally any union member could apply to a Chief Magistrate for an
injunction to prohibit an officer of a trade union from holding
office or controlling funds. The injunction could be granted on a
prima facie case of fraudulent misuse of unioa funds (S. 43).
To ensure democratic decision-making processes new provisions
on meetings and records thereof were also made. Every trade union
had to hold an annual general meeting in default of which the
Registrar could order its convocation and give any consequential
directions in relation thereto (S. 20(1) and (4)). Failure to hold
an annual general meeting was an offence on the part of union
officers (S. 20(7)). Union members - at least 20% of the voting
members - were also also empowered to call an extraordinary general
meeting (S.21). Further every union had to keep minutes of all
proceedings of general meetings and executive committee meetings in
minute books (S. 22(1). These books were open to every union member
and the Registrar (S.23).
Opposition to the Trade Union Bill was extensive and deeply
felt.	 Both the UTUC and DP opposed the restrictive and
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"politically-motivated" aspects while FUTU supported Government
position.
H.M. Luande based his opposition on the Bill's contravention of
ILO Convention No. 87 3 , the Uganda Constitution and the spirit of.
the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Explaining that the Bill had
been copied from Tanzania, giving the Minister Executive powers over -
trade unions without him becoming General Secretary of the central
union as has happened in Tanzania (cf. I. Shivji 1986: 234-235) he
argued:
We are.. .approaching dictatorship, and what a
dictator does at first is to get hold of trade
unions. This has been the practice in most African
countries, that if one wants to dictate, first of
all he snatches the whole trade union movement, puts
them under his control then (they) would have
nowhere to complain (UG 1965 supra: 1798-1799).
Outside parliament he repeated the same arguments (Uganda Argus
24.6.1965) and on behalf of UTUC called upon the ILO to declare the
Act a violation of freedom of association principles under ILO
Convention No. 87 4 . The ILO ruled in his favour though the ruling
had only moral force as 'Uganda had not ratified the Commer‘tiuh (.41.
Nabudere 1980: 235).
More specifically H.M. Luande pointed out that government and,
in particular the Ministers of State and of Labour - G. Ibingtra and
G. Magezi respectively - who sponsored FUTU (UG: Supra, 1808), was
trying to use legislation to stifle the independent UTUC:
I think after having failed through FUTU to wipe out
UTUC what they are doing is to bring an Act to
assist the Minister. I think this is a very
dangerous situation but we will fight it up to the
last point.., the background to this	 to
have a UPC trade unionism (UG: Supra, 1800).
Finally Luande registered his opposition to the exclusion of non-
citizens from union leadership, the overwhelming powers of the
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Registrar and Minister over unions and, less convincingly, the
complex and innumerable administrative work: reports, minutes and
returns to be made by poor trade unions.
On the question of excluding foreigners from union leadership
A. Mayanja of the opposition succintly argued:
The right to organise a trade union, the right to
belong to a trade union, ... is consequent upon the
right to work... if we are going to allow non-
Ugandans to work in Uganda we must also by the same
token allow them the right to belong to trade
unions, to play such part in these trade unions, as
their capacity, intelligence, education and know-how
entitle them to... the majority in any trade union
are necessarily bound to be Ugandans, if these
Ugandans decide to elect a non-Ugandan it must be
för some purpose... (UG 1965(a): 1842).
Other opposition to the Registrar's enhanced powers over and
ministerial intervention in trade unions centred around the fear
that they would be mechanisms for political control through the
registration of client unions, deregistering those opposed to
government or some of its policies and the recognition of unions as
a means of patronage. Mr. Latim summarised opposition views thisway:
way: The Minister should refrain from making
political advantage out of this Bill by trying
to plant party supporters in every corner as
they have been doing in many other Government
Departments... and if he wishes the trade union
movement to flourish in this country let him be
clear out of political support (ibid. 1835).
Outside parliament the DP also issued statements in opposition
to the Bill especially re-registration of existing unions as a
political ploy to register government-supporting unions, the anti-
East African anti-Panafricanist discrimination against non-Ugandans
and indue supervisory powers of the Minister (DP 1965).
FUTU on the other hand, and as Luande claimed (U.G. Supra,
1806-1807), came out in support of the Bill without much
explanation. E.R. Kibuka leader of FUTU saw it as an advance from
the actually more liberal colonial Trade Unions Ordinance 1952 and
advocated for one or two national union centres "with a sound
administration and direction from the top" (Uganda Argus 14.4.1965)..
He stated clearly that he had read the Bill "-with pleasure and
appreciation" (ibid). As with the previous Bills the Minister
flatly rejected all the criticisms and the Bill was passed, becoming
law in July 1965.
Although elements of the Bill were meant to encourage
democratic trade unionism the overall structure was meant to ensure
tight political control. But the democractic aspects also could
only be concretised by a conscious and militant membership. This of
course lay outside the purview of the law. In fact although
Government was legally correct to say that Convention No. 87, not
having been ratified, was inapplicable, irrespective of this the
state had allocated itself powers that were more than supervisory.
They were essentially aimed against a politicised and militant
unionism of the 1962-1964 type. In general the new Act had taken
away the liberalism andwider freedom of association of the Colonial
Trade Unions Ordinance 1952.
What aggrevated the situation for workers was that while one
faction of the union leadership FUTU now took a pro-government line,
the UTUC limited its protests to parliament, party offices (DP),
complaints to the ILO and passive ,public opinion through the press
without organising any effective protests by workers. Our task now
then is to assess the impact of the new industrial relations legal
framework on the trade union movement up to 1971.
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4. THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN
PRACTICE: 1964-1971
In this section it is argued that the new legal framework was not
successful in establishing strong, viable and democratic unions as
the government claimed it should. This was so because while big
unions had been formed after 1965 their viability and strength was
only formal and outward. The reason for this was mainly the
conflicting ideological conceptions of trade unionism advanced by
UTUC, FUTU and government. Secondly the democratic aspects of the law
were not realised due to structural defects of the unions, incessant
leadership struggles, a disorganised rank and file membership and
state lack of interest in enforcing the democratising aspects of the
law. Thirdly the under-pinning objective of encouraging industrial
peace, constitutional dispute settlement procedures as a means to
economic development was hardly achieved due to workers refusal to
follow dispute settlement procedures laid down in legislation and
collective agreements.	 In fact the objective of holding down
workers' remuneration so as to accumulate investible surpluses for
development proved contadictory to the objective of industrial
peace. Finally, African governments generally (Cap 1:23 ) and the
Ugandan one in particular, in the 1960s, argued that the small
working class was a privileged minority and should not be privileged
further. This view had generally prompted the enactment of the
1963-1965 legislation. Equally these arguments found support in the
labour aristocracy thesis of the academics (ibid:23-25). 	 Here we
argue that in spite of minimum wage legislation, the initial high
wage policy and Africanisation, the charge that the working class or
a significant section of it constituted a labour aristocracy is
1.1
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groundless; on the contrary only a very small section of the working
class was privileged while a new but African local dominant class,
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was being created at the expense of
both workers and peasants. Nonetheless the development of trade,
unionism helped workers improve their living conditions, in addition
to improvements arising from the immediate post-independence wage
policies.
(a) THE NATURE OF TRADE UNIONISM
(i) INSTITUTIONALLY VIABLE UNIONS CREATED.
In 1964 40 mainly small unions existed in Uganda (RU 1969:
105). It was against this state of affairs partly that the 1965
Trade Unions Act was aimed. Through the device of re-registration
by the end of 1966 only 26 unions existed (General Notice 273/1966;
RU 1969: 135) after a number of mergers had taken place. A further
merger had reduced unions to 25 by 1970 (ARM, 1970:4). This process
of reducing mushroom union growths had, through registration and
amalgamation, been largely successful. Most unions as a result of
this rationalisation were becoming financially viable; many of them
were more financially sound than the central unions (RU 1969:44). In
addition, although there were no statutory requirement of employers
signing "check off" agreements, several of these were gradually
being signed including one between government and UPEU, thus
improving the financial position of many unions (ARML 1966:20).
However the improved financial and institutional position of the
unions was not reflected in other respects. . In particular trade
union disunity continued while, as we show below, no democractic
processes were nurtured. Union strength and viability remained only
at the formal institutional level.
Below we show how ideological and leadership struggles,
exacerbated by political intervention in union affairs ensured that
concrete union viability, unity and concentration on workers
interests, as ostensibly envisaged by the 1965 Act, were undermined. •
(ii) IDEOLOGICAL AND LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES BETWEEN UTUC AND FUTU AND
THE ROLE OF STATE INTERVENTION
From 1964 when FUTU was formed with government backing after the
dissolution of UFL a struggle over the definition of trade unionism
ensued between UTUC and FUTU. Although ideological differences were
involved the more determinant reasons were leadership struggles and
state attempts to subjugate trade unions to Party and government.
FUTU was led by E.R. Kibuke, the General Secretary of UPEU who
resigned from the Vice-Presidency of UTUC. Right from its inception
FUTU (Supra: II?) declared its support for Government, its opposition
to the ICFTU and support for the Pan-Africanist union confederation
AATUF. It affiliated to AATUF and tried to associate itself with
Socialist Bloc trade unions while UTUC was affiliated to ICFTU. In
a confidential letter to UPC MPs, revealing FUTU's direct connection
with UPC Kibuka said FUTU was formed because of
the refusal of the UTUC leadership to alter its
policy so as to reflect the political status of
Uganda and its foreign policy and further to work
co-operatively with the Government in its efforts
towards economic reconstruction of Uganda (FUTU
1965; see also Uganda Argus 8.8.1964).
Secondly FUTU uncritically supported the new labour legislation on
the grounds that no organisation could be absolutely free or "act
outside the purview of... state power"
	 and that "workers
organisations cannot.., consider themselves above the laws and
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independent trade unionism espoused by UTUC and supported and
encouraged by ICFTU. According to FUTU Luande and UTUC had
languishing under the influence of imperialism
spearheaded by ICFTU... chosen to serve (ICFTU
interests) under the cloak of free trade unionism,
contrary to the aspirations of the people of
Uganda.. .6
UTUC in turn accused FUTU of being a government puppet and
although FUTU rejected this accusation and asserted that there was
no government interference in union affairs and denied receiving
assistance from both government and foreign sources 7 , there is
incontrovertible evidence of government support for FUTU; in
particular support by the right-wing of UPC led by G.K. Magezi,
Minister of Labour, G.K. Ibingira Minister of State and UPC
Secretary General and S. Odaka Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs. They introduced E. Kibuka on political platforms as the
leader of Uganda's workers. 	 In 1964 G. Magezi selected FUTU
officials as the official workers' representatives to the ILO
Conference in Addis-Ababa (R. Scott:146-147) and in 1965 selected
FUTU for the ILO Conference claiming that FUTU was more
representative of workers than UTUC (Uganda Argus 19-6-1965). The
claim that FUTU was more representative was later shown to be untrue
by a Government Report (RU 1969:54, 9). The most incontrovertable
evidence that FUTU was a creation and the base of the right wing
faction of UPC though Obote was aware of and supported it is
correspondence between FUTU and G. Magezi and between FUTU and AATUF
between 1964-1965. FUTU had no funds of its own and relied on
grants from AATUF in Accra. In a confidential letter E. Kibuka
wrote to G. Magezi:
The activities of the FUTU your baby are growing by
day and night and our financial commitments are
increasing daily... In order to make things easy
for you and me, I wish to solicit your help by
drawing the attention of His Excellency (A. M.
Obote-JB) to our monthly financial requirements...
For the smooth running of the organisation a single
cheque for the above amount (050.for salaries, car
maintenance, subsidy to 13 affiliates and
administrative expenses) must be made available for
our use every month until the grant from Accra is 
exhausted8.
Further J. Tettegah, Secretary General of AATUF, while in Uganda,
had promised to transfer the money to G. Magezi for dispensation to
FUTU9 . By 1965 FUTU was desperate and wrote to AATUF:
... if you want this struggle to succeed, the car
should be transferred immediately. The monthly
allocation should continue as requested...
Sincerely speaking everybody is very much worried,
we do not know what is going to happen if nothing
comes through in time. Please come to our rescuel°.
And later as a Government Report found out FUTU had "ample financial
backing" from AATUF (RU 1969:9).
Soon Government-FUTU relations developed into a patron-client
relationship. The Labour Department allocated jobs in a sectarian
manner, via the Labour Exchanges, to FUTU members. Because of
unemployment, this gave FUTU some credibility among some workers (R.
E. Gonsalves:334). G.Ibingira also signed a wage increase agreement
with Kibuka's UPEU (ibid.331), in addition to the general policy on
minimum wages. These developments in fact prompted H. M. Luande to
resign from UPC and sit as an independent M.P. in October 1964,
explaining that while he believed "immovably in the independence and
freedom of trade unionism" government policy was "to interfere in
the liberty and freedom of organised workers' movements and to turn
them into Government tools" in particular by supporting FUTU (Uganda
Argus 9-10-1964).
In spite of this protest G. Magezi continued to support FUTU,
in particular by registering anti-UTUC unions to bolster FUTU
affiliates, as predicted by the opposition in the debate on the
Trade Unions Act. For instance, although a union, NUPAW, already -
existed in the agricultural sector another one, the Uganda Sugar
Workers' Union, led by J. M. Ojambo, and supporting FUTU, was
registered (Uganda Argus 12-2-1966). NUPAW was affiliated to UTUC
and recognised by the Sugar Manufacturers' Association. That this
registration had been politically motivated and disregarded the same
law meant to achieve stability and viability of unions (see
S.5(1)(d) 1965 Act) is vindicated by the fact that following the
arrest of G. Magezi, G. Ibingira and other Ministers in late
February 1966 (as we show below) the new union was deregistered
(Uganda Argus 11-8-1966).
But while FUTU was supported by AATUF and the UPC government
UTUC relied on the ICFTU. In 1965 for instance, it sponsored a UTUC
delegate to the ILO Conference when government supported a FUTU
delegation (Uganda Argus 27-8-1965). Several affiliates of ICFTU
also supported UTUC. These included AFL-CIO and PSI whose leaders
visited Uganda. The British Labour Attache in Nairobi and a PSI
representative tried to persuade FUTU to rejoin UTUC. Indeed after
the visits some FUTU leaders rejoined UTUC though according to FUTU
they were bought by "hot dollars" brought in by the ICFTU agents
(FUTU:1965 Supra). But significantly it was those leaders who
failed to get posts on the FUTU Executive in November 1964 who
rejoined UTUC giving the excuse that FUTU was run by "certain
embassies in Kampala as well as by some local politicians" (R. E.
Gonsalves :334).
The continued rift between FUTU and UTUC was indeed essentially
a reflection of the intense Cold War situation of the 1960's.
Internally it was just one of the means for engaging in leadership.
struggles though a few unionists supported positive neutrality and
non-alignment. AATUF to which FUTU was affiliated officially
espoused Panafricanism, condemned colonialism and imperialism and
advocated positive neutrality and non-alignment for the trade unions
of Africa.	 AATUF Constitution prohibited its affiliates from
affiliating to any other international trade union organisation.
But in practice AATUF had very close relations with the Socialist
WFTU. As such it was opposed bitterly by ICFTU. Thus although
ICFTU's African regional organisation AFRO existed, in 1962 ICFTU
formed ATUC (African Trade Union Confederation) specifically to
oppose AATUF. ATUC advocated freedom of African unions to affiliate
to foreign union organisations, but in practice this meant ICFTU and
western union federations (for details see W. Ananaba 1979:120-140).
Both ATUC and AATUF were mainly foreign funded. AATUF was funded by
the Ghanaian Trade Union Congress (GTUC), the WFTU and Nkrumah's
"contingency fund" (RU 1969:68) apart from its affiliates'
subscriptions (W. Ananaba 1979:130). Although AATUF could have
developed into a genuinely independent and non-aligned African trade
union movement - independent of foreign domination and control by
African
	 governments	 themselves	 the	 problem was	 the
conceptualisation and organisation of the Federation itself. The
setting-up of AATUF was conceived by governments, led by Sekou Toure
of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah off Ghana (RU 1969:65) and its
organisation depended more on governments' support than workers
themselves. It was in this context that FUTU existed in Uganda
supported by the government and funded by AATUF. UTUC on the other
hand relied mainly on ICFTU (R. E. Gonsalves:420-421).
Thus because of being tied to foreign union affiliations and
becoming participants in Cold War unionism and also due to state
intervention in support of one union faction the trade union centres
as well as their affiliates concentrated their energies on
squabbles. The law, silent on both foreign union influence and
political intervention, could not resolve these inter and intra-
union struggles.
(iii) TRADE UNION "UNITY" : THE RISE AND FALL OF ULC
Because of the continued struggle between UTUC and FUTU the
government was not happy with this situation. By 1965 A. Lobidra,
Parliamentary Secretary to the Labour Ministry now publicly argued
in favour of a new national union centre because UTUC and Luande
were opposed to the government policy while "FUTU was supported by
Mr Ibingira and Mr Magezi" (Uganda Argus 27-8-1965). But now, he
suggested, such a new union should be chaired by a government
nominee (ibid). The government was gradually thinking of control
through a single union centre due to the failure of its divisive
strategy of supporting one union faction, FUTU, hoping it would
eventually replace or at least dominate over UTUC.
Within the union movement itself a section now felt that
neither FUTU nor UTUC had workers' long-term interests at heart.
Following A. M. Obote's urging that UTUC and FUTU should form "one
strong trade union movement which will work with the Government for
the welfare of the workers and of the whole nation" (UG 1965(3):6)
moves to unity began. While some leaders of UTUC and FUTU took
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steps to further unity stating so in a communiqe (ThePeople 31-7-
1965) a subsequent UTUC Conference denounced them (Uganda Argus 8-6-
1965). The supporters of unity later declared that the
question of unity would not be difficult had it not
been for the selfish attitudes of the leaders of the
two factions of the trade union movement - FUTU and
UTUC - whom we have reason to believe are only
prejudiced by their positions in a united labour
movement (Uganda Argus 15-9-1965).
Although Obote continued to reiterate the need for unity (Uganda
Argus 21 & 22 September 1965) and a ten-man committee was set-up to
study the issue little was achieved.
What immediately led to the unity of FUTU and UTUC in 1966 was
the defeat of the right-wing Ibingira-Magezi faction of UPC when the
two and other three Ministers were arrested and detained in February
1966. Between 1964 and 1966 an intense ideological struggle had
ensued within UPC following the ouster of J. Kakonge from the
Secretary Generalship.	 Supported by the U.S.A., the right-wing
Ibingira faction in alliance with monarchist forces in Buganda
sought to unseat the Obote Government. (D. W. Nabudere 1980:259).
The Ibingira faction removed UPC-YL officers sympathetic to J.
Kakonge and nine leading left-wing members of UPC, including the
militant Secretary for Youth Affairs, Raiti Omongin, were expelled
from the Party (ibid; A. Mujaju 1973:300). 	 Initially Obote
supported Ibingira against the left-wingers (see A. M. Obote 1965).
He even attacked the anti-ICFTU former leaders of UFL:
There are members of the Party who have been
seriously concerned with the interest which ICFTU
has in our labour movement. Such members including
Mr Ojepa and Mr" John Reich even without the 
authority of the Party, one time formed their labour
movement and sought and obtained affiliation.., to
the AATUF. Mr Raiti Onongin would be remembered as
one who issued several statements to the Press and
wrote a number of letters condemning the affiliation
of UTUC to the ICFTU. The Central Executive
Committee has discussed the interest of the ICFTU in
our labour movement and has took (sic) certain
decisions which we are now following as a Government
(ibid).
In spite of his anti-left-wing position in 1965 Obote was forced to
decisively move against the right-wing Ibingira group when it became
clear that they were planning, with outside help, to unseat himll.
Five Cabinet Ministers were arrested and detained and an incipient
uprising in Buganda was crushed by the army (D.W. Nabudere 1980: 262-
4; M. Mamdani 1976: 242-246).
It was with the arrest of Ibingira and Magezi that UTUC and
FUTU were effectively pressurised into unity. The new Minister of
Labour L. Lubowa declared to trade unionists in a seminar on "Labour
Problems in Uganda" that his policy was "to work to stamp out this
rift within the next few months" (M.O.F. 1966:60). The Government
was now more concerned about political dissidents using the factions
in the trade union movement. At this seminar UTUC and FUTU were
prevailed upon to set up a six-man Unity Committee to advance the
cause of unity (ibid:108-9).	 On 23 August 1966 an all-union
Conference agreed to form a new national centre, the Uganda Labour
Congress (ULC) and a 12-man Caretaker Committee was set up to
oversee the merger of UTUC and FUTU. ULC leadership was elected at
the Inaugural Delegates Conference in November 1966 (ULC:1966).
The formation of ULC in 1966 did not in reality mean the unity
of the trade union movement because it had been only a result of the
unions' fear of even more government intervention had "unity" not
been formally achieved. In the ULC elections L. K. Senkezi of UTUC
became General Secretary, H. Luande ULC President while E. Kibuka
was elected to the insignificant position of Organising Secretary.
Even the Treasurer was from the former UTUC. Thus UTUC virtually
led the new ULC (ibid; RU 1969:36).
ULC pledged to strengthen the union movement by encouraging the
formation of a few strong viable self-reliant national unions. It
pledged to concentrate on workers' education, create Youth and
Women's Wings and publicise the importance of trade unionism.
Grandiose social and economic projects, including the construction
of a Solidarity Building, a housing project, consumer co-operative
shops, credit unions, insurance and pension schemes, were all
planned.	 Further the ULC declared its support for (government)
tripartite institutions and the desire to seek membership on Boards
of Directors of public and parastatal bodies. Finally in conformity
with government policy of positive non-alignment and support for a
Pan- African union federation 12 , ULC pledged to "support any moves
and initiatives aimed at achieving a truly Pan-African trade union
centre". But in an oblique reference to communism, revealing its
underlying ICFTU-inspired ideology it stated it would "strongly
desist from advocating any doctrinaire concepts that are foreign to
Uganda in particular and Africa in general" (ULC:1969).
In actual fact the ULC did not achieve much in its one and half
years' existence.
	
Organisational problems and ideological and
leadership conflicts sparked off a crisis in April 1968 when the UPC
government took advantage of the conflicts, suspended the ULC,
closed its offices and took over its assets. In addition the
government closed the ICFTU African Labour College in Kampala.
Financially the ULC never became self-sufficient.	 Its
affiliates contributed only 10 percent of their income and many of
them were always in arrears (RU 1969:135). 	 ULC like its
predecessors UTUC and FUTU continued to rely on foreign funds.
Consequently it had only one full-time official, the General
Secretary, with no administrative machinery and cadres (ibid:37-38).
Apart from representing unions in the Industrial Court, the ULC did
not carry out any of its grandiose objectives (ibid:41). Indeed a
Commission of Inquiry into its affairs concluded:
Lack of funds by the Uganda Labour Congress has
reduced the organisation to the status of a beggar,
passing the hat round throughout Europe for funds,
for gifts, etc. The organisation could not purchase
even a projector or a camera, but had to obtain
these by way of gifts from the eastern block of
countrites (ibid:91).
As far as the general running of ULC was concerned the
Commission of Inquiry concluded:
ULC was badly managed. It was not only the ULC that
was so managed but the individual trade unions
affiliated to it. The main reason for this was that
the organisation did not have sufficient funds to be
in a position to employ the services of full-time
officials... (ibid:39).
Finally after exhaustively looking at the foreign relations of
ULC in the context of East-West union divisions (ibid:42-91) the
Commission's conclusion was that
although the ULC had dedicated itself to a policy of
non-alignment.., some of the leaders still continued
to have fraternal relations with ICFTU and its
associates. These relations were very near to
affiliation (ibid 92).
As far as conflict was concerned, a Committee set up by ULC
itself established that leadership conflicts existed as a fact and
that E. Kibuka had failed to carry out his duties of organisation
(ULC 1968). As ways of helping ULC achieve its objectives it
recommended the removal of Kibuka as Organising Secretary, the
increase of monthly subscriptions by ULC affiliates from 10% to 20%
of their income and that ULC should approve the reception of foreign
aid by the affiliates (ULC: 1968(a)).
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Following these recommendations and a few weeks before the ULC
Annual Conference, in a TV interview, Kibuka made allegations that
ULC opposed the non-alignment policy of government and that all
former UTUC officials continued to maintain ICFTU affiliation and to .
receive foreign funds. At the end of March 1968 the Finance and
General Purposes Committee (FAGPC) of ULC recommended disciplinary
action against Kibuka. In the meantime the Minister of Labour
warned that government would "take over" the union movement if the
UTUC-FUTU days of conflict returned and advised the calling of an
extra-ordinary ULC meeting to resolve the conflict(R.E. Gonsalves:
358-359).
With his future in the trade union movement in the balance E.R.
Kibuka and his supporters, with police help, pre-empted any
democratic solutions and announced on 22 April 1968 that a
"Revolutionary Council" had taken over the control of ULC,
dismissed the incumbent officials, dissolved the executive committee
and abrogated the Constitution. He then declared that his group had
acted to save the ULC from foreign influence, undemocratic
organisation and mismanagement, claiming support of 13 out of the 26
ULC affiliates (Uganda Argus 23.4.1968). Hoping for government
support he promised to support it in its economic and industrial
relations policies and not to send any trade union students to the
ICFTU College until it was taken out of ICFTU hands (ibid).
It was due to these events that the UPC government took the
opportunity to suspend ULC and take over its assets and, at the same
time, close the ICFTU African Labour College in Kampala (RU 1969:
92). And subsequent to these government actions, on May Day 1968,
A.M. Obote, at Gulu, now openly declared for the first time that
"the labour movement had entered a new era and therefore should be
part and parcel of UPC" (Uganda Argus 2.5.1968). The Commission of
Inquiry into the affairs of ULC appointed after these events was in
fact a preliminary to this end (RU 1969). The recommendations of,
the Commission were important as part and parcel of the Move to the
Left Strategy of the Obote regime between 1968-1971 as we shall see
in Section 6.
(iv) LACK OF DEMOCRACY IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
The Trade Unions Act 1965 had been enacted, according to
government inter alia to enhance internal union democracy and
accountability of the leadership to the members. We argue here that
both the government and the union leaderships were little concerned
about the development of democracy. Instead government concentrated
on trying to control the union centres while the union centres and
later factions of ULC and their respective supporters in the
affiliate unions concentrated on power struggles.
As far as ULC was concerned, although books of account were
kept no budget was made and the affiliate unions failed to pay their
monthly contributions. These omissions were contrary to both ULC
Constitution and the 1965 Act (RU 1969: 20). Further ULC never had
its books audited (ibid. 20-22). 	 ULC collected and kept no
membership returns as required by the Constitution (Art. 3(e);
ibid. 33). In 1967 no Annual Delegates Conference was held and the
1968 one was pre-empted by the Kibuka "coup" (ibid. 10-16).
Finally, there was no machinery for communication of information,
decisions or fora for debates between the ULC and the rank and file.
As the Commissioner concluded:
The facts before me indicated that most of this
information (from ULC) never filtered through to the
branches, and in some cases if it got to the
branches (of ULC affiliates) it never got to the
rank and file of the unions. This indicated that
the existing machinery was defective (ibid. 38).
Indeed as one of the union leaders explained,
While the rank and file are aware of the existence
of the Uganda Labour Congress, they hardly know what
goes on in the Uganda Labour Congress until perhaps
one of the members of their particular branch is
selected to attend the week-end course organised by
the ULC, or perhaps a seminar, or a trip abroad
(ibid.).
The final assessment of ULC by the Commissioner pointed to the cause
of the failure of democractic practice. Referring to the two ULC
factions he concluded:
Both groups forgot the cardinal principle of trade
unionism, which is to fight for, maintain and improve
the living standards of the workers, and instead
involved themselves in unending disputes which were
not in the interests of the workers. Their priority
was not to serve the workers but to assert their
authority and influence over the entire labour
movement.	 This is the reason which led both
factions to attempt to attract financial aid from
overseas to serve their respective purposes (ibid.
41).
As for the individual unions the situation was no better.
First of all, the organisational structures of the unionswere
haphazard. Some unions selected delegates to the Annual Conferences
from the shop level or the branch level. Union leaders could
manipulate representation (ibid. 37). Although Annual Delegates
Conferences appear to have been held by most unions, as far as
branches of unions were concerned, meetings were very rare and as
such "there did not exist an effective line of communication between
the rank and file and the officials of the union" (ibid. 38). In
fact even representation at the Annual Delegates Conferences (ADCs)
appeared to be haphazard and arbitrary leading to incessant disputes
about the national officials usually elected-mainly because the
branches were not defined uniformly (ibid. 39).
Although records of meetings were being kept as required by the
1965 Act what really mattered were the decisions reached. Since.
representation could be manipulated the records reflected only
formal "democractic" proceedings.
Further membership returns were sent in only by a few. While
in 1964 out of 40 unions only 4 sent in returns, and although there
was an improvement between 1965-1966, in 1967 out of the 26 unions
only 6 sent in returns (ibid. 105). The Ministry of Labour itself
had not been enthusiastic about enforcing provisions intended to
enhance democracy especially the preparation and deposit of annual
returns to the Registrar, nor was there an enforcement of the
requirements on audited accounts, especially as funds of individual
unions had improved with the rationalisation of unions and the
signing of some "check-off" agreements (ARML 1966: 20).
The impression given here is that because the rank and file
union membership was disorganised and kept in the dark about union
affairs and because union leaders were busy with leadership
struggles while government concentrated on harnessing the central
unions, the provisions in the 1965 Act meant to nurture democratic
trade unionism remained generally dormant.
(b) TRADE DISPUTES, STRIKES AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE
The underlying aim of the Trade Disputes Act 1964 had been to
encourage constitutional dispute settlement processes and thus
attain industrial peace as a major prerequisite for economic
development. The exclusion of all public service employees from the
arbiration process of the Act was, on the other hand, based upon
parliamentary sovereignty considerations. We argue here that in
practice industrial peace was only partially achieved and even so at
the expense of the developmentalist policy of government. The.
schedulingof many activities as essential services was ignored by
workers and even outside the essential enterprises strikes were
always unconstitutional and illegal. It is suggested here that the
repressive and restrictive dispute settlement procedures-were ignored
by the workers while the state found it difficult and probably
counter-productive to enforce the law.
In general between 1965-1970 strikes declined with the
exceptional year of 1969 (Seep. 111)	 mainly as a result of the
development of collective bargaining (R.E. Gonsalves: 578-582) and
the greater use of the arbitration process by unions. The latter
was so mainly in places where the unions felt weak and where a show
of strength in striking would end in defeat; but above all, unions
had to contend with enormous political pressure against strike
action (B. Nicol 1972: 519). But compared to Tanzania for instance
where a similar institutionalisation of conflict had led to a
virtual "disappearance" of strikes (D. Jackson 1979: 219-251) the
drop in Uganda was only modest. What is more interesting in Uganda
is that all the strikes after 1964 were unconstitutional and illegal
(See B. Nicol 1972: 419; ARML 1970: 5). As B. Nicol observed,
It is clear from the present (his) research and the
little that is known of strikes, that arbitration in
any form is often irrelevant. Strikes often occur
without even a pretence of negotiation at grass
roots level. Very often they arise over issues that
are not negotiable or acceptable as trade disputes.
. A very common demand of strikes, for example, is for
the dismissal of supervisors and managers (B. Nicol
1972: 524).
But even where arbitration was submitted to in fact both employees
and trade unionists complained against the long process stipulated by
law and the long duration in practice taken, especially by the
Industrial Court, to settle disputes (ibid. 534).
As for the essential services their stipulation had little
effect too. Faced with continued strikes the government chose to
expand the definition of essential services so as to be able to
exercise compulsory arbitration. While in 1964 only 10 services
were schedules as essential (Schedule, 1964 Act), in 1965 the Postal
and Telecommunications services, following or rather in the course
of a strike, were declared essential (S.I. 162/1965, The Trade
Disputes (A & S)(Amendment of Schedule) Instrument 1965). When the
Railway Union RAU(U) threatened to come out in support of the Postal
workers whose demands had not been met since 1961-1962 in spite of
recommendations of an official commission (R.E. Gonsalves: 338-9)
the Railways were also declared essential (S.I. 162/1965). Again in
1965 following a strike, fuel, petrol and oil services and then
Teaching and public transport services were also declared essential
(S.I. 170/1965, The Trade Disputes (A & S) (Amendment of Schedule
(No. 2) Instrument 1965; See also B. Nicol 1972: 407). By 1969 they
had increased to 22. In 1969 itself due to the escalation of
strikes (See p. 13) further services were scheduled. They were
eight: the East African Customs and Excise Department; the East
African Fresh-water Fisheries Research Organisation; the East African
Virus Research Organisation; the East African Income Tax Department;
the East African Trypanosomiasis Research Organisation; services
relating to rail, road, and inland waterways and ports; East
African Food Research Organisation; and services relating to Civil
Aviation (S.I. 101/1969 The Trades Disputes (A & S) (Amendment of
Schedule) Instrument 1969). The research organisations were in fact
hardly "essential" but were added by the Minister as "an emergency
measure on the eve of a threatened strike that would have been •
politically embarrassing within the E. .A. Community" (N. Nicol 1972:
408). In fact these essential service provisions were mainly used
as a threat because again, in practice, by 1970 the Minister never
even once used his powers of compulsory arbitration nor was anyone
prosecuted and convicted under the essential services provisions
(ibid. 406, see also . R.E. Gonsalves: 601-602) in spite of the
strikes that took place in clear contravention of the law.
Finally although strikes were reduced, it was at the expense,
to some extent, of government policy which sought after 1965 to
restrict wage increases (UG 1966: 148-149) so as to accumulate
resources for development. 	 B. Nicol for instance came to this
conclusion regarding the role of the Industrial Court in this
respect:
The Industrial Court has assisted in achieving a
reasonable degree of industrial harmony. In doing
so it has largely ignored the Governmental objective
of keeping to the suggested income norms of the
second Five Year Plan (B. Nicol 1972: 435).
Thus it cannot be said that the excessive restriction of the right
to strike, compulsory arbitration in essential services and the long
dispute settlement process of the 1960s achieved their objectives in
this period. The law did of course partly force the unions to use
arbiration procedures, but for the most part the rank and file never
even bothered to follow such procedures. Generally legality was
used by the state to circumscribe workers' industrial protest but
where workers actually came out on illegal strikes the law was not
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used. Thus the law could provide a broad framework for workers
behaviour in industrial disputes but could not achieve its
objectives without actually redressing workers' grievances - the two
proved contradictory.
(c) TRADE UNIONISM, DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY
THESIS
The often made charge that to allow freedom of association
fully as envisaged bby ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98 would put
members of trade unions in a privileged position vis-a-vis the rest
of an under-developed economy was one of the arguments for
restrictions on trade union rights in Uganda (supra:pp.127,136-7,I40).
However although after independence the use of minimum wage
legislation and the Africanisation process greatly improved workers
pay and conditions of service,throughout the 1960s the overwhelming
majority of workers, up to about 90%, were not privileged at all.
Only about 10% of all wage earners increasingly shifted from the
ranks of the working class to the petty bourgeoisie by establishing
their own businesses or to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie due to their
greater access to state and parastatal resources which also helped
them develop independent businesses. Again although part of this
10% may not have established independent businesses, their share of
the national surplus compared to the rest of the workers was so high
that they, rather than the working class as a whole, constituted a
labour aristocracy (see Cap 1:22-25).
Apart from union struggles and the demands of workers in non-
unionised enterprises especially in the early 1960s, the most useful
sources of wage increases and improved conditions of service for
workers were minimum wage legislation and the policy of
Africanisation. The greatest Africanisation process took place in
the Civil Service. Africans in the newly "Africanised" posts were
now paid former European salaries and although a 20% reduction of "
salaries for new recruits to the superscale was made (supra p.130)
pay for senior civil servants and the civil service in general
increased after independence.
	 In the 1960s the higher civil
servants received annual incomes of Shs. 36,000 or more, free or
highly subsidised housing, a government car or subsidised car loan
(RU 1982: caps 17 & 18). In the same period the minimum wage of
ordinary workers was only Shs. 1800 per annum and in 1965 at least
47% of the workers in Uganda earned only this minimum wage (C.M.
Elliot: 21). And in the rural areas in 1969, 93% of the adult males
had an annual income of Shs. 2000 or less (RU: 1972: 92-94). In
1969 the number of Africans earning more than Shs 36,000 per annum
was only 172 in the central government, excluding the salariat of
parastatals, urban and local authorities (RU 1970: 106). By 1969
those civil servants earning more than Shs. 12,000 per annum were
1716 and earned 26% of total wages of the state administrative arm
(J. Jorgensen 1977: 389). The unionisable employees of government
all earned below Shs. 12000 p.a. (p. 13; though in 1968 the range of
unionisable employees was further narrowed down (infra: 183-'4). It
was the privileged position of the civil service officers, their pay
and allowances that were responsible for the lack of protest at the
denial of rights to organise in the 1963 Public Service (Negotiating
Machinery) Act. Having been put in such a privileged position, and
with the process of Africanisation still continuing union protection
was seen as superfluous.
It must be pointed out that although the Second Five Year
Development Plan (1966-1971) banned general wage increases (UG 1966:
149), annual increments were fixed at 3.5% for civil servants,
around the figure of inflation. This was in addition to promotional.
increments (C.M. Elliot: 31). Furthermore, the top civil service as
well as management of parastatal companies and senior urban and
local government officials were able to use their positions and
incomed to create private property in the form of ranches, farms,
shops and other businesses (See H.C. Campbell: 271-281; M. Mamdani
1976: 238, 272-274). 	 In fact a study carried out in the 1960s
situation showed that the higher paid workers had greater chances
and options to invest part of their incomes in supplementary income
activities while the less well paid and lowest paid were usually
unable to break into additional economic activities (C.M. Elliot:
29-31).
In the private sector the impact of Africanisation was less
dramatic. This was so mainly because Africanisation was carried out
very slowly there, even resisted in some enterprises (ibid: 20-21).
However the minimum wage policy did have considerable impact. The
1964 Minimum Wage Order set the minimum wage at Shs. 150 and 130 per
month for big and small towns respectively and Shs. 90 for
agricultural estates, cotton ginning and mining (S.I. 233/1965
Minimum Wages Order). This was a move from the 1962-3 minimum wages
of Shs. 120 for Kampala and Shs. 84/50 for the smaller towns (S.I.
72/1963 Minimum Wages Order). Thus while in 1962 70% of all the
recorded employees were paid only the minimum wage or less by 1965
those paid the minimum wage or less had reduced to 47% as shown in
Table VI. The Second Five Year Development Plan then fixed wage
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increases for five years (1966-1971) at 1.7% overall with the
highest increases for the lowest wage earners who were paid Shs.
1800 p.a. (UG 1966: 149) though as we have seen the civil service
continued to get increases at 3.5% annually.
The arguments for the new restrictive incomes policy were that
further wage increases would increase inflation,	 increase
unemployment as employees resorted to capital intensive methods and
above all increase the income gap between rural and urban dwellers
(ibid: 148; see also D.W. Nabudere 1980:231). While it is true that
in the 1960s workers' incomes were greater than those of peasants
(C.M. Elliot: 62) it must be realised that these workers especially
the lower paid ones could not subsist on their incomes as a family.
In 1962 the Government Report acknowledged that Shs. 240 was the
minimum expenditure in town for an average family of four but the
minimum wage rates were set between Shs. 84/50-120 (supra, 72; UG
1962: 11).	 While in 1964 the minimum wage requirements were
acknowledged to be higher than the ones set: Shs. 130-150 (UG:1963(a):
8). Besides it has also been extensively demonstrated that almost
all wage earners did share a substantial part of their income with
their rural peasant kinsmen (see e.g. R.D. Grillo 1973: 44-64).
It is estimated that in fact the true labour aristocracy
consisted of a very small proportion of the working class and earned
at least Shs. 6000 per year or Shs. 500 per month, that is over 3
times the minimum wage of 1964-1965. The total number of employees
earning this income increased from 4% in 1964 to about 10% in 1969
of the total wage earning class (J. Jorgensen 1977: 393). The
importance of trade unionism in this respect was therefore not that
union membership and thus union rights conferred a privileged
position. The best it did was to ensure that most union members
received wages above the minimum set (see also R.E. Gonsalves: 506).
On the other hand, a distinction must be made between that section
of the wage-earning class which may not have launched itself into .
the ownership of other business but which was part of the privileged
10% and the top civil servants and parastatal company officials who
were even more privileged and constituted an emerging bureaucratic
bourgeoisie. In our view it is only the former that may be called a
' labour aristocracy while the latter, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie,
constituted a new emerging separate dominant class. We shall talk
about this more closely in section 6.
Thus although government argued that workers incomes must be
kept down and their organisational rights restricted so that the
urban-rural gap may be reduced and resources for investment
accumulated, this was done at the expense of the majority of workers
and peasants while a small section of the state sector, an emerging
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, consolidated itself.
5. TRIPARTISM AND THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS
In this section we deal with the general concept of tripartism as
it related to the process of trying to amend those legal provisions
which affected the organisational rights of workers within the trade
unions. Here our contention is that government generally ignored
the principle of tripartism which it theoretically embraced under
the Industrial Relations Charter and the setting up of the Labour
Consultative Council (LCC) in 1962.
	
However even in the
intermittent way the LCC was used very little resulted from its
deliberations as the state tended to use it to legitimise its
policies vis-a-vis workers and the unions, while in practice union
views and even some unaminous LCC decisions were ignored and the
government proceeded to implement its own version of policies and
legislation. In this respect the methods adopted by the trade union.
leadership did not help advance wotkers organisational rights: while
FUTU took a pro-government and clientelist line, the UTUC opted for
parliamentary bureaucratic (LCC itself and complaints . to the ILO)
methods and seeking general public sympathy through press
. statements. These methods continued even with the formation of ULC
in 1966 as the two former factions remained antagonistic till the
suspension of ULC in 1968. As far as the struggle to change the law
and improve workers' organisational rights was concerned the LCC was
the main forum. It should be noted also that the individual
affiliates of UTUC, FUTU and later ULC never made an independent
input in the law-making process because theycould only do so through
their representatives in the central unions. Although UPEU could
have made an independent impact as it had a specific seat in the LCC
as a government employees union, its impact could not be felt
because it generally took pro-government positions as its leaders
were also the main leaders of FUTU. In short we argue that because
the union leadership chose to restrict their struggles for law
reform only to bureaucratic methods and excluded, rank-and-file input
they were largely ignored by government and were thus ineffective.
The fundamental flaw of the LCC lay in its powers and
procedures. First, it was very confidential.	 Secondly it was
purely advisory and consultative (LCC: Rules of Procedure, Clause
8). Thirdly, it was actually controlled by government. Its Rules
of Procedure provided that it would meet "not less than three times
a year" though additional meetings could be held at the discretion
of the Chairman or on the request of at least 6 representatives of
workers and employers (LCC: Rules of Procedure, Clause 2). The LCC
consisted of 16 members plus a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. These
two positions and that of the Secretary were filled by state
officials. Above all the memoranda and proceedings of the Council
and its Committees were confidential and no statements concerning
the business of the Council or its Committees could be made public
except by the Chairman with all members' approval (Clause 7).
Between 1962 and 1964 the LCC met only a few times and mainly
discussed the Industrial Relations Charter. From 1964 with the
formation of the pro-government FUTU, government ignored an LCC in
which FUTU was not represented. Therefore during the drafting of
the crucial Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Acts of 1964 and 1965
respectively no organised tripartite discussions took -piste. '-tade
unions were consulted separately and the Minister of Labour Ma&. it
clear that the LCC was after all only advisory and he was not bound
to follow the views of the trade unions or of any reconstituted LCC
(UG 1965: 1778-1779, 1798). Promising to reconstitute the LCC, he
asserted that the LCC was too slow and stated clearly:
its functions will be terribly limited to a number
of not serious matters, and after all it is not
under the law that I have got to have this, it is
not legally obligatory (ibid: 1855).
The re-constituted LCC began to meet only in 1967 (LCC 1967).
But again no LCC meetings took place between March 1968 and April
1970. With the closure of ULC and the ICFTU College, tripartite
consultations were also suspended.
By the time the LCC met in 1967, 5 major issues affecting union
organisation had arisen for consideration: the power of the Minister
to require an employer to recognise a trade union, qualifications
for eligibility to become a union official, the requirements for
amalgamation, the requirement to circulate union accounts to members
and the question of consent before a dispute could be referred to
the Industrial Court.
'The way these issues were handled shows the limits of the LCC
and restricting struggles for legal change to bureaucratic methods.
First, it had been found in actual practice that there was no
criteria on which a Minister could base himself to require an
employer to recognise a registered union. It was suggested by the
Minister of Labour in 1967 that at least 25% of the workforce should
be members of the union before the Minister could exercise his
discretion under S.13(3) of the 1965 Trade Union Act and also a time
limit for the employer to show cause for his refusal to recognise a
union to be fixed (LCC 1967(a)). Secondly on the question of
qualifications for eligibility to become a trade union official it
was found that the requirement that the officers of a union, except
with the Registrars permission, had to be employed in the industry
or occupation with which the trade union was directly concerned
(S.17(1)) Trade Union Act 1965) deprived the workers of competent
persons knowledgeable in trade union matters (ibid.). Thirdly, with
amalgamation, the requirement of a secret -ballot whereby at least
50% of the membership had to support the amalgamation and to exceed
by 20% those voting against (S.24(1-2)) to some extent had hampered
the government objective of creating big, strong and viable trade
unions which aim unions generally supported. In fact even when ULC
itself was formed in 1966 it was found that the requirements of the
secret ballot were expensive, cumbersome and impracticable and had





the	 provisions	 "hampered	 the
implementation of Government's policy of encouraging the formation
of strong and viable unions based on industries and kindred trades" -
(ibid). It was therefore proposed to amend Regulations 7 and 11 of
the Trade Unions Regulations 1965 (S.I. 182/1965) to allow an annual
or special delegates conference to decide the issue of amalgamation
by 50 percent of the delegates so deciding "since the policies of
registered trade unions are formulated and guided by annual and/or
special delegates conferences" (LCC 1967(a)). Fourthly, one of the
admissions made by the Minister, now agreeing with one of the
opposition views as advanced by H. M. Luande and others in the
debate on the 1965 Trade Unions Bill was that there was no need for
a union to circulate the audited annual accounts to every member
because as members were scattered it was costly and also unnecessary
as many could not understand the accounts (ibid). This argument was
flawed because these accounts could be sent to union branches and
shop stewards most of whom understood them and could explain them to
the rank and file. This could help advance some discussion on the
administration of union affairs rather than using the excuse of
general rank and file ignorance to perpetuate non-accountability.
Finally, according to the whole LCC threats of strikes were ever
present, inter alia, because of the loophole in the law which
required consent of both parties before a Minister could refer a
dispute to the Industrial Court or an arbitration tribunal
(S.1(3)(c)) 1964 Act). It was therefore agreed that a change would
be made to stop any party forcing a strike by withholding such
consent for the reference of the dispute for arbitration (LCC
1967(a).
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In spite of agreement that amendments in the above areas should
be made no amendment of the law was actually made - except on the
question of recognition whereby it was stipulated in the 1970 Trade
Unions Act (S.18(1)(e)) that 10% union membership in an enterprise
was sufficient to entitle a union to recognition which entitlement
• the Minister could enforce (S.18(3)).
Having been suspended in 1968 the LCC began to meet again in
1970 but the official view was still that it would be consulted by
the Minister "only if he deemed it necessary" in case of proposed
amendments to labour legislation (LCC 1970). And although it was
agreed that consultations of the Council should be made (ibid) the
enactment of the 1970 Trade Unions Act showed that no account was
taken of workers' views in particular (see infra, Section 6).
Issues raised in the LCC in 1970 related to workers'
organisational rights related to the level of union representation
and the reinstatement of the ULC. The question who should belong
to and be represented by trade unions has dogged the trade union
movement since independence. The position of the public sector was
very clear (supra,p.134); but in the private sector the legal
position was simply that no employer could make it a condition of
employment whether an employee should belong to a trade union or not
(S.47(1) 1965 Act). Union representatives argued that any employee
should belong to and be represented by a union while the employers
contended that those employees of the supervisory category should
not be represented by the unions (LCC 1970, supra). The compromise
in 1970 was that the status quo be maintained, namely the 1967
position whereby membership would remain open but as to who would be
represented by the union would be subject to union-management
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negotiation in each case (ibid; cf. LCC 1967, supra). The position
was to be clarified only in Industrial Court Award No. 3/1986
whereby the level of unionisation was greatly enhanced and
L3
reasonably clearly democrated by law (infra, Cap. 5:343). The.
second issue, the demand since 1968 (when ULC was suspended) that
the LCC should be reinstated was ignored for some time. The
Government simply stated on several occasions the principle of the
desirability of re-opening it but did little about it (see for
instance, LCC 1970, supra; RU 1970(a) (H. M. Luande):60-61)).
Instead at the end of 1970 the government, by legislation and
administrative fiat, simply dissolved all the trade unions and
established one union with mere branches (S.1 Trade Unions Act
1970).
In a word LCC tripartism did not advance the organisational
rights of the workers and the unions in particular. Reliance on
bureaucratic methods of work without any attempt at rank and file
organisation or harnessing workers' support in making demands on the
government was eventually to lead to the dismemberment and
dissolution of independent trade unionism under the Move to the Left
Strategy. The government had only paid lip-service to tripartism
and ignored it when decisions within the triparte LCC seemed to be
concerned with strengthening the unions.
6. THE MOVE TO THE LEFT STRATEGY AND THE POLITICAL-LEGAL CONTROL
OF TRADE UNIONS : 1968-1971
In this final section we analyse the impact of the political
strategy of the UPC Obote I regime, called the Move to the Left, on
the organisation of trade unions. Our argument is that the policy
was an attempt by a nascent bureaucratic (or state) bourgeoisie to
Consolidate	 itself and that law was used to incorporate the trade
unions, institutionally, and the leadership in particular to the new
state capitalist institutions under the guise of "socialism".
However the incorporationist approach of the 1962-'68 period
must be distinguished from that of the 1968-'71 Move to the Left
Strategy. Between 1962-1968 the government, first, seemed to favour
the ILO-type of tripartism whereby employers, unions and the state
co-operated but under the framework of the Industrial Relations
Charter and the LCC with bipartisancollective bargaining. In this
context strike action though greatly circumscribed was legal and
accepted in principle. Secondly the government supported a specific
form of political unionism, namely, unionism supportive of the
government; thus because support for FUTU against UTUC was not
successful, government pressurised the formation of ULC in 1966.
Thirdly tripartism seemed to have only remained an abstract policy
as the government refused to endorse the Industrial Relations
Charter as a signatory and suppressed the LCC between 1964-1967.
But between 1968-1971 the strategy of the government changed from
basing labour policy and legislation on the requirements of
"development" to a "higher" ideology - the construction of
"socialism". What the Move to the Left Strategy sought to do was to
create a corporate state in which all social classes would be
organically integrated within it, namely workers (in unions),
peasants (in co-operatives) and the state bureaucracy (civil
servants and parastatal officials). This was the aim of both
Documents No. 3 and No. 4 (infra: 18 .1-'2). Although reference to ILO-
type tripartism could still be made in the new structures, the
difference with the 1962-1968 period was that the new structures
including the trade unions would not be autonomous from both state
and capital. As we show below, the 1970 Trade Unions Act was part
of this strategy.
The material basis of the Move to the Left Strategy was that up .
to 1970 the Ugandan economy was overwhelmingly controlled by western
capital. British capital controlled about 80% of the commercial
bank deposits while other foreign banks controlled 10% and the Bank
of Uganda and Uganda Commercial Bank controlled only 10% (M. Mamdani
1976:256-257). The manufacturing sector was controlled by several
foreign companies and local Indian capitalists. 	 The Uganda
Development Corporation (UDC) was the main enterprise through which
the state held joint ventures with, foreign capital and local Indian
capital (for details see J. B. Barya 1986:19-52). But still several
companies in industry were owned solely by these same capitalists.
At independence foreign western capital and non-citizen Asians
controlled the commercial banks, insurance companies, import and
export	 houses,	 construction, mining, wholesale trade, 	 the
importation and distribution of petroleum products, major retail
shops and much of industry (J. Jorgensen 1977:414). From 1963 to
1970 the UPC government moved marginally to control a very small
portion of the economy by establishing parastatals: The National
Housing Corporation (1964), Uganda Commercial Bank (1965), Bank of
Uganda (1966), The National Trading Corporation (1966), Dairy
Industry Corporation (1967), Produce Marketing Board (PMB, 1968),
Apolo Hotel Corporation (1968) and the Import-Export Corporation
(1970) (ibid:403-406). These had only been piecemeal attempts by
the government to help Ugandan Africans participate marginally in an
economy controlled by western capital. The Move to the Left
Strategy from 1968 onwards was meant to reverse this domination and
nationalise "the commending heights of the economy".
The Move to the Left Strategy was formally embedded in five
documents the most important of which was the Common Man's Charter
(or Document No. 1) released in 1969. The Charter was adopted so
that
for the realisation of the real meaning of
independence, the resources of the country, material
and human, be exploited for the benefit of all the
people of Uganda in accordance with the principles
of socialism (A. M. Obote 1969:1).
Stating that it rejected, "both in theory and practice",
feudalism, capitalism, vested interests of any kind and foreign
influence, the Charter declared:
the guiding economic ptinciple will be that the
means of production and distribution must be in the
hands of the people as a whole. The fulfilment of
this principle may involve nationalisation of the
enterprises privately owned (ibid:11).
Accordingly in Document No. 4: The Nakivubo Pronouncements, on May
Day 1970, at Nakivubo Stadium, the nationalisation proposals were
implemented. With immediate effect the government was taking over
60% of 84 major industries including: all oil companies, some
industries, Kilembe mines, banks, plantations, insurance and credit
institutions and the Kampala and district bus services (Uganda Argus
2-5-1970).
Nationalisation served two objects. First and most important,
for our present purposes, nationalisation as part of the Move the
Left Strategy was meant to expand the UPC regime's social base.
Although the nationalisation measures did not greatly increase
national and state control over the economy and resulted in mere
partnership with the Ugandan state as the junior partner (M.
hamdaml, supra:267-8) the supporters of UPC would gain "access to
various directorship, nominal in power but substantial in monetary
gain, through a programme of "Africanisation" (ibid:268). Indeed as
one writer has shown the nationalisation strategy was as much a
means of increasing the pool of government jobs to be awarded by
'patronage as a means of expanding state control of the economy. New
parastatal corporations created new patronage posts and staffs of
pre-existing parastatals mushroomed in size whether or not the
parastatal assumed new economic functions (J. Jorgensen 1977:397-
399).
Secondly nationalisation itself did not actually serve the
cause of socialism, as was being claimed because it was not
necessarily antithetical to foreign capital. 	 For international
capital this was a time when it was seeking partnership with post-
colonial governments to stem the growing economic nationalism and to
gain political protection, protective tarriffs and access to local
finances by setting up joint ventures with the government. (See
generally Y. Ghai, in Y. Ghai (Ed) 1977:27; D. W. Nabudere 1977:
190-1, 246-7). In Uganda itself before the 1970 nationalisations
several foreign companies offered participation of up to 50% of
their shares or holdings in Uganda (M. Mamdani 1976:267; H. C.
Campbell: 263; J. Jorgensen 1977:426). The nationalisation statute,
the Companies (Government and Public Bodies Participation) Act (Act
3/1970) declared that 60% shares would be acquired by the government
(S.1(1) and Schedule 1 of Act 3/1970) and those shares were actually
nationalised by S.I. 70/1970. But by August 1970 several companies
were deleted from the schedule of nationalised companies (S.I.
143/1970) to allow negotiations on the extent of government
participation 13 . What was being proposed was not socialism 14 as
such but a form of state capitalism in a peripheral economy.
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Apart from nationalisation the UPC regime sought to monopolise
political power and dominate other areas in the economic life of
Uganda. In the 1960's it had recruited opposition M.P.'s into its
ranks and after 1965 had a two-third majority in parliament
(ibid:371). Further it came to control most district and urban
councils (ibid). Finally the politicians and the bureaucracy in
local and central governments were usually the same people given
loans for setting up farms or other businesses 15 . The final act of
trying to consolidate both economic and political power came when
the UPC banned all the political parties under the Penal (Unlaw-
ful Societies) (No.2) Order 1969 and prepared to create a one-
party state (S.I. 233/1969; see D.W. Nabudere 1980:278-9).
It is in the context of UPC monopolisation of economic and
political power under the guise of a "move to the left" that changes
in the structure of the trade union movement and the law regulating
it should be understood. The trade unions, institutionally were to
be incorporated within the new nationalised enterprises, while union
leaders could expect to advance into the ranks of the emergent state
bourgeoisie. Thus in the Nakivubo Pronouncements (Document No. 4)
union participation was revealed:
1. Kampala City Council (KCC) together with the trade unions would
acquire 60% of the shares in Kampala and District Buses.
2. Outside Kampala,	 in the four regions, 	 the District
Administrations, urban authorities, co-operative unions and the -
trade unions would acquire 60% of the shares of the bus
companies based in the region.
3. The workers and parastatal bodies would acquire 60% of the
shares in every important manufacturing industry and plantation
(Uganda Argus 2-5-1970).
This union participation would consolidate the provisions of
Document No. 3 (RU 1970(b)) in which the Government declared its
intention to create one public service with a uniform salary
structure for all government officers, district administrations and
urban authorities, the teaching service, parastatals and the co-
operatives, the UPC Party itself and even the trade unions (ibid:7-
8). However the extent of union participation in these enterprises
was not clarified; it was still possible to marginalise them in
favour of the bureaucracy in parastatals, KCC and district
administrations.
Following these documentary declarations and in particular the
May Day Pronouncements workers were enthusiastic and the trade union
leaders pledged to support the government measures. Union officials
declared:
From today the union officials hereby resolve
wholeheartedly to abide by the new political culture
and economic reforms as outlined in the Common Man's
Charter... The new political culture will guide the
labour movement (Uganda Argus 5-5-1970).
But the workers' and trade union leaders' enthusiasm was to
some extent greatly misplaced because an incorporationist strategy
was being worked out by the government whereby organised workers
would lose their autonomy. As harbinger of what was to come during,
the same May Day Pronouncements the fundamental right of workers to
collectively withdraw labour was declared an anachronism and was to
be abolished. Obote proclaimed:
with the entry of the common man into the fields of
ownership and management of the means of production
and distribution, I declare to the organised
workers, the trade unions that the Trade Unions Act
will be appropriately amended to abolish the archaic
principle and practice of strikes (Uganda Argus 2-5-
1970).
The legal changes that were past and parcel of the Move to the
Left had in fact began in 1968 following the suspension of ULC and
were to culminate in the new Trade Unions Act 1970 which was passed
in December. In 1968 in order to ensure no organisation within the
machinery of the state itself the level of unionisation in the
public service was further restricted. Now no permanent public
officer could join a union because only "group employees" were now
unionisable (S.1(a-b) Act 24/1968, The Public Service (Negotiating
Machinery)Act (Amendment) Act 1968). The Act was now also extended
to apply to local administration employees (except chiefs, local
administration prison service personnel and local administration
police force personnel) and urban authority employees of equivalent
rank as or whose terms and conditions of service were similar to
those of group employees (S.1(d) Act 24/1968). In 1969 the Public
Service Act was also amended to make it absolutely clear that "a
public officer who is not a group employee within the meaning of the
Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act shall not be or become a
member of any trade union or association affiliated to a trade
union" (S.27 Act 18/1969 Public Service Act).
But while organisational rights of public employees were now
removed for the majority, the Commission of Inquiry into ULC affairs
(RU 1969: supra: 159) provided government with the occasion to
destroy the organisational autonomy of the trade union movement as a
whole, subject it to political and administrative control and above all
exclude it from political power as a workers' organisational medium.
The one-man Commission of Inquiry headed by G.L. Binaisa, a former
Attorney-General in the UPC Government, was appointed to "inquire
into the allegiations of the breach of the Constitution of the ULC
by the Executive Board, the bad management and financial affairs of
the Congress generally" and ULC relations with Government and
international organisations (RU 1969: 1). However UnionLeaders andnon-
government circles believed it was set up to help government "muzzle
the ULC... pending the Inquiry" (ibid. 103). The recommendations of
the Inquiry into ULC which amounted to making the trade union
movement a government department, though not totally accepted,
provided the basis for the 1970 Trade Union Act. The most important
recommendations were:
1. that the election of officials of ULC and individual unions be
vetted by the Minister of Labour with a final power to appoint
vested in the President of Uganda;
2. that power should be given to the Government to act as watchdog
over the international activities of any union;
3. that a Civil Service post of Administrative Secretary
responsible to the Permament Secretary of the Ministry of
Labour be set up to do the day-to-day administration of ULC;
4. that the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions be increased
plus a right to attend annual meetings as observer;
5. that no trade union official should be a Member of Parliament;
6. that a compulsory check-off system for an employer be adopted
if workers in an employment so request and that more penalties
be imposed for unions failing to collect or remit subscriptions
to ULC;
7. that no trade union official be allowed to earn more than one
salary; and
8. that the trade union movement associate itself with national
centres in the British Commonwealth such as the British TUC
(ibid. 97-104).
In a motion on the above Binaisa Commission, Government policy,
partly deriving from these recommendations, was enunciated regarding
the planned new trade union law. First there would be "a major
alteration in the structural organisation of the trade union
movement..." Government would establish "by means of legislation,
one centre with the existing trade unions dissolving into branches
of one union". This would also mean amalgamation of small unions
and, in addition, to advance this process,
	
Government would
institute "compulsory check-off in respect of those persons who are
members of trade unions" (RU1970(a) (E.Y. Lakidi): 58). Secondly the
finances of the new union would be highly centralised and
administered with more strict supervision from the Registrar of
Trade Unions. Thirdly with regard to international relations, while
dialogue would be permitted all affiliation would stop.	 The
Minister explained:
The Government does not consider... that existing
affiliations by registered trade unions with
international secretariats should continue as this
would be prejudicial to this country's foreign
policy, particularly in view of the revelation that
these international secretariats to which our
registered trade unions are affiliated, have entered
into an agreement to adopt a general policy and
constitution of ICFTU 10 ... Such association
precluded free and cordial relations for the
exchange of experience •between the Uganda labour
movement	 and...	 other	 trade	 union
organisations.. .such as the WFTU (ibid. 59).
Further according to the Minister the organisational, administrative
and financial strengthening of the new union would mean that "those
persons who have wanted to maintain foreign control over Uganda
workers - because they get money from outside - and deprive them of
their independence, will not have room La the new structure" <iM233.
Finally the union leadership was to be excluded from parliamentary
politics ostensibly to ensure no divided loyalties. The Minister
argued that "in order to give dedicated leadership to the movement,
any person who aspires to contest a parliamentary election, should,
as soon as he is elected, resign from the office he holds in the
trade union movement" (ibid.). But the aim was really to ensure an
organic separation between trade unionism and politics, while
Government control over the movement would be increased. As the
Minister concluded:
it will be easier... for the Government to watch
closely the activities of this one organisation and
to work hand-in-hand in the promotion of workers'
interest and success of the economy of this country
(ibid. 60).
The Trade Unions Act 1970 (Act 40/1970) closely followed the
principles outlined above by the Minister. The main effect of the
1970 Act was to destroy the organisational autonomy of the trade
union movement. Though not part of the Party as in Tanzania (I.G.
Shivji 1986: 233-235) or subject to Presidential approval as far as
leadership and policy-making were concerned as in Kenya (R.
Sandbrook: 41-42) the ULC was to be subjected to more government
control than hitherto. Finally the right to strike was abolished.
The Trade Union Act which came into force on 31st December 1970
established a single union, the Uganda Labour Congress (S.1) and
dissolved all the autonomous trade unions originally affiliated to
ULC (S.2). Only branches of ULC instead of autonomous trade unions
could now be formed (S.8-9). To create a very highly centralised
structure it was provided that no union branch could be registered
unless it was composed of not less than one thousand registered
members (S.9(3)). And the definition of a trade union, which was
superfluous as there was now only one trade union with mere
branches, was amended to mean "any combination whether temporary or
permanent, of a thousand or more persons other than an employees'
association..." (S.72). The right to organise now extended only to
the formation of branches of ULC and not beyond (S.55(1)).
The leadership of ULC or its branches was still restricted to
Ugandan citizens (S.10(4)). In fact the government had in October
1970 went beyond the 1965 mere exclusion of foreigners (mainly
Kenyans) from union leadership. On the pretext that it was trying
to improve the conditions of work of Ugandan workers the government
expelled 33,000 Kenyan workers from Uganda (Uganda Argus 6.10.1970;
J. Jorgensen 1981: 286).
To exclude union leaders from political leadership it was now
provided that "no person shall hold office in the ULC or in a
registered branch union if he is a member of the National Assembly"
(S.22(5)).	 This section appears to have been aimed at the
independent minded former UTUC leaders who had refused to become
part of the party or government machinery. Government seems to have
opted for control of the Trade Unions through the Ministry of Labour
(Registrar and Labour Minister) and economic incorporation in the
nationalised companies or parastatals but could not risk direct
political representation of workers least organised opposition
developed.	 While trade unions could participate in economic
institutions they would not be allowed to participate in political
power.
Having ensured that the ULC would be under government
supervision and direction government made provision in the new law
to ensure union recognition by employers where at least 10% of
employers in a given enterprise were members of the ULC union branch
(S.18(1)(e), see supra: p. 175). The finances of ULC were also to be
improved by expanding the sources to include: subscriptions,
investments, donations and check-off contributions from members.
But all funds would be kept by the ULC Treasurer and no branch could
keep or invest funds without ULC approval (S.40(2)). Here the aim
was to strengthen the institution of ULC and to guarantee its
ability to co-operate with government once membership and finances
were stabilised. But unlike during the FUTU-UTUC days foreign
donations and gifts could only be received after government
approval. S.42(3) provided that
the ULC or its branch union shall not enter into any
agreement for aid of any nature with any foreign
country or organisation without consultation with
and approval of the Minister.
And to enhance government control over the expenditure of union
funds the Registrar of Trade Unions was now empowered "to inspect
the books of account... at any time he may think fit" (S.45(3)).
Finally the prohibition of strikes promised by President Obote
on May Day 1970 was made into law now. While peaceful picketing was
maintained as a right (S.57(1)(a)), such picketing was prohitited if
done in such a way as, inter alia, "to cause complete cessation of
work" (S.52(1)).And no picketing was allowed at or near government
premises (S.52(2)). However although these provisions were intended
to prevent strikes the Trade Disputes Act of 1964 had not yet been
amended to close those options whereby theoretically strikes could
take place (see pp. 123-124). The law was not to be thorougly re-
examined in this respect in any case because in January 1971 Amin led
a coup d'etat against the UPC-Obote regime and reversed most of the
Move to the Left innovations and aspects of the new Trade Union Act.
In the short term it operated (1970-1971) the Move to the Left
strategy and its innovations did not, in practice, involve ordinary
workers and their leaders. Instead the UPC seems to have focused its
attention on negotiations with multinationals and the role of the
state bureaucracy in the "new socialist culture" (See IPA: 1970).
By August 1970 trade union leaders were complaining that in spite of
the Move to the Left innovations "not enough has been done in the
way of educating the workers and trade union leaders as to what role
their movement is expected to play in order to achieve the.., goals
envisaged in the said proposals" 17 . H.M. Luande also pointed out
that although directors to the nationalised companies had been
appointed no worker or trade union leader had been. And against the
law proposed to abolish strikes he argued that this would not stop
strikes because "the workers themselves are not involved at all" in
the economic arrangements (RU 1970(c): 165-166). Similarly at an LCC
meeting
workers' representatives made a request to the
effect that the Ministry of Labour, in conjunction
with the Milton Obote Foundation, should organise a
seminar, the purpose of which would be to educate
workers on the role they would have to play in our
changing economy and to explain to them what the 
five documents are all about (LCC: 1970(a)).
These demands by workers showed that the Move to the Left had
little to do with "the principles of socialism" as claimed by the
Charter. The Charter itself had been conceived by Obote for "the
masses" without the latter's input or participation 18 . This was
socialism from above, a contradiction in terms.
Finally, although no legal provision was made to make the ULC
part of the only party the UPC or of government, administratively
the government was gearing itself to directly influence ULC
administration. In fact only five days before Amin's 25th January
1971 coup the Minister of Labour announced the provisional formation
of 14 branches of the ULC though he had no legal powers under the
new Act to do this (Uganda Argus 21.1.1971). Branch formation was
legally entirely in the hands of the workers (S.9 Trade Union Act
1970).
This formation of ULC branches and the dissolution of
autonomous trade unions earlier by the new Act marked the end of the
trade union struggle for organisational autonomy in the first decade
. of independence. The state had achieved through legislation and
administrative fiat temporary subjugation of the trade union
movement. We say temporary because both the Move to the Left
strategy and the fundamental philosophy and structure of the ULC
were reversed by the Amin regime from 1971 onwards.
CONCLUSION
The origin of the post-colonial legislation enacted by the
Obote I regime between 1963-1965 was in the radical and political
left-wing unionism expressed in the UFL . and UPC-YL alliance under'
the leadership of the first UPC Secretary General, J. Kakonge. The
strike wave between 1961-1964 was the immediate impetus for the
enactment of legislation restrictive of union rights and the right
to strike in particular. 	 These strikes also provided the occasion
for the UPC government to articulate its developmentalist ideology
as the justification for the restrictive industrial relations
legislation enacted to replace the iore libeTai and voluntarist
colonial legislation. This restrictive iegisLaticm ptemiseA 	 tk\e
ideology of development provided the labour policy framework between
1962-1968. In this period state control of the trade union movement
was attempted through the creation of a pro-government union Centre,
FUTU in 1964 to counter the autonomous UTUC. However FUTU itself
came to be a tool of the right-wing faction of UPC and thus failed
to serve the interests of UPC in general. For this reason trade
union "unity" was now advocated by the UPC which led to the
formation of ULC in 1966.
But the change in strategy by government to advocate trade
union unity also served a wider strategy of the Move to the Left
which, between 1968-1971, was an attempt by the UPC to widen its
social base under a populist "socialist" programme. 	 The
ideological justification of policy changes also shifted from mere
development to the building of an egalitarian socialist society.
But the laws regulating trade union organisation enacted in 1968 for
the civil service and 1970 for the trade union movement generally
were aimed at co-opting trade unions and trade union leaders into
the state economic institutions (the mushrooming parastatals and
joint venture companies) while at the same time excluding them from
political participation. Law here was an instrument of the nascent,
state bourgeoisie. Besides, the tripartite LCC became another way
of legitimising legislation which consistently failed to take into




the	 1965	 re-registration	 process	 and the
rationalisation of the trade unions created sizeable and financially
viable unions at least as compared with the pre-1965 and colonial
situations this viability only remained at the institutional level.
Both the central union ULC and its affiliates failed to nurture
democratic processes in accordance with their constitutions and the
1965 Act. Although there were structural reasons for this the most
important causes lay in the union leaderships's concentration on
power struggle and the government's primary concern with harnessing
the union movement.
The trade disputes legislation to some extent helped reduce
disputes and strikes in particular. However this was only possible
due to improvements in workers' conditions of service engendered by
trade union struggles, minimum wage provisions, the policy of the
Africanisation and Industrial Court arbitration which for the most
part gave awards beyond the wage limits set by the Second Five Year
Development Plan. In other words legislation could not resolve the
contradictory objects of both industrial peace and capital
accumulation for "economic development". But in spite of the
improvements the working class as a whole did not attain a
- 193-
privileged position vis-a-vis the rest of society. On the contrary
only a tiny minority (about 10% of all wage-earners) could be said
to have consisted of either a labour aristocracy or an emerging
state bourgeoisie. Thus objectively the .developmentalist ideology
on which the legislation of 1963-1965 and the socialist ideology on
which the 1968-1970 legislation were based had the consequence of
protecting the emerging local dominant class, the state bourgeoisie
at the expense of the majority of the workers, peasants and the
unemployed.
In general the first decade of independence in Uganda shows,
that the law regulating the organisation of workers was constructed
in a dialectical way through the struggle between the working class
on the one hand and the state and capital on the other. This was
the case between 1962-1965. The main characteristics of the law
here were instrumental and political. Instrumentally law was used
to achieve state objectives while politically it embedded the
emasculation of aspects of yotkets rights available during the
colonial period. Legal ideology was not in itself important in the
period 1962-1968 because the state did not argue so much that its
labour policy and legislation should be followed due to the
legitimacy of law but
	
invoked what it considered the higher
justification - the ideology of development. Although the 1963-1965
legislation reflected state/capital dominance over the small working
class, institutionally the law created a basis for the development of
strong unions; but this was not realised because both state and
union leadership had little interest in the democratic aspects of
the law. Further, continued rank and file industrial action against
the law showed a contradiction between the restriction of rights and
workers' incomes on the one hand and the desire for industrial peace
and capital accumulation for development on the other.
The more systematic strategy of the Move to the Left would have
integrated the trade unions and their leadership in particular to a
corporatist state that sought to dissolve all autonomous
organisations - economic and political. For trade unions, the 1970
Trade Unions Act was the main instrument for this purpose. However
more administrative and political methods of incorporating trade
unions into the state were necessary to achieve government
objectives and were being put into place by the time of the 1971
coup. Law therefore only provided an institutional framework while
political and administrative innovations would help actually
concretise government objectives.
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CHAPTER IV: THE PERSISTENCE OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATION
UNDER STATE REPRESSION 1971-1979
INTRODUCTION
The overthrow of the Obote I regime by the army in a coup led
by Idi Amin in January 1971 engendered important changes in
industrial relations in Uganda and the organisation of trade unions
in particular. In this chapter we examine and explain the impact of
the legal changes that took place during the period of the Amin
dictatorship 1971-1979.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 deals
with the re-emergence of trade union autonomy and the liberalisation
of industrial relations legislation between 1971-1974. We argue
here that the Amin coup provided space for trade unions to regain
their organisational autonomy. This was so mainly because the Amin
regime sought to create a wide social base and thus initially had
room for workers' demands and the expression of their grievances.
Between 1971-1973 trade union struggles and demands for autonomous
organisation and their protest against the 1970 Trade Unions Act
found sympathy with the civilian Ministers of Labour who
ideologically believed in autonomous trade unionism. It was this
coincidence of ideological belief in independent working class
organisation in the context of a regime that was seeking popular
support that was responsible for the liberalisation of trade union
legislation between 1971-1973. The amendments to the Trade Disputes
Act 1964 made in 1964 on the other hand were mainly a result of
workers' struggles and strike activity in particular, between 1971-
1973. They were meant to streamline the legal dispute settlement
process by creating more specific and quicker procedures, , making
the Industrial Court more independent and making awards enforceable
against recalicitrant employers.
Section 2 assesses the practical application of the new
industrial relations legislation. 	 This practical application
however must be seen against the background of a new trade union
structure created in 1973-4. In 1973 the National Organisation of
Trade Unions (NOTL) was created and was later launched in 1974 with
16 unions affiliated to it. The trade union structure created at
this time provided a strong institutional basis for Uganda's trade
union movement and this structure has continued even after Amin. It
was also created in the same context as the 1971-74 legislation when
the Amin regime still sought legitimacy from civil society (e.g.
trade unions) and was so encouraged in labour matters by the
civilian Ministers of Labour. However in practice the actual
importance of the new trade unions though
	
potentially more viable
and the role of the more liberal trade union and trades disputes
legislation came to depend upon the character of the state and the
employers.
Thus we contend in this section that the liberal trade union
and trades disputes legislation was not applied during Amin's era
especially in the period 1973-1979 for two main reasons. One: as a
result of the so-called Economic War (1972-1973) during which Asians
were expelled and the subsequent diplomatic - economic embargo from
the West, Uganda's industrial base almost collapsed. 	 This
contributed both to the weakening of trade unions (especially
through loss of membership) and the repressive industrial relations




government's lack of legitimacy led to the adoption of repressive
practices to ensure that there was no political opposition to it
amongst the workers generally and trade unions in particular. Thus
although the Industrial Court always upheld the rights of trade.
unions to exist and represent their membership, in practice the new
employers (mafuta-mingi) who took over the Asians' expropriated
properties (both soldiers and civilians) generally ignored such
awards, provisions of collective agreements and the law in general.
This was more generally expressed in the militarisation of
industrial relations whereby managers and employers resorted to
police and military force to resolve industrial conflict or simply
to suppress any workers' dissent.
Further we argue that trade unions were weakened not simply
because of the collapse of the industrial base following the 1972-73
Economic War but also because of the Presidential ban on collective
bargaining between 1974-1 .976. This hastened the deterioration of
workers' terms and conditions of service and further undermined
trade unionism. In the end, working class gains of the 1960s were
eroded in the 1970s and even the small labour aristicracy that
existed was eradicated.
Finally in this section we show that under Amin there was a
diminution of the role of the legal dispute settlement procedures as
well as a diminution of strike action. This was so because the
dispute settlement machinery and strikes came to be seen by workers
as ineffective and dangerous respectively due to blatant state
repression.	 But because the institutionalisation of dispute
settlement procedures was predicted upon the need for industrial
peace for economic development the diminution of orderly collective
bargaining, the role of trade unions generally and that of the
dispute settlement institutions and procedures may also be seen as
part and parcel of the government's abandonment of the ideology of
development and its concern with mere survival. Indeed by 1977 the .
Amin regime accepted that industrial 'production had collapsed and
having abandoned the ideology of development instituted a programme
of "rehbilitation".	 Thus in Uganda developmentalism as an
ideology collapsed in the mid-1970s and has since not provided a
legitimating function with regard to laws restrictive of union
rights and * dispute settlement procedures that considerably
circumscribe strike action.
In Section 3 we argue that although tripartism and a consensual
view of industrial relations were first encouraged by the Obote I
regime (1962-1971) it was during the Amin period that tripartism as
advocated by the ILO came to be more systematically internalised by
the trade union movement. This was for two main reasons: first, the
Amin regime used the expulsion of the Asians to claim that Uganda
was now economically independent, in control of its own economy and
that consequently all classes and social groups should work co-
operatively and not antagonistically. Secondly, because the Amin
regime excluded western trade unions from operating in Uganda the
ILO became the major source of trade union education. So while in
the 1960s Ugandan unions were basically grooved in the Cold War
disputes and were generally in disarray between 1968-1971 after the
closure of ULC and the ICFTU African Labour College in 1968, in the
1970s ILO ideas in particular tripartism and a technocratic and
careerist conception of trade unionism were generally unchallenged.
Such conception of trade unionism today may thus be traced more
specifically to this period.
Finally in Section 4 we argue that effective amendment to the
law was restricted to the 1971-1974 period when the Amin regine was
still open and seeking a wide social base. After 1974 the regime
did not bother to consider union demands for several amendments to.
the labour laws through the LCC forum. This was because the regime
now had little concern for legal legitimation of its industrial
relations practice and arbitrariness in employer-union relations and
state intervention in these relations predominated.
1. THE RE—EMERGENCE OF TRADE UNION AUTONOMY AND THE LIBERALISATION
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGISLATION: 1971-1973/4
(a) TRADE UNION AUTONOMY AND THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE UNION
LEGISLATION: 1971-1973
The year 1971 was supposed to be the beginning of the
implementation of the Move to the Left strategy in which the trade
unions were to be incorporated in the structure of the growing state
bureaucracy under UPC hegemony. The removal of the Obote I regime
halted this process and provided an opening for the trade union
movement to demand changes in the 1970 Trade Unions Act which had
altered the trade union structure and greatly undermined trade union
autonomy from party and state. Although the trade union leadership
could have gained from incorporation into the new economic
institutions they would still have preferred to retain the unions'
organisational autonomy. Thus trade unionists were among the first
elements of Ugandan society to welcome the Amin coup. Their main
expectation from the coup was a guarantee of freedom of association.
For example one of the General Secretaries happily observed that
"the common man has been saved from a corrupt Government and... a
corrupt man" (Uganda Argus 30.1.1971). But he then indicated that
he expected all-round freedom of association, supported Amin's steps
to reinstate political parties and was glad that "Major General Idi
Amin Dada does not believe in a one-party system" (ibid). Other
union leaders echoed similar sentiments. And when AATUF urged trade
unions in the world not to recognise the Amin government Uganda's
trade union leaders met to dissociate themselves from that call
Uganda Argus 19.2.71).The celebration at a get-together party of UGIL
(Uganda Garments Industries Limited) workers encapsulated the mood
of the time. Amin was described as "the saviour of Uganda" and the
workers later declared:
our celebration today has a dual purpose, one for
(the) reinstatement of our freedom of speech and
association, denied us... during the last eight
years. The other is the end of despotic rule of
Obote and his colleagues (Uganda Argus 22.3.1971).
It was in this euphoric atmosphere that the trade union
leaders called upon the new government to reverse the dissolution of
autonomous trade unigns and the centralisation brought about by the
1970 Act. In response to this a temporary measure was adoptedl.
This was the Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree (No. 10/971) which
was effective from 1st March 1971 (S.2). This Decree provided that
” ...all trade unions registered under the Trade
Unions Act 1965 shall continue as separate trade
unions until such time as the Minister, shall, by
notice published in the Gazette, dissolve them"
(S.1(a)).
This then was only a holding mechanism and at this time the
philosophy of one trade union structure of the 1970 Act was not
tampered with. In fact in the aftermath of the coup Ministry of
Labour officialdom still faithfully followed the spirit of the 1970
Act. According to the Acting Labour Commissioner, Decree 10 of 1971
"was issued to amend the relevant section of the 1970 Act to enable
existing unions to operate legally 'but the rest of the Act is
effective'" (Uganda Argus 3.4.1971). Unions were supposed to ;wait
ministerial directions to the single ULC (ibid).
It is contended here therefore that the eventual restoration of
trade union autonomy under Decree 29 of 1973 was a result of the
struggle of the Trade union movement on the one hand and the support
of the liberal civilian tinisters of Labour at a time when the Amin
regime was seeking a broad and reliable social base. 	 The
coincidence of ideological belief in union autonomy held by most
trade union leaders and the civilian Ministers of Labour ensured
that the reversal of the 1970 Act was put on the agenda quite early.
Thus in 1971 an emergency LCC meeting was called at the Minister's
request because
... in view of the recent change of Government it
was the Minister of Labour's pledge to re-examine
and review the industrial relations policy and the
law relating thereto, and to provide for the
safeguarding of the free and voluntary character of
the trade union movement (LCC: 1971).
Apart from the calls of the trade unionists for the revival of
autononnus trade unions and a liberalisation of the restrictive
provisions of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Acts, the state
was .also interested in the formation of a few but viable trade
unions which would discipline workers and minimise strikes. The
question of strikes was very urgent because in the wake of the coup
rank and file workers had decided to ignore more openly the official
and constitutional dispute settlement machinery. To the workers the
coup provided an opening for them to express their grievances. To
most of then the niceties of the law were an irrelevance. Between
1971-1974 strikes escalated though fewer workers were involved in
1973 and 1974(infra:212-'3). To some extent too concern with curbing
strikes united trade union leaders and the state in instituting the
new liberal legal provisions and streamlining, and further.
strengthening the various trade unions.
Right from 1971 H.M. Luande, representing the trade unions and
supporting the Amin coup, had stated that "the Military Government
has made it possible for Uganda's organised labour to resume some of
the principles - which should guide trade union leaders and rank and
file members - of free trade unionism..." (Uganda Argus 1.5.1971).
Subsequently several meetings were held by the union leaders to co-
ordinate their demands for amendments to the laws affecting workers
(Uganda Argus 11.4.1972). To the unionists the re-establishment of
a central union, the ULC, was central to the changes they demanded.
For instance six General Secretaries, responding to President Amin's'
call to the workers to end illegal and "irresponsible" strikes
argued that in order to end "this alarming (strike) situation,
endeavours should be made to reconstitute the ULC which will co-
ordinate the activities of the workers and advise them" (Uganda
Argus 13.3.1971). The unions further pursued this line in the LCC
where it was eventually unanimously agreed that "the Uganda Labour
Congress should be established as soon as pcissible as this would
check on illegal strikes" (LCC: 1971, supra: 7). To co-ordinate
their demands and activities the union leadership organised
themselves in the All Uganda Trade Unions Steering Committee
(AUTUSC) led by L.K. Senkezi, Secretary General of NUCCTE and later
by R.W.T. Wetosi of the Makerere Employees Union2.
The concept of an autonomous trade union movement was also
shared by the new Labour Minister who pointed out that "the
philosophy behind the Trade Unions Act 1970 was the establishment of
one trade union only". In his view "this philosophy did not appear.
to be in conformity with democratic trade unionism and would appear
to be unconstitutional" (LCC: 1972:3).	 The LCC, following the •
• Minister's request for recommendations, also decided unanimously
that "the workers of Uganda should be permitted and assisted to
organise themselves into a number of trade unions of their choice"
(ibid).
This view however was not unanimous. There was a struggle
within Amin's Cabinet regarding the veryexistence and rights of
trade unions. Since there was no parliament under Idi Amin the
Cabinet was the highest decision-making body. In the Cabinet two
views were counterposed: the autocratic view and the liberal one
pursued by the Ministry of Labour itself. The autocratic view was
that a free trade union movement and strike action in particular
would threaten the developing economy of Uganda and even the
government as in some other countries.	 It was therefore
"inadvisable to have trade unions in the country" and as such unions
could "either be left to operate as a different type of organisation
or banned completely" (Ministry of Justice 1973:5),The liberal view
which to a great extent triumphed was •that Uganda was part of the
international community which had accepted the operation of trade
unions and "could not afford to ban them". First, it was contended
in support of this view that for practical purposes, with the
emergence of new employers after the Economic War, workers should be
protected from likely exploitation by these new employers. Secondly
from other contries' experience "the banning of trade unions...had
not prevented strikes". Thirdly, trade unions were not necessarily
a security or economic risk but in fact "served a very useful
purpose through which the workers could ventilate their grievances"
and that through the trade unions,"it was easier for the Government
to deal with workers' grievances rather than negotiate with them as
a mob". Therefore what should be done to acccommodate them was "to
modify the machinery for their operation to enable Government to
control them effectively". It was then pointed out in this
connection that "that was precisely what the amendment Decree was
intended to achieve" (ibid).
In spite of objections by a section of the Cabinet and by
employers to some extent (LCC 1971) the liberal Trade tnion Act
(Amendment) Decree (No. 29/1973) was eventually enacted. The Decree
was liberal because it reinstated the existence and autonomy of
trade unions on a permanent basis and generally enhanced trade
unions' freedom of association. Further it reinstated the principle
of voluntary industrial relations based on collective bargaining
between autonomous unions and employers, albeit overseen by the
state. The Decree was published on 8th December 1973. Its main
object was "to amend the Trade Unions Act 1970, to re-establish the
freedom of employees to form autonomous trade unions and for other
matters connected therewith" (Decree 29/1973, Longlitle). S.1(b)
replacing S.1 of the 1970 Act established the National Organisation
of Trade Unions (NOTU) as the only central trade union in Uganda to
which all registered trade unions had to affiliate. The dissolution
of autonomous unions by the 1970 Act was therefore reversed.
The legal re-establishment of autonomous trade unions with one
national Centre fulfilled the aspirations and demands of the
organised workers which were accepted by the Ministry of Labour and
eventually by the Amin cabinet. This change reversed the central
principle of the 1970 Act which aimed at creating one monolithic
organisation amenable to political-administrative control.	 The
other amendments extended the trade unions' freedom of association.
Three of the amendments were particularly important because they
concerned union financial strength and aspects of freedom of
association.
First the question of the source and administration of union
funds was resolved in such a way as to give unions more say with
less state intervention. While the Ministry of Labour and the
unions argued for , compulsory check-off for every unionisable
employee the employers could only accept compulsory check-off only
for members (LCC 1971, Supra: 5). This issue was not specifically
resolved until 1974 when the Trade Unions (Check-off) Regulations
(S.I 71/1974) were made. The check-off system was to apply only
where a union member of a recognised union in any workplace gave
written consent that his monthly union subscription be automatically
•deducted by the employer and be paid to the union (ibid, Regulation'
1(1)). This provision was consistent with the concept of freedom of
association and also provided a basis for union financial viability.
With regard to foreign finances and donations, both NOTU and its
affiliates were obliged "not to enter into any agreement for foreign
aid of any nature with any foreign country or organisation without
consultation with, and approval of, the Minister" (S.1(w) Decree
• 29/1973). This was meant to ensure that foreign aid was directed
only to legitimate trade union purposes. What was more important
with respect to funds is that local gifts and donations were left to
the unions themselves to decide upon unlike under S.42(1) & (2) of
the 1970 Act where the branch unions could not. Some autonomy in
financial matters was therefore also envisaged for the affiliates of
NOTU unlike under the structure of the 1970 Act where only national .
officials of ULC could decide.
Secondly a provision was made to ensure that employers complied
with the provisions on freedom of association. To ensure that no
anti-union practices or discrimination against union members were
engaged in by employers the Registrar was empowered to investigate
the affairs of any employer and could in this connection "call on
the employer to produce for his inspection all or any of the books
or documents of the employer or to furnish in writing such
information or explanation as the Registrar may require" (S.1(z)
Decree 29/1973). Although this was dependent upon the discretion of
a state official - the Registrar - it was an advance as it provided
some specific means of checking recalicitrant employers.
Thirdly, there was unanimous agreement in the LCC without much
discussion that S.22(5) of the 1970 Act which prohibited a Member of
Parliament from becoming a unionofficial be repealed. Although the
Labour Ministry first argued that there would not be sufficient time
for both duties and that "such a trade union official would tend to
mix his political responsibilities with those of trade unions': the
trade unionists' counter-arguments were eventually accepted (LCC
1971:2). In the relatively free atmosphere of the first months of
the Amin regime they argued that countries like Kenya and Britain
allowed full-time unionists also to become 11.P's and no confusion or
neglect of responsibilities had occurred. Instead, they argued,
"trade unionists in Parliament.. .would contribute effectively in
debates on matters affecting labour policy and legislation" (ibid).
So the right of trade union leaders to engage in parliamentary
politics was restored by the deletion of S.22(5)(S.1(n)(ii) Decree
29/1973).
Apart from these positively liberal amendments Decree 29 of
1973 contained provisions meant to strengthen the union constituency
but enhancing democratic unionism at the same time. Besides, though
no legal provision was made to that effect in terms of foreign
affiliation Pan-African trade unionism and positive non-alignment
were strongly encouraged. However firm state overview was to be
maintained.
The most hotly debated issue regarding the unions' constituency
was the scope of the right to belong to a trade union and the level
of union membership above which any employer would be obliged to
recognise a union. The 1967 general position that every employee
was free to belong to a trade union with the union and employer free
to agree on who would be represented by the union was maintained.
But as the question of recognition, particularly the percentage
level of union membership entitling a union automatic recognition,
could not be agreed in .the LCC it was left to the Minister to
determine	 (LCC 1971 supra: 6). Subsequently the 1973 Cabinet
meeting also extensively debated this issue and agreed that the 10%
which S.18(1)(e) of the 1970 Act provided as the minimum level of
union membership. at which recognition was obligatory was too low.
Decisions reached by such a minority, the Cabinet argued, could be
detrimental to the economy or security of the country and that
"leaving the percentage at only 10% to recognise a union, would be
putting the country at the mercy of • a few union "hot heads""
(Ministry of Justice 1973 supra: 6).	 Although the view was
proferred that union membership was difficult to organise and a high
percentage should not be required as this "would be tantamount to a
virtual ban of trade unions in the country" it was rejected on the.
ground that "since trade unionS were formed to cater for the
interests of workers, it would be surprising if the 51% membership
could not be reached easily. Such a situation... would only be
indicative of their lack of interest to join the unions, in which
case there was no cause to force them to" (ibid.). Thus S.18(1)(e)
of the 1970 Act was amended to increase to 51% the level of union
membership at which any employer could be obliged to recognise a
union (S.1(m) 1973 Decree). What this meant was that whereas
voluntary recognition could be accorded a union whose membership at
any enterprise was below 51% of the unionisable workforce,
compulsory recognition could be enforced only where the majority of
workers were members.
As for foreign affiliation the Government position was to
encourage relations with other trade unions in Africa. This was in
conformity with OAU policy then aimed at achieving an all-Africa
trade union unity in one Confederation (W. Ananaba 1979: 135). The
main idea behind this policy was to strengthen the independence of
African trade unions.	 Thus in 1972 the Labour	 Commissioner
observed that if the envisaged All-African Trade Union unity was
eventually achieved national unions would automatically affiliate to
it (LCC 1972. supra, Minute 11/72). Indeed the Organisation of
African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) was inaugurated in 1973 and when
NOTU was formed in 1974 it affiliated to it (NOTU 1984(a): 35). And
at the time the OATUU Charter prohibited its affiliates from having
any other affiliation (ART. 8 OATUU Charter). 	 Although this
provision appeared to infringe the principle of freedom of
association, in the context of the reality of Cold War trade
unionism, it was a positive attempt by African governments and
unionists to maintain the position of positive neutrality and non-
alignment.
Finally both unions and employers had demanded in the LCC that
the Minister's supervisory powers especially the right to cal l for
information on any trade union matter (S.16 1970 Act) be removed or
transferred to the Registrar.	 Their argument, especially the
unions, was that this *would lead to political control or
interference (LCC 1971, op. cit: 2). Eventually however it was
agreed that ministerial supervisory powers be retaLued "fa KrZew of
the past experience and constant confusion in the labour movement".
So it was accepted"that the Government must have some measure of
control over the activities of the ULC and its affilitates" (ibid).
Thus although a number of liberalising provisions had been enacted
by Decree 29 of 1973 clear state overview was maintained in the
hands of the Registrar of Trade Unions and to some extent, the
Labour Minister.
The amendments of Decree 29 of 1973 were in fact only one
aspect of the industrial relations legal framework created under
the Amin regime. The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
Act (Amendment) Decree (No. 18/1974) was the other. It is to this
Decree that we now turn.
(b) AhENDMENT OF THE TRADE DISPUTES ACT 1964: THE ROLE OF THE
1971-1973 STRIKES
We have seen above how demands of the trade unionists and the
stand of the liberal Ministers of Labour helped bring about the.
liberal and voluntarist Decree 29 of 1973. The amendment of the
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act 1964 on the other
hand was more directly a response to rank and file workers' strike
action between 1971-1974. What is important is that the strikes
revealed a unity of purpose between union leaders and government,
namely, that amendments to the 1964 Act should be made to	 make
dispute settlement fast and efficient and thus minim ise strikes.
The effect nonetheless was a further liberalisation of the
industrial relations legal framework.
From 1971 immediately after the coup several workers in
different sectors began going on strike. Although the level of
strikes between 1971-1974 is comparable to that between 1g66-1970
what is clear is that more workers were now involved in the strikes
and more man-days were lost as a result (Cf. Cap III;P.111). Table
VII below illustrates this change. Although most of the workers'
demands between 1971-1974 concerned wage increases, late wage
payments and implementation of other contractual benefits, demands
for union recognition, the removal of oppressive and racist
management and against discrimination were also prominent (ARML
1973: 79, 26-27; 1974: 59-62). For instance hardly a month after
TABLE VII:
	 STRIKES IN UGANDA 1971-1978
Year No. of Strikes
	 No. of Workers Involved	 Man-days Lost
1971 44 23,245 55,162
1972 64 23,301 56,896
1973 46 8,300 20,941
1974 41 3,962 48,805
1975 -
1976 -
1977 5 1,784 2,682
1978 7 6,497 18,647
Sources:
	 ARML: 1973-1974; 1977-1978;
	 ILO 1977: 843
the coup	 the	 Apolo Hotel
	 workers	 came	 out	 on strike against
dismissals and racism in the management of the hotel (Uganda Argus
20.2.1971). Soon the textile workers of Uganda Rayon and Textile
factory at Kawempe (Uganda Argus 8.3.1971) and of Uganda Blanket
Manufacturers (Uganda Argus 9.3.1971) were out on separate strikes.
The workers at the branch levels refused to follow the grievance
procedure agreements, demanding improvements in terms and conditions
of service and the removal of some management staff who were
discriminating against workers for making some political statements
in the wake of the coup (ibid.). It seems that they hoped to take
advantage of the honeymoon of a new regime because strikes were
highly visible compared to negotiations under the legal grievance
procedures.
At this time the state responded with both threats of
repression and attempts to negotiate. President Amin himself came
out to argue that although his government's policy was to encourage
good industrial relations and to ensure that workers receive
"maximum economic and social benefits for their labour" government
would not tolerate or condone "any illegal strike" (Uganda Argus
12.3.1971).	 He even claimed that one of the strikes had been.
engineered by Obote's intelligence organisation, the defunct General
Service Department. The Uganda Armed Forces would "deal severely
with those elements" in the same way they had crushed Obote's plots
and overthrown him (ibid.). Finally if strikers did not return to
work their jobs would be given to the unemployed (ibid.).
But the strike which very clearly exposed the deficiency of the
dispute settlement process was that of Kampala City Council-(KCC)
workers. In September 1971 KCC workers went on strike and demanded
to discuss their grievances only with President Amin. They ignored
the Minister of Labour's appeals to stop the unlawful strike and
resume their duties "pending discussions with their representatives"
(Uganda Argus 18.9.1971). Threats by the Acting President Apolo
Kironde that the strikers would be dismissed if they failed to
return to work were also defied. Workers demanded wage increases
and improvements in other terms of service. They complained about
the employment of non-citizens when Ugandans were available,
promotion through bribery, corruption, tribalism and unfair wage
structures. They also charged that "most of the houses meant for
the lowly paid workers in the City Council had been given to the
girl-friends of some big men in the City Council" (Uganda Argus
20.9.1971). They returned to work only after the appointment of a
Commission of Inquiry into the alleged malpractices of some senior
KCC officers and the suspension of the Assistant City Engineer
(Uganda Argus 20/21.9.1971) and after a meeting with President Idi
Amin (ibid. 22.9.1971).
-215-
During 1971 in fact Commissions of Inquiry appointed by the
President became a method of soothing militant workers (see also
Uganda Argus 16-10-1971 with respect to cement and fertilizer
factory workers in Tororo). What is instructive in this is that it
further undermined the credibility of the then existing dispute
settlement machinery under the 1964 Act. It was indirect government
recognition that the law and its winding procedures was not
conducive to dispute settlement but only frustrated workers who
bypassed their union leaders and went on wild-cat strikes. Yet the
union leaders though concerned about the inefficiency of the law
insisted that workers should follow it. Following a violent strike
at Lugazi Sugar plantations, where over 100 acres of sugar were set
on fire by the 7000 workers with a loss of shs. 1.5 million and 1000
metric tons of sugar, the NUPAW General Secretary, R. Imanywoha
condemned the strike as unofficial. He stated that he was alarmed
by the strike which he claimed "was instigated by a few of the
management staff using their official positions (to drag) in the
innocent workers on strike unaware of their motives" (Uganda Argus
6-11-1971). Regarding the KCC strike the UPEU leader E. R. Kibuka
stated very clearly:
The union wishes to condemn in the strongest terms
all those evildoers who are trying to damage the
good name of this country and indeed our Government
of the second Republic of Uganda whose politics are
well known to every citizen.., and whose policies
are being implemented (Uganda Argus 18-9-1971).
The trade union leaders as a group had also issued a general
statement supporting President Amin's call against strikes. They
argued that
as responsible trade union leaders they... cannot
condone acts whereby workers disregard their leaders 
and take matters into their own hands, and announced
their intention of calling a general meeting of all
trade union leaders in Uganda to discuss "the
alarming situation" (Uganda Argus 13-3-1971).
They insisted that although the right to strike was guaranteed by
IL() Conventions it should only be used after "exhausting the
negotiating machineries in Uganda and provisions of the contracts
signed by workers and employers..." (ibid). On another occasion L.
K. Senkezi of NUCCTE warned that "illegal strikes must be stopped"
adding: "don't go on strike until we have told you to do so" (Uganda
Argus 22-3-1971).
Discussions in the LCC took place between 1971-1972 regarding
amendments to the 1964 Act as a way of streamlining the dispute
settlement process. It seems however that disputes arising as a
result of the Economic War 1972-1973 were the immediate impetus for
the enactment of the 1974 amendment. The Economic War involved the
expulsion of Asians from Uganda and the expropriation of their
properties (see infra: 22l-'2). The Africans (mainly soldiers and the
petty bourgeoisie) who took over the properties and enterprises were
generally anti-unions and union activities were suspended for the
latter part of 1972 and most of 1973 (ARK. 1973:24). The new
employers' anti-unionism was generally responsible for the disputes
and strikes of 1973 and 1974. While these new employers were
prepared to honour existing collective . agreements especially
following President Amin's appeal - as their benefactor - "they were
not.., equally prepared to enter into new negotiations on terms and
conditions of service in which wages especially were involved"
(ibid). Apart from this absentee landlords and caretakers who came
in with the Economic War especially in the plantation sector
complicated industrial relations.	 Strikes took days to resolve
because "The Ministry (of Labour) officials or managers of these
estates could not easily trace the whereabouts of those responsible
for decision-making" (ibid:27). Several disputes were reported to
the Ministry involving refusal by employers to recognise unions.
According to the Ministry of Labour "the new employers on the whole
simply had no appreciation of the role of trade unions" (ibid:25).
Even on strikes the Ministry candidly admitted:
The "Economic War" raised all sorts of aspirations
among the workers such as the succession to some of
the positions formerly held by Asians. When these
were not realised and new people were recruited from
outside their industry, frustrations set in and
easily found an outlet in strikes. Thus many of the
causes given by the workers themselves were simply a
cover for their deep underlying frustrations that
could not be openly expressed (ibid:27).
In short various aspects of the so-called Economic War were
responsible to a great extent for the 1973 disputes and strikes.
This situation generally continued into 1974 (ARML 1974:30-31).
Right from 1971 when more workers began striking, made several
demands and even involved presidential intervention, the Ministry of
Labour sought, through the tripartite LCC, to have the law amended
as a remedial measure for unlawful strikes (LCC 1971, op. cit,
Minute 3/71). However all the parties, the union leaders, the
employers and the state limited their solutions to procedural and
did not discuss substantive causes of the strikes. According to the
unions, whose views were generally accepted in this respect, there
were three main causes of unlawful strikes: 1) the continued absence
of a central trade union, 2) lack of workers' education especially
shop stewards and 3) the slow and inefficient grievance handling
machinery (ibid). The LCC then agreed that a crash education
programme be instituted and that "trade union officials... go around
to explain to the rank and file the need to follow agreed procedures
and the effect of strikes on the economy of a young country like
Uganda (ibid). The re-establishment of ULC was also agreed in
principle as a measure that "would check on illegal strikes" (ibid).
The amendments to the 1964 Act were agreed on between 1972-1974
and were introduced by the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and
Settlement) Act (Amendment) Decree 1974 (No. 18/1974). The effect
of the amendment was to relatively speed-up the dispute settlement
procedures 3 , to make an award enforceable on a recalcitrant
employer and to make the Industrial Court more independent.
One of the loopholes in the grievance machinery under the 1964
Act was that both parties had to agree to refer a dispute to the
Industrial Court (S.1(4)). After several deliberations in the LCC
it was agreed in 1972 that the Minister be empowered to refer a
dispute to the Industrial Court without the consent of both parties
to a dispute (LCC 1972, op. cit. Minute 13/72). So it was now
provided that after the receipt of a conciliator's Ispott
(conciliation itself had to be through within six weeks of the
appointment of a conciliator, S.1(4)) on a dispute the Minister
would refer such dispute "with or without the consent of the
parties" to the Industrial Court or arbitration tribunal (S.1(5)).
The employers had also suggested that "a provision should be made in
the law to the effect that union leaders... be held responsible for
the action of their members in the event of strike or any other
industrial action" (ibid, Minute 9/72). But this was rejected.
Indeed there was no need for such provision as the law then
subsisting made it criminal for anyone whether a trade union officer
or not to "cause, procure or counsel" any worker to go on strike
without exhausting the grievance procedure (SS. 15 & 16, 1964 Act).
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Further it would probably have been of no consequence to make trade
union officers liable for civil loss as they would never be able to
pay; trade union property itself, in any case, was immune from civil
process (S.18 (1)(a) & (b) 1970 Trade Union Act).
The second significant amendment was that it was now an offence
for any employer to fail or refuse "to implement an award of an
arbitration tribunal or Industrial Court within twenty-eight days
from the date of its publication" (S.8A(1)). The third important
amendment was that the Industrial Court itself was now made more
independent of the Minister as it was now empowered to announce its
awards and have them gazetted without ministerial approval (S.8(1)).
Finally, for the first time also the Trade Unions Tribunal was
actually set-up under S.7 of the 1970 Act to determine especially on
some disputes within a union or between unions (The Trade Unions
Tribunal (Appointment) Order, S.I 45/1974, Commencement 19-4-1974).
The 1974 amendment to the 1964 Act was thus a result of
workers' struggles which had precipitated both trade union leaders
and government to strive to improve the grievance handling
machinery. This became possible due to the support of the liberal
civilian Labour Ministers and the government's desire, before 1974
at least, to retain workers' support.
Taking the provisions of Decree 18/1974 and those of Decree
29/1973 together it is clear that from a military regime a liberal
industrial relations legal framework compared to the civilian and
"socialist" Obote regime had emerged by 1974. But what was to be
more crucial was the practical application of this law. This was to
depend on the relative strength of labour and capital; but the
decisive element would be the ability and/or willingness of the
state to enforce this relatively liberal law. It is to that
practical application of the law that we now turn.
2. LOW-PROFILE UNIONISM UNDER AMIN 1973/74-1979
The actual industrial relations practice that prevailed during
most of Amin's rule rested upon two factors: the virtual collapse of
Uganda's industrial base as a result of the Economic War (1972-1973)
and the government's lack of legitimacy. In this section, as
pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, we proceed to
explain why in spite of the rationalisation of the trade union
movement, the formation of the central union NOTU and the presence
of liberal industrial relations legal provisions, the trade unions
and workers generally did not enjoy the stipulated legal rights or
improve their terms and conditions of service. Later we also show
how the prevailing tripartite and technocratic conception of trade
unionism was systematised and strengthened under Amin and also how
the tripartite LCC proved ineffective as a means of engendering
further legal change in industrial relations under an insecure and
repressive regime.
(a) TRADE UNIONS AND THE ECONOMIC WAR
Here we set out first, the nature of the Economic War and its
destruction of Uganda's industrial base as the basis for the type of
industrial relations that prevailed under Amin. Secondly we look at
the reorganisation of the trade unions and the formation of NOTU as
the historical basis for the comtemporary trade union movement - at
least the potentially viable institutional structure.
(i) THE ECONOMIC WAR, INDUSTRIAL COLLAPSE AND ANTI-UNION INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
The source
	 of the Economic War (1972-1973) lay in the
overwhelming foreign control over Uganda's economy. Although
initially Idi Amin had reversed the May Day nationalisations of 1970
(see J. Barya 1986:62-63) in his search for a social base he was
forced to grant the demands of the African petty bourgeoisie. 	 The
latter demanded that the Asian domination of commerce be curbed.
The idea of expropriating the Asian businessmen was therefore
gradually embraced by the government and became attractive to Amin
because the spoils would also 	 allow him to gratify is arm.
Gradually there developed an alliance between the military, the
state bureaucracy and the emerging African petty bourgeoisie,
especially the businessmen (J. Jorgensen 1977:524). Although the
British controlled financial capital in Uganda and had other
industrial ventures (cf.cap.III: 178) the Asians controlled wholesale
trade, enjoyed monopoly import rights as a result of experience,
contacts and cartels - in all, about 2/3 of the trade volume in
Uganda (J. Jorgensen 1977:505). Further the Asians owned some two
banks and in manufacturing and plantations Madhvani and Mehta
competed favourably with the state-owned Uganda Development
Corporation (UDC) and European companies (ibid: 505-506). The
African petty bourgeoisie, especially the Baganda, who were opposed
to Obote's "socialist" policies saw the coup as a means of
championing the cause of private property for the Africans.
Throughout 1971 and part of 1972 they demanded the expulsion of
Asians. Ordering their expulsion in 1972 President Amin echoed the
sentiments of the petty bourgeoisie:
My Government believes that one of its primary
duties is to ensure the welfare of all members of
the community. This means, for example, that no.
one section of the community can be allowed to
dominate, control or monopolise the business life of
the nation. No country can tolerate the economy of
its nation being so much in the hands of non-
citizens as is the case in Uganda today. The Asian
community has frustrated attempts by Ugandan
Africans to participate in the economic life of
their own country. Asians have used their economic
power to ensure that the Ugandan Africans are
effectively excluded from participating in the
economic life of their own country. They have used
their family ties, their languages which are unknown
to Ugandans to exclude Africans from the business
life of their own country. They have refused to
identify themselves with Uganda... Their main
interest has been to exploit the economy of Uganda
and Ugandan Africans. They have been milking the
economy of the country...4
Subsequently most Asians were expelled from Uganda. This included
both employers and employees most of whom were skilled.
But following the expulsion Amin discovered that most of their
industries and businesses were tied to British finance capital which
now began claiming ownership or some other rights (M. Mamdafti
1976:307-8). Further the Asian expulsion had led to a suspension of
aid by the British and American governments. Amin's reponse to all
this was to take over other foreign companies especially British
ones: factories, all foreign owned tea plantations and foreign
companies formerly run as joint ventures (J. Jorgensen 1977:518; J.
Barya 1986:65-66).
The spoils of the Economic War distributed mainly in 1973
consisted of 5655 shops, firms, factories, ranches, agricultural
estates and homes. Of these 5299 (including industries and ranches)
were allocated to individuals, 169 to Government departments or
Ministries, 2 to charitable organisations and 32 to parastatal
bodies (RU 1977:46).	 In the end the Businesses Allocation
Committees allocated at least half of the businesses to the military
or their relatives and friends; the rest went to the African
bureaucratic and petty bourgeoisie.	 Further the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie benefitted collectively because the industries that were
too large or technically complex to entrust to individuals were
allocated to parastatals like UDC, became parastatals in their own
right or were put under Ministries. Because UDC was overburdened
with over 100 companies under it 10 new parastatals were set up in
1974 (Commonwealth Secretariat 1979:113-115). Thus the managerial
or bureaucratic bourgeoisie expanded. In the commercial sector the
new commercial bourgeoisie soon became known as mafuta mingi (too
much fat). In class terms the new empLoyers became tkve expanded
state sector, the commercial bourgeoisie and the propertied
military.
The anti-trade union character of the new employers originated
-
from their ignorance and shear managerial incompetence. 	 The
Economic War brought in illiterate and semi-illiterate businessmen
and employers (civilian and soldiers), put the top management of
many parastatals in the hands of the militarry while many individual
companies were also owned by soldiers.	 Further managerial
incompetence also led to industrial decline and hence the need to
coerce workers to maintain even minimal levels of production (see
infra: 234-'8).However managerial incompetence and loss of some
skilled Asian labour aside, industrial decline in Uganda was
accelerated by the cutting of western aid (for technology, inputs
and technical expertise).
The economic War did not change the structure of Uganda's
economy which was based upon import-substitution industries which
had no inter-industrial linkages at the national level. When
western aid was cut off the scarcity of imported machinery, spare
parts and raw materials was exacerbated. Very soon the Ugandan
economy simply became a "spare parts" economy (H.C. Campbell: 406-
408).	 By the mid-1970s the ideology of development had been
abandoned. As developmentalism receded the regime could only talk
of rehabilitation. Thus in 1977 an "action programme" was launched.
Its overall objective was "to rehabilitate the key sectors of the
economy so as to restore and increase the level of production and
put the economy on a sound base for future development" (RU 1977:
40). Central to the Programme was the encouragement of foreign
investment and aid. By 1975 all industries depended on imports for
57% of industrial inputs 	 (Commonwealth Secretariat 1979: 106).
Lack of foreign industrial inputs, spare parts and technology and
managerial incompetence had gradually eroded the productive capacity
of industry. In 1976 productive capacity per industry had dropped
to an average of 30% or below from the 70% average of 1971 (RU 1977:
95). The Minister of Labour himself by the end of 1973 acknowledged
that the Economic War created industrial chaos:
Some inexperienced managers assumed high decision-
making responsibilities; new personnel were engaged
on jobs for which they had no sufficient skills;
many employees lost their jobs; there were frequent
breakages of machinery, shortages of spare parts and
raw materials and, overall, there was an acute
shortage of skilled personnel (ARML 1973, Foreword).
The economic War had also disrupted the employers organisation
FUECI (Federation of Uganda Employers, Commerce and Industry)
because the majority of the membership had been expropriated. FUECI
had been formed in August 1971 and had amalgamated the Federation of
Uganda Employers (FUE), the Federation of Uganda Industries (FUI)
and the Uganda Chamber of Commerce (UCC) (FUE n.d (c. 1972)).
During the business allocation exercise of 1973-1974, due to the
prevailing confusion regarding ownership some trade unionists "were
apprehensive of the problems of this transitional period and decided
to suspend their activities" (ARML 1973: 23). However the main
reason for the near-redundancy of unions was that "attempts to
contact the new employers/managers were frustrated, partly because
the majority of the new employers were ignorant of the existence of
trade unions or even if they were aware, were not familiar with the
mechanism of trade union activities, and others were simply scared
of them" (ibid. : 24). This then is the context in which the
application of the liberal industrial relations legislation must be
seen in so far as it affected the organisation of workers in the
trade unions.
(ii) THE RE-ORGANISATION OF TRADE UNIONS AND THE FORMATION OF NOTU.
It should be observed here that although trade unions were
forced to take a low profile under Amin, as we show below, the
reorganisation of the trade unions and the formation of NOTU in 1974
were of significant historical importance for the trade union
movement. For the first time in our view the trade union structure
was rationalised and potentially strong and viable industrial unions
created.	 In addition after six years without any central
federation the trade unions now had a new national centre, NOTU.
The process of restructuring the union movement had proceeded
hand in hand with the discussions on amending the 1970 Trade Unions
Act and the 1964 Trade Disputes Act. The aim of this restructuring
was to ensure that the resulting autonomous unions would be
sufficiently strong and viable to fulfil their functions. The union
leaders and the government were agreed on this. Moves to restructure
the unions were itensified after the declaration of the Economic War
in 1972 when new African employers ignorant of the established
industrial relations emerged. The Ministry of Labour explained that
union re-organisation would take place "with a view to providing for
the establishment of trade unions which would be able to render
better service to its members and which would be able to contribute
more effectively to nation-building" (Voice of Uganda 30.3.1973).
In the process of union reorganisation the liberal Minister of
Labour, L. Katagyira, even presented the case of the need for unions
to the new employers. In the 1973 annual meeting of the employers'
federation FUECI he argued that "it was always easier to deal with
an organised body of people than with a disorganised and leaderless
mob" and urged the employers "to look at trade unions as essential
workers' organisations which are interested in the welfare of their
members and the promotion of peace and happiness among the workers
in general which is very essential for optimum productivity" (Voice
of Uganda 7.7.1973).	 Thus in 1974 the same Minister while
announcing government arrangements, after agreement with the
existing unions, to reorganise the trade union movement under NOTU
coordination argued, with great credibility at the time that
the Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree of 1973...
was a true reflection of the Government's intention
to uphold principles of democracy in the trade union
movement and to maintain the right of freedom of
association of workers so as to enable them to
negotiate with the employers on an equal basis
(Voice of Uganda 23.2.1974).
The re-organisationcxerciseensured that small unions merged with big
ones on an industrial basis. The 25 unions of 1966 (G.N. 273/1966)
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had been reduced by two mergers to 24 by 1974 (NOTU 1984 (a): 12).
These were now streamlined, amalgamated and reduced to 16 as Table
VIII below shows.
TABLE VIII NAMES AND MEMBERSHIP OF REGISTERED UNIONS AFTER THE
1974 RE-ORGANISATION
REGIST-	 NAMES OF UNIONS 	 DATE OF	 PAID-UP
RATION	 REGISTRATION MEMBERSHIPS -
NUMBER
TU 1	 Railway African Union (Uganda)
	 9.7.74	 3,138
TU 2	 Uganda Hotels, Food and
Allied Workers's Union 	 9.5.74	 3,976
TU 3	 National Union of Plantation
and Agricultural Workers (Uganda) 9.5.74
	 10,495
TU 4	 National Union of Educational
Institutions	 9.5.74	 23,976
TU 5	 Uganda Beverage, Tobacco
and Allied Workers Union	 9.5.74	 2,015
TU 6	 Uganda Electricity and
Allied Workers' Union 	 9.5.74	 1,374
TU 7	 Amalgamated Transport and
General Workers' Union	 9.5.74
	 1,493













	 Uganda Mines, Metal and
Allied Workers' Union	 16.5.74
	 4,180
TU 12
	 Uganda Printers, Journalists,
Paper and Allied Workers' Union 17.5.74
	 1,349
TU 13
	 Uganda Public Employees' Union 17.5.74
	 23,976
TU 14
	 National Union of Co-operative
Movement Workers (Uganda)	 23.5.74
	 6,044
TU 15
	 Uganda Building Construction,










Source ARM1:1974 : Appendix X
All the 16 unions were automatically affiliated to NOTU as
stipulated by S.1(1) of the 1970 Act as amended by Decree 29 of
1973. In 1974 total paid up union membership stood at 106,260
compared to the total book membership of 106,180 in 1971. This
meant an improvement in membership because unpaid up members are
usually a considerable number (ARML 1974: 51; B. Nicol 1979: 283).
Although the union membership fell between 1974-1976 as a result of
a wage freeze and ban on collective bargaining (infra:237- 1 8)it is
reported that by 1978 union membership had recovered and was
estimated at 150,000 book membership (NOTU 1980) out of a total of
367, 600 recorded employees (1977 figure, see RU 1982: Table 1.18).
If we consider that the paid membership was much less, probably the
NOTU estimate of 1978 may not be greatly exaggerated.
The importance of the formation of NOTU and the re-organisation
of union movement is that institutionally for the first time
Uganda's trade unions had a genuinely unified national centre, while
the 16 affiliates of NOTU were potentially strong and viable instead
of the previous small unions that "used to waste.. .time bickering at
each other forming splinter groups among the workers" (See RU 1976:
104).
In spite of this positive re-organisation of the trade union
movement and the liberal law guaranteeing a voluntarist industrial
relations system the effects of the Economic War and a dictatorial
government to a great extent made the positive changes of 1971-1974
redundant. With this in mind we proceed to look at the operation of
the new industrial relations legal framework in practice and its
effects on the trade unions in particular and workers generally.
b) THE "LIBERAL" INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE
In general the liberal industrial relations legal framework set
up between 1971-1974 was not taken advantage of by the unions nor
did the state seriously attempt to enforce it. In this section we
analyse why this was so. First we argue that while the Industrial
Court generally upheld union rights and freedom of association
employers and management who did not owe their positions to legal
provisions ignored the law. 	 Secondly because the political system
came to depend upon force, the new employers and managements
personalised and militarised industrial relations greatly rendering
the legal framework redundant.
	
Thirdly the collapse of the
industrial base, anti-union employers, the 1974-76 wage freeze
weakened the unions and diminished the role of collective
bargaining.	 Conditions of labour thus greatly deteriorated.
Finally there was a great diminution of the role of the legal
dispute settlement processes while at the same time strikes almost
disappeared after 1974 - this was because workers distrusted the
legal machinery's effectiveness while strikes were brutally
suppressed.
(i) UNION RIGHTS IN PRACTICE - GENERAL
The Industrial Court in general always endorsed the rights of
unions to represent their members. But the Court was unable to
enforce its awards nor could unionists and workers due to the
atmosphere of repression. Some examples will suffice. In Uganda 
Printers, Journalists and Allied Employees Union visiko Brothers 
Press Ltd. (I.C.C.1/1974) the respondents argued that because they
had changed their name the former collective agreement with the
union did not bind them and tried to change some terms and
conditions unilaterally.
	
The Industrial Court held that the
respondents were still bound by the agreement until both parties
signed a new Agreement.
Similarly in UTGWU v. Blue Bird (Uganda) Ltd (I.C.C. 6/1975)
the respondents were a one Col. Suleiman and his wife. The dispute
was about suspension/wrongful dismissal. It was argued for the
respondents that the union had no locus standi to represent the
claimants and further that as the owners had taken over the business
from the Asians they were not party to their collective agreements.
It was also held here that any trade union has the locus standi to
represent its aggrieved member and that the suspension had been
unlawful. What is more instructive here is that the soldier-
employers refused to attend Court to give evidence and all that the
Court could do was to recommend seminars and courses for both
workers and employers "to be addressed by eminent Judges/Chairmen or
others who have had very long experiences in labour matters" and
urged employers "to bear in their minds that workers are the
backbone of the economy of this country"; so "they should not.. .be
treated as expendable commodities".
In NUCCTE v. Family Planning Association of Uganda (I.C.C.
5/1975) counsel for the respondents argued that because the
respondents had not recognised the union the latter could not
represent the Claimant albeit a member of NUCCTE. Rejecting this
the Court observed that it had been set up specifically "to enable
employers and their workers to settle their disputes as
expeditiously as possible and to control and regulate strikes so
that the economy of this country may not be jeopardised and
disrupted by unnecessary delay in settling trade disputes due to
legalistic tactics and approaches which are applicable in ordinary
law courts". It then held that were unions not to represent their
members simply because the party whose decision they were
challenging did not recognise the union "employers would •use the
same to victimise innocent workers in which case the Court would
have shirked from its responsibilities of protecting legal
industrial rights of workers and the maintenance of industrial peace
in the country".
But while the locus standi of unions to operate and represent
workers was upheld by the Court in actual practice the Court had no
way of enforcing its own awards and many employers and their
managers simply acted outside the legal or collectively •agreed
framework. We shall demonstrate this below.
At another level the new liberal legislation was actually
reversed or became redundant. For instance while trade union
leaders had been left free to become M.P's this freedom was reversed
not only for trade unionists but for all Ugandans because political
parties and activity were banned under Amin. While the Suspension
of Political Parties Decree (Decree 14/1971) had suspended all
parties and their activities for two years ostensibly "in the
interests of national security and public order... as a temporary
measure" (ibid., Long title), the two-year suspension was later made
permanent and extended to the 8 years of the Amin regime (see Decree
6/1972, dated 15/3/1973). Subsequently any union association with
"politics" was condemned. In 1974 Amin "sternly warned trade union
leaders to stop playing politics" because "following reports from
intelligence officers,... there had been some strikes in Uganda
organised by a few workers who wanted to increase their wages
unilaterally" (Voice of Uganda 11.5.1974). On another occasion,
condemning the striking workers at Lugazi Sugar Works who had burnt
down the plantation, . he "urged them to respect their bosses, to
love one another and to have discipline. He also warned them not to
indulge in politics and never confuse their job with political
activity" (Voice of Uganda 22.5.1974).
In fact "politics" here did not mean party politics but
embraced any form of protest or open dissent. From 1974 onwards
leading members of the Amin regime reiterated the government's
anti-freedom of speech and anti-freedom of political organisation
openly and ad nauseam. The Minister of Labour himself while
addressing the delegates of all the newly registered trade unions in
1974 though affirming the government's committment to workers'
freedom of association "warned the trade union leaders and the
workers not to abuse these freedoms... (because) the government
would take necessary action whenever it is found that a trade union
leader or any worker, for that matter, was trying to confuse other
workers and disrupt the goverment's efforts in uniting the people of
Uganda" (Voice of Uganda 27.5.1974). 	 He did not see any
contradiction between espousing freedom of association while
actually preventing workers from exercising it is in the political
field5 . Later, referring to some public statements by H.M. Luande
who had compared the then industrial relations problems to the
situation in Vietnam and noting that "some leaders were politicians
in days gone by" he recalled Amin himself:
if such persons want to continue to be leaders of
workers in a revolutionary Uganda they must try
their best' to keep their political dreams to
themselves and not preach their politics to the
workers and thereby confuse them (Voice of Uganda
28.5.1974).
These positions were repeated subsequently (Voice of Uganda
15.7.1974); and the Minister of Education for instance, while
addressing Makerere University unionists in the course of a trade
dispute declared rthat "the time for militant unionism was gone" and
that all should work together (Voice of Uganda 7.2.1975).
While freedom of association in general political terms was
denied to all Ugandans and unions warned against political dissent,
the voluntarist industrial relations system erected between 1971-
1974 was even more openly violated by the new employers.
(ii) THE MILITARISATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: REPRESSION
REPLACES LEGALITY
Although the Ministry of Labour especially the Minister himself
continued to claim in public that both in law and practice the Amin
regime was committed to voluntary industrial relations processes,
the reality was there for all to see. In both the nationalised and
private industries industrial relations were militarised, workers'
protest at conditions of work brutally suppressed while union
officials were constantly at risk of imprisonment, torture,
dismissal and even death.
Although these practices were largely unrecorded and could not
generally be reported in the official and private press, some post-
Amin reports give some indications of what prevailed especially
between 1974-1979 6 . Some examples however may suffice.
In one of the nationalised companies the Manager transformed
himself into transport officer, cashier, storekeeper, canteen
supervisor and general supervisor. He did not follow the grievance
procedures laid down but physically punished workers he considered •
at fault (NOTU 1979: 2-3). At Pamba Textiles Limited, a nationalisad
company also, some company managers used company employees as
servants in their homes,	 while at Nile Breweries Limited
commodities meant for workers were diverted to personal businesses
allocated to one of the Managers during the Economic War (ibid: 5-
6). In Uganda Grain Milling Company the General Manager sold bread
to magendoists (black marketeers) and instituted arbitrary wage
scales which did not reflect skills and qualifications (ibid: 6-7).
However it was the militarisation of industrial relations that
was most pervasive.. For instance when one of the most notorious
figures of the Amin regime, Central Province Governor Major Nasur,
addressed the Uganda Rayon Textile workers at Kawempe he urged
increased production but warned the workers against "politics". He
blamed the workers for drunkenness and absenteeism and rumour-
mongering (Voice of Uganda 7.4.1975); but above all instructed the
Manager to take drastic measures to stop the plumetting production
situation from getting worse and "to keep the National Textiles
Board and the Governor's Office informed" (ibid.).
At Associated Match Co. Limited the Personnel Officer planned
with "Amin's agents" to force the foreman out of work and planned
"the disappearance of his car and his property". He held several
meetings with the State Research Bureau (the notorious intelligence
branch) and army personnel and intimidated workers. As a result of
insecurity and fear for their lives some workers deserted and
production fell (NOTU 1979: supra, 2-3).
The Pamba Textiles Limited's manager was himself thought to be
a member of the notorious State Research Bureau. Further,management
refused to pay union dues as per check-off agreement, constantly
suspended or dismissed union officials and adopted delaying tactics,
in collective bargaining7 . Finally it was also reported that in
1975 at Pamba Textiles some union leaders were killed as management
tried to suppress the UTGWU union branch which denounced management
corruption and incompetence8.
At Nile Breweries Limited during the course of a strike in 1976
the General Manager in collaboration with some Nubian sales managers
(Nubians were ethnically related to Amin) called in Lt. Col. Hussein
of Col. Gaddafi Barracks who brought in soldiers to intervene. Some
workers were almost beaten to death, others were detained in the
military barracks and 84 others summarily dismissed. 	 Then
management "banned all union activities" and terminated the services
of all union branch representatives in the brewery (NOTU 1979: 5).
No other worker thereafter dared offer himself to be a union leader.
At Uganda Grain Milling Co. due to staff discontent the
Military Governor of Busoga in collaboration with the General
Manager imprisoned one staff member "brought (him) back in the
factory... barefooted", called a staff meeting where he arrested
more staff members and warned "to come for more staff members if the
staff did not stop working against the General Manager". In general
the General Manager "used the Amin Military Police to solve
industrial problems by reporting every minor offence to the Military
Police who never hesitated to arrest and detain alleged offenders"
(ibid: 6-7). In this industry union activities were also suppressed
by both the General Manager's violent threats against union
officials and his recruitment of policemen in plain clothes "to work
together with workers in order to spy on them" (ibid: 7).
At Nyanza Textiles Industries Limited (NYTIL) management also
used "military men to intervene in purely industrial matters" while
five branch officials were dismissed by the Provincial Governor and
the Minister for Power and Industry, both of them soldiers, who
declared them "unwanted" in Busoga Province (ibid. 8). This was in
1977. The alleged reason was that the union officials had met at
Crested Crane Hotel, Jinja, and planned an illegal strike. There
was no evidence of this and the national union leadership of UTGWU
believed this was management tactics to muzzle the union. Before
being dismissed the union leaders were detained 9 . All this of
course was in total disregard of established procedures for dealing
with disputes.
The militarisation of industrial relations and suppression of
trade unions created even more industrial instability as some
workers also resorted to "writing anonymous letters to government
officers" as a way of accusing repressive managements, hoping for
action from the unpredictable military-political bosses. 	 This
prompted the Busoga Governor, Captain Haruna Salim, for instance, to
advise the workers that if they had any complaints" they should
either go and see the officers in person through the local chiefs or
write and sign the letters so that their complaints could be
attended to" (Voice of Uganda 17.4.1976).
After Amin's removal in 1979 the industrial relations order
that prevailed under his rule was succinctly described by H.M.
Luande, NOTU Chairman.
	 Like other civil institutions and
organisations trade unions had been suppressed. Workers were
cowed. They had been denied freedom of speech and association.
Collective bargaining with employers had lost its true meaning and
as "a result trade unions almost went on a long paid leave" (NOTU:
1979(a):6).
In enterprises where unions were recognised, top managers
could not follow the laid down procedure of settling
grievances and they respected or... feared only Amin
who planted them in those positions. The most
unfortunate part of these managers was that they
were inexperienced in industrial and personnel
management; they were not sure of what to do and
suspicious of those experienced and qualified
personnel who served under them and worse still they
did more of spying on their staff than actually
managing since they were members of the notorious
State Research Bureau (ibid. 4-5).
(iii) WEAK TRADE UNIONS, THE DIMINUTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
THE DETERIORATION OF CONDITIONS OF LABOUR.
Under Amin the collapse of the industrial base weakened the
trade unions in several respects. Other factors however also
contributed to the weakening of the unions. Our concern here is
with the presidential wage freeze 1974-1976 and the diminution of
collective bargaining as further sources of union weakness and the
deterioration of workers' conditions of labour. In essence both the
Economic War and the 1974-76 wage freeze added up to a negation of
the liberal trade union law of 1973 as it could not be taken
advantage of as a result.
In 1973 the government appointed a Salaries Review Commission
(G.N. 372/1973) and subsequently Amin imposed a general ban on wage
increases and improvements in other terms and conditions of service
(ARM, 1974: 31). While addressing sugar plantation workers who had
gone on strike demanding wage increases and improvement in work
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conditions he made this clear: "nobody can have his salary increased
until the report of the Salary Review has been published" (Voice of
Uganda 22.5.1974). This ban lasted between 1974-1976. Although it
was lifted on 25.1.1976 (NOTU 1976: 4) the Special Grading Committee.
set up after the Salaries review "to look into the possibilities of
restructuring terms and conditions of managerial staff in the
traditional Civil Service, government-run companies including
parastatal bodies" went ahead to announce that "the terms and
conditions of service of established staff will be subject matter
for the consideration of the Committee" (ibid: 5). Collective
negotiations which had begun were suspended until protestations and
representations by employers and workers led to the lifting of the
suspension later in 1976 (ibid.) . In the Mkantime the tmacle. \vnians
were dealt a serious blow as workers resigned from unions and even
union leaders left jobs to find some other employment. This was in
addition to the fact that following the Economic War some of the
most able trade union leaders had "either taken up managerial
positions or... become mafuta-mingi" (NOTU 1975(a): 7).
In the LCC meetings of 1975 even the employers' federation
FUECI demanded that the wage freeze be lifted. This was because, as
they had constantly reported, "due to wages remaining static, they
were constantly losing their employees and the situation was even
worse in the tea estates. The cost of living had risen considerably
and this was affecting the morale of the employees...; as a result
of this, workers were moving from one industry to another in order
to look for better wages" MCC 1975: Minute 7/75). The workers'
representatives supported this demand and pointed out that unions
especially in the plantations "had lost several members because of
the wage freeze and most of them had left the estates in order to go
back to their homes to grow food for living" (ibid.). Elsewhere the
NOTU Chairman similarly argued that without wage/salary increases
the unions were difficult to run as no contributions came in but.
more so because members lost interest in the unions. He observed
that "very many members have resigned and such a situation badly
affected	 NOTU and its affiliates' financial strength" (NOTU
1975(a): 3).
In 1976 a NOTU investigation into the monthly contributions
from its affiliates revealed that workers' desertion from jobs,
resignations from unions, redundancies, lay-offs and closures of
enterprises led not only to NOTU's financial doldrums but were
undermining the whole trade union movement (NOTU 1976(a)). In the
tea estates not only did many workers abandon their jobs to seek
others but "those who remained at the estates decided not to become
union members" (ibid: 4). In the transport industry the ATGWU
reported that many of its companies had closed down or were
intending to do so and thus many workers were being laid off (ibid:
10). NUCCTE gave similar reasons for a drop in its membership
(ibid: 11). And generally the 16 trade unions affiliated to NOTU
all complained that employers delayed in sending the members'
subscriptions to the unions' headquarters account in accordance with
the check-off requirements (ibid., see S.I 71/1974). This was
because either the companies were themselves in financial problems
or because of the anti-union character of the new managements and
employers.	 In NOTU itself between 1975-1976 because of its
impecuniosity all its staff left to look for other jobs and from
time to time temporary staff had to be employed (NOTU 1976
Supra: 16-17).
The suspension of collective bargaining further weakened the
unions and worsened workers' living conditions. As we saw the
Economic War (1972-1973) had disrupted collective bargaining and union
activities (Supra: 223-'5) while between 1974-1976 the wage freeze
suspended collective bargaining. Basically then collective
bargaining during the latter part of the Amin regime took place from
late 1976 onwards. The Ministry of Labour thus reported for both
1977 and 1978 that "collective bargaining was the most common method
by which wages were fixed" though "in small undertakings where
workers were not unionised wages were fixed between individual
workers and employers". Further it was observed that "unlike in
the past years when some employers paid wages below the statutory
minimum now such employers paid higher wages. The immediate
explanation... was that workers would not readily accept manual
labour at low wages" (ARM1 1977: 12-13). Again in 1978 most union
negotiated wages "which were well above the statutory minimum of
shs. 240" (ARML 1978: 9, see S.I. 34/1976).
It must be understood however that the minimum wage itself had
become meaningless in the face of the general rate of inflation
which ha.d generally risen from 146% in 1970 to 1125% in 1978 (A.E.
Walugembe-Musoke 1987: 17). So while workers belonging to trade
unions may have fared better as a result of collective bargaining
the inflationary situation easily eroded their gains and for this
matter the 1976statutáry minimum wage order was of little relevance
in worker-employer relations. It may be said in fact that in order
to retain labour some employers were forced to raise wages simply
due to inflation. Due to the weakness of the unions also some
employers, taking advantage of the anti-union industrial relations
atmosphere, tried to revive the works committee system which only
dealt with non-negotiable issues. 	 But because the committees
achieved little, workers became disillusioned with them as their
requirements were not met "while some of the trade unionists became
sceptical of the system...; they felt that joint consultation where
it existed, was a tactful manoeuvre by employers to weaken trade
unionism" (ARM, 1977: 12). It would appear then that the late
revival of collective bargaining under Amin may not have enhanced
workers terms and conditions of labour in any significant way. A
brief examination of the cost of living trends may illuminate this
point.
Before we look at the cost of living trends we note that the
deterioration of the economy led to redundancies and the growth of a
bayaye (lumpen proletariat) social class.
	 An indication of
redundancies is the mining sector which in 1971 had about 7400
workers. By 1977 they had dropped to about 4100 (RU 1982: Table
1.18). Overall employment is recorded to have increased between
1971-1975 from 324,538 to 371,259 employees (RU 1977: 39). However
this was only in the public sector as a result of the 1972-3
nationalisations and subsequent employment recruitment especially in
administration (ARML 1974: 34). Employment in the private sector
overall actually declined from 190,508 in 1971 to 161,937 in 1975
(ibid. 38). While some of the workers especially in the private
sector who deserted or were made redundant went back to subsistence
farming, a big number is estimated to have joined the black market
sector (magendo) and became bayaye. At the end of the Amin regime
the number of bayaye households was estimated to be about 200,000
both part-time and full-time. About 50% of these households were
non-peasant or urban bayaye (R.H. Green 1981: 27). This was one of
the most significant results of Amin's destruction of the economy.
For those who remained in work the cost of living rose very.
fast especially for the middle-income and low-income earners. While
the cost of living indices in 1971 stood at 151, 161 and 169 for the
high, middle and low income groups respectively by 1975 it had
risen to 280, 327 and 410 respectively; towards the end of the Amin
regime the indices stood at 658, 1172 and 1546 in 1978 for the three
income groups respectively (A.W. Walugembe-Musoke 1987: 26a). And
according to these cost of living indices this meant that the lowest
paid workers' cost of living always rose faster than that of the
bourgeoisie or even middle income earners (See I. Livingstone and
H.W. Ord 1980: 423). In any case for the most part the upper income
strata is non-unionisable both in the public and private sectors.
Although no figures were available for wage levels in unionised and
non- or partially unionised enterprises for the 1970s the rate of
inflation definitely outstripped the wage int-teases. 'Me mtwimum.
wage fixed in 1965 at shs. 160 was only raised in 1976 to shs. 240
(S.I. 34/1976). Although after 1976 many employers paid wages above
the statutory minimum especially in the unionised sectors many
employees in the government sector received only the minimum. Even
those paid above the minimum in both sectors could not attain their
1960s standard of living due to the hyper-inflation of the latter
part of the 1970s.
Thus even the small labour aristocracy of the 1960s was
gradually destroyed. The only winners under the Amin regime were
the new businessmen (soldiers and civilians) or the commercial
bourgeoise (mafuta-mingi), the new employers and the top executives
who had access to the national surplus unhindered by legal rules and
conformity with administrative procedures. (See generally, J.
Jorgensen 1977: 524-538; H.C. Campbell: 400-402).
(iv) DISPUTES AND STRIKES: THE DIMINUTION OF LEGAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESSES.
The deterioration of workers' living standards in the 1970s
would under other circumstances be expected to generate worker
discontent, numerous industrial disputes and strikes. We have seen
above how many workers responded to the decline of their standards
by deserting jobs and returning to the countryside or by becoming
bayaye. By the mid-1970s unions and workers had come to distrust
the official and legal settlement processes and institutuons. This
was so in spite of the speeding up of the processes by the 1974
Trade Disputes Act (Amendment) Decree. Equally workers had
distanced themselves from strike action due to the repression the
state was then want to met out on them.
Although the statistics available may not be completely
accurate they indicate that conciliation and mediation atrophied
from their 1970 importance of 118 cases a year to a mere 5 in 1978.
By 1973 out of 68 disputes only 20 were resolved by mediation while
a whole 32 of them were carried forward unresolved. This therefore
seems to have progressively persuaded unions and workers to have
less confidence in the official legal dispute settlement processes.
Table IX shows the general trend between 1970-1978.
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Mediation Parties- of Court Minister
1970 118 14 9 - 8 9 158
1973 20 6 6 2 - 32 68
1974 28 14 2 10 12 2 66
1977 ? 10 ? 3 ? 1 51
1978 5 8 - 6 1 4 24
Source: ARML: 1970-1978
, What is more important is that gradually the total disputes
reported to the Ministry of Labour diminished. It was only the
Industrial Court that seems to have retained a measure of confidence
from the workers though this was also gradually undermined. The
Court's role was further undermined when its Chairman was murdered
in 1978, it is believed, by the state's "security" agencies
10themselves. The murder aside, the role of the Court was exercabated
by its long delays in dealing with disputes. Most of them took
about a year to resolve. As Table X shows the level of disputes
settled by the Court tended to diminish with time. What is more
significant is that although before 1974 cases could be referred to
the Court only with both parties consent while after 1974 (see
S.1(5) of the 1964 Trade Disputes Act as amended by Decree 18(1974)
either party could simply report the dispute without the other's
consent, after 1974 disputes reported to the Ministry and referred
to the Court actually diminished (Tables IX and X).
TABLE X DISPUTES BROUGHT BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COURT 1970-1978
Year Total Registered Settled Carried	 Withdrawn/Settled
Forward	 Out of Court
1970 14 10 1 3
197311 6 4 2 -
1974 14 8 4 2
1977 10 6 1 3
1978 8 2 2 4
Source: ARML: 1970-1978.
The diminution of the role of dispute settlement processes and
institutions suggests a virtual breakdown of workers' confidence in
legal mechanisms as a way of resolving industrial disputes. However
even the unlawful strikes common up to 1974 also dwindled in the
latter half of Amin's rule. As Table VII shows (p.213) up to 1974
strike action was still high, between 41-64 strikes a year, but
thereafter strikes diminished. In 1977 there were only five strikes
and in 1978 only seven. Although strike statistics for 1975 and
1976 are not available, from a perusal of newspapers at the time
(Voice of Uganda 1975-1976 especially) and some interviews 12 the
level of strikes was indeed very low. This was in fact the period
of the wage freeze in which workers resistance to adverse terms of
labour took other forms rather than strikes, namely: sabotage of
industrial production, desertions en masse especially in the
plantations,and theft at work (ARML 1974: 34; NOTU: C.1977 : 3; see
also supra: 238-'9).Although government interpreted the drop in
strikes as a result of the success of its new liberal industrial
relations legal provisions (RU 1976: 103) and vigilance of the
Ministry of Labour, the truth of the matter is that actual
repression, the collapse of industrial production and weak unions
had all contributed to loss of morale on the part of workers. Above
all from various experiences strikes had increasingly "turned into
bloody affairs, with the fascist army mowing down unarmed workers"
(M. Mamdani 1983: 49) and so workers preferred not to confront
oppressive managements supported by a repressive regime.
The collapse of the economy following the Economic War was
almost total by the end of 1976. 	 This is why in 1977 a
rehabilitation programme known as The Action Programme (RU 1977) was
launched. It was a short-term 3-year programme meant to attract
foreign investment and rejuvenate industrial production (see supra:;
. also J. Barya 1986: 73-78). This time no pretence existed as to
the development credentials of the regime. From now onwards
economic policy was based on the minimal baseline of
"rehabilitation".
The Economic War and its results, namely, the virtual collapse
of industrial production together with a dictatorial regime were
therefore the fundamental cause of the failure of the liberal trade
union and trade disputes legislation enacted in 1973-1974. In spite
of the institutional restructuring of the trade union movement and
the formation of a central coordinating union, NOTU the
- 247 -
militarisation of industrial relations, the 1974-1975 wage freeze
and ban on collective bargaining all led to the weakening of trade
unions and the consequent deterioration in workers terms and
conditions of labour.
	 The diminution of the legal dispute
settlement processes and institutions as much as the virtual
abandonment of strike activity by unions and workers was also a
result of the intense repression workers experienced from both
employers and the state acting in concert.
The latter part of the Amin regime (1974-1979) therefore saw a
major weakening of the trade union movement in Uganda.
	 This	 was
mainly due to economic collapse which was coupled with employer and
state repression. Ideologically instead of economic independence
and development the regime had now settled for mere
"rehabilitation". However in spite of all this economic decline
trade unions as institutions survived and more so with potentially
more viable structures due to the 1974 re-organisation. Although
the legal rights which even further improved between 1971-1974 could
not be utilized for the most part due to the repressive conditions,
the most important thing was that they survived the regime.
3. TRADE UNION EDUCATION, IDEOLOGY AND THE LAW
One of the more invisible legacies of the Amin era within the
trade union movement was the entrenchment of the ideology of
tripartism on the one hand and that of technocratic and careerist
unionism on the other. Although it may not have been of much
practical importance under Amin it provided the conceptual premises
from which the trade unions demanded legal changes to enhance union
participation in workplaces and even in the political system. The
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major importance of the two ideologies however lies in their
continuing prevalence in Uganda's trade union movement today.
It was mainly the role of education, in the context of the so-
called Economic War of independence, that enhanced the tripartite .
and technocratic ideological views of trade unionism under Amin.
Following the Economic War Amin's approach to industrial relations
was that there was no	 contradiction between labour and capital.
All economic enterprises belonged to "all Ugandans". On May Day
1974 General Amin laid out his government's views on industrial
relations:
in Uganda of today everybody is a worker so long as
he is engaged in some productive activity which
contributes to national development. We do not
believe in sharp and artificial divisions between
the workers and the so-called employers as you find
in imperialistic capitalist countries. We are
joined together by a common bond of brotherhood and
have the common goal of achieving prosperity and
well-being for all people. ...Both the workers and
their managers must continue to regard each other as
comrades in arms, each making their contribution in
their own way towards the desired goal... (fighting)
the common enemies of poverty and under-employment
(Voice of Uganda 1-5-1974).
Yet in the same breath he acknowledged a contradiction between
workers and management especially the new ones, though he tried to
marginalise the problem. He continued:
I have.., had a few reports of some managers who
continue to use threats and bad language to their
workers whenever• the latter make complaints
regarding their conditions of work. It is to these
few bad managers that I wish to appeal very strongly
so that they can change their ways... (ibid.).
As a matter of fact right from 1973 the Ministry of Labour
tried to encourage tripartism and co-operation between unions -
workers and the new employers. The Minister of Labour castigated
employers for laying-off workers in order "to make room for their
friends and relatives" hoping that this had been done "out of
ignorance and emotions" and appealing to both partners to co-operate
.(Voice of Uganda 15-12-1973). And following various promises by the
Minister of Labour that a tripartite Workers Education and
Organising Committee would be set up (see, e.g. Voice of Uganda 22-
3-1975) this committee was set up in 1977. Its objectives were "to
consider the workers' education programmes and at times consider
subjects to be taught... at seminars and courses when organised"
(NOTU 1978(5):6).
In our view the government's encouragement of tripartism - at
least by the Ministry of Labour - reinforced the educational
programmes of the ILO. The importance of ILO educational impact
under Amin arose mainly from the fact that due to Amin's conflict
with the West the ICFTU and other western unions were effectively
excluded from operating in Uganda. Instead, in addition to the ILO,
the unions from USSR and Arab-Islamic countries saw this exclvsion
as an opening for them to influence Uganda's trade union movement.
NOTU was the main channel through which educational programmes
were run. NOTU established its Department of Education in 1975
headed by R. W. Kasozi (NOTU 1976(b):2). Although many trade union
leaders had been overseas on ILO and a few other organisations'
courses, NOTU began training Field Organisers, Trade Union
Instructors and Senior Trade Union leaders for whom different
courses were held, more systematically, from 1975-1976 (NOTU
1976(a):6). From this time ILO influence increased. In February
1976 a ten-man ILO delegation visited Uganda and held meetings with
NOTU and Government officials and then recommended a "crash
programme of (sic) Trade Union Leaders" (ARML 1977:12-13). From
1977 ILO organised seminars for Trade Union Instructors and Leaders
and helped NOTU send union leaders out for courses especially at the
ILO Centre for Advanced Technical and Vocational Training, Turin,
Italy, and a few in some African countries (NOTU:1976, 	 supra:7;
ibid:13).	 In 1978 ILO donated finances to fund local courses
especially for General and Organising Secretaries (NOTU: 1978:2-3;
1978(a); ARML 1978: 9).
In these courses the aim was to teach trade unionists the
labour laws of Uganda, other labour matters like the nature of the
Social Security Fund and the nature of the ILO and international
trade union organisations (see NOTU 1978(a)ibid). Subjects were taught
in an uncritical way and the institutions and organisations dealt
with as though they were natural. In some courses the Minister of
Labour himself taught the course on labour laws! On the other hand
the Soviet central trade union, the AUCCTU (All Union Central
Council of Trade Unions) was also trying to get a foothold in
Uganda's trade union movement. By 1974 it was sending Ugandan trade
unionists to its 10-month course at the International Faculty of
Higher Trade Union Education College (ARML 1974: 29). At the local
level AUCCTU began organising joint annual seminars with NOTU from
1976 onwards for national and regional or branch union leaders and
inviting NOTU representatives to annual May Day celebrations in
Moscow and AUCCTU Congresses (NOTU 1976, supra: 6, 15; 1977: 11;
1978(a): 8). The Soviet union's assistance to Uganda's trade unions
was part of a wider Soviet strategy to gain political influence in
Uganda after Amin's rupture with the West (see M. Mamdani 1983: 68-
76).
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What is crucial here however is that while the AUCCTU sponsored
seminars to teach socialist trade unionism, at the same time
lecturers from Uganda and the ILO taught labour laws and labour
issues in a technicist way and within the framework of a peripheral
capitalist economy that Uganda was. They projected the role of
workers as tripartite social partners in accordance with ILO
ideology.
Relations with the Eastern Bloc countries, through the WFTU and
directly with countries like Yugoslavia were limited to invitations
to congresses and one or two short-course seminars for a couple of
trade union leaders (ARNI 1977: 13). The relationship with the
Arab-Islamic countries was mainly formal. From 1976 Libyan, Iraqui
and Egyptian unions were inviting Ugandan unionists to their
congresses and paying visits to Uganda promising assistance of all
types many of which promises were not fulfilled. For instance
Libyan unionists had in 1975 visited Uganda and made a grandoise
promise - to build a Workers' College in Uganda. But this turned
out to be mere politicking (NOTU 1977 : 11-12; NOTU 1978).
The overall impact of the seminars was that tripartism as an
idoelogy was reinforced within the trade union movement and ILO
concepts were more consistently taken on board. These effects could
be seen in the demands or "requests" (as they mainly were under
Amin) of the unions within the LCC meetings and in other fora. At
one of the seminars organised by the AUCCTU one lecturer Dr. D. E.
Energin taught that "collective bargaining is not a class-conscious
political movement geared towards changing the economic system, but
rather one that has been orientated towards increasing union power
in the operation of business" while another lecturer merely spelled
out "the means of production and how to improve productivity". The
overwhelming number of technical subjects at these seminars drowned
such topics by the AUCCTU lecturers aiming at emphasizing the need
for workers'participation in decision-making within enterprises (see.
NOTU 1977(b)).
A combination of ILO and AUCCTU education produced the
"requests" for workers' participation in decision-making but as an
incorporationist concept. 13 Indeed the NOTU Secretary General set
out such strategy for workers' participation in his Memorandum to
the LCC for discussion. He first pointed out that since the
Economic War "the workers have been rather silent, probably in the
hope that the Government would come to their rescue and solve their
problems like it has solved other touchy ones" (NOTU 1975(a): 7).
Noting that the trade union movement had in fact been dormant he
echoed Amin on the non-conflictual nature of labour-capital
relations:
Both management and employers have a common goal and
objective in that all aim at making the enterprise
for which they work a success. The legendary that
there are two sides in industry the management on
• ne hand and the workers on the other presupposes
that the two sides have different goals and
objectives and is therefore absolutely false and
detrimental to economic development (ibid.).
•He therefore suggested that workers should be given a chance to
participate in decision-making through suggestion schemes, Joint
Consultation Committees and above all, since "all workers are,
through the state, the co-owners of the majority of our
industries.., they should be given an opportunity to participate in
the highest decision-making organ - the Board of Directors" (ibid:
8-9, 10).
As an extension of this thinking the trade unionists even
sought political incorporation into the Amin regime. They requested
to be represented on Amin's National Forum (NOTU 1978(a): 13). The
National Forum was one of the schemes set up by Amin to try and.
re-create some social base through the appearance of consultation.
From 1977 the participants in the National Fora were actually hand-
picked by Provincial Governors and were national only in that they
came from different parts of the country - they were in fact the
voice of the mafuta-mingi (M. Mamdani 1983: 57). The ideology of
tripartism having been embraced by the union leadership culminated
in the demand to be incorporated into the dictatorship. This was
not simply a survival strategy by the unions because they had no
hidden attempts of opposing the repressive regime. However this was
not merely their failing. What was more unfortunate in the case of
Uganda of the 1970's was that among the petty bourgeoisie opposed to
Amin no serious attempts were ever made - with the possible
exception of Y. Museveni's FRONASA (Front For National Salvation) -
to link up their exiled political organisations to any worker or
peasant organisation, clandestine or open. 14 Repression aside, the
political vacuum created by the Amin regime and the unchallenged
ideology of tripartism in industrial and political terms had
effectively emasculated and depoliticised the trade union movement
by the fall of the dictatorship in 1979. What should be clarified
here however is that while workers and trade unions in particular
were pressing for some forms of workers' participation in
management, the regime was merely interested in containing workers'
discontent and incorporating them into state institutions. Thus the
rhhtbricl about tripartism by the regime was part of the corporatist
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strategies of the government. But in the period 1974-1979 because
the economic basis for the success of a corporatist strategy had
been undermined which partly further pushed the regime into
repressive behaviour this meant that in practice tripartism had,
little impact. Repression was the mainstay of the regime.
However the predominance of repression and arbitrariness in
industrial relations during the Amin era seems to have convinced the
unions that the removal of the dictatorship would resolve all their
problems. In this regard tripartite ideology as such was not
questioned. The problem was the particular regime. Thus the
importance of the ideology, having been more systematically nurtured
under Amin, through educational courses, would be more important in
the post-Amin era.
4. LAW REFORM AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE LCC
Between 1974 and 1979 the fall of the Amin regime attempts were
made by the trade unions through the LCC to have some amendments
made to the law including the ratification of ILO Convention No. 87
(Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
Convention 1948). The issues which were of constant concern to the
unions were: reinstatement in case of wrongful dismissal, amendment
to the Workmens Compensation Act and the extent of the check-off
system.
One interesting and in fact the only amendment to the Trade
Union Act after 1973 concerned the use of union funds. Immediately
after the formation of NOTU the Minister of Labour had warned union
leaders who "tended to sit in the offices and wait for money
collected by check-off system to come in at the end of the month.
They could pay themselves without having done a good months' job for
the workers" (Voice of Uganda 27-5-1974). To show that he was
serious about this he suspended the Organising Secretary of the
Uganda Hotels and Allied Workers Union who was also Deputy Chairman
of NOTU because he had collected funds and put them to personal use
(Voice of Uganda 28-5-1974). The Minister's constant warnings on
the question prompted H. M. Luande in 1975 to acknowledge that some
union leaders did embezzle funds but not all, suggesting that "if
such officers are found (they) should individually be dealt with
other than damaging other innocent officers and the morale of the
entire labour movement" (NOTU 1975: 2). Another case where the
embezzlement of union funds was central was in the Educational
Union. In fact this union was deregisteted in 1916 CG.	 610)19-
on the grounds that its funds were being expended in an unlawful
manner and on an unlawful object (S. 11(I)(b)(v) of the Trade Unions
Decree No. 20/1976). Although the Trade Union Tribunal later held
that the union shop upon which union funds were expended was a legal
object, it did not determine the question whether the concerned
union had also embezzled those funds in the union shop (see Voice of
Uganda 11-9-1977).	 The important point however was that the
amendment to the Trade Union Act made in 1976 was a result of a
cumulative pattern of embezzlement of union funds by some officials
that prompted the Minister to wage a lone battle against the
practice and to ensure that the 1976 Amendment was made. S.14(1) of
the 1976 Decree (Decree 20/1976 consolidated the 1970 Act and Decree
29/1973) empowered the Registrar of Trade Unions to interdict or
suspend any officer (or his representative) of a trade union if
satisfied that such officer had misused, misappropriated or
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mismanaged the funds or affairs of the trade union. Since provision
already existed empowering union members to apply to the Trade Union
Tribunal to prohibit a trade union officer from holding or
controlling funds if a prima facie case of fraudulent misuse of.
funds was made against him (S. 52(1) Trade Unions Decree carried
over from S. 51(1) of the Trade Unions Act 1970), this was a further
positive attempt to protect trade unions from unscrupulous leaders.
This amendment aside, the trade unions themselves tried in vain
to have some reforms. First of all, at every opportunity since the
1960's they had tried to have the Industrial Court empowered to
reinstate a wrongfully dismissed worker. In AT GWU v. Messrs. 
U.T.C. Ltd (I.C.C. 19/1971) for instance where the respondent was
found to have been wrongfully dismissed the Court had reiterated its
position since the 1960's:
As regards reinstatement this Court has stated time
and again that it cannot order reinstatement of any
employee of any company even if he may be wrongfully
dismissed. The only alternative remedy in such
circumstances is to order payment of compensation
and this is what is going to be done...
By 1970 however workers representatives in the LCC were citing
Mauritius and Cameroon where a similar Court could by law order
reinstatement (LCC 1970	 : Minute 7/70). Indeed in neighbouring
Kenya the Industrial Court there had been so empowered since 1971
(K. Leitner: 105) while in Tanzania such powers existed since 1967
(W. L. Kapinga: 91-103). H. M. Luande raised the issue again in
1975 following the formation of NOTU demanding a right to
reinstatement by the Court in cases of wrongful dismissal (NOTU
1975: 1-2). Although similar requests/demands continued to be made
and the Ministry of Labour promised the amendment (NOTU 1976
	
: 10)
nothing was actually done about it due to continued employer
opposition to it.
The second concern of the trade unions was the Workmens'
Compensation ActKCap. 197 Laws of Uganda). Due to the 1970s inflation
the rates of compensation to injured workers had becme meaningless.
Although in 1978 the LCC agreed that the whole Act "should be
amended to take care of the present situation" nothing was done
about it. (NOTU 1978(a): 14). Employers opposed the amendments but
apparently the main problem has been the uniona' own failure to
present an argued case of exactly what amendments they would like
to see made (Interview, NOTU Secretariat August 1987).
The third demand of the unions concerned rights of
organisation. They demanded that ILO Convention No. 87 be ratified
by the Uganda government. However this was always rejected on the
grounds that the Convention gives unfettered freedom to unions which
would be detrimental to a developing economy. But in the same
breath that the unions demanded more organisational rights they
demanded a compulsory check-off system for all workers in a
workplace where a union was recognised.	 But even in situations
where a voluntary check-off already existed the union's complaint
was that employers were failing to submit union dues to union HQs.
NOTU demanded that "the arm of the law should be extended to those
few employers who have the intention of frustrating the union by
refusing to submit to them their dues" (NOTU C.1977: 4). The unions
argued further than compulsory check-off systems in Kenya and
Tanzania had made their union centres financially viable and able to
undertake economic projects on behalf of their members. Finally they
argued that since non-members enjoyed the benefits acquired for all
workers by the union this amounted to a "nursing of free riders
within the unions under the pretext of freedom of association"
(ibid.). The government nonetheless continued to reject the demand
for compulsory check-off as it did in connection with the one for
ratifying ILO Convention No. 87.
It would appear that although some of the deiands by the unions .
for legal reform were modest for instance amendments to the
Workmens' Compensation Act, the major problem after 1974 for them
was that the Amin regime generally paid little heed to legal
mechanisms.	 The 1976 amendment was a result of the Labour
Minister's initiatives and was easy to implement but all demands for
reform from the unions were objected to by the employees and failed
to materialise or were simply ignored by the state. The ICC had
become a mere discussion forum. Although implementing any legal
reforms would have been difficult in itself the goodwill of the
1971-1974 period on the part of the government had disappeared and
even merely putting the required amendments on the statute books
became impossible. Thus the crucial element in both the creation
and practical utilisation of legal rights was the character of the
state.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the Amin regime in the area of trade union
and trade disputes legislation was its liberalisation while at the
same time the practical utilisation of this liberal law was denied.
The period 1971-1974 saw a considerable liberalisation of trade
union and trade disputes legislation following the UPC-Obote I
attempt between 1968-1971 to incorporate the unions into the
economic structures of the Move to the Left and the erosion of many
union rights.
Specifically the Amin regime restored the organisational
autonomy of the trade unions and made legal provisions guaranteeing
a voluntary industrial relations system but including the
enforcement of legal rights that employers could otherwise deny.
unions or workers. However the coming into being of the 1973/1974
legislation was a result of the struggles of workers and trade
unions with the help of liberal civilian Ministers of Labour. The
desire of the Amin regime to cultivate a social base created a
favourable political context for the demands of the workers and
unions to be met for the most part. This is why the autocratic and
repressive elements of the Amin regime was defeated with respect to
the 1973/1974 legal amendments.
The second historical contribution of the kmin -regime was its
re-organisation and rationalisation of the trade union movement
under a genuinely unifying central federation, NOTU in 1974.
Potentially at least a strong and institutionally viable structure
of the trade union movement was put in place, following the
enactment of Decree 29 of 1973. It was a restructuring achieved in
co-operation with the trade unions and not imposed as in the case of
the ULC of 1970/71.
However the achievement of liberal laws was not to be
concretely realised by the trade unions due to the Economic War and
the subsequent repressive character of the Amin regime. 	 The
Economic War led to a virtual collapse of industrial production,
redundancies and desertions and a consequent weakening of the
unions. The freeze on wages and collective bargaining between 1974-
1976 exercabated the weakening of the unions. The collapse of the
industrial base and the weakening of the unions also fuelled
desertions, workers' return to the rural areas and the creation of
the bayaye social class. While weak unions may still have operated
at the industrial level the militarisation of industrial relations
ensured that unions could not, without great risk, utilise the
rights of organisation achieved or the collective bargaining
mechanism even when this was eventually allowed. But precisely
because the Amin regime and the new employers were dependent upon
force and violence for their survival legality as a legitimating
factor in industrial relations became redundant. It was equally for
this reason that the dispute settlement institutions, liberalised
and streamlined to some extent in 1974 became almost superfluous.
Strike activity itself similarly dwindled because of the repression
it encountered from the regime. And likewise the tripartite LCC
lost its law reform role and union demands in this respect were
ignored because law was no longer an important mechanism of dealing
with trade union affairs and industrial relations generally. At
best trade unionism was forced to take a low profile.
Finally the ideologies of tripartism and technocratic unionism
were more systematically internalised by the trade unions mainly due
to the dominance of ILO educational influence during the Amin
period. The importance of this conception of trade unionism -
practically unimportant under Amin - was to be more apparent in the
post-Amin period.	 The unions' conception of themselves, their
demands for law reform and participation in economic and political
institutions would be permeated by the twin ideologies. 	 But
tripartism as a component part of general corporatist policies
proved impracticable under Amin partly because of the economic
collapse but more so because rather than relying on various forms of
political participation by civil society the Amin regime, in the
latter period, was sustained essentially by repression.
In general the Amin era illustrated the point that law is a
political category encapsulating the balance of class and social
struggles. While between 1971-1974 the balance of these forces was
in favour of a liberalisation of the law, the period 1974-1979
showed that the concrete realisation of the legal rights achieved
required a constant struggle. In the former period the liberalism
and openness of a regime arising from a coup and seeking to
establish a social base in addition to civilian Ministers, who
sympathised with a liberal view of industrial relations provided a
favourable political context for the realisation of some of the
unions' and workers' demands. In the latter period however the
unity of the state and the new employers, in the context of a
collapsed industrial economic base, pushed the workers and the trade
union movement into such a weak position that they could not draw
upon the legal rights won earlier on precisely because the balance
of class and social forces was against them. During the Amin period
therefore law proved to be mainly of a residual importance: rights
of organisation predating the regime and the more positive ones
created between 1971-1974 at least continued to exist and at the
same time, a potentially strong, viable and centrally co-ordinated
union structure was put in place.
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CHAPTER V: THE TRIUMPH OF AUTONOMOUS TRADE UNION ORGANISATION
OVER STATE INTERVENTION 1979-1987
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters dealt with the socio-historical context
and in particular the class struggles that led to the enactment of
trade union and trade disputes legislation in Uganda and how this
came to be applied or ignored in actual practice. In this chapter
we shall further assess the practical application of this law
between 1979-1987. In this period no changes in legislation took
place and as such the legislation originating from the colonial era
and the post-colonial period between 1974-1976 remains the framework
of operation for the trade unions and workers in general. The
period 1979-1987 however falls into two distinct political contexts.
The Obote II regime (1980-1985) was distinctly repressive while the
NRM government (1986- ) provides a favourable atmosphere for
freedom of association.
This chapter is divided into 5 sections. In section 1 we first
examine the attempts by trade unions to form a Labour Party in 1980
and their failure. We argue that the economism of the trade union
movement led to this failure and left the trade unions open to
political interference by government and the ruling Party, UPC.
Here the tactic used was similar to the 1964-1966 one, namely to
split and take over the union movement by sponsoring a rival trade
union centre. However because of the presence of a more determined
union leadership this was successfully resisted. But because
political intervention was largely unsuccessful, state repression
and illegal intervention in union affairs became prevalent.
Secondly we argue that apart from political intervention leadership
struggles in the 1980s both in NOTU and its affiliates were
responsible, to a large extent, for the negation of union democracy
and the consequent weakening of the trade union movement. This.
leadership struggle was fuelled by factors both internal and
external to the unions.
In section 2 we contend that the economic crisis of the 1980s
resulting from Uganda's collapsed economy, an adverse international
economic climate and the IMF-directed economic policies led to the
depression of workers' living standards to their lowest level in
Uganda's post-colonial history. This in tura led to an escalation
of trade disputes and strikes. But besides the economic crisis the
government suppressed the Industrial Court mainly because it was
feared that the Court personnel could be sympathetic to anti-
government political organisations and the anti-government official
trade union movement.	 The economic crisis and the an Dbote 11
regime's distrust of trade unions and workers thus generally coincided
to make the legal dispute settlement process redundant.
In section 3 we argue that since 1979, with the overthrow of
the Amin regime, western trade union organisations especially ICFTU
and AALC have, with the collaboration of the union leadership,
created an environment of ideological and financial dependence on
the part of Uganda's unions. Ideologically the struggle over NOTU
affiliation to either ICFTU or OATUU on the one hand and the
educational impact of ILO technocratic conceptualisation of trade
unionism on the other have demonstrated the adverse impact of
foreign unions and technocratic unionism on Uganda's trade union
movement in terms of self-definition and empowerment in the struggle
to advance workers' interests.
From the above, we argue, in section 4, that partly as a result
of this ideological influence, that is the technocratic, tripartite
and careerist conceptions of trade unionism the struggle by unions
for the reform of labour laws in general has been feeble. This
situation was aggravated by government's refusal to reactivate the
LCC in the 1980s which left the unions to mere sporadic demands for
some legal reforms.
Finally in section 5 we give a provisional assessment of the
impact of the NRM government on trade union organisation for the
initial period 1986-1987. The main point here is that the trade
unions survived the repressive Obote II period; hence their
"triumph" over state intervention. However although freedom of
association has been effectively guaranteed for the first time since
the mid-1970s, the ideological self-conception of the unions
themselves and the NRM's lack of any specific programme for workers
generally or unions in particular meant, by the end of 1987, that
essentially the old labour policies and legislation, with their
deficiencies continued. For the trade unions their ideological
self-conception has isolated them and the working class generally
from other sections of society in political terms or at best left
them politically unorganised because there has been little link up
or attempt to link up trade union struggles with other political and
social struggles and organisations.
Our conclusion is that the character and organisational
capacity of the trade unions have depended essentially upon the
character of the state and the specific regime in particular. At
the same time the economic crisis exacerbated the national political
contradictions that were being reproduced among the workers by the
regime and also led to the redundancy of the dispute settlement laws.
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But at the level of the unions themselves their ideological self-
conception, that is a technocratic and careerist view, in addition
to the leadership struggles were responsible for both the negation
of democracy in and consequent weakening of the unions. Thus
although the economic crisis provided a weak material basis for a
successful application of law, political factors were most
fundamental in shaping the character of trade unions while on a
secondary level ideological deficiencies and leadership struggles
further emasculated potential union strength.
1.	 THE NATURE OF TRADE UNIONISM
The relationship between trade unions and government between
1979-1987 was determined mainly by the outcome of the 1980 General
Election in Uganda. On the one hand an attempt by the trade union
movement to draw out a political programme and even form a Labour
Party was aborted by a section of the trade union leadership. On
the other hand the UPC-Obote group came to power after an election
widely accepted as having been rigged. 1 Although the majority of
workers and trade unionists were opposed to the Obote II regime,
they were not politically organised; on the other hand lack of
sufficient support among the workers and trade unions, in a
situation where armed political opposition to the government now
existed, led the UPC government to adopt anti-union and anti-worker
policies and behaviour. It is in this context that we locate the
government's violation of workers' freedom of association. This
violation consisted of partisan political intervention, illegal
intervention or an opportunistic use of law and open repression.
(a) ATTEMPTS TO FORM A LABOUR PARTY AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMISM
In 1980 four parties contested the General Election. These
were the UPC, DP (Democratic Party), UPM (Uganda Patriotic Movement)
and CP (Conservative Party). The first two were parties of the
1960's while CP was a reconstituted KY (Kabaka Yekka). It was
monarchist, federalist and conservative. The labour policies of UPC
and DP were essentially the same. They were agreed on the concept
of tripartism - that is co-operation between government, management
and labour. But while DP promised "to encourage the growth of free
trade unions and trade union activities", educational facilities and
the re-establishment of a Uganda Labour College (DP 1980: 29-30) the
UPC promised to "ensure the participation of workers in the
decision-making process in their places of work", to "provide
conditions under which individual workers or through their unions
acquire shares in industries" and finally to "establish an
autonomous corporation for the administration and management of the
Social Security Fund" (UPC 1980: 38-39). The DP therefore clearly
adopted the ICFTU position as demanded by the Luande faction of the
union movement while UPC did not declare support for "free trade
unionism" but stressed the incorporationist strategy. But since
both parties were agreed on tripartism which coincided with union
demands the actual specifications of the manifestoes were not very
crucial. Tripartism was the central ideology.
UPM on the other hand took a more pro-worker position not only
in its manifesto but in its actual composition. Although the
policies on workers were not very different from those of DP and UPC
UPM was actually formed with a distinct component of workers. It is
this fact more than any other that made it potentially amenable to
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. respond to working class interests. However the working class
component came in because of the trade unions' failure to form a
separate Labour Party.
The trade unionists' ability to engage in parliamentary
politics was made possible, we recall, due to the 1973 amendment
allowing trade unionists to become MPs. Following some discussions
in NOTU D. Wogute, NOTU Secretary General declared in May 1980 at a
Seminar for Post Office workers that all previous governments had
failed to articulate workers interests. He observed,
Many of these people have gone to power under the
guise of articulating workers' interests, but on
becoming incumbents they forgot the workers. How
long are we to vote in people of this kind? We
shall form an opposition whose stand would always be
stated clearly (Uganda Times 19-5-1980).
But on the same occasion the veteran trade unionist H. M. Luande
took the less radical approach and only "congratulated the Military
Commission on having guaranteed the holding of the general elections
under a multi-party system" (ibid.). But later the idea of forming
a Labour Party was discussed by NOTU and its affiliate unions and a
Committee was set up to study the issue closely (Uganda Times
18.6.1980).
In the meantime supporters of the anti-Amin guerilla
organisation FRONASA led by Y. Museveni together with a section of
the left-wing intelligentsia were at an advanced stage of forming
the UPM. In the preparatory stages the Museveni group decided to
call upon the workers who were contemplating forming a Labour Party
to join them and form one organisation 2 . It was at this stage that
a rift developed in the labour movement. Apparently the split was
essentially on allegiance to either DP or UPM - the UPC had little
support in the labour movement unlike in the early 1960's. A
section of trade union leaders led by D. Wogute himself accepted to
join the new UPM and D. Wogute was elected one of the Vice-Chairmen
of the Party (Uganda Times 10-6-1980). Thereafter he declared that
"the workers and peasants in Uganda had been neglected since .
independence" and hailed the UPM for having "given recognition to
the workers" and "urged the workers to regard the UPM as their
movement" (ibid.).
But the trade union faction led by H. M. Luande NOTU Chairman
and J. Ssebuliba NOTU Deputy Secretary-General issued statements
dissociating NOTU from D. Wogute's relationship with UPM. J.
Ssebullba argued that "no party had ever been formed by the workers
of Uganda as claimed by Wogute. The workers of Uganda should note
that Wogute and his followers have joined the UPM as individuals but
not as workers' respresentatives" (Uganda Times 18.6.1980). H. M.
Luande reiterated that "NOTU had never formed any Party nor
authorised the formation of one". He accused "those individuals who
were forcing NOTU into an alliance with UPM without the workers'
mandate" of being "greedy and over-ambitious". According to him,
those concerned are newcomers in the trade union
movement in this country and do not know the basics
of trade unionism (and he) encouraged trade
unionists to join any political party as individuals 
and not as a workers' organisation (ibid.).
Disagreements over the approach to existing political parties
led to the dropping of both the Labour Party project or any attempt
to adopt a common political programme for workers. The ideology of
economism in trade unions, of separating trade union and political
organisation triumphed.	 Workers were in effect being told to
support the parties of the different bourgeois and petty bourgeois
factions in Uganda. As a matter of fact both H. M. Luande and J.
Ssebuliba joined DP and encouraged workers to do the same. However
of all the parties it was UPM which fielded the highest number of
trade unionists as parliamentary candidates because a clear section
of it was recognised as a working class section3.
Lack of a political programme and political organisation that
united workers was to lead to the divisions among workers engendered
by the UPC regime between 1981-1985. When UPC came to power after
the rigged December 1980 Elections a section of UPM led by Y.
Museveni declared an armed guerilla struggle against the UPC-Obote
II regime in February 1981 (Y. Museveni 1986: 7; Y. Barongo 1989:
82). Several other armed groups were set up but Museveni's National
Resistance Movement (NRM) and its armed wing the National Resistance
Army (NRA) were the strongest. The approach of the UPC regime to
the trade union movement was essentially determined by the knowledge
that the movement was opposed to it and sympathetic in large measure
to the armed opposition.
(b) STATE VIOLATION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Freedom of association for workers is generally guaranteed by
the Uganda Constitution (Art. 18) for the formation and organisation
of trade unions and further affirmed by the Trade Union Decree 1976
(S.56, see also Cap. II:.59-60) and Ugandds ratification of ILO
Convention No. 98. These statutes and the Convention provide the
basis for the existence and right to operate that in principle
Uganda's trade unions enjoy. In the period 1981-1985 the UPC regime
however violated these clearly stipulated legal rights. Trade
unions were viewed as political opposition sympathetic to the
opposition parties and the armed guerilla organisations in
particular. This violation consisted of three elements: partisan
political intervention and attempts to split the trade union
movement and thereby subjugate it to UPC interests, illegal and/or
opportunistic use of the law and finally open repression.
(i) THE DIVISIVE STRATEGY OF THE UPC OBOTE II REGIME
The method of intervention in the trade union movement adopted
in 1981 was to form the UPC Worker's Council to parallel the
official and legally recognised movement consisting of NOTU and its
affiliates and to eventually take the latter over. The UPC Workers'
Council was however to be supplemented by the other UPC organs in
workplaces namely UPC Party Branches and UPC Youth Wing sections.
While for the UPC leadership the UPC Workers' Council, 	 Branches
and Youth Wing were a way of minimising an all-round opposition to
the regime, the leaders of these UPC organs saw them as a means of
patronage through which they would be rewarded by the UPC
government. The UPC Workers' Council and the Industrial Branches
were set up by the UPC Secretariat in collaboration with some UPC
union leaders the most important of whom were E. K. Hall NOTU
Chairman Okot-Omara, NOTU Treasurer-General (in 1981) and D. Wogute
Secretary-General of NOTU who had already crossed from UPM and
joined UPC in April 1981 (NOTU 1982: Appendix "B"). Led by Okot-
Omara their tactic to get the governments' support was to brand all
non-UPC unionists and workers and even those UPC unionists and
workers who did not agree with their politics as "bandits" - that
is, those supporting the anti-UPC guerilla movements (ibid.).
Right from 1981 therefore the UPC with these UPC unionists
began setting up all the above UPC front organs in workplaces. D.
Wogute, who had crossed to UPC was now calling upon the Minister of
Labour to open UPC Branches for instance in East Africa Breweries
Limited, UGIL and Pepsi-Cola (Uganda) Limited, arguing that the
Minister would "boost the morale of the workers, in particular UPC
workers, by officiating at these ceremonies" 4 . Increasingly UPC
Branches were set up in most enterprises to counter any suspected
organised opposition to the government. In NYTIL, the UTGWU Branch
office was even painted in UPC Party colours to the chagrin of non-
UPC workers
	 (Observation and Interview with Branch officials,
December 1987).
Thus in MULCO (alias Pamba Textiles Limited), Jinja, in 1981
the UPC Industrial Branch simply dissolved the union Branch
Executive and merely informed the General Secretary, UTGWU, claiming
that the incumbent officials were ineffective:
For smooth running of our Mill, the following are
now Trade Union Caretakers until you organise fresh
elections... (listed-JB).
the UPC as a policy-maker advises you to confirm
the above men to represent the Trade Union until you
organise fresh elections5.
At UGIL, Kampala, the UPC Branch first suspended the union
Branch Secretary because "he was opposed to (UPC) and is parallel to
its aims and objectives, something which would eventually divide the
workers". A month later the UPC Branch also simply dissolved the
union Branch Executive and wrote to NOTU:
This is to advise that owing to the direct sabotage
done by the officials of union UGIL Branch the UPC
UGIL Branch decided to dissolve the whole Union
Branch. You already know that the union officials
of this firm are working for the downfall of UPC
UGIL Branch7.
Similar unconstitutional replacements of elected Branch union
leaders took place at ATM, Mbale and NYTIL, Jinja with the UPC
Branches "conducting elections" (NOTU 1982: Appendix "C").
In other enterprises however the UPC organs simply split the
unions especially where union leaders also happened to be UPC Party
members. This was more problematic for the Party because there was
no need to supplant such union leadership. Intra-UPC contradictions
were simply being replicated in the trade unions. Such was the case
in Uganda Railway Workers' Union (URWU).
Due to power struggle between the Kampala URWU Branch and the
national URWU leadership (for details see infra:298-300)
	
the UPC
Workers' Council in URC (Uganda Railways Corporation) took sides
with the Branch. Matters came to a head in the 1984 Quinquennial
General Meeting for Kampala URWU Branch in which the Workers'
Council and union Branch leaders "demanded open elections of voters
lining up behind the candidates" (URWU 1985(a): Min. No.
2/HQ/NEC/85). As the National Executive Committee (NEC) refused
this, insisting on the constitutional secret ballot (Art. 8(a) URWU
Constitution) commotion ensued and as a result no elections were
held. Subsequently the NEC under Art. 12(1)(e) of URWU Constitution
suspended the Branch for infringing the constitution (URWU 1985(a):
ibid.).
In fact although the majority of URWU national leadership were
UPC members they strongly opposed the UPC Workers' Council. Early
in 1985 for instance the URWU President, a UPC member, clarified
URWU position on the anti-union Party organs:
the UPC Workers' Council had declared a full-fledged
war against the union... and he wondered why such a
group had been left at large to cause breach of
peace to the workers in the Corporation, which was,
even against the law without any action being taken
against it by the authorities concerned (ibid. Min.
No. 1/HQ/NEC/85).
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The Managing Director of URC equally denounced the Workers' Council
as "some few wrong elements within the Corporation who were
masquerading as representatives of workers on a UPC ticket with ill-
intention of disrupting not only the Corporation services, but also .
whatever had been achieved for the workers" (URWU 1985
	 : 10).
Finally even the Deputy Minister of Labour deplored the devisive
role of the UPC Workers' Council in the Corporation and suggested
that the union and the Council should play their separate roles
positively (ibid: 11).
However although the UPC Secretariat supported the Workers'
Council the UPC regime as a whole was more interested in having
union leaders that were not anti-government. The survival of the
URWU leadership thus partly became dependent upon intra-UPC
contradictions.
In the event the UPC Secretariat and sections of government
maintained support for UPC organs. UPC sycophancy amongst the
workers was constantly encouraged.	 A. Lobidra, Secretary for
Mobilisation at the UPC Secretariat, for instance could address
union leaders in these terms:
at present UPC means Obote and Obote means UPC for
he is second to none and not even a single Minister
can succeed Obote. He is the symbol of UPC.
Without Obote hence UPC there is no Trade Union
Freedom.
	 So how can the Trade Unions function
without Obote, hence UPC8.
But the trade union leadership and membership for the most part
resisted supporting UPC. The majority of both the leadership and
the membership were anti-UPC. Of the 15 trade unions in Uganda 11
had General Secretaries and other officials, in the majority,
supporting either UPM or DP (NOTU 1982: Appendix B, supra). Indeed
in 1982 D. Wogute was voted out of office at an Extra-Ordinary
General Meeting for his dictatorship and pro-UPC stand. He was
accused of	 suppressing NOTU organs,	 the FAGPC	 (Finance
Administration and General Purposes Committee), the Education and
Scholarships Committee, misappropriation of foreign donations and
above all failing to call the Annual Delegates Conference between
1979-1982 (NOTU 1982(a): Minute 7/4). And though not mentioned
openly the union leaders were also against D. Wogute for his
"opportunistic crossing" from UPM to UPC (Interviews, NOTU
Secretariat September 1987). 	 S. A. Okolimong was then elected
Acting Secretary General. He was an original member of UPC and
trade unionists had been pressurised behind the scenes to elect a
UPC supporter. Thus when elected he openly stated that "he was a
Congressman (UPC member) and... promised to take care of UPC
interests and... that his administration will set a good example"
(NOTU 1982(a): supra, Minute 9/4). Besides, the unionists preferred
such an S.G. to protect the non-UPC union leaders (Interviews,
supra). A few months after the removal of D. Wogute his supporters
E. K. Hall and Okot-Omara were also removed from office by the NOTU
CGC (Central Governing Council) and replaced by E. Katuramu and P.
Katabulingi as Chairman and Treasurer-General of NOTU respectively
(NOTU: 1982(b): 10).
The ability of the majority of the trade unions to avoid being
overrun by the UPC organs was greatly assisted by divisions within
UPC vis-a-vis the trade union movement. From 1982 onwards a split
developed within the UPC on how to deal with a hostile trade union
movement. Some Ministers and other UPC leaders openly opposed the
UPC Workers' Council while others argued that it should take over
the union movement and supported the harrassment and imprisonment of
leading anti-UPC unionists. This created great tension amongst
workers. Thus in 1982 a leading UPC figure and Chairman of the
Uganda Railways Corporation Board of Directors was appealing to the
UPC Secretariat to formulate a guideline for the Council and UPC
Branch leaders on the one hand and the trade unions on the other "to
avoid confusion and interference between the two nwhile the Managing
Director and also leading UPC member A. Ejalu argued that the UPC -
Branch "would be used to advocate the principle of unity" (Uganda
Times 4-2-1982).
However tension continued. And soon support for the official
and legal trade union organisations came
	 from the Attorney-
General/Minister of Justice who ruled that the UPC Workers' Councils
had no constitutional basis within UPC itself and no legal status in
Uganda. He argued that they were mere ad hoc bodies of the Party:
The Councils cannot fit into categories of
charitable or other social and sporting organisation
such as are registrable with the Registrar-General,
Ministries of Culture and Community Development and
Rehabilitation. Nor under Trade Union laws which
are non-partisan.
In short if the Councils decide to operate
independently of the Party Branches, they will find
some problems at the Party end and interaction with
non-Party organs such as NOTU9.
In spite of this ruling, both the Councils and Party Branches
were maintained. Thus A. Lobidra of the UPC Secretariat while
addressing UPC workers in Jinja later on acknowledged that opponents
of UPC viewed the Party Branches as "spy centres" and that
"deliberate and sustained efforts to bar UPC from industries were
made by management cadres who manifested political feelings hostile
to UPC" (The Worker, No. 2 November 1983). Again while the Minister
of Labour and his Deputy, A. Butele and H. Tungwako respectively,
opposed the UPC Workers' Council and its anti-trade union
activities, the UPC Workers' Council equally took an anti-Ministry
of Labour stand because of the latter's general support for the
official and legal trade union movement. By 1983, even S. A.
Okolimong the Acting S.G. of NOTU and a UPC partisan himself had
joined the rest of the anti-UPC Workers' Council unionists and .
unreservedly condemned the Councils' activities. Thus he wrote to
the Deputy Minister of Labour condemning the Council leaders who had
carried placards against the Deputy Minister on May Day. He stated:
NOTU viewed this kind of behaviour with serious
concern because this body has proved to be
destructive and as such Government ought to do
something to correct this irresponsible behaviour...
NOTU categorically denounces and condemns the
Workers' Council and its activities... (and)
dissociates itself from all Workers' Council
activities calculated to cause enmity among the
workers 10 .
In 1984 during the organisation for May Day celebrations the
Ministry of Labour had insisted on inviting only 1000 workers
selected by NOTU and its affiliates for the reception and sought to
exclude UPC partisans from the parades. However the UPC Secretariat
prevailed upon the Ministry to give the assurance that "all UPC
Industrial Branches from the country are free to mach under the
banner and colours of the UPC Party" and the Minister of Labour was
then compelled "to issue a circular to all management of industries
to refute the allegations that the UPC were not to participate in
the parade" (NOTU: 1984). In NOTU the consensus about all UPC front
organs was stipulated by the NOTU Chairman, E. Katuramu, in 1984.
He declared:
On political platform NOTU recognises the UPC
Industrial Branches and we do not recognise the
"Workers' Council" because of its bad motives
calculated to cause divisions among the workers. We
shall continue to do everything possible to unite
all the workers of Uganda for the purpose of
upholding the banner of solidarity which tells us
that we should think together, do things together,
be responsible together and when time comes for us
to sink we shall sink together".
Thus the failure of the UPC Workers' Council to take hold in
the trade union movement was not simply a result of the majority
trade unionists' refusal to be split for the sake of advancing the .
partisan political interests of the insecure UPC regime. It was
also a result of the support they were given by some UPC leaders, in
particular the Ministers of Labour themselves, especially against
the UPC Workers' Council and above all, the Attorney-General's
ruling.
(ii) GOVERNMENT NEGATION OF UNION DEMOCRACY
Although the government's attempt to split the trade ilnim
movement using the UPC Workers' Council generally failed with only a
few Party Branches taking over some union Branches (e.g. supra: 27f-I4).
it . did not thereby stop interference in union affairs. Instead
it sought to influence the election of NOM and its affiliates'
leadership. This resulted in the government's prohibition of union
Quinquennial and Annual Delegates Conferences as long as it was not
assured that pro-UPC leaderships would be elected. To this end both
illegal methods and opportunistic use of law were resorted to.
Following the election of S. A. Okolimong as Acting S.G. of
NOTU in 1982 it was expected by unionists that a proper NOTU
Delegates Conference would be held to elect NOTU officials
especially as the Chairman and Treasurer-General had also been
replaced on an acting basis. Later, August 1982 was decided upon
for a Delegates Conference.	 But suddenly in July 1982 NOTU
officials and staff, including the S.G. were arrested (for details
see infra: 284-286). As a result the ADC could not take place.
Instead as the S.G. reported to the CGC in October "the
understanding reached in the President's office and your (CGC)
recommendations at the last Council meeting (was) that NOTU should
continue to make consultations with the relevant authorities". When
he consulted the authorities on the issue of holding the ADC he was
"advised to advise (the CGC) that the holding of the Delegates
Conference should be postponed until the necessary consultations are
finalised" (NOTU 1982: 18-19).
Meanwhile with respect to the NOTU affiliates the government
had also suspended elections. The Ministry of Labour even wrote to
union branches prohibiting elections. The Deputy Minister of Labour
thus wrote to NYTIL:
recently a Ministerial decision was taken to the
effect that no trade union or NOTU should carry out
elections until further notice. The union should
therefore not go ahead with the proposed branch
elections 12 .
Apparently the "understanding reached in the President's
office" referred to above had something to do with ensuring that
NOTU was UPC-led (Interview NOTU Secretariat, September 1987). This
"understanding" was not implemented and the union leaders later
decided to hold the 3rd Quinquennial Delegates Conference (QDC) on
17th March 1984. However the Minister of Labour again stopped it
and ordered its postponement "until further advice" (NOTU: 1984(a)).
But a CGC meeting took the view that "Okolimong had colluded with
the Minister to put off the Delegates Conference" to keep himself in
power (ibid.). And even the Acting Chairman of NOTU E. Katuramu
"reiterated that he vowed not to be party to any delay of the
Delegates Conference" and for that reason resigned from the NOTU
Secretariat "with immediate effect" (ibid.). The CGC then demanded
the resignation of the Acting S.G. himself but he was adamant;
instead, eventually, a 10-man delegation was appointed to meet the
Minister and discuss the issue with him.
In the meeting between this delegation and the Minister of .
Labour the union leaders bluntly accused the Ministry of imposing
unwanted leadership on NOTU and the workers since no proper
elections had been held since 1979 and as NOTU leaders since 1982
had only been acting. Both the Minister and the Registrar of Trade
Unions first gave legalistic reasons for postponing the NOTU
Conference, namely that the affiliate unions must first have their
ADCs, pay all their subscription arrears to OT\3 and also naintain
"the understanding reached in the President's office".
	 The
Registrar then "reminded" the unionists of the legal requirements to
hold ADCs (S.26,Decree 20/1976, to send annual returns (S.48) and
the Minister's power to request any information (S.16)).
	 The
Minister then "directed the Registrar to make sure that all unions
were up to date in their contributions to NOTU and that the Trade
Union Inspector of Books must ensure that the law is followed before
NOTU Delegates Conference is held". Without much discussion he
finally "declared that he was not going to succumb to any pressure
whether internal or external and that if the unions fail to fulfil
the conditions he set, he will dissolve the unions and appoint
Caretaker Committees" (NOTU: 1984(b)).
Later the affiliates of NOTU were officially allowed to hold
their ADCs but NOTU was to hold its ADC after the affiliates ADCs
and no union with arrears to NOTU would attend the NOTU ADC 13 . But
by the time of the July 1985 coup which overthrew the UPC-Obote II
regime the majority of the unions had not held their ADCs nor had
NOTU. These ADCs and QDCs were to be held by all the unions from
1986 onwards after the NRM/NRA took over in January that year.
Two points stand out clearly from the above. Although the
Minister of Labour had no power to stop the holding of trade union .
ADCs and QDCs he did illegally stop them. Secondly he and the
Registrar argued correctly that affiliates of NOTU must first pay
their arrears (26 months arrears without good cause meant the
dissolution of the affilitate, 	 while thirteen
	 weeks arrears
disentitled the affiliate from attending NOTU meetings) (NOTU
Constitution Art. 5) i
 that they should send their annual returns to
the Registrar and so on. But this insistence that trade unions
follow their constitutions and legislative provisions was only
opportunistic so that failure to follow the law could be used by the
Ministry to impose its wishes on the unions. In fact the motivation
behind this belated concern with legality and constitutionality was
the desire to concretise "the understanding reached in the
President's office", namely that NOTU and its affiliates should be
UPC-led.
Indeed in general the enforcement of law by the Ministry of
Labour did not take place and the union leadership carried on
unsupervised by the membership as Annual Delegates' Conferences
(ADCs) and Quiniluennial Delegates' Conferences (QDCs) had been
suspended. In particular annual returns were neither made nor sent
• to the Registrar of Trade Unions by most unions. In 1982 for
instance the Labour Commissioner wrote to all the unions, repeating
a 1981 demand, that all unions should update their membership
figures (returns) adding that "this particular circular will serve
as a warning to those unions who (sic) have not submitted the
information to us and in any case it might be taken to mean that you
do not have the right qualifications" 14 . In fact some unions like
the Building Union confirmed that at times their membership fell
below the requisite 1000 (S.73(1) Trade Union Decree 20/1976) which .
was never reported to the Ministry not did the Ministry check
(Interview, Building Union Officials, September 1987).
As far as annual returns were concerned, that is the audited
balance sheet and changes of officers and in the union constitution
(S.48 Decree 20/76), these were hardly complied with either by most
trade unions. Towards the end of 1984 the Ministry of Labour
apparently under S.49 of the Trade Union Decree ordered its Senior
Industrial Relations Officers "to inspect all trade union membership
Registers and ascertain the paid-up membership of each Trade Union
and their areas of jurisdiction and their individual accounts".
Further the requirements of sections 46-49 of the Decree (on
requirements that proper accounts books be kept, that audited
accounts be presented to the ADCs and furnished to the Registrar)
were to be emphasized to all the unions 15 . It is not clear whether
this inspection was carried out. What is clear is that most unions
sent no annual returns to the Ministry between 1979_198516.
The main reason why union accountability as required by union
constitutions and the Trade Union Decree never took place was the
suspension of union ADCs and QDCs by the government. And although
civil servants in the Ministry of Labour appear to have attempted to
enforce some of the legal requirements that may have ensured a
minimum level of accountability, this was feeble. But above all
accountability was hardly possible since ADCs and QDCs are central
to the union memberships' ability to oversee the leaders' running of
union affairs. Without these meetings the union leaders were left
to their own devices: no approved budgets, no approved policies and,
instead, concentration on leadership struggles especially with UPC
agencies.
Thus from 1979 to 1986 neither the ADC nor the QDC of NOTU nor
those of the majority of the unions were held due to political
interference. Attempts by civil servants of the Labour Ministry to
enforce aspects of the law were hampered by the fact that the major
meetings of the unions were suspended for a long time. What the UPC
strategy achieved was only to keep unmandated leaderships in the
unions and constant tension in the union movement. However the
tactic of dividing workers using the UPC Workers' Council and other
UPC front organs did not succeed and non-UPC unionists resisted
incorporation into the UPC. Freedom to hold meetings and elect
leaders of their own choice was to come back to the trade unions
only after the NRM came to power.
(iii) REPRESSION OF UNION LEADERS AND WORKERS
Finally aside from actual interference in union administration
the UPC regime arrested and detained both union leaders and workers
merely suspected of political opposition. Although under the Public
Order and Security Act 1967 (No. 20/1967) preventive detention for•
periods which are renewable is legal many unionists were neither
held under this law nor charged with any specific offence. The main
reasons for the arrest, torture and imprisonment of workers and
trade unionists was the assumption that they supported the armed
struggle against the regime which the government called "banditry".
Here the aims of the UPC Workers' Council leaders coincided with
those of the government. The former used the unionists' or workers'
anti-government stand against them in the struggle for union
leadership of the workers generally while the latter used the
Council as much as the other party organs to keep itself informed of .
the level of political opposition among the workers.
A few examples will suffice. In 1982 the leadership of the
Postal Union were arrested on allegations of "instigating a
subversive strike to cause economic sabotage and to overthrow the
Government without going to the bush" (NOTU 1982: Appendix "B": 4)
For the same reasons, leaders of the Education Union and 12 workers
at the Kakira Sugar Works had been arrested and detained (ibid.).
Again in 1984, 35 workers at Kakira Sugar Plantation were arrested
by soldiers from Magamaga Army Barracks on the allegation that they
had "connections with banditry activities". Their trade union NUPAW
and NOTU protested their innocence. Although a few were released
the others were not, though no charges were brought-U . la the same
year J. Mbaziira NOTU Trustee and J. Kangavve, Organising Secretary
of NUCMW(U) were arrested by the intelligence unit NASA (National
Security Agency) but no charges were brought against them18.
Although Kangavve was traced and found alive in prison, J. Mbaziira
has never been seen alive again (NOTU 1986: 7-8). In fact aware of
the political motivation behind the detentions the Ministry of
Labour obliquely divested itself of responsibility:
I would strongly suggest that cases. of this nature
have to be handled with great care as normally the
motives behind the arrests are not clear19.
However the most revealing incident regarding the UPC
government's rejection of trade unions and leaders independent of it
was the arrest of NOTU officials and staff and some other workers in
July 1982. The background to the arrests lay in the UPC Workers'
Council leadership contest with the official and legal union
movement. When D. Wogute, E.K. Hall and Okot-Omara were removed
from NOTU leadership at the beginning of 1982 they made the UPC
Workers Council their medium of struggle against the unionists who
opposed UPC interference in the trade union movement. Earlier on in
fact because this faction felt insecure and in the minority it had
used the legalistic device - because of some unions being in
subscription arrears to NOTU - to declare 9 of them non-existent
(See NOTU Constitution, Art 5(2)) and purported that NOTU had taken
trusteeship of them20 . But the Ministry of Labour refused to accept
this move as did the unions concerned. 	 Further, on various
occasions the same faction accused the top union leaders of the same
9 unions and even some senior Ministry of Labour officials who
supported non-partisan unionism of being "bandits" (NOTU 1982:
Appendix "B" op. cit.: 4).
It was in this context of struggle between the ousted Wogute.
Okot-Omara-Hall faction and the incumbents of NOTU and most of its
affiliates that the former in collaboration with the UPC Secretariat
and a section of the Army organised the arrest of NOTU officials,
staff and a number of workers in July 1982. The allegations against
them were political: 1) that NOTU had recruited 19 people and sent
them to Kenya and Libya to train and join "Amin's men... to come and
overthrow the Government of Uganda"; 2) that one J. Kalem had been
sent to Italy to negotiate for arms which had already arrived in
the country; 3) that although the Acting Secretary General of NOTU
S.A. Okolimong had been advised "to stop working with DPs and UPMs
in NOTU", he had refused to do so; and 4) that the 14 July 1982
meeting in NOTU at which the arrests took place was for the
distribution of arms "to start fighting the elected Government of
Uganda".
These allegations were all found to be false. With respect to
the political affiliations of UPC unionists the Secretary General
could do nothing about it especially as they were the majority.
What is even ironic is that the meeting was actually supposed to
discuss "the proposed crossing of some General Secretaries into UPC
which was going to take place on 30.7.1982" and "to check on the
promises which some union leaders had made in April that they should
be given time to think about it". More revealing even is the fact
that the meeting was also supposed "to discuss the proposed line-up
of candidates for the forthcoming NOM Elections in ikagnst 13132,"
(NOTU 1982: Appendix "A": 1-2).	 The unionistswere detained and
tortured at Mbuya Military Barracks. Although they were later
released, they were never charged with any offence.
The point here is that the refusal of UPC to accept that it had
failed to command a dominant role within the trade union movement
and among the workers generally and its creation of the UPC Workers
Council, the Party and Youth Wing Branches had created room for the
UPC partisan unionists to trample upon other unionists' and
workers' freedom of association. It was the lack of legitimacy of
the UPC regime and UPC front organs among the workers that led the
UPC to discard many of its pretensions to legality with respect to
the trade union movement.
Compared to the 1960s where the unions were gradually being
incorporated into state institutions especially under the Move to
the Left Strategy (1968-1971) in the 1980s the trade unions
successfully resisted being used as the mouthpiece of the ruling
Party. They were even able to pass resolutions "in honour of the
arrested trade unionists", to demand the release of those "whose
whereabouts remained unknown following similar arrests" and also to
condemn "violence in the trade union movement". Finally they openly
declared that they sought to uphold "personal freedom and individual
rights" and "the democratic character of Trade Unionism" 21 . And
unlike under Amin when trade unionists and workers had no link to
organisations seeking to remove Amin, some trade unionists and
workers appear to have maintained some contact with the anti-Obote
guerrilla movements especially the NRM/NRA of Y. Museveni 22 . These
contacts however were on an individual basis. The NRM itself also
claimed to have some cadres in industries who, without causing
permanent damage, were supposed to sabotage production in other
ways 23 . However this claim is not borne out by any evidence. Any
relationship between the NRM/NRA and the workers or trade union
leaders between 1981-1985 could only have been very limited. This
is also vindicated to some extent by lack of policy specifically
dealing with working class affairs in the NRM Ten-point Programme
(see infra: 346).
(c) LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES, NEGATION OF DEMOCRACY AND WEAKENING
OF UNIONS.
Apart from state intervention in union affairs it was the
prevalence of leadership struggles within the unions that aggravated
the disorganisation of the unions and weakened them even further.
These struggles with state intervention added up to negate such
union democracy as the union constitutions and legislation sought to
uphold. Further, this negation of union democracy was also in some
respects encouraged or funded by foreign trade unions intent on
furthering their own image or objects within Uganda's unions.
Before analysing the character of the leadership struggles it
is important to point out that the basis of these struggles are the
benefits enjoyed by union leaders.	 First, at the time of
independence many trade union leaders saw trade unionism as a
launching pad into politics or as a means of forming patron-client
relations wth political leaders as happened in the 1960s (Cap III).
Under Amin such relations were not possible but in the 1980s the
1960s situation was partly revived. Secondly, vocal or mnitant
union leaders are often promoted in order to neutralise them and
some unionists saw leadership as a helpful step in this connection.
Thirdly, the union itself possesses material and financial benefits:
scholarships, trips, allowances, union assets like cars, economic
projects and other property which many union leaders tend to put to
their personal use. Fourthly, union leadership creates power -
leaders negotiate with employers, their role in trade disputes is
reported in the press, they deal with government and political
leaders and are often in the limelight. Fifthly union leaders have
also tended to forge personal or client relations with managements
which also explains their tendency to moderation compared to the
rank and file 24 . Finally and probably more fundamentally these
struggles exist because of the paucity of jobs - a reflection of an
underdeveloped economy. 	 Union leadership is one of the more
materially beneficial jobs especially at the national level in this
situation. All these factors point to the vulnerability of union
leaders compromising with goverment or management for personal
benefit thus weakening the unions by undermining their autonomy.
But whereas the above constitute the raison d'etre for
leadership struggles, these struggles may take various forms.
R. Sandbrook is of the view that in Africa two forms of union
cleavage have been occupational status and ethnicity (R. Sandbrook
1975: 94). In Uganda R.D. Grillo in a study of RAU(U) concluded
that occupational differentiation did not provide a basis for
cleavage in the union while ethnicity did to some extent (R.D.
Grillo 1969: 306-308; 1973: 156-176). We shall argue here that in
Uganda in the 1980s cleavage in unions essentially took the form of
politically-inspired factionalism. Although this may in turn be a
reflection of the political differences in Uganda which were partly
based on ethnic differences, the latter element was only secondary
and derivative. What actually mattered most were the political
differences.
We shall use examples from two unions to illustrate the above
points for the period 1979-1987. These are UTGWU and URWU.
(i) UTGWU
In UTGWU (Uganda* Textile and Garment Workers' Union) leadership
struggles began immediately after the fall of Amin in 1979. This
struggle was sparked off by D. Wogute the new NOTU Secretary
General. Immediately following his election in 1979 D. Wogute
launched a campaign against some senior trade unionists whom he
considered threats to his position mainly because he had just
returned from exile. He began by suspending P. Amandrua, General
Secretary, and A. Ssejemba Treasurer of UTGWU respectively on the
allegation that they had, between 1978-1979, improperly advanced and
loaned themselves union money. The NOTU Central Governing Council
(CGC) suspended them from their posts on 22 September 1979 25 . It
was also in this context that NOTU purported to dissolve 11 of the
16 Uganda unions affiliated to it and take trusteeship of them on
the grounds that they had failed to pay their contributions to NOTU
in ti me26.	 Although this general dissolution was successfully
resisted by the concerned unions, the suspension of P. Amandrua and
A. Ssejemba was maintained pending investigations.
In the meantime the Caretaker leaders of UTGWU hurriedly
convened a Delegates' Conference and P. Mutete and D.W. Musekura
were elected Secretary General and Treasurer respectively with S.
Batumbia as new Chairman on 12 November 1980 27 . However in 1982 the
NOTU Disciplinary Committee which had investigated the allegations
exonerated the two leaders and recommended their reinstatement28.
The Mutete faction opposed this decision and applied for a High
Court injunction to restrain the Amandrua faction from resuming
their positions. But P.Amandrua successfully had the unjunction
lifted 29 . Subsequently further struggles ensued between the two
factions in which the Mutete faction used security personnel to
physically throw the Amandrua faction out of office. Eventually
however the District Commissioner, Jinja assisted to reinstate the
Amandrua faction early in 1984 30 . The struggle for leadership,
however, continued.
It should be pointed out here that in UTGWU in particular the
leadership struggle was fuelled by foreign union support for the
Mutete faction. This in turn encouraged some of the leaders to act
unconstitutionally or illegally as they came to regard their foreign
sponsors as their constituency more than the union membership. The
most outstanding impact of foreign unions in this case was the
support that ITG & LWF (International Textile, Garments and Leather
Workers' Federation) and in particular its General Secretary C.
Ford, and the AALC. In 1982 the ITG and LWF and the AALC had
offered to run a seminar for UTGWU at Mutete's request though, it
seems, NOTU refused to sanction it because Mutete had not made the
request through NOTU31 . Further, on a number of occasions, without
NOTU approval and against government policy, Mutete sent UTGWU
unionists sponsored by the AALC to the Afro-Asian Institute, Tel-
Aviv, Israe132 . Again after his removal from office in 1984 Mutete
attended seminars in Egypt and Israel organised by ITG and LWF on
behalf of UTGWU. He was sponsored by ITG and LWF when he was no
longer UTGWU leader and the Vice-Chairman, K.A. Newton who had been
nominated by the union could not go33.
Finally no sooner was P. Mutete removed from UTGWU leadership
than C. Ford found him a job as ITG and LWF representative in
Zimbabwe 34 . Then in 1986 prior to UTGWU elections at its QDC, P.
Mutete came back from Zimbabwe and together with S. Batumbia and
supported by ITG and LWF launched a leadership campaign. ITG and
LWF had provided Mutete with finances to organise seminars for
UTGWU. In fact P. Nutete himself wrote the letter ot UTGWU before
the UTGWU elections (while ITG and LWF Representative in Zimbabwe):
... the ITG & LWF has directed its African
Representative currently based in Zimbabwe to come
to Uganda and run a number of Trade Union Seminars
in your union starting May 1986. The
Representative's tasks will among other things
include the funding and accounting of the ITS funds,
co-ordinating the Seminars and in co-operation with
your Education and Organising Secretary, draw up the
Programme for the Seminars targeted at all Branch
officials and Chief Shopstewards (emphasis-JB).
N.B. The success of these Seminars will no doubt
influence future donations to your union from the
ITG & LWF, Bruxelles35.
The aim here, according to the Amandrua faction and NOTU which took
an independent line on the issue, was for Mutete to use the seminars
to meet and bribe supporters for the forthcoming elections36 . In
the circumstances UTGWU decided to postpone the seminar until after.
the elections.
Nonetheless P. Mutete came and contested the UTGWU General
Secretaryship on 16 July 1986 and was defeated by P. Amandrua37.
But because of the personalised relationship between the Mutete
faction and C. Ford of ITG and LWF the educational assistance and
seminars promised to UTGWU were now cancelled because the leadership
favoured by ITG and LWF had been defeated, let alone
democractically. Indeed 17G and IMF now raised a new issue: it
accused UTGWU of affiliation to the "communist WFTU" which was
untrue38 . Although by the end of 1987 C. Ford was still trying to
intervene on behalf of the Mutete faction by appealing to President
Y. Museveni39 the issue of the Mutete faction's defeat was closed as
far as unionists in Uganda were concerned and appeared to concern
only the foreign constituency of the hutete faction.
Apart from foreign patronage another impetus for leadership
wrangles has been the personal gain of union incumbents and
institutional assistance to the unions from managements. This may
explain the moderation of union leaders in trade disputes vis-a-vis
rank and file militancy (e.g. infra: 319). In the textile industry
patronage usually took the form of cloth for UTGWU leaders to sell.
Between 1981 and 1983 when P.K. Mutete wasUTGWU leader he often
requested for bales of cloth from NYTIL management to sell and
finance his family obligations°. Even when P. Amandrua took over
in 1984 the same practice continued41 . Apart from the personal 
"assistance" that management gave to union leaders, management even
funded some union activities. Thus NYTIL management donated 30
bales of cloth to UTGWU to sell on the open market and finance its
1986 Quinquennial Delegates' Conference (QDC) 42 . Similar practices
took place in other unions such as URWU (see infra: 301).
The leadership wrangles in UTGWU engineered by D. Wogute in
1979 but kept alive mainly by ITG and LWF was detrimental to the
union and its membership. In 1979 after NOTU suspension of the
Amandrua faction D. Wogute wrote to all textile enterprises where
UTGWU was recognised advising them "not to conduct any union
business...until advised otherwise by this (NOTU-S.G.) Office"43.
Thereafter during the Amandrua-Mutete conflict between 1982-1986
managements refused to pay union dues and even to negotiate
especially before Amandrua's reinstatement in 1984. Thus Uganda
Bags and Hessian Mills Limited (UB & HM Limited) bluntly refused to
negotiate when the Chief shopsteward made proposals for new terms
and conditions of service because, the General Manager argued, "we
do not know at present the General Secretary of the union with real
authority with whom we can sit and negotiate... H44	When P.
Amandrua was reinstated S. Batumbia and P. Metete wrote to all
General Managers advising them not to pay union dues45 . Some
managers took advantage of this confusion and refused to pay as per
check-off agreements". Finally, in the various disputes in the
textile industry at the time the shopstewards and membership were
also left on their own as in the Lira Spinning Mill strike of July
1984. Although by the end of 1984 P. Amandrua had re-established
himself and most managements were paying union dues and willing to




The leadership struggle in URWU (Uganda Railway Workers' Union)
in the 1980s provides a microsa of almost all the factors that
affect the operation of both statutory and union constitutional
provisions that are meant to guarantee democracy in any trade union
in Uganda. Unlike in UTGWU for instance the provisions of URWU
Constitution were very crucial, not simply in the way they were used
but how they were being changed in the course of the struggles. In
UTGWU factors external to the union like foreign support and NOTU
leadership strategies seem to have been more crucial in sustaining
the leadership struggles; and the union constitution was being used
without manipulation. In URWU however, factors external to the
union seem to have been as important as those internal to it, mainly
the provisions of the constitution themselves. The form of conflict
in URWU revolved around local political and personality struggles
while the foreign element in the struggles, though present, was
peripheral. Nonetheless the foreign element was being strengthened
as one of the weapons in the intra-union struggles.
To understand the intra-union struggles in URWU it is important
to outline some of the constitutional provisions pertinent to that
struggle.
The highest body in the union is the Quinquennial Delegates'
Conference (QDC) at which the national leadership is elected (Art.
8(f), URWU Constitution). Prior to each QDC each union Branch holds
its QDC too (Art 12(1)(c)). Below the QDC is the Annual Delegates'
Conference (ADC) which is the "supreme authority of the union" (Art
8(1)(a)) because it is the policy-making organ which also
ratifies/rejects all decisions taken in the course of the year by
the national leadership (ART. 8(1)(e)). National officers consist
of the President, General Secretary, Treasurer and their Assistants
and three trustees (Art 4(g)). Each branch also has a Chairman,
Secretary and Treasurer and their Assistants (Art. 12). 	 All .
elections, voting for the amendment of rules and other matters are
by secret ballot (Art. 8).
Below the ADC are three union organs: the National Executive
Committee (NEC), the Finance, Administration and General Purposes
Committee (FAGPC) and the Cabinet. The NEC consists of all the
national officers, the three trustees and one representative from
each registered branch of the union .(Art. 9(a)). It has powers to
suspend or dismiss any officer or employee of the union (clerks and
substantive Secretaries: the Administrative, Organising, Education,
Economics and Research Secretaries (Art. 7)) subject to appeals to
the ADC. In practice this leaves all power in the hands of the only
full-time elected officer, the General Secretary who works with the
full-time appointed employees.
Below the NEC is the FAGPC which consists of the national
officers plus 6 members elected at the QDC (Art. 10 (a)). But this
Committee acts only when asked and on matters referred to it by the
NEC.	 Otherwise it deals exclusively with financial matters
(ibid.). If the FAGPC fails to meet twice, the General Secretary
(G.S.) is empowered to convene the Cabinet whose quorumis only four
members, or the NEC itself may deal with the matter in question
(ibid.). So, constitutionally the FAGPC is easily dispensable and
four members of the Cabinet may determine issues supposed to be
dealt with by 12 members of the FAGPC.
The NEC is also empowered to suspend a Branch for refusal to
carry out the rules, decisions or resolutions of the delegates'
Conference or the NEC or for deliberately infringing Constitutional,
provisions (Art. 12(1(e)).
The smallest organ is the Cabinet which consists of all the
national officers and the three trustees. Its function is "to carry
out the day-to-day business of the union and deal with matters that
the FAGPC is entitled to deal with" (Art. 10(b)). In short the
Cabinet is the FAGPC without the six elected members who are not
officials.
The URWU Constitution has several authotitamian -potentialities
which as we show below were manifested in the 1980s leadership
struggles.	 First of all the ADC is composed of the national
officials and three delegates from each registered branch of URWU,
namely "the top three Branch officials of the union or their Branch
Representatives appointed by the Branch Executive Committee" (Art.
8(1)(c)).
	 But as the election of the Branch Executive at the
Branch's QDC is "convened and supervised by the Cabinet" the whole
electoral exercise can be manipulated by the Cabinet. Secondly
unlike some other unions, the ADC is composed only of officials and
has no direct representatives of the rank and file. Thirdly, the
role of the Cabinet at the Branch level is a 1980s innovation
brought in to deal with recalicitrant branches. So long as the
Cabinet can ensure that its supporters become the Branch leaders all
union decisions at any Conference will be rubber stamps of the
Cabinet decisions. This control of who constitutes Branch delegates
and the matters to be dealt with by the union Conferences is
possible also because the names of all Branch delegates and matters
for discussion must be submitted to the General Secretary 21 days
before the ADC date (Art. 8(d) & (g)). •This may be used to remove
unwanted delegates or issues. Quorum for the ADC is 2/3 of the
members entitled to attend and vote (Art. 8(a)).
Two issues around which leadership struggles revolved and in
which the national leadership used the constitution to act
undemocratically were the 1985 leadership elections at the QDC and
the suspension of Kampala Branch followed by the expulsion of the
Branch Executive.
The last QDC of URWU had taken place in 1919 (WW1: 1n1.%
and the next one was due in 1984 but did not take place due to
leadership struggles and the 1984 strike in particular (see infra:318-
'20).However although the UPC Workers' Council existed in URC the UPC
government did not interfere with the QDC of URWU since URWU
leadership was essentially UPC.
	 Besides in 1984 all unions had
been theoretically allowed to hold their ADCs and QDCs (supra:280 )•
URWU was one of a couple of unions that held their ADC/QDC in 1985.
The crucial point about this QDC was that the NEC was able to bribe
the delegates and stage-manage the elections. The small composition
of the Delegates' Conference appeared to provide room for this as
the ADC/QDC, composed of the NEC and respresentatives from the 11
branches of URWU, added up to only 42 delegates.
Several months before the QDC of 1985 the NEC had decided that
before holding the forthcoming QDC after organising
all the Branch elections, the union would undertake
to buy one suit and a briefcase for each delegate
including the National Officials of the Secretariat
(URWU: 1984: Minute No. 98/CBT/MTG/84).
Not only was this done but the delegates were accommodated in
the most expensive hotels (Colline and Speke Hotels), bought shoes
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and paid sumptuous allowances with union money47 . Armed with these
bribed delegates at the 1985 QDC the Secretariat/Cabinet of URWU
stage-managed the electoral process and were re-elected by
acclamation. As the records show:
Before the elections commenced the Branch Secretary
of Jinja, Bro. D. Kyewe moved a Resolution that "in
view of the meritorious work done by the current
National officials of the Secretariat by which they
had demonstrated in leading the union to prosperity
through wise, competent and dynamic leadership, they
be returned unopposed to continue with the next term
of office". This resolution was unanimously
supported and adopted by the Delegates (URWU 1985:
Min. No. 7/HQ/ODC/85, p. 18).
What should be noted here is that the Kampala Branch, the main
URWU Branch consisting of about 1/3 of the union membership, was not
represented. But in representational terms it was simply one of the
11 branches all of which had equal status (Art. 8(1)(c), URWU
Constitution). This point in fact brings us to the Kampala Branch
URWU leadership struggles.
The struggle between the Kampala Branch and URWU national
leadership was essentially a political and, personal struggle.
Particularly the UPC Workers' Council happened to have strong
support in the Branch (see URWU 1987(a): 2) and appears to have been
supported by the former Managing Director of URC, A Ejalu. A. Ejalu
had been suspended and later removed from the URC post in 1982.
Henceforth, believing that the union had campaigned for his
removal, A. Ejalu is said to have entered an informal pact with the
UPC agencies in URC which were already allied with the Kampala
Branch to oppose URWU leadership. In September 1984 capitalising on
workers' demands for wage increases in line with the kakobogo 
minimum wage guidelines (infra: 319)
	
the URWU Kampala Branch,
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supported by the UPC agencies in URC spearheaded a strike in order
to discredit the national union leadership and probably oust it.
Following the strike the G.S. of URWU made allegiations to the
effect that A. Ejalu, some leaders of UPC agencies in URC and the
Kampala Branch Executive were planning to murder the union
Executive48 . This ended up in a libel case49 . According to URWU
leadership on the day of the strike
all youths of UPC Railway Branch, Kampala... were at
the Locomotive Depot meeting with flags to be raised
and flowed (Sic) as soon as the union was ousted by
the Workers' Council".
It was in this context that the Kampala Branch came to
contravene constitutional provisional while the NEC took advantage
of this conflict to further increase its powers. Following the
September 1984 strike Quinquennial Branch elections were eventually
called in Kampala Branch as had already happened in other branches.
According to the NEC
as the election of the Branch Chairman started...
the same group of workers and officials who had
staged the illegal strike deliberately and wilfully
disrupted peace by causing disorder to the extent
that it became impossible for the Cabinet to conduct
elections..., the same group ordered the Cabinet not
to conduct elections by secret ballot but to use the
style of voters lining up behind the candidates...
Coupled with commotion and breach of peace... the
Cabinet decided to stop conducting the elections
(URWU 1985(a): 7).
Thereafter the NEC decided to suspend the Kampala Branch for
breach of the Constitution (Art. 12(c)), engineering the 1984 strike
and insubordination. The Secretariat took over the Branch "until
such a conducive time that elections would be held"51 . Then
following a NEC-FAGPC meeting in 1986 all the officials of the
Kampala Branch were expelled from the union pending appeal to the
ADC (URWU 1986: 5). The conflict about the voting system to be
used, which occurred again in 1986 (URWU 1987(b)), it is alleged, was
also brought about by the fact that A. Ejalu and the UPC Workers'
Council had in 1984 bribed the delegates and wanted open voting to
ensure victory52.
Although constitutionally the URWU leadership was right to
suspend the Kampala Branch and expel the Executive it
opportunistically used this conflict to enhance its powers in the
Constitution: The 1987 URWU ADC, controlled by the NEC, not only
upheld the 1986 NEC-FAGPC decision to expel the Kampala Branch
officials from the union, but more significantly increased the
national leaders' powers by resolving that
"The Secretariat should handle any subsequent
similar activities in the same context of this
resolution without the National Executive Committee
or a Special Delegates' Conference" (URWU 1987(c)).
Further the Constitution was also amended. While originally
the NEC could "suspend any branch for refusal to carry out the rules
or decisions" of the ADC or NEC the new provision added refusal to
carry out "resolutions" as a further ground for suspension (Art.
12(1)(e)).	 Thus the URWU Constitution further circumscribed
constitutional means of holding the national leadership accountable.
Further, the fact that the smallest branches as well as the very big
ones like Kampala Branch have the same constitutional rights seems
to encourage the small branches' susceptibility to bribery.
Finally, it should be observed that since either side in the
conflict appeared ready to use unscrupulous means, amendment to the
union constitution in a more democratic direction may not completely
resolve the conficts as they go beyond mere constitutional
inadequacies.
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It may be illuminating as in the case of UTGWU to point out
that even with URWU leadership the benefits arising from managerial
"assistance" to union leaders and the union itself fuelled the
struggles and at the same time undermined union strength and
Independence.
Assistance for union leaders by management came in the form of
promotions and material benefits. In the 1980s almost all national
union leaders were promoted very fast, superseding all other
workers. A. Kitakule the President, for instance was promoted twice
between 1983-1986 superseding 21 workers and 13 workers on each
occasion; P.K. Katabulingi the G.S. was promoted (while full-time
G.S.) in 1983 skipping eight grades and superseding 23 workers while
Maloba Vice-President was also promoted fast 53 . On a more personal
level management has provided material benefits to union leaders.
For example the C.S 4 a trustee and another URC employee were
involved in "confidential" correspondance to purchase several (ship)
containers from URC in order to construct houses from them 54 . And as
with UTGWU, URC management often provided "assistance" to the union
itself. In 1986 for instance URC management granted a union request
and purchased two airtickets "to allow two of its officials, viz.,
the President and G.S. to attend the 35th Congress of ITF in
Luxembourg "and Shs. 8.6 million was accordingly donated55.
2. WORKERS' RESISTANCE TO EROSION OF LIVING STANDARDSr
THE REDUNDANCY OF LAW
Apart from the political and illegal interference of
government in union affairs, and union leadership struggles which
• weakened the unions, the economic policies adopted by the UPC regime
greatly undermined the workers' standards of living. Workers were
accordingly forced into constant strikes to improve their terms and
conditions of service. However at the same time the government
itself actually suppressed the Industrial Court fearing its .
potential as an anti-government institution. This lack of a final
arbitration body increased the number of so-called illegal strikes.
Thus both the unfavourable economic situation of the 1980s and state
suppression of the Industrial Court concided to make the legal
dispute settlement process redundant for the most part. We look at
the two issues separately.
(a) THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF WORKERS AND THEIR RESISTANCE:
The poor performance of the Uganda economy in the 1980's and
its adverse effects on workers living standards was caused by
factors in the international capitalist economy as well as internal
ones. From 1979 the world recession had increased unemployment,
produced a decline in purchasing power and thus a shrinking of
markets in the West. Equally capital flows to the Third World were
retrenched while the price of Third World primary commodities also
fell in the industrialised capitalist countries. This meant a
deterioration in the terms of trade and above all an escalation of
the debt crisis 56 . In Uganda as the shilling is pegged to the U.S.
dollar vis-a-vis other hard currencies, the dollar's depreciation in
the 1980's meant an automatic depreciation of Uganda's shilling57.
Internally because of the collapse of the industrial, agricultural
and tourism sectors in the 1970's under Amin foreign earnings for
Uganda were very low in the 1980's and thus only a few capital
goods, raw materials, spare parts and essential consumer items could
be imported.
The economic collapse was addressed by the UPC-Obote II regime
with monetary adjustment policies as demanded by the IMF. This
involved the devaluation of the Uganda shilling and changes in the
exchange rates between 1981-1984. Other conditionalities included:
an end to most government subsidies to allow market forces to
operate, ending government controls on imports thereby liberalising
trade, upward adjustment of producer prices and ceilings to
government domestic borrowing and expenditure. These changes were
required by the IMF before it could give a go-ahead for western
governments and financial institutions to give aid to Uganda (see A.
Mahmood 1985: 7-8; Forward, 1985: 4). So from June 1981 the Uganda
shilling was devalued by 90% and from August 1982 there was
developed a system of managed devaluation of two exchange rates (A.
Mahmood, ibid: 7).	 Between 1982-1984 Window Two rate the one
relevant for non-government expenditure and most imports fluctuated
between Shs. 230-350 to the dollar. But in 1984 when the two
exchange rates were unified at the rate of Shs. 300, with the actual
price thereafter to be determined by weekly auctions, the result was
devastating. Within six months the rate had fallen to Shs. 550 to a
dollar. Yet the open market rate was at Shs. 1200 in January 1985
(Forward, supra: 5). By the time of the coup in July 1985 the
official rate stood at Shs. 600 and the open market rate at Shs.
2000. By the time of the NRM take-over in January 1986 the open
market rate stood at Shs. 5000 to the dollar! (Financial Times,
London 29-5-1986: 2; K. Edmonds 1988: 109).
This IMF-inspired monetary policy devastated the living
standards of all wage-earners. Further the rehabilitation of the
economy was actually hampered and only speculators and a few
comprador merchants (mainly returnee Asians) and elements connected
to top UPC leaders were able to gain from the lopsided economy
created (Forward, supra: 5). One writer succinctly described the
results of the policy:
Even though many retail prices were set with regard
to the kibanda (black market) rate, in line with the
scarcity of goods, retail prices did increase
following the float (devaluation), eroding the
income of those on fixed incomes. Especially
adversely affected were civil servants and
industrial workers, including those in the large
parastatal sector... The industrial sector with
minimum stocks to revalue, low production levels and
a reluctance to re-value assets, saw its working
capital eroded. Since access to credit was also
tight, attempts to rehabilitate this sector in
pursuit of longer-term aims were often frustrated by
its inability to purchase foreign exchange, even if
this had been allocated from donor credits (K.
Edmonds, ibid: 103-105).
However in order to concretely understand the collapse of
workers' living standards a look at the character of government
expenditure, wages policy and the price movements is necessary.
Government expenditure was one of the foremost causes of inflation
in the 1980's due to deficit financing through domestic borrowing
from the banks in spite of IMF conditionalities (RU 1987/1988: 18-
19). Ministry of Defence expenditure between 1981/82 and 1986/87
increased from 20.3% to over 30% of total government recurrent
expenditure (ibid: Table 9: 76). This expenditure was followed by
expenditure on the Finance Ministry which rose from 24% in 1981/82
to 27.2% in 1986/87 while education, also immediately unproductive,
took 15.5% in 1982/82 though it had fallen to 11.8% in 1986/87
(ibid.).
	 Thus while there was an expansion of money supply
expenditure was mainly on non-productive sectors which fuelled
inflation.
Thus the external economic situation, the debt problem, the
collapse of industrial production and all this vis-a-vis a growing
population (from 9.5 in 1969 to 15 million in 1986, ibid. Table 24),
followed by IMF-inspired monetary policies, the expansion of money .
supply and government expenditure especially on Defence in order to
fight armed political opposition were the various factors
responsible for the 1980's economic crisis.
Before we look at the wages policies of the 1980's it is
important to look at the price movements in order to understand the
extent of the collapse of workers' living standards. The reaction
of the workers, for the most part in disregard of the legal dispute
settlement process, was a measure of the level of exploitation they
felt they were subjected to. The cost of living between 1981-1986
rose for all wage-earners even more drastically than under Amin.
For the middle-income earners the Cost of Living Index (COI) rose
from 200.7 (1981=100) in 1982 to 350 in 1984 and 2218 in 1986 (ibid.
Table 18). For the low-income earners, in which the majority of
workers are included, the index rose from 115 in 1982 to 213 in 1984
and 1446 in 1986 (ibid. Table 17). The biggest price rises began
after 1984 with acute shortages of food supply, essential consumer
commodities, raw materials and spare parts. And while there was a
rapid expansion of money supply due to increasing budget deficits
mainly financed by borrowing from the central bank, the supply of
goods and services was stagnant or dwindling. This increased the
demand for both imported and locally produced goods which was
reflected in the depreciation of the Uganda shilling and the
consequent rise in prices (ibid: 21).
The wages received by workers did not reflect the rise in the
cost of living at all. In the 1980's there have been several wage
rises. Between 1976 and 1983 no rise to the minimum wage of Shs.
240 (see S.I 34/1976) had been made. In November 1983 all Makerere
University employees received a flat 20% wage increase and this was
extended in March 1984 to all public employees. The Budget of June
1984 following the unified exchange rate substantially increased the
minimum wage to Shs. 6000 (the kakobogo wage rise). In fact since
1984, except for 1985 there has been an annual wage rise for public
employees in a futile attempt to keep up with inflation (See A. W.
Walugembe-Musoke: 24). 	 The minimum wages stipulated by the
government apply only to the public service: the civil service,
Teaching Service Commission and Makerere University while the
parastatals and private sector were free to negotiate wages and
other terms and conditions of service. As the minimum wage in real
terms has always been very low the private sector and parastatals
have usually paid higher wages than the public service.
It should be observed here that throughout the 1980's the
Minimum Wages Advisory Board and Councils Act 1963 has not been
practically used to inquire broadly into the general economic
situation of the country before minimum wages are laid down (SS. 3-
6, Cap 196, Laws of Uganda). Although in 1983 a Minimum Wages Board
was set up under the Act its recommendations could not be awaited as
wage increases had to be announced even before its recommendations
. came out (NOTU 1984(c): 	 p.1). This was indeed inevitable because
price increases bore no relation to the wage levels. For instance
at the end of 1981 when the minimum wage stood at Shs. 240 a
kilogram of dry fish cost Shs. 400, of bread Shs. 474 while at the
end of 1984 with the minimum wage of Shs. 6000 the same amount of
fish cost Shs. 1072, bread Shs. 662 and the staple food matoke of an
average weight of 10kg. cost about Shs. 760 (RU 1987/88: Table 19).
By 1987 the inflation rate had even further escalated. Yet even .
those workers both unionised and non-unionised who earned above the
minimum wages, even five times more, especially the so-called middle
class, could not subsist on their monthly wages for more than a
week.
Several results of this were an increase in absenteeism, part-
time petty trade, stealing of office and factory equipment,
installations and goods. Corruption and embezzlement were also
fuelled (see for instance C. Machyo 1985: 26-33; RU 1988: 52, 62).
The 1980's in fact saw a situation where unlike in the 1960's (Cap
111:165-170) when workers especially the small labour aristocracy
could use their wage earnings to launch into independent business
the workers were now instead seeking other part-time work and petty
trade to supplement their meagre wages. Similarly the concept that
workers rights and wages should be restricted for the sake of
general development gave way to the concept of the need to
"rehabilitate" the collapsed economy. Thus the development plans of
the previous two decades gave way to rehabilitation programmes (see
RU: 1982; 1983). In otherwords the ideology of development, by the
1980's, had been completely discredited and could no longer be used
to justify restrictions on workers' organisational rights and
demands for improved terms and conditions of work.
But individual and negative reactions aside, collective action
especially in terms of strikes and even factory takeovers to resist
the economic collapse and consequent pauperization of the workers
was now prevalent. More often than not strikes were intended to
hasten the trade unions' collective bargaining position while at
other times they were simply a rejection of the legal dispute
settlement process. The Ministry of Labour could only try and .
restrict disputes and strikes but for the most part failed to stop
them. Given the level of repression in this period and the attempts
by the UPC regime to divide the workers, as already seen, the number
of strikes that took place were testimony to workers' resolve.
Before we look at some examples of the disputes and strikes in the
1980's it is important to point out that the main dispute settlement
institution, the Industrial Court was suppressed for the most part
under the Obote II regime.
(b) THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
From 1980-1985 the Industrial Court was inoperative. This
meant that only conciliation and arbitration were formally available
as remedies for trade disputes (S.1(3) Trade Disputes Act 1964).
But the finality of Industrial Court awards was not available. This
came to be because when the terms of service of most Panel members
of the Court expired in 1980 and that of the President in 1981 no
new Panels or President were appointed (M.L.: 1981). Although later
the President was appointed no Panel members (representing workers,
employers and independents) were appointed (M.L.: 1982).
In 1981 seven disputes were pending; but because workers and
trade unions knew there was no final adjudicatory body they soon
stopped reporting trade disputes to the Ministry of Labour for
referral to the Industrial Court. In 1982 only one dispute was
referred to the Court, another was withdrawn and settled out of
Court58 while many others were overtaken by events because of the
inflationary economic situation as shown above. This meant that any
dispute unresolved within a year would be made redundant as wages
and other terms had to be improved constantly as a result of both
trade union and rank and file pressure. For instance UTGWU was
demanding a minimum wage of Shs. 1059 per month in 1980 but by 1982,
though the dispute was not officially withdrawn, the minimum wage at
the industry in question was above Shs. 1500 per month excluding
fringe benefits (M.L.: 1982).
In 1983 the Industrial Court President, redundant, went away
for a course at the University of London, no Panel was appointed nor
a Deputy President and therefore no disputes were heard or resolved.
The unions again saw it fit not to report any new disputes and
indeed none was referred to the Industrial Court that year. On the
contrary even some of the pending disputeswere withdrawn for
settlement out of Court59.
It was only at the end of 1984 that the Industrial Court was
inaugurated on the 11th December. A Deputy President was also
appointed namely, J. Otto who was a Legal_ Advisor to the UPC
Secretariat!
	
(M.L.: 1984).	 The Court Panel was also appointed.
But although two disputes were referred to the Court none, including
four disputes pending from 1979-1980, was heard. In 1985 a few
hearing dates were fixed but no case was heard because the parties
failed to turn up (M.L.: 1985). This was particularly so after the
overthrow by the Army of the UPC-Obote II regime in July 1985.
Thereafter the General Tito Okello government was so unstable
especially as the country was later under two de facto governments
with Y. Museveni's NRM/NRA controlling about one-half of Uganda.
Most government institutions, including the Industrial Court could
not operate.
However the question still remains why the Court was suppressed
by the Obote II regime between 1980-1984. Failure to appoint the
Panel members and for some time the President and his Deputy were
responsible for its dormancy. Workers were therefore given no
choice but to accept any outcome of collective bargaining where
unions were recognised or go on strike illegally. The governments
refusal to reactivate the Court seems to have been determined by its
fear that the Court might become another anti-government
institution. This was especially so as the Ministry of Labour
generally supported the official legal trade union movement against
the partisan UPC Workers' Council. In fact the Minister of Labour
and his Deputy are said to have constantly pressed for the
reactivation of the Court by having the different representative
Panels appointed60 . However the government was more cautious. This
is probably why the Deputy President of the Court appointed in 1984
was the Legal Advisor in the UPC Secretariat. He was seen as a
counterweight to the non-partisan Court President.
(c) TRADE DISPUTES AND STRIKES:
During the period 1979-1987 the law regulating trade disputes
was not simply rendered essentially superfluous by the hyper-
inflationary situation requiring constant and swift adjustments of
workers' wages and other terms of service; nor was it so rendered
due to the concurrent suppression of the Industrial Court by the
Obote II regime.	 In most of the disputes and strikes the
fundamental problem that could not be resolved by the dispute
settlement mechanisms was the economic situation of the enterprises
in the 1980's economic crisis which was further exacerbated by IMF-
directed monetary policies. But the economic problems aside, some
of the strikes were a reflection of political contradictions within
the wider Ugandan society. It is our contention that these various
factors point to the conclusion that while the economic crisis still
stands and while the political suppression of legal institutions
(e.g. the Industrial Court) remained and national political
contradictions were being replicated among the workers, the law
which is blind to these factors could not resolve these "industrial
disputes" nor could the trade unions play their role in ensuring
that both collective agreements and the dispute settlement law were
followed by their membership. The economic and political factors
behind the strikes are not solvable by legal mechanisms but on their
own ground.
In general, following the removal of Amin in 1979 industrial
unrest and strikes escalated. The main thrust of the strikes at the
time was the demand for freedom of association and the practical
liberalisation of industrial relations especially the removal of the
repressive pro-Amin managements in workplaces most of which were
government-owned corporations or joint ventures (NOTU 1979). It is
estimated that during the Obote II regime most industries had at
least one strike per year while textile factories had about three
strikes or lockouts every year between 1981-1987 (Forward 1987:5).
It may be useful to look at some specific examples to illustrate the
points made above. We shall look at the Lira Spinning Mill strike
of 1984, the MULCO strikes between 1984-1987 and the Uganda
Railways Corporation (URC) strike of 1984. These strikes show the
economic, political and intra-union organisational problems that
rendered the dispute settlement provisions of collective agreements
and legislation generally redundant.
(i) THE LIRA SPINNING MILL STRIKE 1984
In 1984 the Lira Spinning Mill was in an economic crisis like
most industries in Uganda. At the heart of the problem was lack of
spare parts and the fact that the structure of the whole factory was
crumbling and needed a complete overhaul and rehabilitiation
(Forward 1987(a): 4). But whereas this was the economic context,
managerial behaviour was the immediate impetus for the actual strike
in July.
For five months prior to July workers had not been paid their
meagre wages.	 Workers' unofficial representatives, 	 the UTGWU
shopstewards and Branch leaders constantly demanded wage payment in
time and as per collective agreement. Management argued that there
were no finances though they continued paying themselves sumptuous
allowances and even loans as a cushion against the inflationary
situation. Further, the Manager's Mercedes Benz was kept at the
factory's expense and managerial ostentation generally continued
(Forward 1984:5). The demands of the workers, reflecting the firm's
and general national economic crisis, as on previous occasions,
were:
1. prompt payment of wages and a wage increase due to the
inflationary situation;
2. provision of housing or sufficient housing allowance to meet
private rental charges;
3. better working conditions in the factory: protection of machines
and adequare medical care;
4. participation in decision-making and management;
5. the right of the union to exist independent of management in
organisation and decision-making;
6. the right to strike as a fundamental right;
7. the elimination of the corruption rampart among management;
8. greater productivity and efficiency provided conditions for such
efficiency were guaranteed;
9. the elimination of arbitrariness and high-handed administration
by management (ibid: 6-7).
But as management failed to pay the wage arrears and refused to
sit down and negotiate, workers were infuriated. The dispute
settlement procedures were not even invoked. The workers detained
the Manager, relieved him of the Mercedes Benz, factory keys and
other property, took over the factory and continued to work.
Although the Lira District Commissioner and armed police tried to
intimidate the workers and release the Manager, workers resisted and
affirmed his dismissal. Later they took him to the local police
station and demanded police investigation into the running of the
factory. Instead the police released the Manager who together with
management regrouped and this time called in the Army. The latter,
with an array of all sorts of weapons attacked the factory and took
it over after two days of workers occupation. The Manager then
declared all workers locked out and closed the factory. Effectively
all workers were dismissed. The Army now occupied the factory and
is alleged to have stolen factory spare parts (Forward 1984 (a): 2).
By the end of 1987 the factory had not re-opened. In fact during
the July 1985 coup soldiers looted it and thus exacerbated the
situation. It is only in the period 1988-89 that the NRM government
signed agreements with the USSR and the Swiss Roko Construction Co.
that rehabilitation is said to have begun61.
Although management had violated the collective agreement
between Lira Spinning Mill and UTGWU in failing to pay wages in
time, to give housing allowances and to provide healthy and safe
conditions of work as required by statute (Factories Act, SS. 13-54)
it appears that the fundamental problem was the national economic
crisis. But three additional factors aggravated the situation.
First, open managerial ostentation annoyed the workers. Secondly,
the union was very weak. This was partly as a result of the Mutete-
Amandrua leadership disputes(Supra:289-'92)which left the union branch
on its own; it was also partly because in 1983 almost the entire
leadership of UTGWU branch at the factory had been promoted out of
the unionisable grades, an attempt by management, it is claimed, to
weaken the union (Forward, 1984: 7). Finally, political conflict
(the 1985 coup) and state support for management all added up to
convince workers that no one was on their side.
Therefore the law, whether legislation or collective
agreements, lacked the material basis (economic stability) and
political framework in which to successfully operate. But to a
considerable extent too the organisational weakness of UTGWU at
national level further isolated the workers in spite of	 their
unity and militancy on the factory floor. Union organisational
strength, economic and political stability seem f to be conditions
precedent to any effective utilisation of legal rights and
procedures..
(ii) THE MULCO STRIKES 1984-1987
Economic problems of MULCO textile factory were also central to
the industrial disputes and strikes there. This factory, originally.
owned by the Asian capitalist, Madhivani was expropriated in 1972
during the Economic War but had been repossessed by Madhivani
International as a joint venture with government in 1984 under the
Expropriated Properties Act 1982. The new management was now Asian.
Management's main complaint was that there was lack of working
capital to buy cotton, chemical inputs, spare parts and machinery in
time62.
In October 1984 management had taken the decision to close the
mill "because of lack of working capital" it would not be
"economically viable to operate..." 63 , but this developed into a
dispute and the closure was never effected. The general industrial
collapse under Idi Amin had also affected MULCO. Thus while in 1972
MULCO produced 12.5 million metres of cloth annually, by 1978 it was
producing only 4.5; while in 1974 it produced 1.8 million kg. of
yarn, by 1978 this had fallen to a mere 0.7 (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1979: Annex 11.1, p.159). Like many other industries
MULCO was then looted and ransacked of "cloth, raw materials,
spares, office equipment, vehicles, etc." in the 1979 war against
Idi Amin (ibid. 131). By 1984 the workforce had reduced to 1500
from the 1979 pre-war position of 500064.
With the collapse of the value of the shilling in 1984 and the
Kakobogo budget minimum wage guidelines of that year the MULCO
workers demanded a review of their wages and terms of service. Two
strikes took place in the factory in the second half of 1984
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demanding wage increases and payment of arrears 65 . Another dispute
arose in January 1985 as management selectively recalled only a few
workers from their December 1984 leave so as to reduce the workforce
further. UTGWU challenged this and demanded the payment of all.
entitlements to laid-off workers. 	 The agreed terms were not
fulfilled by management and two further strikes followed in
September 1985 (Forward 1987: 6).
The remaining workers still could not be paid their wage
arrears in full nor could management fulfill their obligations under
various collective agreements. Between October 1985 and February
1986 three strikes followed and management now acknowledged that
"wildcat	 strikes have been turned into regular pressure
occurrences" 66 . By this time apart from the arrears in question and
other entitlements, workers demanded the removal of the General
Manager (G.M.). More interesting and novel was the fact that "staff
members" or middle-management now joined workers in the strike: they
were opposing the abrogation by management of their old Agreement.
Immediately the G.M. was removed and replaced.	 Negotiations
on a new Agreement for workers began in July 1986 but no progress
was made. Two strikes in October and December respectively followed
(Forward 1987: 7) but the G.M. refused to meet the UTGWU General
Secretary for negotiations. 	 Outside the Trade Dispute Act
procedures the workers appealed direct to the Minister of Labour who
intervened informally. In the meantime workers like at the Lira
Spinning Mill locked the G.M. out, took over the direction of the
factory and even stepped up production. The G.M. here also called
in the Army and the police who, using guns, intimidated workers,
forced them out of the factory which was then closed (ibid.). Again
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outside the statutory provisions the Minister eventually imposed a
settlement and ordered the re-opening of the factory and
negotiations with the union. Most of the agreed terms were then
implemented.
In April 1987 a new collective agreement was reached 67 . But by
May the agreement was not being implemented, in particular the
following terms: transport, clean drinking water, the stocking of
the medical unit and welfare shops, provision of the agreed food
rations, protective clothing, the repair of the factory roofing then
almost collapsing and the slashing of the bush around the factory".
No progress was made.
Following the 1987/1988 Budget new minimum wage guidelines,
both the middle-management ("staff") and the rank and file union
members now acted in concert. In particular staff members demanded
salary increases and protested against racial abuse and
discrimination by the Asian management, particularly in the Accounts
Section. It was claimed that intrasigent and militant Africans in
management and the Accounts Section were bring transferred and were
to be replaced by Asians. F.X. Kabale the Cost Accountant had been
dismissed69 . The aggrieved "staff" appealed to the District
Administrator, Jinja while the G.M. requested the Minister of
Labour to allow him to dismiss the union officials who were "causing
trouble". No compromise could be reached. Workers went on strike
and "staff" joined them. This was between 21-24th August 198770.
Together the union and the "staff" demanded the following:
1.	 the reinstatement of 11 workers dismissed in December 1986 in
spite of agreement to the contrary after the strike;
2. the reinstatement of Mr. F.X. Kabale and 11 askaris;
3. the signing of a new staff agreement as staff rejected the new
one imposed by management;
4. adherence to the collective agreement (MULCO-UTGWU) especially.
with respect to: transport, canteen and welfare facilities, the
welfare shops, protective clothing and the medical unit
provisions:
5. the removal of the G.M. Mr. Ireland;
6. the payment of cost of living allowance to "staff" as approved
by Head Office71.
After the management-union meeting workers agreed to return to work
pending the resolution of their grievances. But it appears that
the same type of crisis industrial relations continued up to the end
of 1987.
In these strikes as in the case of Lira Spinning Mill the
economic crisis of the period appeared to be the underlying cause of
the collapse of the legal dispute settlement procedures. In MULCO
state intervention occurred outside the established procedures and
especially under the NRM did not come out against the workers. But
the character of management which appeared bent on using the general
national economic crisis to renege on some agreed collective terms,
seems to have exacerbated the disputes. It was never always clear
in each dispute whether the economic problems of the factory were
real or imagined. Further the character of management seems also to
have brought together the rank and file union members and "staff"
who now acted in concert.
(iii) THE 1984 URC STRIKE
Finally we look at the 1984 September strike in URC. Following
the removal of Idi Amin in 1979, URWU had managed to raise wages for
its membership and in 1982 an Agreement between URWU and URC
upgraded all the posts and gave new fringe benefits and increased
the value of others for most of the employees 72 . Although this.
Agreement was later implemented it was after some delay and
disputes. In the meantime inflation escalated and government
announced the 1984 minimum wage guidelines in the Kakobogo Budget.
The URC had to revise its wage structure again as at the time its
minimum stood at Shs. 1,885 73 , while the new national minimum was
now at Shs. 6000 (Supra;306). A new Wage Agreement was accordingly
signed between URWU and URC on 27 July 1984 74 . However by September
1985 the URC had not yet implemented the wage increase because
Government had delayed approving the Revised Railway Tariffs which
were to generate money to finance the wage increases75.
This is the background to the September strike. The strike
took place only in the Kampala station, the headquarters of URC.
However it was actually engineered by the URWU Kampala Branch and
the UPC agencies in URC acting together to discredit the URWU
national leadership (see supra:298= '99): However itwas only a one-day
strike as the national union leadership was able to explain to the
workers the delay for the implementation of the wage increase and
because the Minister of Transport had also similarly informed the
workers in a public meeting 76 . This strike, though a reflection of
workers' grievances, was essentially a result of the intra-union
struggles engendered by the UPC agencies and, apparently, the person
of A. Ejalu. The dispute could not be handled through the legal
dispute settlement mechanism because it was essentially an intra-
union dispute. This is why no complaint was made through the
established machinery. The strike appeared as a spontaneous "wild-
cat" strike.	 It may indeed be said that it was resolved by
political intervention since, following the Minister's address, it
was decided that the workers be paid wage advances pending .
government ratification of new tariffs77.
Several conclusions may be developed from the above strikes
with regard to the function of the legal dispute settlement process.
First, it seems that the economic crisis and lack of capital
(especially foreign exchange) of the 1980s was the fundamental basis
for the various disputes and strikes.	 Secondly political
contradictions, managerial intrasigence and pro-management state
intervention aggravated the industrial relations crises thus
rendering the laid down legal dispute settlement procedures even
more irrelevant to disputes.	 Thirdly, intrarunion disputes
themselves,	 partly	 reflecting	 wider	 national	 political
contradictions weakened the unions in their representational
function. It would appear then that for industrial disputes to be
brought within legal settlement procedures the following issues must
be addressed: the stabilisation of the economy whereby sustained
industrial production can be assured, the minimisation of national
political intervention in union organisation thus allowing genuine
union autonomy, and the internal democratisation of unions to
eliminate or at least greatly reduce factionalism.
The result of the economic crisis of the 1980s which made it
very difficult for workers to follow the long dispute settlement
procedures due to the need for quick solutions in an inflationary
situation, the govenrment's suppression of the Industrial Court and
intra-union disputes coincided to make the dispute settlement
procedures generally superfluous.
3. FOREIGN MATERIAL AID AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE IN THE
TRADE UNIONS
The organisation of workers particularly in trade unions during
the 1980s was not only adversely affected by the unfavourable,
economic climate and political intervention and repression as so far
demonstrated; it was also, in an indirect but more lasting way in
impact, influenced by foreign trade union material "aid" and
ideology. The trade union ideology, building upon the work of the
ILO in the 1970s especially, was that of economism expressed in the
technocratic and careerist conception of trade unionism. 	 The
foremost union federations which advocated and taught, through
educational courses, this conception of trade unionism were the
western ICFTU and AALC. The most prevalent issue around which the
struggle for the ideological definition of trade unionism was waged
was affiliation - namely, whether the non-aligned position of OATUU
or the pro-western position of ICFTU should be adopted. In Uganda
as there is no legal probibition of foreign affiliation the struggle
was more politico-ideological than legal.	 However the more
pervasive ideological influence of western trade unions has been
through the means of education, particularly after 1979. This
influence has been possible we argue mainly because of the material
and financial dependency of Uganda's trade unions, especially NOTU,
on ICFTU and AALC above all other foreign trade union organisations.
Thus to understand the role of the legal framework in shaping
the character of Uganda's trade union movement the ideological self-
conception of the unions themselves must be taken into account. It
is important to point out however that the influence of the ICFTU
and AALC intersects with that of ILO tripartism and the governments'
preferance for a corporatist relationship between party, government
and the unions.	 Thus economism of the ICFTU and AALC, ILO
tripartism and government desire to co-opt and control unions though
not in total agreement had common ground. 	 But government.
corporatist intentions could not be realised in the 1980s because of
a multi-party system and union hostility in the period. The most
important effects of foreign union influence here were in damaging
the non-aligned position of NOTU, undermining leaders commitment to
their unions and buttressing a technocratic, static and uncritical
conception of unionism. We shall deal with the question of
affiliation, material aid and then the nature of the ideological
influence through educational courses, in this order.
(a) THE FOREIGN AFFILITATION QUESTION
The issue of foreign affiliation especially for the national
centre, NOTU was a prime focus of ideological struggle in the 1980s
as to whether NOTU should be non-aligned in accordance with OATUU
policy and Charter as much as with the policies of various Ugandan
governments or whether it should affiliate to the western ICFTU.
The Trade Union Decree 1976 provides that the funds of NOTU,
subject to the provisions of the Decree and NOTU Constitution, may
be expended for "the payment of subscription and fees to any
federation or congress of trade unions to which the National
Organisation of Trade Unions, after consultation with the Minister,
may be affiliated" (S.44(g)).	 The NOTU Constitution itself
stipulates that the aims and objectives of NOTU shall be, inter 
alia, "to establish friendly relations, affiliate where suitable
with express authority of the Annual Delegates Conference, and
participate in activities of international trade union organisations
having objectives similar to those of NOTU and the government's
declared foreign policy" (Art 3(n)).
It may be recalled that from 1966 when the UTUC and FUTU merged
to form ULC no national centre affiliated to any foreign trade union
federation (Cap III:156-'7) and throughout the Amin era no relations
were maintained with western trade union federations except
relations between some NOTU affiliates and their International Trade
secretariats	 (ITSs). NOTU was affiliated only to OATUU whose
Constitution prohibited any of its affiliates from affiliating to
any other international trade union organisation (Art. 8, OATUU
Charter). However in 1981 D. Wogute without any constitutional
authority, as no Delegates Conference had authorised him, affiliated
NOTU to the ICFTU 78 . And in 1983 S.A. Okolimong, Acting S.G. of
NOTU attended the 13th ICFTU World Congress in Oslo, Norway and his
name later appeared as a Member of the Executive Board of ICY171. At
the same time a NOTU delegation to the USSR "praised ICFTU
activities in Uganda".	 Government reacted unambiguously and
declared "that NOTU should not affiliate to ICFTU and that this
matter is not negotiable in any way whatsoever" 79 . It in fact asked
NOTU to denounce the affiliation and to conform with the OAATU
Constitution and the decision of OAU Heads of State that "no
national centre in Africa should affiliate to any international
organisation"8°.
Ever since the formation of OATUU in 1973 and especially after
1976 when all trade union centres in Africa became members (NOTU
1984(1); 32) the question of affiliation has been the most
controversial with the western-oriented centres arguing that Article
8 of the OATUU Charter infringed trade union autonomy and violated
the principles of ILO Convention No. 87 (W. Anaraba 1979: 137-8).
In October 1986 the Second Extra-ordinary Congress of OATUU in
Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia decided to amend the Articles governing .
affiliation. Article 8 now allowed OATUU affiliates to affiliate to
international trade union organisations although those not so
affiliated would have an additional vote (Art. 9) and those so
affiliated would not be elected to the OATUU Executive Committee
(Art. 10) 81 . But the Ugandan Ministry of Labour was opposed to
these changes. It explained:
We have studied this amendment and are slightly
perturbed that it may weaken OATUU. I fear that now
that OATUU members are allowed to affiliate,
although there are some conditions, a number of
these may in fact find themseles in the hands of the
internationals. Clever internationals may use the
resources at their disposal to persuade OATUU
members to affiliate to them, thereby making these
members forget their interest in OATUU82.
However the new Secretary General of NOTU R.W. Kasozi (1986-
1988) sought to argue that these amendments were democratically
arrived at with the participation of the Wisemen Committee of OAU.
He concluded:
I am of the opinion that the amendment was intended
to restore the freedom of association to the
national centres, not necessarily to weaken the
OATUU. It should be noted that even before the
amendments there were already some national centres
in Africa which were affiliated to either WFTU or
ICFTU83.
R.W. Kasozi further argued that after all various non-African
national centres were affiliated to regional and continental
federations as well as to internationals 84 . What he conveniently
forgot was that the African trade union centres were for the most
part weak and looked to the other national centres, regional
organisations and the internationals for assistance. The attraction
of the internationals lay essentially in their financial resources.
As a matter of fact the confusion within OATUU and wrangles over
Art. 8 had been consistently instigated and kept alive mainly by
AFL-CIO and ICFTU using some African centres sympathetic to their
ideological outlook (J.D. Akumu).
In 1986 in fact R.W. Kasozi as the new Secretary-General, said
to have been sponsored by AALC (see subsection Kc). below) and a
few other leaders led the NOTU Annual Delegates Conference to make
the resolution that "the trade unions and NOTU should be left free
to affiliate to international trade union organisations of their
choice but following the Government foreign policy" (NOTU 1986: 8).
But this appears to have been a manipulated resolution because in
1987 a clear struggle was on against affiliation. A section of the
trade union movement favoured the traditional policy since ULC days
of positive non-alignment and being "a friend to all and foe to
none" (Cap 111:156). This culminated in a report of splits in NOTU
over whether to align East or West or to remain non-aligned (New
Vision 13-10-1987). At the 1987 ADC of NOTU R.W. Kasozi the G.S.
raised the question of affiliation but was ruled out of order as the
issue was not on the agenda. As no decision was made the position
remained positive non-alignment85.
The 1986 resolution had itself been a contradiction in terms
because government policy under the NRM remains "positive non-
alignment". As such the struggle on the issue remains though .
government opposition may determine that no affiliation takes place.
The important factor however will be whether the majority in the
trade union movement come to take a nationalist and independent non-
alignment policy as generally advocated by the African union
continental, OATUU. Thus although legally NOTU may affiliate to
any foreign union organisation its Constitution and that of OATUU
require consistency with government foreign policy and penalty for.
such affiliation respectively (NOTU affiliates are free to affiliate
to the ITSs). The struggle therefore seems to be more about the
ideological implication of affiliation rather than legal restriction
since in the latter case the determinant factor is political, namely
government foreign policy.
This view was practically vindicated in 1986. Because of
NOTU's close relations with ICFTU at the time, although not
affiliated to it, a circular addressed to "all affiliated
Organisations" was sent to it. The ICFTU indicated that it was
worried that its affiliates would be invited to the September 1986
WFTU Congress and wished to reiterate its policy regarding "contacts
with trade unions under communist control". This was "to avoid any
initiative which may directly or indirectly weaken the ICFTU and the
international free trade union movement" and thus:
a) ensure that bilateral contacts with national
centres which do not share the same principles
of free trade unionism and internationalism as
the ICFTU follow this programme.
b) participate in multi-lateral contacts with these
same organisations only at the ILO and within
the framework of the specific activities of this
organisation.
The circular ended thus: "we therefore firmly recommend that you do
not attend the WFTU Congress" 87 . And R.W. Kasozi accordingly
promised that "no pact will be entered into between the two
organisations" even if they attended the WFTU Congress.
Thus very close relations to ICFTU, let alone affiliation
precluded fraternal relations with other international trade unions
due to the East-West divide which the non-alignment policy seeks to
avoid. At the same time such restrictive relations or affiliations,
generally referred to as "trade union imperialism", threaten the
unity of OATUU and the commitment of African national centres such.
as NOTU to their own union continenta1 87a . However the issue of
affiliation cannot be seen in isolation from the material and
financial aid that African affiliates usually expect from either the
East or the West. It is to this that we now draw our attention.
(b) THE ROLE OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL AID
The importance of foreign financial and material aid to Ugandan
unions especially NOTU has been its close connection with the
donors' interest in influencing choices of union leadership and
ensuring that the union movement supports and takes on their
ideological outlook. 	 On the other hand the Uganda government
particularly between 1979 and 1986 were mainly concerned that trade
unions should not be used for political purposes in opposition to
the existing political status quo. For this reason governments have
simply been concerned with the narrow enforcement of the law which
required that foreign donations and aid be received by the unions
only after ministerial approval. S.43 of the Trade Unions Decree
provides that "the NOTU or any registered trade union shall not
enter into any agreement for aid of any nature with any foreign
country or organisation without consultation with and approval of
the Minister".
While it may be said that material and financial aid to
Uganda's unions was necessary after the 1979 war that removed Idi
Amin, its continuation could mainly be explained by the ideological
and leadership influence the donors hoped to exact. We shall
explain how this was demonstrated between 1979-1987.
The foreign unions that predominated in aid-giving were the
AALC and ICFTU. Immediately after the fall of the Amin regime ICFTU
donated $2500 and AALC $5000 to NOTU88. In 1981 the AALC donated
cartons of soap while ICFTU gave more than $10,000 to NOTU although
most of this money was apparently misappropriated by D. Wogute and
his supporters leading to their ouster in 1982 (NOTU 1982(4):
Minutes 7/2-7/4). It was this generous "assistance" that persuaded
D. Wogute to affiliate NOTU to the ICFTU in 1981 without any
constitutional authority (supra: 323).	 Between	 1981-1983	 ICFTU
sponsored workers' educational programmes, the NOTU Department of
Research and Economics, bought NOTU a vehicle and office equipment
and gave funds and a motorcycle for setting up NOTU Regional
Offices 89 . However when NOTU was prevailed upon to disaffiliate
from ICFTU in 1983 ICFTU became hostile and 'stopped all its "aid".
It equally ensured that its rich affiliates would not help NOTU.
Thus in 1984 when the Acting S.G. of NOTU wrote to the AALC for
assistance especially to fill the gap left by ICFM) by iumdiavg the
completion of the Trade Union Instructors' Programme, the AALC
replied:
As a loyal affiliate of the ICFTU we are not
prepared to step into a situation from which they
have withdrawn... I must say that we do not
understand your disaffiliation from the ICFTU, in
view of their record of assistance to your
organisation through very difficult times... I am
sorry we cannot provide the funding as you
requested.. 90
Similarly the Japanese Confederation of Labour (DOME') could not aid
Ugandan unions without ICFTU approva191.
Before the 1983 NOTU-ICFTU rupture the AALC tried to establish
a foothold in Uganda. Apart from sponsoring some local and foreign
seminars (to the USA) for unionists it provided a vehicle,
maintained others and promised to support NOTU Economic Projects and
a Newsletter (NOTU: 1985:6). Between 1980-1982 the AALC stationed
its representative, Charles Taylor, in Uganda. In 1982 he had tried
to formalise AALC activities in Uganda by signing an agreement with
government which however never materialised 92 .	 The government
itself, before the NOTU-ICFTU rupture, though warning that "Uganda
was a non-aligned country and therefore there should be no clique
from any block to use the trade unions to project their image", went
ahead to appeal to the AALC to give assistance to NOTU and "to
consider putting up a Labour College for the workers of Uganda and
also think of completing the Workers' House 03	This seemed
contradictory enough as such a College, like the ICFTU one before
it, would indeed have been an ideological tool for the AALC-ICFTU.
The NOTU-ICFTU rupture however ended all these initiatives. Instead
the AALC simply tried to maintain a presence in Uganda. It only
purchased some office furniture and equipment for NOTU, provided
vehicle spare parts and funded a NOTU workshop. The previous
generous funding stopped and AALC beganto insist that "any further
assistance to NOTU will depend on evidence of concrete progress
within the union which will show that it is developing as a viable
and democratic organisation" when no such conditions, however
justifiable on the face of it, were put before94.
But in order to have an ideological influence on Uganda's
unions the AALC and ICFTU did not only give financial assistance and
sponsor educational courses (infra, subsection (c)) they tried to
sponsor NOTU and other unions' leadership sympathetic to their
ideological outlook. Between 1980-1982 AALC supported D. Wogute and
his faction. AALC reluctantly accepted the removal of Wogute in
1982 and even met with him "together with E.K. Hall and Y.D. Okot-
Omara in their NOTU capacity while fully aware that Wogute had
already been dismissed" 95 . It was even alleged later in 1982 that
D. Wogute and E.K. Hall were found with CIA documents". In 1986
the new S.G. of NOTU R.W. Kasozi was instrumental in restoring NOTU-
ICFTU relations. He is also said to have been sponsored by the AALC
to campaign for the Secretary Generalship (NOTU Secretariat Sources,
October 1987). Within a day of his election in fact he wrote only
to the AALC informing them of the results and requesting them to
send a representative to Kampala to assess NOTU needs and strengthen
"co-operation"97.
It should be added here too that the AALC sponsored the. NOTU
Quinquennial Delegates Conference at which R.W. Kasozi was elected,
sent several trade unionists for short courses in the U.S.A. between
1986-1987; and expecting NOTU to decide to re-affiliate to the ICFTU
funded the NOTU ADC of 1987. Besides, from 1986 it paid salaries of
all NOTU staff, paid for office rent, allowances for meetings and
general administrative expenses to the value of $16000. All in all
NOTU, from 1986, has depended for more than 90% of its income on
foreign, especially AALC and ICFTU donations 98 . The greatest danger
here is that in such circumstances the NOTU leadership has tended to
look to the foreign sponsors as its constituency and done little
about even getting the affiliates to pay their dues and ensuring
that it retains the confidence of the workers after election (cf.
Cap 111:161). This sort of result is evidenced by research on other
countries. R. Cohen writing on Nigerian trade unions in the 1970s
showed not only that foreign unions caused divisions in the Nigerian
trade union movement (R. Cohen 1974: 99, 123-4) but encouraged
leadership neglect of their duties. 	 While acknowledging that
foreign financial help could help a union's autonomy vis-a-vis
government, he concluded:
the affiliation of national centres to the
international bodies often has a negative aspect,
for the assurance of financial support, patronage
and scholarships, leads to a tendency to neglect
grass-roots organisation and the building up of
viable trade union structures (ibid. 250).
The ICFTU from 1986 resumed funding the Department of Research
and Economics fully, agreed to fund, a three-year Education and
Training Programme to develop a new team of Trade Union Instructors
and shopstewards, to resume financing the setting up of NOTU
Regional Offices fully and to finance some NOTU economic projects
(NOTU 1987: 2-3). By 1987 R.W. Kasozi noted with satisfaction the
role of aid to NOTU from the two organisations:
I wish to single out two organisations namely: the
African American Labour Centre (AALC) and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) which came to our aid at the most difficult
times (NOTU: 1987(a).
In fact immediately after the 1987 ADC R.W. Kasozi went on a tour of
USA sponsored by the AALC, it is believed, to further discuss the
affiliation-to-ICFTU question and strengthening AALC-NOTU links
(NOTU Secretariat Sources, October 1987).
With respect to NOTU affiliates the case of UTGWU is pertinent.
We have already seen how the leadership struggle in UTGWU between
the Mutete and Amandrua factions between 1984-1987 was kept alive
mainly by the intervention of the ITG & LWF. The foreign union for
a long time refused to accept the legitimate and democratically
elected leadership of UTGWU and kept the leadership dispute
artificially alive by sponsoring the Mutete faction. Further the
educational aid that had been promised was also cancelled because
the successful faction after UTGWU elections was not favoured by the
foreign union (See Supra:292). But in the final analysis this was
only detrimental to the workers in Uganda, members of UTGWU.
During the Obote II period and up to 1987 government policy
towards foreign aid for the unions and the application of S.43 of
the Trade Union Decree have been very narrow. In most cases aid was
negotiated and the Ministry of Labour simply informed, at times
after the receipt thereof. The Obote regime was mainly concerned
with questions of political security for the goverumeat amd wpart
from opposing NOTU affiliation to ICFTU the ideological outlook the
unions took on did not matter especially as the ICFTU and AALC
together with ILO encouraged economism, tripartism and technocratic
unionism. Such ideological outlook could not threaten the political
status quo. The Ministry of Labour only tried to remind the unions
to inform it of their foreign trips and receipt of donations before
being undertaken, or received 99 . During the Okello period the same
view of trips and donations were taken 100• In fact under Obote the
only trips abroad refused were to Libya because Libya was known to
support the anti-Obote guerilla movements101.
Since 1986 the NRM-led government has not adopted any specific
policy on the issue. Apart from generally allowing trade union
freedom of association the government, through the Ministry of
Labour, only insists that approval for donations be sought so as "to
reduce possible abuse of responsiblity of trade union leaders by
ensuring that the sources of funding are known and the purpose to
which this fund is to be used is clearly in line with the interests
of the nation" 102	But it is precisely because the NRM has
generally guaranteed the organisational freedom of trade unions that.
since 1986 the AALC and ICFTU in particular have made a big comeback.
Relations between Uganda's unions and foreign ones will therefore
depend also on the eventual position that the NRM takes on the
issue. The important point however is that legal control over
foreign aid for the trade unions has generally been focused on
implications for government security rather than wider ideological
implications for the trade union movement. For the unions and NOTU
in particular the question is whether they can maintain their non-
aligned position and develop the capacity for self-reliance.
(c) TRADE UNION EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGY
Although several western trade union organisations have been
involved in organising educational courses for the trade union
leadership and to some extent the rank and file in the 1980s, again
the most important have been ICFTU and AALC. To a lesser extent the
CTUC (Commonwealth Trade Union Council) FES (Frederick Ebert
Stiftung, German) OATUU and the AUCCTU have also been involved. The
courses have been organised both locally and abroad.
From the mid-1970s ILO had begun to train NOTU Trade Union
Instructors and continued to do so with the NOTU Five Year Workers'
Education Programme between 1983-1988. Other courses organised by
NOTU and different sponsors have involved national union leaders,
branch leaders, the rank and file (to a limited extent) and the
development of study materials (see: NOTU: 1985: 1987(a); 1987).
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Education courses have focused mainly on union leaders at all levels
and this is why the character of the unions has been greatly
influenced by this education. The lecturers and teachers in these
courses have been from the donor organisations, the local Trade
Union Instructors, the Ministry of Labour and occasionally from
Makerere University.
The overall result of these courses has been to buttress the
ideology of economism, a type of trade unionism that eschews
politics.
	
At the same time the local Trade Union Instructors
trained by the ILO since the mid-1970s have generally taught and
passed on the tripartite consensual view of trade unionism. The
type of trade unionism taught has thus been essentially technocratic
and has encouraged careerism on the part of union leaders. On these
issues the sponsors of the courses, the local Trade Union
Instructors and the Ministry of Labour have been generally agreed.
A look at the course contents may illuminate these points.
R.W. Kasozi NOTU Director of Education for a long time (1975-
1986) described the role of trade union education thus:
trade union leaders should be able to understand
their responsibilities and to have the necessary
knowledge, abilities and skills to discharge their
duties efficiently. There is also a felt need to
equip workers with the appropriate tools to enable
them to understand the problems of environment,
their	 rights	 and	 obligations	 and	 their 
responsibilities	 towards	 their	 trade unions, 
enterprises and society. 
Consequently trade union education should aim at giving knowledge
of: trade union law, how to keep records, the conduct of meetings,
the collection and control of union funds, public speaking and
organisation103.
Indeed this is what trade union education has essentially
consisted of. It has generally lacked analysis of the historical
development of trade unionism, the struggles that had to be waged
outside and within Uganda by workers to achieve rights to organise, .
to bargain collectively and to advance, in some countries, to the
taking of political power. 	 Although it is not doubted that
technical education is useful and necessary, to limit courses to
this conceptualisation of trade unionism narrows the scope of trade
unions' role in society unnecessarily. Courses have also generally
covered topics such as the scope of trade union agreements, the
nature of the Social Security Fund and the description of
international trade union organisations l°4 . In short the status quo 
is treated as natural and the bottom line of trade unionism is seen
simply as the acquisition of negotiation and administration skills,
learnt almost professionally, to improve the living conditions of
workers without any questioning of the broad economic and political
status quo.
Although a couple of trade unionists have attempted a class
analysis and tried to view trade unionism in all its ramifications,
including the legal regulation thereof in a definitely historical
and materialist perspective, their analysis still remains too
fragmented and unsynthesized 1(15 .	 The assessment of •the NOTU
Education Programme 1983-1988 by a Makerere Professor is indeed
pertinent:
The sort of workers education you have been giving
is going to create a trade union movement without a
sense of purpose or direction. It is the dynamic
aspect of trade unionism, as an understanding of
combination as a means of self-transformation, that
is the key casualty in a technocratic and
bureaucratic conception of workers' education.
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It is not enough for workers and their leaders to
acquire techniques of collective bargaining. They
must also develop, through the process of education,
an agenda for change on all fronts: legal, economic,
social, cultural. And this awareness must be rooted
in an historical understanding of both the society
and their struggles in it. (M. Mamdani, Weekly Topic 
Vol. IV, No. 33, 4 May 1988: 10).
Thus because of reliance on foreign aid for its administration
NOTU which runs most of the educational courses for all trade unions
has also been subjected to an ideological conception of trade
unionism that emasculates workers' struggles and seeks to subordinate
them to the economic and political status quo. Thus although in the
1980s the trade unions fought against state incorporation, their
ideological self-conception, based on ILO and AALC/ICFTU tripartism
and economism respectively, appears to have prevented them from
viewing themselves as part of a process of social and political
change in which they could play a distinct role as organised
representatives of labour. For our immediate purposes, we contend
that it is essentially this quiescence in the status quo and narrow
ideological self-conception that has prevented or at least seriously
hampered the trade unions from pressing for the long-overdue legal
reforms. It is to this question that we now turn our attention.
4. TRADE UNIONS AND LAW REFORM
Although the 1980s have been a difficult period for Uganda's
trade unions especially due to the economic crisis and political
repression, as far as law reform is concerned what has mainly
hindered progress has been the trade unions' conception of
themselves, their methods of struggle and general acceptance of the
existing political economy.
The issues to which labour law reform and law reform generally
were pertinent in the 1980's have been: the demand for increased
workers' participation in enterprises and other institutions, the
demand for compulsory check-off for all workers, the demand for a •
general labour legislation review and unionisation of Bank of Uganda
employees. The content of the unionists' demands especially their
narrow and bureaucratic conception of workers' participation was a
measure of the limitations of their training and education.
The persistent demand since the 1970's and which continued into
the 1980's was that unions should be represented on Boards of
Directors of public corporations and that their representation in
tripartite bodies should be extended.	 But because the Labour
Advisory Board, appointed in the early 1980's to replace the LCC,
was actually never called to .meet, union demands were now made
through correspondence at seminars and May Day rallies l06 . However
government view remained that appointments to Boards of Directors or
even tripartite bodies like the Social Security Fund was ministerial
prerogative and workers or unions could only be given the privilege
to suggest names107.
On May Day 1985 the trade unionists expanded their demands for
incorporation within state economic and political institutions.
They called upon the Government "to consider appointing more women
workers to participate in decision-making bodies such as Boards of
Directors, School Boards of Governors and other decision-making
organs" and since "UPC is a party of the workers and the workers are
one of the pillars of the Party, in that regard the Government
should seriously consider appointing two workers representatives to
Parliament since parliament is one of the top decision-making
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bodies" 108 . Some of these changes, especially the later would have
required some legal amendments, in particular to the Constitution.
However the point is that the initiative was left to the state while
the demands themselves were incorporationist and would not
necessarily help advance workers' interests. What input could two
appointed M.P.s make in a 126-member parliament? A case in point
was that in spite of the presence of the NOTU S.G. on the National
Housing and Construction Corporation Board this parastatal had never
made any programmes for the housing of workers (Interview S.C.,
NOTU, September 1987).
The second demand was that government should "make legislation
on the introduction of direct check-off system which should apply to
all workers" 109 .	 But the unions had failed to use even the
available law to improve their revenue. In many cases employers
never sent check-off monthly dues or delayed to do so where union
members had consented to the check-off. Prosecution could have been
urged by the trade unions under regulation 5 of the S.I 71/1974. In
fact the Labour Commissioner often reminded both the unions and
employers of this regulation 11°. The union leadership's failure to
mobilise workers to pay their dues or to pressurise employers to
submit the dues paid was apparently related to the unions' reliance
on foreign funding. As we saw NOTU in particular relied for more
than 90% of its income in the mid-1980's from foreign sources.
The third and more general union demand was that a review of
all the labour legislation should be made. Consequently on May Day
1984 President Obote promised a review and update. Then the Labour
Commissioner wrote to both NOTU and FUE:
I should be very grateful if you would let me know
any suggestions of the sections of the labour law
you would like to see amended or improved and how
this should be done. You are aware that the
Workmens' Compensation Act is already in the
pipeline but your suggestions are welcome all the
same. The labour legislation to be considered are
as follows:
1. Employment Decree and Employment Regulations.
2. The Minimum Wages Advisory Board and Wages
Councils Act and Rules.
3. The Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement)
Act.
4. The Trade Unions Decree and its Regulations111.
The Labour Advisory Board which replaced the LCC never met to
consider and review these statutes. It seems here too that as with
the Industrial Court government was not ready to reactivate an
institution where an essentially anti-government union movement
could officially express its views which would be given greater
legitimacy in a tripartite forum.
Although NOTU itself belatedly appointed and three-man
Committee of trade unionists in 1986 to make proposals for the
labour law reforms (NOTU: 1987: 7), by the end of 1987 the
Committee had done no work at all. NOTU in fact appeared
overwhelmed by the whole idea and seemed not to know what to do. I
suggest that it is essentially because the unions had already
ideologically
	
straitjacketed	 themselves	 and	 expected most
initiatives to emanate from the state that they had no alternative
programme of their own for the reform of the laws that affect them
everyday 112 . After all apart from some complaints on specific legal
provisions they took the legal status quo itself as natural.
Finally, a clear manifestation of the trade unions'
acquiescence in the status quo has been their failure to advance the
case for unionisation of Bank of Uganda employees. Decree 29 of
1973 apart from maintaining that the Armed Forces, the Police Forces
and Prison Services could not form or belong to trade unions had
also included the Bank of Uganda in this excluded category
(S.1(ff)(i); see also S.72(1)(b) Decree 20/1976). Thus no employee
of the Bank could join a trade union. The ILO, apparently since
1979, in its Direct Request to the Uganda Government on the
application of Convention No. 98, ratified by Uganda, has always
demanded why the bank employees have been denied the right to
bargain collectively through a union (M. L.: 1977-1980). Since 1980
the Ministry of Labour's annual reply to the ILO request which has
continued has been standard, namely, that "the Committee's comments
have been noted and arrangements are under way to present the matter
to the relevant authority for decision" or that "inter-ministerial
consultations on the matter are still continuing" (M. L.: 1980-
1986). Each copy of the Ministry of Labour's Annual Report on ILO
Conventions is sent to both NOTU and FUE. Yet both NOTU and NUCCTE
(under whose organisational jurisdiction Bank of Uganda lies) have
made no effort to demand from governments that the bank employees be
'allowed to exercise their rights to organise and bargain
collectively.
5. TOWARDS THE FUTURE: TRADE UNIONS AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
UNDER THE NRM GOVERNMENT 1986-1987
The most important contribution of the NRM-led government since
January 1986 to the trade unions is that their freedom of
association has been effectively restored. In this context the
Industrial Court, having been revived, has also made some awards
which have further enhanced union and workers' organisational rights
especially the level of unionisation in private enterprises.
However in spite of these positive developments the NRM itself lacks
a clear programme for workers and trade unions while the unions
themselves are still essentially tied to their economistic,
technocratic and tripartite ideological self-conceptions. This has •
meant that very little has been done to advance workers'
organisational rights. Thus in spite of the labour legislation
review process the unions have not yet put out those restrictive
aspects of the law as areas for amendment.
(a) FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
It is now acknowledged by the trade union leaders and the
membership that they are free since 1986 to organise without
government interference.	 No attempt to divide, take over or
incorporate trade unions in the NRM or government had been attempted
by the end of 1987. Indeed as the Prime Minister argued on Labour
Day 1987:
Since we came to power, my Government has unleashed
the restrictions and political bondage that
characterised the past regimes. Workers have been
asked to exercise their democratic rights and elect
leaders of their choice. By July 1986 all except
one union (UPEU-JB)... had elected their leaders in
a democratic way"
That this was so was confirmed by NOTU (NOTU 1987: 6) which was a
great advance on the 1980-1985 period when ADCs could be held only
with ministerial approval and most of which were never held.
A clear case of government interference in union rights had
been the banning of trade unionism in the Co-operatives. Sometime
in 1985 the Minister of Co-operatives and Marketing had proposed a
scheme allowing workers to buy shares in co-operatives. This Would
be so if the trade union in the co-operatives was banned114.
Immediately the Minister's proposal was acted upon and managers of
various co-operative unions refused the trade union to negotiate
with them 115 . Although the civil servants in the Ministry of Labour
made it clear that such a ban on trade unionism was contrary to the .
law (S.56 Decree 20/76) and advised the offending Ministry to follow
the law116 the Ministry refused to comply. The National Union of
Co-operative Movement Workers (Uganda) (NUCMW(U)) resumed its
collective bargaining role and held their first ADC since 1978 only
in July 1986 following the NRM take over117.
NRM accession to power has also created an atmosphere in which
the Industrial Court operates freely. Of particular importance
since 1986 are two awards which have enhanced the organisational
rights of workers and trade unions. In Uganda Electricity and 
Allied Workers' Union v. Uganda Electricity Board (Trade Dispute
Cause 2/1984) determined in 1986, the respondent Board inter alia
claimed that because some earlier awards in the 1960's and 1970's
had held that housing and housing allowance were not a contractual
right but only gratuitous the question could not be re-opened. The
claimant union on the other hand sought to make them a condition of
service and as such negotiable. The Court awarded:
We do not accept that industrial or labour awards
will ever be made which will forever deny workers
the right to bargain or negotiate collectively to
obtain better and reasonable conditions of service
from their employers... We reject the Respondent's
proposition and position on this point and award
that the union is not barred from undertaking
collective bargaining on behalf of its members
(p.11).
Referring to S.56 of Decree 20/1976 which guarantees rights of
freedom of association the Court also observed:
One of these rights is the right to bargain
collectively through chosen representatives. Any
attempt by an employer to interfere with the right
to collective bargaining or negotiation outside the
ambits of the law is illegal and is indeed declared
a criminal offence under S.56(3) of the Decree
(p.8).
Thus the right to expand negotiable issues including those
previously considered non-negotiable was positively affirmed.
However for organisational purposes the most important award is
Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union v. The Oil Industry 
Joint Industrial Council (Trade Dispute Cause 3/1986). The central
issue was the right to join and be represented by a union, in
particular the basis on Which an employee in the private sector is
eligible to join a union.
	
This in turn revolved around the
definition of "supervisory" and "managerial" grades. The Court
awarded inter alia 1) that the definition of "supervisors" as part
of management in the 1981 Recognition Agreement was too wide; 2)
that the indiscrimate, total and automatic exclusion by the
respondents of every Assistant/Deputy Head of Department and all
"immediate supervisors" without any reference or further inquiry as
to the actual and precise nature of the functions assigned to any of
them in the ordinary course of employment was unwarranted (p. 100).
Finally the award overruled the wholesale exclusion of employees
from union representation simply because their duties were
confidential or supervisory or because they were professionals or
university graduates. This award seems to have resolved the issue,
in broad terms, as to who is unionisable in the private sector, an
issue that has dogged the union movement since the 1960's (see
). )4 0
supra, Cap III: p.14).
	
This award has allowed employees hitherto
excluded from union membership by Recognition Agreements to join
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unions. In particular it enhances the security of the hitherto non-
unionisable employees often called "middle management" and should
further strengthen the unions themselves.
Another advance by NOTU is that in 1987 following a number of •
years' agitation by women trade unionists a NOTU Women's Wing
Department was constitutionally created118.
Finally, in general NOTU and its affiliates can freely express
their views and opinions. Unlike in the past for instance NOTU is
now able to prepare and read its own May Day Speech without
censorship from the Ministry of Labour119.
(b) THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADE UNIONS AND THE NRM
Although freedom of association has been guaranteed for the
trade unions, this freedom has not been further advanced so far due
to the political and ideological limitations of both the trade
unions and the NRM. Three crucial issues which have so far arisen
do bring out this point very clearly.
The first one is the question of industrial democracy. The NRM
generally subscribes to the concept of grassroots democracy. Thus
Resistance Councils and Resistance Committees form the structure for
this form of popular democracy from the village level to the
National Resistance Council (NRC) or parliament 120 .	 It was
therefore suggested by some NRM leaders that Resistance Committees
(RCs) be established in industries and workplaces to oversee
management, fight corruption and assist in the democratic running of
public corporations 121 . But most trade unionists came up against
the establishment of RCs in workplaces arguing that they would
duplicate work and cause divisions among workers as the UPC Workers'
Council had done. R. W. Kasozi, S.G. of NOTU put it this way:
Recalling the incidents of UPC Workers' Council as a
deadly monster towards the trade unions between 1981
and 1983, NOTU has successfully convinced the NRM
Government that the trade unions should serve as
Resistance Committees and Councils at all workplaces
where trade unions are recognised... It is now up
to us the trade union leaders to show the government
that we are really resistant and there is no need
for duplication of effort in industries122.
The limitation of the debate here is that it has been too
narrow.
	 The union leaders have been concerned mainly with
protecting trade unions as institutions though to some extent
genuinely trying to avoid political divisions among the workers.
But they have forgotten two things. First, that RCs are essentially
democratic organs unlike the UPC Workers' Council which openly
sought to divide workers on partisan lines for the benefit of the
ruling Party.	 Secondly, RCs would have included even non-
unionisable employees and are not sectarian since they embody all
shades of political opinion. The narrowness of the debate on the
part of both the unions and the NRM is that the whole question of
industrial democracy in a wider sense has not been raised by either
of them. RCs and trade unions need not be seen as the only
alternatives of democratising industrial relations or enhancing
workers' rights especially in the decision-making process.
The second issue is the political role of trade unions. The
trade unions as under Obote have come out only to demand more
participation in Boards of Directors of public corporations,
tripartite institutions and parliament 123 . A few of the union
leaders nonetheless were opposed to incorporation and argued that
worker directors would only be used to rubber stamp the decisions of
other classes against workers' interests 124 . This is only an
attempt to simply improve on the status quo without questioning it.
The trade unions have done very little to link up with other social
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struggles, especially as they represent a very small minority in the
whole of Ugannda. These could be professional associations, women's
organisations and peasant organisations. But because of their
ideological values inculcated for a long time unions still view.
their role simply as technocratic organisations and tripartite
partners.	 The education the unions receive therefore needs a
fundamental re-thinking.
On its part the NRM in spite of being the most radical
political organisation to come to power in Uganda since independence
has no clear programme or role for workers. Its basic policy
document does not give them or trade unions any specific role
(Y. Museveni 1986). The main reason for this appears to be because
the NRM organised itself as a guerilla movement (1981-1986) mainly
in the countryside and among the peasantry. Even in a seminar
organised for the trade union leaders on the NRM - Ten Point
Programme, the NRM leaders did not show that they envisaged any
specific role for organised workers or the trade unions (NOTU
1987(b)).
Finally because of lack of a clear positive policy for workers
on the part of government and the trade unions' own weaknesses and
especially ideological limitations, the industrial relations legal
framework erected between 1963-1976 is still in place, intact. 	 As
indicated before (p.338-'39) in spite of the labour legislation review
process initiated in 1984 following trade union complaints and
demands, by the end of 1987 the unions had failed to provide their
own views as to which aspects of the labour laws should be amended.
Some of these aspects relevant to organisational rights are indeed
obvious. First, the dispute settlement process is still too long
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and cumbersome and this is partly why all the strikes that take
place are unlawful. Secondly, the essential services where the
right to strike is effectively non-existent, are too many (Cap III:
163).Thirdly, apart from group employees, the public service.
employees are prohibited from joining trade unions (Cap III:183-'4)and
at the same time they cannot go on strike. Finally although ILO
Convention No. 87 need not be ratified in its entirety, provisions
from it could be incorporated in national statutes to enhance the
organisational independence of the unions.
It is important to stress here that the limitations of trade
unions are essentially limitations of leaders.	 Workers have
sufficiently demonstrated their disagreement with the restrictive
legislation especially by taking unofficial and illegal industrial
.action. But for rank and file views to be taken on board by the
union leadership a democratisation of the unions themselves is
essential. Such democratisation would ensure that existing rights
and those that may be won in future would be defended by the
majority of workers in case of attack.
So, although the NRM has created a political context in which
existing organisational as well as other rights may be enjoyed by
workers and trade unions, for the trade union movement to strengthen
its position and effectively protect and champion workers'
interests, there is a need to change its ideological and political
outlook. At the same time, as a small segment of society, the
unions and workers generally may need to link up with other social
organisations for purposes of mutual solidarity.
CONCLUSION
The period 1980-1987 has generally shown the extent as much as
the limits of state intervention in union affairs and their freedom
of association. In this period the level of resistance to such
state intervention among the unions developed to a higher level.
However the ideology of economism prevented the trade union movement
from forming a Labour Party in 1980 or at least adopting a unifying
political programme which made it easier for the ruling UPC Party to
adopt a divisive partisan strategy by creating UPC organs especially
the UPC Workers' Council to counter the legal trade union movement.
The regime also attempted through illegal means, an opportunistic
use of law and repression to subject the anti-UPC unions, which were
in the majority, to the regime. But in spite of the regime's
disregard for the law the independence of the trade unions was
generally preserved due both to the contradictions within the UPC
regime itself and the firmer resolve of the trade union members and
their leadership. The success of the trade union movement in
retaining its autonomy before 1986 was therefore a result of their
ability to take advantage of political contradictions within the
ruling UPC and, more importantly, their constant defence of trade
union rights even in the face of repression. However political
intervention aside, intra-union leadership struggles, at times
fuelled by foreign trade unions with their own motives, have also
independently contributed to the weakening of trade unions.
Further in this period the legal dispute settlement process was
rendered redundant by the collapse of the economy and high rates of
inflation which required constant adjustments of workers' terms and
conditions of service which the long dispute settlement procedures
could not do. But besides this, the Industrial Court, the final
arbitration body in industrial disputes, was effectively suppressed
by the regime between 1981-1984 for fear that it could be used by
political	 opponents.	 Economic	 imperatives	 and	 political.
calculations of the regime thus made the law superfluous in this
respect.
But it was not only political interference and the economic
situation that constrained the enjoyment of existing legal rights by
workers and trade unions. Financial dependence on and ideological
influence of foreign, especially the western AALC and ICFTU, unions
have had a crippling effect on Uganda's trade unions.
	
The
ideological influence comes mainly as a result of the financial
dependence of the unions especially NOTU on foreign donations. This
influence has been manifested most intensely around the question of
affiliation. Affiliation or even close relations to the ICFTU in
particular, against both Uganda government policy and OATUU policy
for a long time, subvert the independence of the union movement on
the one hand while the trade union education given buttresses the
economistic and technocratic ideology of the ILO and the western
unions generally. It is essentially this narrow ideological self-
conception that has constrained Ugandan unions from developing both
political and legal programmes to advance workers' interests whether
alone or in concert with other social organisations since the
working class is only a small fraction of Uganda's populace.
Similarly the freedom of association generally guaranteed for the
unions by the NRM since 1986 has not been fully taken advantage of
as a result, to a large extent, of the narrow self-conception of the
unions themselves.	 But equally this is as much due to the
limitations of the NRM itself which by the end of 1987 had a policy
vacuum vis-a-vis trade unions and workers generally.
In general then what determined the survival of the legal
autonomy of the trade union movement after 1980 was a constant
struggle against political and illegal interference and repression.
While economic imperatives contributed to the redundancy of certain
aspects of the law, in general political interference seemed
preponderant. But the end of political interference has not proved
sufficient to advance the legal organisational rights of trade
unions and workers generally. Their own ideological limitations in
circumstances of relative freedom may prove a more enduring
impediment than political intervention. But while an environment of
political freedom is essential for a legal and genuinely autonomous
existence and operation of trade unions, it is not sufficient.
Disputes outside the law have continued since the NRM came to power
due to the continuing economic crisis. 	 The enjoyment of
organisational rights therefore seems to be more dependent upon the
character of government and state while the operation of the
industrial relations legal framework depends more on economic
stability. Needless to say a continuing economic crisis may also
lead the state to encroach upon workers' organisational rights in
the long run.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
The legal regulation of trade union organisation in Uganda has
passed through several distinct phases. Prior to 1945 the pre-
dominantly immigrant semi-proletarian labour was not susceptible to
organisation and as such the enactment of the 1937 Trade Union
Ordinance being a Colonial Office initiative did not have much
practical impact. However from 1945, beginning with the General
Strike of that year, wage-labour, in concert with the rising petty
bourgeois politicians, began to assert itself and slowly raised its
collective consciousness especially in the organisation of strikes.
The growing militancy of labour from 1945 led to the enactment of
protective legislation shelved since the 1930s. The beginning of a
conscious effort by the colonial state in response to labour action
was the enactment for the first time of the Trade Disputes Ordinance
in 1949, amended in 1950, and of the new Trade Union Ordinance of
1952. It was a response to the struggles of workers in Uganda and
East Africa generally but taking British colonial experience
elsewhere as a guideline to their aims and content. The aim here
was to use legislation to control labour action and organisation
through constitutional and institutional channels.
The development of trade unionism in Uganda accelerated in the
mid-1950s due to a growing industrialisation process, the consequent
relative stabilitation of labour and the struggle for independence
which enhanced wage labour's conviction about the utility of
industrial organisation. The trade union movement was however
carefully separated from political organisation and prevented from
having any organic links with the nationalist political parties by
legislative, political and ideological means. The state under the
1952 Trade Union Ordinance through the mechanism of compulsory
registration and power to refuse or cancel registration of any union
and other provisions defined the form and content of trade unionism
allowed to exist. The objects of any union were also statutorily'
defined and could not include political aims nor could the unions
fund political activity. Trade union economism was the ideological
framework within which the law permitted Uganda's trade unions to
develop. These aspects of the law were by and large effectively
used.
However the actual ideological character that trade unions
came to internalise was systematically taught and concretised by the
ICFTU and other western unions through overseas courses for union
leaders and above all through the ICFTU African Labour College
established in Kampala in 1958. The organisational separation of
workers in trade unions and the rising petty bourgeoisie, or middle
classes, in staff associations meant that the trade unions were
further detached from the concerns of the political leadership which
was dominated by the petty bourgeoisie. The result was that both
the legal definition of legitimate trade union function and the
ideological conception of trade unions as mere economic organisations
reinforced each other to create an essentially apolitical trade
union movement.
The first decade of independence (1962-1971) saw two distinct
phases in the law regulating trade union organisation and a struggle
between the UPC-Obote I government and the trade unions. The post-
colonial African government sought to make the trade union movement
an ally of the government and attempted a tripartite
conceptualisation of industrial relations through the encouragement
of the Industrial Relations Charter (1964) framework and the Labour
Consultative Council (LCC). However the successful struggle for
autonomy by the majority faction of the trade union movement, UTUC
against the government-sponsored FUTU led to government change of
strategy. The formation of ULC was seen by government as a means of
instituting its corporatist policies of the Move to the Left
Stragety (1968-1971) in which the trade unions were to be a
component part. In this context the trade union leadership and
probably other leading wage earners would be absorbed into the
emergent bureaucratic bourgeoisie that would form or expand in the
parastatals, co-operatives, government administration itself and the
Party. The 1970 Trade Unions Act was an aspect of this strategy
with regard to the working class. By accepting these corporatist
policies the unions acquiesced in the destruction of their autonomy
in return for the economic benefits of the 1970 nationalisations and
integration, at least of the leadership, into the ruling class. Such
incorporation was only possible, however, in the one-party state
that had also been put in place, in which dissent and autonomous
civil organisations had no place.
History however did not permit this scheme of things to
develop. The Amin Coup of 1971 reversed the Move to the Left
Strategy and created a different political environment for the trade
unions. The Amin era also had two distinct phases for the trade
union movement. Between 1971-1974 the regime still sought to create
a social base to legitimate its existence and the Economic War was
the main plank in this search for legitimacy. The trade unions,
supported to a considerable extent by the civilian Labour Ministers,
demanded a legal restoration of their autonomy, the reactivation of
their national centre and other rights negated by the 1970 Act. The
Trade Disputes Act was also amended and the Industrial Court made
more independent in response to the escalation of strikes by which
workers hoped their grievances would be more quickly met. A.
conducive political environment was crucial in the restoration and
extension of union rights and the liberalisation of the dispute
settlement procedures. However as a result of the Economic War
which destroyed industrial capacity and overall national economic
performance, the managerial incompetence of the new employers
(military and civilian), the regime came to depend upon force to
sustain itself. Industrial relations were therefore militarised and
the legal rights won, both organisational and procedural, for
practical purposes came to be redundant. This was particularly so
between 1974-1979 when the regime no longer depended on the consent
of the civilian population but rather on the beneficiaries of the
Economic War and the coercive arms of the state.
Nonetheless the union organisational structures set up and the
statutory rights laid down remained in place and survived the
regime.	 It appears in fact that because of the survival of a
unified legal trade union structure, from 1974, the union struggles
of the 1980s against state intervention were partly strengthened by
the legal status of the official trade union movement. The basis of
the 1980-1985 struggle between the majority of the trade unions and
the Obote II regime was the latters' insecurity resulting from the
highly controversial 1980 General Election results. The crisis of
legitimacy for the Obote II regime was heightened by the armed
opposition that was organised immediately after the elections. In
spite of the attempt through the UPC Workers' Council and other
Party agencies to split and take over the trade union movement, as
in 1964-1966, the move failed and instead, repression and an
opportunistic use of law against the autonomous majority faction of
the union movement were resorted to. It appears that it was due to
opposition from various quarters, namely various armed organisations
and the DP parliamentary opposition itself, that the union movement
was able to effectively resist government and Party intervention.
However the democratic running of the trade unions was blocked
by government prohibition of union conferences and leadership
elections at all levels. While the government tried to use the law
to justify its policies, for the most part it deployed and depended
upon repression in order to keep the hostile trade unions under
control. The importance of the character of a given regime and its
impact on the level of freedom of association for trade unions and
other civil organisations may have is underscored by the fact that
the accession to power of the NRM/NRA in 1986 immediately created an
environment in which freedon of association as stipulated by statute
and the ratified ILO Convention No. 98 could be exercised concretely
by the trade union movement.
Three important elements which are of lasting importance for
the trade union movement however should be distinctly identified,
namely: 1) the economic context in which trade union freedom is
exercised, 2) the ideological self-conception of the unions and its
relationship to the creation of legal rights, 3) internal union
democracy.
The underdeveloped nature of Uganda's economy was the basis for
the state's adoption of restrictive trade union and trade disputes
legislation in the 1960s which restrictions were justified as
requisites for "economic development".
	
Although the economic
collapse of the 1970s negated the ideology of development, the
objective material conditions arising from that collapse, together
with a military dictatorship rendered both trade union rights and .
the legal dispute settlement process generally redundant. Equally
the economic crisis of the 1980s - which seems set to remain in the
medium term at least - and the economic uncertainty of enterprises
have meant in this decade that the rights won by the unions in
collective agreements could hardly be realised. Nor could the
dispute settlement process properly operate to resolve disputes.
Therefore for any return to a legal conduct of industrial relations
to be possible the economic viability of enterprises must be
assured. Without this legality in industrial relations must remain
tenuous.
The second question concerns union ideology. Trade unions in
Uganda have had two major sources of ideological outlook, namely the
ICFTU and the ILO. From the mid-1950s to 1968 ICFTU dominated the
scene of trade union education in Uganda and its ideology of a "free
labour movement" was taken on by the UTUC because it coincided with
its attempt to maintain independence from the UPC Obote I regime and
against FUTU opportunism. From the closure of the ICFTU College and
suspension of ULC in 1968 up to 1974 trade union education was in
disarray. However after the formation of NOTU and the establishment
of a Department of Education, as western trade unions were excluded
from operating in Uganda under Amin, the ILO was the major source
of trade union education. It is during this time that tripartism
and a consensual view of industrial relations were systematically
taken on board by the trade unions. Since then trade union
leadership has viewed trade union education as an exercise in
technical leadership training. With the return of ICFTU and AALC as
the dominant foreign sources of funding and trade union education in
the 1980s the technocratic conception of trade unionism and little
attempt to study and understand the legal, political and economic
status quo have received a new lease of life and meant that the
trade unions are still isolated organisations in Ugandansociety. In
particular their inability to learn from the historical processes by
which their organisational and other rights (substantive and
procedural) were won, compromised or denied, has meant that they
have no programmes for change on the legal, political and economic
fronts - programmes that would at least state their views or demands
in these areas in their dealings with the political parties or any
government.
The third issue is the character of trade union democracy.
Since colonial times all governments have formally declared their
support for union democracy in the interest of union members.
Legislation has always contained provisions meant to ensure a
certain level of leadership accountability to the membership. But
all governments have never taken serious and credible initiatives to
have these provisions applied. Besides, the union constitutions
themselves do provide mechanisms for leadership accountability in
addition to the statutory requirements. However since independence
(1962) the union leaders have mainly concentrated on struggles for
leadership while state and foreign union intervention, especially in
the periods 1962-1968 and 1980-1987 have undermined both union unity
and democracy.
The economistic-technocratic character of trade unions has been
essentially a result of ICFTU and ILO domination of union education
while their undemocratic features have resulted from state and
foreign union intervention or influence and the lure of union .
leadership per se. The re-assessment of the function of trade
unionism in a broader social-political sense and hence a
reassessment of trade union education, the struggle for self-
reliance and genuine non-alignment and a re-consideration of union
constitutional structures are moves necessary towards the creation
of more democratic, politically and socially relevant, independent
and non-aligned trade unions.
Several general propositions are deducible at a more abstract
level from the historical spectrum of the legislation regulating
trade unionism in Uganda and the contemporary character of trade
unions both as organisations in themselves and in their relationship
with the wider political economy, the state in particular.
First of all at the- very heart of the legal and political
obstacles the trade unions have historically faced in Uganda is the
underdeveloped nature of the economy. In the 1960s the definition
of development adopted by the ruling class and the related
restrictive industrial relations legislation proved contradictory to
the objective of peaceful industrial relations. The 1972-1973
Economic War whereby Uganda's industrial capacity drastically
deteriorated and more recently the hostile international economic
environment and internal political conflict have meant that the
material basis for trade union freedom and industrial relations
conducted within the framework of legality is still fragile. Thus
although since 1986 the state has generally guaranteed rights of
union organisation, the economic demands of workers especially
through industrial action cannot go on for long without provoking
state attempts to curb freedom of association, even if this may be
purely for economic reasons compared to the repression of the
previous regimes that was mainly politically-motivated.
However, within the given economic parameters we argue that the
most important determinant of the legal rights of union
organisation, their scope and practical significance has been the
character of the state. In spite of trade union protests against
the limitations law placed on organisational rights under the 1952
Ordinance, the 1963-1965 legislation and in the latter case in spite
of the support by the parliamentary opposition, the statutes as
conceived by the governments were never modified. This was in turn
a reflection of the weakness of workers as a minority class face-to-
face with a state generally supported by employers.
Even more instructive is the failure of the trade unions to
exercise existing rights in the 1980s before the NRM/NRA take-over
in 1986.	 This was because the various regimes did not have
sufficient pressure from workers and other quarters to respect
legality. But it would be one-sided to say that workers and trade
unions were always hemmed in by the state and were, as such,
completely helpless.
	 The period 1962-1968 in the UTUC-FUTU
struggle, the liberal legislation of 1971-1974, the successful
defeat of the UPC Workers' Council by the legal and official trade
union organisations in the Obote II period 1980-1985 and above all
the continued existence of an autonomous trade union movement for
most of the period 1962-1987 and up to now, is testimony to a
sustained level of organised labour's resistance to state
intervention and attempts at subjugation.
This "triumph" of autonomous trade union organisation however
depended on two other crucial factors. One of them was the
fractionalisation and fragmentation of the various regimes and their
social base especially as the periods 1962-1968 and 1980-1986.
graphically show. Indeed the fragmentary character of the ruling
classes or groups in Uganda since independence may be compared to
the more relatively united ruling classes of neighbouring Kenya and
Tanzania which have generally managed to subjugate trade unions
through corporatist political formulae (R. Howard 1988: 241-242; R.
Sandbrook 1982: 107-114, 203; B. Freund 1988: 100-102; I.G. Shivji:
1983). The second factor was that apart from the Amin regime the
legal status of the majority factions of the trade union movement
could not be completely bypassed. In this sense legal rights, even
as a mere baseline of the right to exist, proved to be quite
important.
The dialectical struggle between state and trade unions
regarding the creation and utilisation of legal rights from the
colonial period to date validates our initial argument that law, as
shown by this study, is a class and political category. The various
phases of the creation of statutory organisational rights for
workers and the chequered history of the struggle for actual
utilisation of those rights show that all depended upon the balance
of class and social forces at any specific historical moment. On
the part of the state the statutes were instruments deployed to
achieve specific objectives - this was so especially with respect to
the control aspects of the law. But from the point of view of
labour the rights won and in particular the historical ability to
maintain a legal and autonomous existence should be seen as a
political achievement. In this respect the Marxist view that law is
hn instrument of the ruling Class is modified because law here
proved to be, to a considerable extent, an arena of Class struggle
and could be positively useful to the dominated classes. Further,
as regards the ideological aspect of law, the post-colonial state
has not seriously attempted to advance legal ideology and give it a
legitimating character in its industrial relations legislation and
policy. Instead, alternative ideologies were attempted especially
those of development, the construction of socialism and economic
independence.
The other general proposition is that the historical
educational and ideological training created a narrow self-
conception by the unions. The union leadership created thereby has
only an economistic-apolitical view of trade unionism and conceived
itself in a professional technical light while the actual socio-
political conditions in which the unions exist have been ignored.
Yet trade unions though representing a minority in Ugandan society
have been probably the only historically continuous organisations in
civil society amidst repressive regimes. It is their vision of
society that has been a major handicap in their attitude to politics
and its relationship to the economic issues. But precisely because
the state has been most crucial in determining the scope of union
rights and their utilisation in practice it appears to be all the
more imperative for trade unions to consciously seek to influence
the character of the Ugandan state in their favour. Further a
broader view of their place in society would put them in a position
to struggle on all fronts for positive change: legal, political,
cultural and economic. But again as a minority their success may
only be assured if they act in concert with other organisations in
civil society for wider socio-political reforms, organisations such
as those representing women, professional associations, rural
peasants and even students.
But besides the ideological limitations, constitutional
structures and leadership struggles within the unions must be
confronted. The historical record shows that lack of leadership
accountability to the membership makes them susceptible to
compromise through clientelist relations with management, government
leaders	 and	 even foreign trade union organisations.	 A
democratisation of trade unions is therefore a condition precedent
to enabling themselves, as organisations, to re-define their role in
society in a more progressive direction.
Thus in our view if the trade unions are to move beyond their
current limitations on their agenda today are two broad questions.
On the one hand they would have to develop political and legal
reform programmes and confront the queStion of political power and
how it is generally exercised, but in particular how it is exercised
vis-a-vis them. On the other hand they would need to re-think their
own ideological self-conception and to democratise their structures
in order to involve their membership in any debates with the state
about the economy or other programmes they may wish to adopt.
Needless to say the continued defence of their legal status,
organisational rights and autonomy is a critical baseline from which
everything else has to emanate.
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